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 Abstract 
The overall aim of the study was to investigate barriers to online professional information seeking, 
use and sharing occurring within the NHS in England, their possible effects (upon education, working 
practices, working lives and clinical and organisational effectiveness), and possible explanatory or 
causative factors. 
 
The investigation adopted a qualitative case study approach, using semi-structured interviews and 
documentary analysis as its methods, with three NHS Trusts of different types (acute - district 
general hospital, mental health / community, acute – teaching) as the nested sites of data collection. 
It aimed to be both exploratory and explanatory. A stratified sample of participants, including 
representatives of professions whose perspectives were deemed to be relevant, and clinicians with 
educational or staff development responsibilities, was recruited for each Trust. Three non-Trust 
specialists (the product manager of a secure web gateway vendor, an academic e-learning specialist, 
and the senior manager at NICE responsible for the NHS Evidence electronic content and web 
platform) were also interviewed. Policy documents, statistics, strategies, reports and quality 
accounts for the Trusts were obtained via public websites, from participants or via Freedom of 
Information requests. Thematic analysis following the approach of Braun and Clarke (2006) was 
adopted as the analytic method for both interviews and documents. The key themes of the results 
that emerged are presented: barriers to accessing and using information, education and training, 
professional cultures and norms, information governance and security, and communications policy. 
 
The findings are discussed under three main headings: power, culture, trust and risk in information 
security; use and regulation of Web 2.0 and social media, and the system of professions. It became 
evident that the roots of problems with access to and use of such information lay deep within the 
culture and organisational characteristics of the NHS and its use of IT. A possible model is presented 
to explain the interaction of the various technical and organisational factors that were identified as 
relevant. A number of policy recommendations are put forward to improve access to published 
information at Trust level, as well as recommendations for further research. 
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Athens (AuTHENtication System): a third-party (EduServ) authentication system used by the 
NHS to provide access to commercially provided electronic content. Now 
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AUP Acceptable use policy 
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19 
PHE  Public Health England 
PWU  Personal web use 
RSS  Rich Site Summary OR RDF Site Summary OR Really Simple Syndication 
R&D  Research and development 
RIPA  Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (2000) 
ROC   Receiver Operating Characteristic 
s.d.  = sine dato – no date 
SEO  Search engine optimisation 
SETA  Security education, training and awareness 
s.l.  = sine loco – no place 
SIEM  Security Information and Event Management 
SIRI  Serious Incident Requiring Investigation 
SIRO  Senior Information Risk Owner  
SFIA  Skills for the Information Age 
SHALL  Strategic Health Authority Library Leads 
SoMe  Social media 
STM  Scientific, technical and medical 
SWG  Secure web gateway 
TDAG  Technical Design Authority Group 
TEL  Technology-enhanced learning 
TMSA Transformational Model of Social Activity – Roy Bhaskar’s approach to the issue of 
agency and structure in social theory  
 
TOE Technology-Organisation-Environment  
UKCHIP  United Kingdom Council for the Health Informatics Professions 
URL   Uniform Resource Locator 
USB Universal Serial Bus – an interface standard for computer peripherals 
UTM Unified Threat Management 
VRE  Vancomycin-resistant enterococci 
VLE  Virtual learning environment      
VDI  Virtualization Desktop Infrastructure – a Microsoft virtualisation technology 
VoIP  Voice over IP 
VPN  Virtual private network 
 
 
 
 
20 
Publications 
Research findings have been published as follows: 
 
Ebenezer, Catherine 
Nurses’ and midwives’ information behaviour: a review of literature from 1998 to 2014 
New Library World 116(3/4) 2015 155-172 
 
Ebenezer, Catherine 
Access to and use of Web 2.0 and social media applications within the NHS in England: the role and 
impact of organisational culture, information governance, and communications policy  
Presentation given at annual research afternoon of Trust T3, February 2015 
 
Ebenezer, Catherine 
Access to and use of Web 2.0 and social media applications within the NHS in England: the role and 
impact of organisational culture, information governance, and communications policy  
Presentation given at iFutures conference, University of Sheffield, 7th July 2015. At 
https://www.researchgate.net  
 
Ebenezer, C., Bath, P.A., & Pinfield, S. 
“Access denied”? Managing access to the World Wide Web within the National Health Service (NHS) 
in England: technology, risk, culture, policy and practice. In P.A. Bath, H. Spring, & B. Sen, (Eds.). 
Health informatics for enhancing health and well-being. Poster presented at ISHIMR 2015: The 17th 
International Symposium on Health Information Management Research, June 24th-25th 2015, York, 
UK (p. 287-288). York and Sheffield: York St. John University and University of Sheffield 
 
Ebenezer, Catherine 
Social media applications within the NHS: role and impact of organisational culture, information 
governance, and communications policy 
Presentation given at meeting of Council for Allied Health Professions Research (CAHPR) Cumbria 
and Lancashire AHP Regional Hub, October 2015. At http://www.slideshare.net/ebenezercm/social-
media-applications-within-the-nhs-role-and-impact-of-organisational-culture-information-
governance-and-communications-policy/  
 
Ebenezer, Catherine; Bath, Peter A; Pinfield, Stephen 
“Access denied?” Managing access to the World Wide Web within the NHS in England:  
technology, risk, culture, policy and practice 
Presentation given at CILIP Health Libraries Conference, Scarborough, 15th-16th September 2016. At 
http://www.cilip.org.uk/sites/default/files/documents/catherine_ebenezer_0.pdf  
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Structure 
This thesis is concerned with investigating the major organisational and technical factors involved in 
barriers to professional information seeking, use and sharing within the NHS in England. The 
introductory chapter (1) begins with a brief statement of the research problem (1.2) followed by a 
brief personal reflection on the researcher’s motivation for undertaking the work (1.3). This is 
followed by background and context information (1.4) across seven main areas: structure and 
operation of the NHS (1.4.1), policy drivers for access to published information (1.4.2), NHS IT 
strategies and developments (1.4.3), information governance and security (1.4.4), NHS libraries and 
e-library initiatives (1.4.5) NHS e-learning developments (1.4.6), and the current state of the health 
informatics professions (1.4.7). The chapter continues with a statement of the aims and objectives of 
the research (1.5), of its research questions (1.6), and of its possible outcomes and benefits (1.7). 
The structure of the thesis as a whole is set out (1.8). The summary and conclusion (1.9) leads on to 
the following chapter. 
 
1.2 The research problem 
A multiplicity of policy drivers supported access to information resources by NHS staff for 
professional purposes. These included the NHS Constitution, clinical governance and quality 
frameworks, and professional standards, which are discussed below in Section 1.4.2. 
 
However, widespread and persistent anecdotal reports from library and training staff working in 
NHS settings in England, discussed on the LIS-MEDICAL mailing list (Blenkinsopp, 2008b) indicated 
the existence of a variety of barriers to professional information seeking, use and sharing, and to 
teaching and learning, apparently presented mostly by information governance, information security 
or other information technology policies and practices.  
 
These barriers, arising primarily at the level of individual Trusts rather than nationally,1 included the 
blocking of individual websites or categories of websites, and infrastructure and system policy 
                                                          
 
1
 Throughout the thesis, capitalisation of the initial ‘T’ is used to distinguish references to NHS bodies from 
references to ‘trust’ as an interpersonal or organisational disposition. 
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barriers to the use of particular content types and applications. The material blocked sometimes 
included e-journal content purchased nationally or locally. PC hardware and software that could not 
support media types required within e-learning, lack of system permissions to download some types 
of material (such as podcasts) and slow network performance also presented problems. For students 
on brief placements, training requirements for network access could be difficult to fulfil in a timely 
fashion. Significant impediments thereby appeared to be presented to information seeking, to the 
teaching of students on placement, and to professional e-learning and updating. Limited access to 
the most current and up to date professional health information and, consequently, to the practice 
of evidence-based health care, in both clinical and managerial contexts, thereby appeared to result, 
presenting potential risks to the quality of health services and clinical care provided within the NHS. 
In particular the blocking of various Web 2.0 and social media applications, as was common in many 
NHS Trusts, as indicated within the discussions of the Library and Knowledge Services Leads (LKSL) 
Information Management and Technology Group (IMTG) and in posts to the LIS-MEDICAL mailing 
list, seemed to leave information professionals, clinicians and managers with substantially reduced 
capacities for professional networking and information sharing (Blenkinsopp, 2008a). 
 
While it is acknowledged that computer literacy deficits are a contributory factor to wider problems 
relating to innovation in NHS IT (see below, Sections 2.8.5, 6.4.5, 7.1), it should be noted that the 
impacts of information literacy or computer literacy deficits, and of resource issues (e.g. resulting in 
subscription-based or pay-per-view content being unavailable) upon access to published information 
(Rowlands, Nicholas, Brown, & Williams, 2011), while important to professional learning within the 
NHS, are outside the scope of this research. (Within the NHS, some of these problems were 
mitigated to some extent: health professionals used mediated search services and document supply 
services provided by NHS libraries as well as carrying out their own searches (Brettle, Hulme, & 
Ormandy, 2007)). Wider socio-political aspects of “access to information”, as comprehensively 
reviewed by McCreadie and Rice (1999a, 1999b), are also not considered. 
 
1.3 Rationale and motivation for the research 
From March 2008 until May 2012 the researcher worked within the NHS as library manager of a 
mental health Trust in the north east of England, where she was a regional representative on the 
then national Strategic Health Authority Library Leads Information Management and Technology 
Group (IMTG) and a member of her Trust’s research governance group. Within her own Trust she 
frequently encountered obstacles to information seeking, use and sharing of the kind described 
above (Sections 1.2, see also Section 3.9). As a service to the health library profession and a 
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contribution to the quality of library and information services and of clinical care, to which she had 
been committed throughout her librarian career, it seemed important to her to investigate the root 
causes of these barriers to information seeking and to present her findings to the relevant 
professional bodies, in the hope and expectation that beneficial changes might result to policy and 
practice. 
 
1.4 Background and context 
1.4.1 Overall structure and operation of the NHS 
The National Health Service of the United Kingdom (NHS) came into existence on 5th July 1948. It 
offers comprehensive, free and universal entitlement to medical care to all UK residents, which is 
funded almost entirely on taxation and based solely on clinical need, although some charges are 
made for prescriptions and for dental and optical services. It covers physical and mental health, 
learning disabilities, primary care services, and ambulance services, but not social care, for which 
responsibility was transferred in 1974 to local authorities; it is funded by them and privately via 
means-tested systems of access. The NHS is one of the United Kingdom’s largest employers. In 2014, 
the NHS in England employed a total of 1,187,606 staff (NHS Choices, 2016). The Department of 
Health’s total managed expenditure on NHS services in 2014-15 was £115,802 billion (Department of 
Health, 2015a). 
 
Responsibility for health services is devolved and accountable to the national administrations of the 
countries of the UK: the Welsh Government (NHS Wales / GIG Cymru), the Scottish Government 
(NHS Scotland), the Northern Ireland Executive (Health and Social Care in Northern Ireland: HSCNI). 
The United Kingdom Government is responsible for the NHS in England via the Department of Health 
(DH). While the regulation of individual clinicians is managed on a UK basis, these different national 
NHS bodies operate independently, with different organisational forms, regulatory bodies, and IT 
infrastructures, including digital libraries. In particular those of Wales and Scotland do not operate 
an internal market, whereas those of England and Northern Ireland do. Since 2013, NHS services in 
England have not included public health, which under the terms of the Health and Social Care Act 
2012 became the responsibility of local authority public health boards accountable to Public Health 
England (Kaehne, 2014). The overall structure of the NHS in England is shown in Figure 1.1 below. 
 
The governing principles of the NHS in England are set out in the NHS Constitution, first published in 
2009 on the recommendation of the Darzi review, High quality care for all (Darzi, 2008), and 
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subsequently amended. Its declared aim and purpose are as follows: “It sets out rights to which 
patients, public and staff are entitled, and pledges which the NHS is committed to achieve, together 
with responsibilities, which the public, patients and staff owe to one another to ensure that the NHS 
operates fairly and effectively.” (Department of Health, 2015b, p. 2). It covered basic principles, 
values, and the rights and responsibilities both of patients and the public and of staff. 
 
NHS primary care is delivered by a variety of independent contractors. These include general 
practitioners (GPs), dentists, pharmacists hand optometrists. GPs usually work in practices as part of 
a team which includes other clinical and administrative staff. General practitioners act as 
gatekeepers to secondary care and other services via a system of referrals. General practice 
organisations manage their own IT infrastructures within an overall national procurement 
framework, GP Systems of Choice (GPSoC)2. In 2016, there were 7,616 GP practices in England.  
 
The main organisations responsible for providing other health services (including acute general and 
specialist care, community health services, mental health and learning disabilities services, and 
ambulance services) within the NHS in England are NHS Trusts. The NHS Trust as an organisational 
form developed from the introduction of the internal market and purchaser-provider split into the 
English NHS in 1991. Following the establishment of the internal market, “purchasers” (health 
authorities, as they then existed, and some general practices) were provided with budgets to 
purchase health services from a range of “providers”. Trusts are public sector corporations serving 
populations in large catchment areas, each headed by a board consisting of executive and non-
executive directors, and chaired by a non-executive director. They compete with each other and 
with other providers locally within their specialisms for contracts to provide services, via complex 
processes of competitive tendering.  
 
The Trusts in the study, other than T2, were Foundation Trusts (FTs). FTs, which enjoyed wider 
autonomy than non-foundation Trusts, mainly of a financial nature, were regulated in respect of 
their finances and corporate governance at the time of the study by Monitor, while non-FTs were 
managed by the Trust Development Authority. (The two bodies merged in 2016.) The structure of 
FTs, which involved local members and elected governors, was designed to encourage accountability 
to their communities in a more patient-centred NHS. As well as annual reports, they were required 
                                                          
 
2
 GPSoC: https://digital.nhs.uk/article/282/GP-Systems-of-Choice  
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to produce annual quality accounts describing their performance against a range of national 
indicators. All health and social care providers were regulated and licensed in respect of the quality 
and safety of their clinical services by the Care Quality Commission. 
 
In 2016 there existed 137 acute non-specialist Trusts (including 85 Foundation Trusts); 17 acute 
specialist Trusts (including 16 foundation Trusts); 55 mental health Trusts (including 43 Foundation 
Trusts); 34 community providers (11 NHS Trusts, six Foundation Trusts and 17 social enterprises); 
and 10 ambulance Trusts (including five foundation Trusts)(NHS Confederation, 2016). Some of the 
non-specialist acute and mental health trusts also provided community health services. Figure 1.1 
below illustrates the main lines of accountability and funding responsibility within the structure. 
 
Intrinsic to the operation of the internal market is a procurement function for services known as 
commissioning, this being “the process of ensuring that care services are provided effectively and 
that they meet the needs of the population … a complex process with responsibilities ranging from 
assessing local population needs, prioritising outcomes, procuring products and services to achieve  
those outcomes and supporting service providers to enable them to deliver outcomes for individual 
service users” (Yorkshire and the Humber Joint Improvement Partnership, 2015).  
 
NHS England, which took on full statutory responsibilities in April 2013, had been established 
primarily as a a commissioning body; it was responsible for purchasing primary care services and 
some other specialised services. Regional teams of NHS England were responsible for the 
commissioning of services in their respective areas, as well as providing professional leadership in 
both clinical and non-clinical aspects of health services. The regional teams also commissioned public 
health programmes, such as immunisation and screening. The majority of hospital and community 
services were commissioned by so-called Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs), which were 
overseen by NHS England. CCGs, of which there were 212 in 2014-15, were clinically led groups 
which included all the general practices within their area (NHS Choices, 2016).  
 
The services of Commissioning Support Units (CSUs), which at the time of the study were being 
established by NHS England as independent business units intended to provide a range of 
administrative functions, including information governance and IT support, were available to CCGs 
to support this task. CCGs were not, however, obliged to use them, being free to place contracts 
with private sector organisations recognised within the national procurement framework. In some 
instances, CSU functions were subsequently brought in-house by the CCG; in other instances, CSUs 
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struggled to establish themselves as viable businesses (NHS Commissioning Board, 2011; Thiel, 
2013). 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Structure of the NHS in England 
(NHS Choices, 2016) Crown copyright 
 
1.4.2 Policy drivers for access to published information 
It was a principle of the NHS Constitution (Department of Health, 2015) that all staff should have 
appropriate access to training, support, education and professional development and to resources 
for the conduct and implementation of research: 
“[The NHS] provides high quality care that is safe, effective and focused on patient 
experience; in the people it employs, and in the support, education, training and 
development they receive; in the leadership and management of its organisations; and 
through its commitment to innovation and to the promotion, conduct and use of research to 
improve the current and future health and care of the population.” 
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In addition, the NHS pledged to:  
“provide all staff with personal development, access to appropriate education and training 
for their jobs, and line management support to enable them to fulfil their potential” 
 
Under the Health and Social Care Act, 2012 a duty existed on behalf of the Secretary of State for 
Health to ensure “the use in the health service of evidence obtained from research”. In addition, 
evidence-based practice and the need to update knowledge and skills featured widely in 
professional standards documents as requirements for clinical practice and revalidation 
(Department of Health, 2012a, 2012c; General Medical Council, 2013; Health and Care Professions 
Council, 2014; Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2008; Royal Pharmaceutical Society, 2014) and in the 
values statements of individual NHS organisations. 
 
Clinical governance, introducted into the NHS in the late 1990s, has been defined as “the system 
through which NHS organisations are accountable for continuously improving the quality of their 
services and safeguarding high standards of care, by creating an environment in which clinical 
excellence can flourish.” (Department of Health, 1998, p. 116). The policy documents which 
introduced the clinical governance framework (Department of Health, 1997, 1998, 2000) strongly 
emphasised the central role of continuing professional development and learning as a means of 
providing NHS clinical staff in all professional groups with the knowledge to offer the most up to 
date, effective and high quality care to patients. They also emphasised the incorporation of 
research-based evidence into clinical practice as a means of facilitating clinical effectiveness, sources 
for which needed therefore to be accessible to staff (Halligan & Donaldson, 2001; McSherry & 
Haddock, 1999; Scally & Donaldson, 1998); see under "infrastructure", "culture" and "quality 
methods" in Figure 1.2 below). The more recent focus on quality governance retains clinical 
effectiveness as one of its core components (National Quality Board, 2011). Clinical governance is 
discussed further in Sections 2.5.5.1 and 2.5.5.2 below, in relation to organisational characteristics of  
the NHS, regulation and public trust. 
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1.4.3 NHS IT strategies and developments 
Part of the background and context of the research concerns approaches within the NHS in England 
to information technology strategy and information systems implementation in general. Historically 
this had been a much-contested area; innovations in information technology, although assigned a 
high strategic priority and large financial investment, had proved extremely difficult to implement 
(Currie, 2014; Currie & Guah, 2007; Eason, 2007; Greenhalgh & Keen, 2013; Mark, 2007; Sauer & 
Willcocks, 2007; Takian & Cornford, 2012). Moreover the NHS had tended to oscillate between 
centralised and decentralised approaches to information systems implementation (NHS England, 
2014a; “‘Stars are aligned’ for health IT - Freeman,” 2016). To support its strategic aims, the DH and 
NHS England from 2012 onwards had introduced competitive bidding processes for national funding 
to drive information technology innovation: initially the Nursing Technology Fund3 and subsequently 
the Integrated Digital Care Technology Fund.4  
 
                                                          
 
3
 Nursing Technology Fund: https://www.england.nhs.uk/digitaltechnology/info-revolution/nursing-
technology-fund/  
 
4
 Integrated Digital Care Technology Fund: https://www.england.nhs.uk/digitaltechnology/info-
revolution/idct-fund/  
Figure 1.2 Integrating 
approaches of clinical 
governance 
Scally and Donaldson 
(1998), p. 82 
Reproduced by permission 
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National administrative structures supporting NHS information technology had undergone 
considerable changes over the preceding decade, associated with the establishment in 2002 and 
eventual winding-up in 2011 of a major centralised programme known as the National Programme 
for IT in the NHS (NPfIT). The former NHS Information Authority, established in 1999 following the 
publication of the strategy document Information for Health (NHS Executive, 1998), was abolished in 
April 2005; its work, including responsibility for the National electronic Library for Health (see 
Section 1.4.4 below) was divided between Connecting for Health (the agency managing NPfIT), and a 
newly created Information Centre for Health and Social Care. This latter was subsequently renamed, 
initially as the Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC), then in July 2016 as NHS Digital. 
Connecting for Health ceased to exist in March 2013 (Campion-Awwad, Hayton, Smith, & Vuaran, 
2014). 
 
At the time of the study, the organisational landscape was continuing to shift and evolve (Heather, 
2016b). Information technology within the English NHS was coordinated by the National Information 
Board (NIB), established in September 2014 by NHS England to succeed the former Informatics 
Services Commissioning Group which had been established in late 2012. This was a collaborative 
partnership of representatives from 29 organisations. Its remit was to provide strategy and 
leadership across health and care organisations on information technology, and to set 
commissioning priorities for the Health and Social Care Information Centre (National Information 
Board, 2014a). The NIB was responsible for the publication in November 2014 of the strategy 
document Personalised health and care 2020: using data and technology to transform outcomes for 
patients and citizens (National Information Board, 2014b) and in July 2015 for the setting out of a 
series of work streams for NHS IT. These included the conduct of the Digital Maturity Self-
Assessment  (NHS England, 2016) by Trust IT departments, which assessed aspects of informatics 
readiness, capability and infrastructure, and development of so-called digital roadmaps by CCGs, 
both in pursuit of the strategic objective of a paperless NHS by 2020 (NHS Confederation, 2014). In 
contrast with previous centralised NHS IT strategies, the details of how individual health 
organisations were to achieve these aims were to be determined locally (National Information 
Board, 2016). This strategy remained in operation, modified to some degree in its implementation 
by other initiatives, notably the government’s linking of IT funding to Sustainability and 
Transformation Plans (Whitfield, 2016b) and the recommendations of Professor Robert Wachter’s 
review of NHS IT (Wachter, 2016).  
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NHS informatics policy documents such as Liberating the NHS: an information revolution 
(Department of Health, 2010) and The power of information (Department of Health, 2012d) 
appeared to manifest a limited understanding, pervasive within the NHS, of the concept of 
“information” as relating solely to internally-generated data and information, and excluding the 
exchange of shared experience and knowledge, or externally-published information (Daines, 2011). 
Some implications of this are discussed below in Section 11.4. 
 
Provision of PC and network infrastructure within NHS Trusts was managed locally, either in-house, 
via outsourcing arrangements, or a combination of both. NHSmail,5 a national web-based email 
service approved for the sending of patient-identifiable and sensitive information, was available to 
NHS organisations, though many (including the Trusts in the study other than T2) continued to use 
domain-based email predominantly. In general (other than eduroam Wi-Fi installations in teaching 
hospitals) provision of IT infrastructure appeared to be driven by the requirements of clinical and 
administrative systems rather than those of professional learning. In relation to patient and staff use 
of mobile devices, the general practitioner Marcus Baw and others in the NHS Hack Day group had 
established a register of hospitals, AboutMyHospital, offering Wi-Fi access to staff, patients and 
visitors, which provided a good overview of existing levels of Wi-Fi availability. (NHS Hack Days were 
weekend events designed to bring together clinicians, software developers, designers and 
statisticians to create innovative IT solutions to problems besetting the NHS.) Wi-Fi access for clinical 
staff and patients had become a concern for the group; it had been found that Wi-Fi network access 
was in some places being reserved for managers and executive staff (Baw, 2013). This led it in May 
2013 to create and publish a survey of Wi-Fi availability to staff.6 During the course of the research, 
provision of free Wi-Fi in all NHS buildings became an expressed aim of government policy (see 
Section 12.8, below). 
 
The potentially adverse impacts of obsolete IT infrastructure on clinical system stability and security 
were highlighted in two reports on NHS information technology in England published in the summer 
of 2016. The CQC’s review Safe data, safe care (Care Quality Commission, 2016) identified it as a 
potential security risk. The review recommended that “computer hardware and software that can no 
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 NHSmail: https://digital.nhs.uk/nhsmail  
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1.amazonaws.com:8080/ewd/aboutMyHospital/index.html  
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longer be supported should be replaced as a matter of urgency.” (p. 5). The Wachter review, Making 
IT work (Wachter, 2016, p. 36) recommended that:  
“The new digital strategy for the NHS should involve a thoughtful blend of funding to help 
defray the costs of IT purchases and implementation, resources for infrastructure (hardware 
such as monitors and keyboards, network modernisation, wifi) … The odds of failure will be 
increased by focusing only on buying and installing IT systems without attending to issues 
like hardware, network stability and speed, workforce training and development, programme 
evaluation, and iterative improvements.” 
 
1.4.4 Information governance and security within the NHS  
Gartner Research defined information governance as “the processes, roles, standards and metrics 
that ensure the effective and efficient use of information in enabling an organisation to achieve its 
goals” (Logan, 2010). In an NHS context it was defined as “a framework for handling information in a 
confidential and secure manner to appropriate ethical and quality standards in a modern health 
service” (NHS Connecting for Health, 2007). Information governance systems and processes in the 
English NHS, which were highly centralised, encompassed concepts of records management, 
information security, public accountability and legal compliance (Lomas, 2010). They followed a 
controls assurance approach, in that they were characterised by “a focus on robust, documented 
policies and procedures, delivered through accredited processes and systems, by accredited staff” 
(Haw, Derry, & Gowing, 2006, p. 4). They were intended to ensure necessary safeguards for, and 
appropriate use of, patient and personal information. They were developed from the work of 
Caldicott guardians (Roch-Berry, 2003) in response to the increasing risk and complexity of managing 
person-identifiable information (PII) or other sensitive information in an era of growing dependence 
upon information technology, in particular electronic patient records (Donaldson & Walker, 2004). A 
Caldicott guardian was a senior person responsible for protecting the confidentiality of patient and 
service-user information and enabling appropriate information-sharing (Department of Health, 
1999). 
 
The key statutory requirement for NHS compliance with information security management principles 
was the Data Protection Act 1998, and in particular its seventh principle: “Appropriate technical and 
organisational measures shall be taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data 
and against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data” (Information 
Commissioner’s Office, 2012). Information security requirements for NHS IT infrastructure were 
established by the Infrastructure Security Team at the Health and Social Care Information Centre. 
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The organisational framework for information security within the NHS in England was provided 
primarily by the document Information security management: NHS code of practice (NHS Connecting 
for Health, 2007), referred to subsequently as the Code of Practice. It sat alongside other 
information governance codes of practice covering confidentiality, records management, and legal 
obligations. Another important consideration was the eighth principle of the Data Protection Act 
1998, which stated that “Personal data shall not be transferred to a country or territory outside the 
European Economic Area unless that country or territory ensures an adequate level of protection for 
the rights and freedoms of data subjects in relation to the processing of personal data”. At the time 
of the study the EU-US Safe Harbor Framework7 under the provisions of which personal data could 
be lawfully transferred to and from US companies, had been ruled invalid by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (Price & Cook, 2015). A new framework, the EU-US Privacy Shield, had been 
adopted in its place (Dunn, 2016; Gilbert & van der Heijden, 2016)..8 
 
The Code of practice specified the development and use of an information security management 
system (ISMS) as a method of measuring compliance with information security standards, as 
prescribed in ISO 27001 (ISO, 2013). Within its ISMS, an NHS organisation was required to define the 
business needs for information security and set these out within a corporate information security 
policy, to identify and assess the risks to information security, and to establish controls, where 
necessary, to manage them, including staff training. It was also to identify a risk evaluation method 
and documentation processes. Other than BS ISO/IEC 27001, NHS organisations were encouraged to 
make use of other nationally and internationally recognised “best practice” standards, such as ITIL 
(Cabinet Office, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d, 2011e) for infrastructure management and security. 
The Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC) published detailed technical briefings for IT 
staff on various technologies. Significantly at the time of the study, preparation of guidance on 
content filtering “for organisations who wish to deploy or operate content filtering systems” had 
been stated to be “in progress” since 2013.9  
 
The Code of practice also prescribed a structure whereby each NHS organisation needed to establish 
an accounting officer (the chief executive), a senior information risk owner (a board level 
                                                          
 
7
 EU-US Safe Harbor Framework: (http://export.gov/safeharbor/index.asp), 
8
 Privacy Shield Framework: https://www.privacyshield.gov/welcome  
9
 http://systems.hscic.gov.uk/infogov/security/infrasec/gpg.  
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organisational lead for information governance), information asset owners (senior members of staff 
to whom ownership of assets was assigned) and information asset administrators, who supported 
the information asset owners and had day-to-day operational responsibility for information risks in 
their areas. It was thereby made clear that information governance needed to be owned and 
managed locally, and was not the sole responsibility of information governance or IT staff. All 
information assets needed to be identified, and information flows described in detail. All NHS staff 
were required to undertake annual training via e-learning in the basics of information governance 
via the training tool, and each Trust had a target of ensuring that 95% of staff completed it.10 Each 
NHS organisation was required to develop a comprehensive information risk policy, to sit within its 
overall business risk management framework. The senior information risk owner was responsible for 
developing and implementing this policy.  
 
The information governance performance of NHS organisations was rated via the Information 
Governance Toolkit (IGT) (https://www.igt.hscic.gov.uk), which set out information governance and 
security requirements for different types of NHS organisation. The 63 information security assurance 
requirements within the IGT were drawn substantially from the ISO 27000 series of standards: ISO 
27001, ISO 27002, ISO 27005 and associated applicable controls. Other requirements were drawn 
from the Data Protection Act 1998, the Caldicott report (Caldicott, 1997), and the Code of practice 
itself. However, despite its introduction, the number of NHS data breaches was increasing overall: 
7255 were reported between 2011 and 2014, with a 101% increase between 2013 and 2014 (Evans, 
Maglaras, He, & Janicke, 2016). A senior manager at NHS Digital (formerly HSCIC) suggested in late 
2016 that the IGT in its present form was likely to be abolished and replaced (Heather, 2016a). 
 
The then-current state of data protection law and practice reflected heightened public concern 
following the 2007 loss of CDs in the post by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) containing 
the records of 25 million child benefit recipients, and other well-publicised data breaches occurring 
at the time (Ceeney, 2009; Grant, 2015; Kamath, 2008; Turle, 2009; Watters, 2009). The Information 
Commissioner’s Office (ICO) had the power to issue monetary civil penalty notices of up to £500,000 
for serious breaches of the Data Protection Act occurring on or after 6th April 2010 (Information 
Commissioner’s Office, 2010). Short of doing this, the ICO could require the signing of an 
undertaking on the part of a data controller (generally the chief executive in an NHS Trust) to comply 
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 https://www.igte-learning.connectingforhealth.nhs.uk/igte/. 
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with the seventh data protection principle, in respect of remedying whatever security measures 
were lacking. The details of such incidents were published on the ICO website, hence adverse 
publicity and further possible loss of public trust was involved. NHS Trusts were also required to 
provide information about data breaches in their annual reports (Grant, 2015); Foundation Trusts 
were required to report IGT scores within their quality accounts (Monitor, 2014). Within an NHS 
Trust, breaches of the Data Protection Act were classified as Serious Incidents Requiring 
Investigation (SIRIs)(Health and Social Care Information Centre, 2015a). Trusts were required to 
report to the ICO via the IGT reporting tool any information governance incident rated at SIRI Level 2 
or above (HSCIC, 2013). The staff involved in such SIRIs could face various forms of disciplinary 
action, including dismissal. For these reasons, information governance tended to be accorded a high 
strategic priority within NHS organisations, particularly when a data breach had previously occurred; 
tolerance of information security risks was generally very low (BCS ASSIST, 2012). A high level of fear 
could be engendered among NHS staff at all levels regarding information governance issues 
(Caldicott, 2013; Renaud, 2012; Renaud & Goucher, 2012). 
 
One aspect of NHS information security policy that had far-reaching impacts upon information use 
and sharing was the requirement that all portable media and devices be encrypted. The policy was 
introduced in early 2008 (Department of Health, 2008) following the HMRC data loss and the 
subsequent issuing of guidance by the Information Commissioner’s Office.11 It was not implemented 
immediately in all NHS organisations; in the researcher’s former Trust, for instance, the requirement 
to use encrypted USB memory sticks was not brought in until early 2009 following a data breach 
(3.9), and the process of encrypting the large number of Trust-owned laptops was undertaken during 
the summer of that year. The requirement applied in practice to laptop computers, tablet 
computers, mobile phones and USB memory sticks. Encryption standards were prescribed nationally 
(Department of Health, 2008; Health and Social Care Information Centre, 2015; Wood & Penny, 
2012). A national contract existed with McAfee Data Protection for the supply of device encryption, 
port control, secure content encryption and mobile encryption software, although its use did not 
appear to be mandatory (“McAfee wins contract for NHS data encryption,” 2008). 
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 According to Grant (2009), this guidance was issued in early 2008. The original version was no longer 
available at the time of the study. The most recent  version (April 2015) may be found at 
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Particular policies governed the use of mobile phones. Their use had formerly been banned entirely 
within NHS premises on the grounds that mobile signals could interfere with medical devices and 
equipment. At the time of the study it was still relatively common to see notices in hospital 
outpatient departments and doctors’ surgeries requesting patients not to use them. Since 2009 the 
use of mobile phones on NHS premises within England had been governed by the policy framework 
set out within Using mobile phones in NHS hospitals (Department of Health, 2009b), as elaborated 
within more recent Information Governance Alliance guidance (2015). These two documents set out 
clearly where usage should be prohibited or restricted, and how staff should manage patient usage. 
However, the use of mobile phones by staff members was not addressed. 
 
The HSCIC, while it provided strategic guidance on the deployment of mobile technologies,12 did not 
provide specific security guidance relating to mobile phones. However, the guidance provided by 
HSCIC on the security of tablet computers was very stringent. Automatic cloud backup was to be 
disabled. The ability to transfer data from the device to other networks or devices was to be 
restricted as far as possible to a “whitelist” of permitted destinations. The application suite was to 
be standardised (unnecessary applications should be removed, and the possibility of re-installing 
them blocked) and implementation of a virtualisation service considered to ensure that data was not 
stored on the device. It was thereby implied that access to download sites for applications and files 
(such as Google Play or the Apple App Store) should also be blocked. Bluetooth had to be disabled, 
and virtual private network (VPN) connections used to networks; where possible the ability to 
connect to wireless networks other than those specifically intended was also to be disabled. Tablets 
were not to be used to store person-identifiable or sensitive information. As with other portable 
media, they had to have strong encryption enabled by default (see above); the use of a mobile 
device management (MDM) system was recommended. (MDM systems provide configuration and 
access controls, and the facility to wipe the device remotely in case of loss or theft.) 
 
Professional associations also issued guidance to their members regarding the use of mobile devices. 
The Royal College of Nursing discouraged the use of personal mobile devices in the workplace, on 
grounds of information security and confidentiality, personal safety, and potential costs (Royal 
College of Nursing, 2012b). 
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In the case of social media, the HSCIC, while entertaining website blocking as a possibility, clearly 
recommended user education rather than technical controls as the main remedy for inappropriate 
social media use: “Whilst there are technical website filtering controls that could be applied, the 
main defence against threats associated with blogging and social networking is user awareness 
related” (Health and Social Care Information Centre, 2012, p. 6). Within health services in England, 
social media policies and guidelines have been issued by national strategic bodies (e.g. NHS England, 
2013), NHS Trusts, regulatory bodies (e.g. General Medical Council, 2013; Health and Care 
Professions Council, s.d.; Nursing and Midwifery Council, s.d., 2015), professional associations (e.g. 
British Association of Social Workers, 2012; British Psychological Society, 2012.; Royal College of 
General Practitioners, 2013; Royal College of Radiologists, s.d.), and trade unions (e.g. British 
Medical Association, 2011) (cf. below, Section 2.8.4). The report of the official investigation into the 
sexually abusive activities of the late Jimmy Savile on NHS premises (Lampard & Marsden, 2015) set 
out a requirement for NHS Trusts to formulate a policy regarding the management of access to the 
Internet and to social media by patients and visitors. This was said to be required in order to address 
a safeguarding concern, viz. “to protect people on their premises from the consequences of 
inappropriate use of information technology, the internet and social media.” (p. 18). NHS electronic 
communications and social media policies in relation to information needs have become a focus of 
discussion by NHS librarians (Elcock, 2016; Rey, 2016); see also Section 5.5. 
 
1.4.5 NHS libraries and e-library initiatives   
It is important by way of background to provide some account of initiatives to provide NHS clinical 
staff with online resources for evidence-based practice and decision-making, as problems were 
frequently encountered with using these.  
 
The provision of library and information services within NHS organisations was managed and 
supported at a strategic level by Health Education England (HEE) (Health Education England, 2014). A 
development framework for library services, Knowledge for healthcare, was issued in late 2014 
(Health Education England, 2014), according to which “Healthcare library and knowledge services 
underpin all aspects of the NHS - supplying the evidence base to the service to make decisions on 
treatment options, patient care and safety, commissioning and policy, and to support lifelong 
learning, undertake research and drive innovation” (p. 6). The provision of services was coordinated 
by library leads from each of the 13 HEE Local Education and Training Boards (LETBs), and subject to 
a national quality assurance framework. Library and information services within NHS organisations 
could vary greatly in form and means of delivery; they could be provided as standalone services, or 
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via outsourcing or partnership arrangements with institutions of higher education or with other NHS 
Trusts. Funding for libraries was complex and often historically based on educational funding 
streams, with marked inequities between regions, and between the acute and other sectors 
(Ebenezer, 2000; Robert Huggins Associates, 2005; Hill, 2008; Stewart, 1992). This bore on the level 
of staff support available for service development and information literacy training, as well as the 
provision to end-users of subscription-based information resources.  
 
It was common in the later 1990s for NHS libraries to purchase subscriptions to web-based versions 
of bibliographic databases locally, although a number of regional library services were experimenting 
with consortial purchasing (Pye & Ball, 1999). The 1998 NHS IT strategy Information for health (NHS 
Executive, 1998) included among its strategic objectives a plan to establish a National electronic 
Library for Health (NeLH) : “a National Electronic Library for Health including accredited clinical 
reference material will be established” (NHS Executive, 1999, p. 60). This was intended to provide 
easy access for clinicians to best current knowledge, and thereby to improve health and health care, 
patient choice, and clinical practice (Toth, Muir Gray, Fraser, & Ward, 2000), the assumption being 
that “health professionals have information needs that they themselves recognise and that they will 
access such information if provided with the means to do so” (Randell, Mitchell, Thompson, 
McCaughan, & Dowding, 2009). The plans envisaged that NHS librarians would play a pivotal role in 
the development and delivery of the NeLH's aims and objectives. Included in the proposals was the 
creation of a series of so-called Virtual Branch Libraries covering specialised areas; these were 
intended to function as communities of practice (Brice, 2003). The pilot NeLH went live in 2000; it 
was launched as a full service in the spring of 2003. Available resources included a selection of 
evidence-based sources authenticated via the Athens system (now OpenAthens), including the 
Cochrane Library; the range of these increased over time. A subsequent IT strategy document, 
Building the information core (Department of Health, 2001) set NHS Trust IT departments a target 
for clinical and support staff to be provided with basic email and web browsing services by March 
2002, and other staff to have them by March 2003. The NeLH aimed to work in partnership with NHS 
libraries (Turner, 2004). 
 
The DH’s response to the report of the inquiry into paediatric cardiac surgery at the Bristol Royal 
Infirmary (Department of Health, 2002a), gave impetus to the establishment of a unified, hybrid 
National Library for Health (NLH) that included a greater amount of centrally-purchased electronic 
content (Ebenezer, 2005; Herman & Ward, 2004; Isetta, 2008), procurements for which were carried 
out via the National Core Content project (NCC)(Glover, 2008). A new common interface for 
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bibliographic databases integrated within the NLH website was implemented in April 2008, initially 
called Search 2.0, later renamed Health Databases Advanced Search (HDAS) (“Journals and 
databases,” 2008). The deployment of an NHS-wide link resolver enabled library leads and Trust 
library managers to purchase additional content to supplement the “core” e-journal and e-book 
purchases, which could thereby be made available to staff within the relevant Trust(s). However, 
problems with HDAS (originally known as Search 2.0) had been frequently reported by librarians via 
the LIS-MEDICAL JISCmail list and elsewhere ever since its launch, including slow response times, 
non-availability of the service, crashes, anomalous search results, or problems with exporting search 
results. Even following a major upgrade in June 2012 which had been intended to address the main 
technical problems, these reports had continued.13 For the benefit of library staff reporting service 
issues, a summary of reported problems with HDAS had been published on the NICE website.14 As an 
measure to minimise their impact, access was made available for library staff and end-users to the  
relevant aggregators’ “native” interfaces as an alternative. In response to the ongoing problems, 
another major upgrade of HDAS was initiated in 2015 and launched in October 2016.15  
 
During its ten-year life span, responsibility for the former National electronic Library for Health / 
National Library for Health transferred between organisations four times: from the NHS information 
Authority (NHSIA), to Connecting for Health when the NHSIA was abolished, then to the NHS 
Institute for Innovation and Improvement before, following publication of the Darzi review (Darzi, 
2008), finally transferring to the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE ), albeit in a 
considerably altered form — i.e. minus its strategy, its Virtual Branch Libraries and its development 
remit for NHS library services — as NHS Evidence (National Library for Hesalth, 2009). This 
institutional instability, and the resulting separation of e-library initiatives from other aspects of NHS 
IT, is of importance  culturally and politically, and is discussed further in Section 11.5.  
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 They are referred to in the minutes of the LKSL Information Management and Technology Group for 
November 2012: 
http://www.libraryservices.nhs.uk/document_uploads/SIMTG/SIMTG_minutes_14_Nov_2012.pdf.  
The researcher has been unable to locate the report which was circulated to members of the group.  
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 http://www.nice.org.uk/about/nice-communities/library-and-knowledge-services-staff/nice-evidence-
services-issues.  
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From the outset, the third-party authentication service Eduserv Athens (later OpenAthens) was used 
to authenticate access for NHS staff to e-resources.16 Eligible staff needed to register individually for 
OpenAthens accounts using an NHS email address or from a computer within the N3 network. 
Accounts were issued for a period of two years initially. They could be retained when staff moved to 
another NHS organisation; users were required to change their account details online to do this. 
Users frequently contacted library services requiring help with lost usernames or passwords 
(although an automated password reminder facility was available), with expired accounts, and with 
problems transferring their accounts. They were also likely to encounter problems with individual 
resources (see Section 5.3, below). A relatively small proportion of NHS clinical staff registered for 
OpenAthens accounts; the percentage of an organisation’s staff who were active Athens account 
users was at one stage proposed as a national key performance indicator (Royal Berkshire NHS 
Foundation Trust, 2014). In the interests of information literacy support, some universities also 
issued their health sciences students with university OpenAthens accounts; these provided access 
not to locally purchased material, but solely to the national core content e-resources (University 
Health and Medical Librarians Group, 2014). Students on placement within the NHS were also 
eligible to register for local NHS OpenAthens accounts on the same basis as staff, and an individual 
student was able to hold both types of account; this was another fertile source of confusion. 
Individuals who were not eligible for a personal NHS OpenAthens account could be offered an access 
account, enabling them to access NHS e-resources within an NHS library on a walk-in basis.  
 
End-users’ difficulties with Athens or OpenAthens authentication were referred to a major library 
strategy document: “There always seems [sic] to be problems logging into Athens … and accessing 
the article is quite confusing.” (Health Education England, 2015b, p. 14) This relates to Brennan et 
al.'s finding (2014) that NHS staff and student users perceived the need for usernames and 
passwords to be a major barrier to accessing information. 
 
At the time of the study, social workers within the UK had available to them an information portal 
developed by the Social Care Institute for Excellence (SCIE): 17 those employed by local authorities 
who were working within the NHS had access online to a range of professional journals in social 
work, authenticated via Athens, as well as to local and national NHS information resources. 
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 Eduserv OpenAthens: http://openathens.org/  
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 SCIE: http://www.scie.org.uk [retrieved 01/05/2013]; 
40 
In relation to access to information resources, one of the agreed follow-up actions from the TDAG 
survey (described below in Section 2.7.3.4.2) (TDAG, 2009b), was the setting-up of a national 
whitelist of “domains not to be blocked” within the NHS. This whitelist was updated at the group’s 
meetings, where candidate sites for addition to the list which had put forward by librarians within 
the members’ geographical areas were discussed and decided upon. The list was maintained as an 
MS Excel spreadsheet; it was available to download at the (LKSL) website.18 The successor to the 
group ceased to exist in March 2015 when LKSG’s subgroups were reorganised to align with the core 
themes of the Knowledge for Healthcare library strategy (Health Education England, 2014); its 
papers were archived on the site. Subsequently, arrangements were made for the list to be 
maintained by one of the local OpenAthens administrators. The intention was that library managers 
should send updated versions of the whitelist to their Trust IT departments as soon as they were 
published, for the required configuration changes to be made.  
 
1.4.6 NHS e-learning developments  
Barriers were also encountered to accessing and using e-learning resources as information sources, 
so again it is relevant to provide a brief account of NHS e-learning initiatives. At the time of this 
study, education and training delivered within the NHS could be categorised in terms of 1) 
professional pre-registration and post-registration training 2) statutory and mandatory training 
delivered to all Trust staff 3) other Trust-based or externally sourced training relating to 
organisational learning and staff development needs. Statutory training was that which the Trust 
was required to provide by law, or where a statutory body had instructed organisations to provide 
training on the basis of legislation, and was required for all staff groups. Requirements for 
mandatory training were mainly determined by the individual Trust, but included initial and annual 
refresher training on information governance for all staff, delivered via e-learning (NHS England, 
2014). Mandatory training was concerned with minimising risk, providing assurance against policies, 
and ensuring compliance with external standards, and was generally specific to roles or 
departments. The content of statutory and mandatory training had been partly standardised 
nationally via the North West Core Skills Programme and subsequently the UK-wide Core Skills 
Framework produced by Skills for Health. The statutory and mandatory training provided by all the 
Trusts in the study was aligned to varying degrees with the Core Skills Framework.  
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All of these forms of education and training could involve e-learning. On grounds of cost-
effectiveness it had become common practice across the NHS to deliver mandatory and statutory 
training via e-learning, at least in part. The document Supporting best practice in e-learning in the 
NHS: a strategic framework (NHS National Workforce Group, 2005) identified a clear need to 
establish the wider adoption and deployment of e-learning across health care services. The 
subsequent report Modernising healthcare training: e-learning in the healthcare services (e-mpirical, 
2006) outlined a number of recommendations and strategic elements considered essential for the 
effective management and deployment of e-learning at national, regional and local levels (Bingham 
& Wright, 2008). It noted that “barriers to access to computers and a supportive learning 
infrastructure remain and probably represent the biggest barriers to the effective implementation of 
the use of new learning technologies” (p. 10). 
 
Wright and Bingham (2008) cited the need to meet the DH’s Standards for better health 
(Department of Health, 2009c) and the NHS Litigation Authority’s Risk management standards (e.g. 
NHS Litigation Authority, 2013) as a key driver for the introduction of technology-enhanced learning 
within the NHS.  
 
The publication of the DH’s Framework for technology enhanced learning in November 2011 
encouraged the wider adoption of learning technologies given their potential for patient and service 
delivery, development of the workforce, flexibility for training delivery and cost effectiveness 
(Department of Health, 2011a). From 2008-2009 onwards, the DH had made significant central 
investments in e-learning. Significant national initiatives had been put in place to drive forward the 
e-learning agenda forward within the English NHS, including the -Learning Repository;19 the National 
Learning Management System (NLMS)20, a new module of the national Electronic Staff Record (ESR), 
designed to enable and track employee access to e-learning); the Skills for Health e-Learning 
Readiness Toolkit21 and NHS Core Learning Unit22; and the setting up of e-Learning for Healthcare (e-
LfH), which develops e-learning content in partnership with medical royal colleges and other 
professional health care organisations (Bingham & Wright, 2008). In November 2013 the online 
networking platform My Health Skills was launched as a “platform [for members] to voice opinion, 
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 E-Learning Repository: http://www.elearningrepository.nhs.uk/  
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 NLMS: http://www.esrsupport.co.uk/nlms/index.html  
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 E-Learning Readiness Toolkit: http://www.elearningreadiness.org/index.php  
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access relevant information, build capability and seek advice from fellow colleagues within the 
healthcare sector”.23 Latterly e-LfH, which became a part of Health Education England, had planned 
the creation of a Technology Enhanced Learning (TEL) Hub, a platform designed to be a first port of 
call for TEL information and resources; it was intended to launch this in 2017.24 The governance 
structure for e-learning comprised a national E-Learning Strategy Board, the E-Learning 
Management Group, and the Strategic e-Learning Leads group (Ward, Sutton, Divall, & Hull, 2008). 
Facilities or guidance for checking the suitability of local PC infrastructure existed for some of this 
content, e.g. the ESR PC Check,25 and e-LfH’s Technical requirements for accessing all e-Learning for 
healthcare products (e-Learning for Healthcare, 2008). In September 2016, e-LfH added the e-LfH 
Hub to the list of OpenAthens resources to facilitate access for certain professional groups. 
E-learning encompasses a range of delivery methods and content types, including re-usable learning 
objects in various formats, virtual learning environments (VLE), learning management systems (LMS), 
social networking environments and tools including forums, wikis and blogs, audio- and video 
conferencing, e-portfolios, podcasts, video clips, online simulation and educational gaming (NHS East 
of England, 2009). Other than “official” NHS e-learning material, a wide range of other e-learning 
content existed, produced by higher education institutions, professional bodies and publishers, that 
NHS professionals might have wished or needed to access for professional development purposes; 
(Childs, Blenkinsopp, Hall, & Walton, 2005). E-learning was also widely used in the pre-registration 
education of health professionals, creating a need for students on placement to access such content 
from within NHS networks (Bilham, 2009; Clarke, 2009; Walton, Smith, Gannon-Leary, & Middleton, 
2005; Ward & Moule, 2007). As well as carrying out mediated searches and information literacy 
training, NHS librarians had an important early role in facilitating e-learning at local level, both in 
terms of strategic planning and particularly through their provision of support to staff accessing e-
learning material using library computers; they were well placed to report on problems with PC 
system or requirements and with network, authentication or usability issues (Beaumont, 2005; 
Childs et al., 2005; Sutton, Booth, Ayiku, & O’Rourke, 2005). 
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1.4.7 Health informatics professions  
Understanding the organisational aspects of information access issues, which necessarily involves 
detailed consideration of the systems and processes which support information governance and 
network security and which enable appropriate access to online resources, requires some 
background knowledge of the groups of staff who are responsible for them. 
 
Ongoing trends towards the professionalisation of health informatics since the 1990s had been 
driven by the increasing importance of information systems in the delivery of health care, and, 
within the NHS, by the increasing importance of inspection and regulation, and the perceived 
priority of patient safety (Haw et al., 2006). Health informatics was widely considered to be an still-
emerging profession, since it faced problems of consistent education, registration and accreditation, 
both in the UK and elsewhere (Lui, 2013). An umbrella body, the United Kingdom Council for Health 
Informatics Professions (UKCHIP) 26 was created following the publication of the DH document 
Making information count: a human resources strategy for health informatics professions 
(Department of Health, 2002b); it had the introduction of a requirement for statutory registration of 
health informatics workers as one of its main aims, placing them it on a par with clinical 
professionals. 
 
From the perspective of inter-professional relations, information technology, information 
governance and library / information / knowledge work may usefully be positioned within this 
overall broad field. Health informatics was defined by the DH as “the knowledge, skills and tools that 
enable information to be collected, managed, used and shared to support the delivery of healthcare 
and to promote health and wellbeing” (Department of Health, 2002, p. 3). Overall it was said to be 
“concerned with the structures and processes, as well as the outcomes involved in the use of 
information and information and communications technologies (ICTs) within health” (Bath, 2008). 
Bath identified three main areas within the field, each of which overlaps considerably in scope with 
the others: medical informatics, health informatics and health information management. Other 
authors categorised areas within the field differently, e.g. Haw et al. (2006) identified six main staff 
groups: information and communication technology; health records; knowledge management; 
information management; clinical informatics; and senior managers and directors of service.  
                                                          
 
26
 United Kingdom Council for Health Informatics Professions: http://www.ukchip.org. Subsequent references   
are to the UKCHIP website unless otherwise stated.  
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The Health Informatics Career Framework (HCIF) developed by UKCHIP (2014) identified a total of 
eight main areas of work or career pathways within health informatics: knowledge management, 
information management, information technology, health records and patient administration, 
clinical informatics, education and training, and project and programme management. The work of 
health service IT staff, information governance staff and library staff was considered to belong to 
different pathways (information and communications technology, information management and 
knowledge management, respectively) within a the wider framework. Information governance was 
concerned with legal and ethical frameworks for the management and use of information (see 1.4.4 
above), and was located within information management as a sub-specialism. Information 
governance staff working in the NHS were able to become members of the Institute of Health 
Records and Information Management (IHRIM), which supported staff working within health 
records, information management, and clinical coding.27 The HICF mapped to other occupational 
standards and frameworks such as the NHS Knowledge and Skills Framework (KSF) (Department of 
Health, 2004; NHS Staff Council, s.d.), Skills for the Information Age (SFIA)28 for information 
technology, and the CILIP Professional Knowledge and Skills Base (CILIP, s.d.). Other than UKCHIP, a 
variety of professional bodies supported different aspects of health informatics work. These included 
IHRIM, the British Computer Society specialist group Association for Informatics Professionals in 
Health and Social Care (BCS ASSIST), and the Chartered Institute of Library and Information 
Professionals (CILIP). In 2016, UKCHIP, BCS: the Chartered Institute for IT, CILIP and IHRIM 
announced their intention of creating a new federation for the health informatics profession, to be 
called the Federation for Informatics Professionals in Health and Social Care (Fed-IP). The proposed 
Fed-IP was to act as an independent single voice for the profession, and to set and maintain 
standards of professional competence and conduct for individuals working in health and care 
informatics, publishing a register of persons who had met the standards. (Federation for Informatics 
Professionals, s.d.) 
 
Despite efforts to unify these bodies, the professional landscape can thus be seen to be both 
fragmented and contested, indicating the likelihood of conflict. Since health informatics 
professionals in the UK worked within an organisational environment (i.e. the NHS) that was subject 
to the practices of New Public Management, they participated in organisational structures that  
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  IHRIM: http://www.ihrim.co.uk/.  
28
 SFIA: http://scripts.bcs.org/sfiaplus/sfia.htm  
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required them to work in accountable and evidence-based ways within strong frameworks of 
organisational control (Evetts, 2003, 2011; Hunter, 1996; Noordegraaf, 2007, 2013). While the 
discourse of unity within an overarching professional framework may have been be influential at 
occupational level, the different groups were commonly in competition and conflict at workplace 
level (cf. Johannisson & Sundin, 2007). This issue is discussed further in Sections 2.5.5.1 and 11.5. 
 
1.5 Aims and objectives of the research  
The overall aim of the research was to investigate barriers to online professional information 
seeking, use and sharing occurring within the NHS in England, their possible effects (upon education, 
working practices, working lives and clinical and organisational effectiveness), and possible 
explanatory or causative factors.  
 
Its specific objectives were as follows:  
1) to establish in detail, via investigations carried out at specific sites (Section 3.3), the nature and 
extent of barriers to accessing to published information online within the NHS in England, related to 
the functionality of information technology infrastructure or from aspects of policy and practice 
relating to the use of information technologies; 
 
2) to determine the effects that these might be having on professional information-seeking, learning 
and decision-making in the contexts of clinical and management practice, education and research, 
and the possible consequences for working practices, for working lives and for clinical and 
organisational effectiveness; 
 
3) to investigate the norms, practices, attitudes and beliefs, values, interests and presuppositions of 
stakeholder groups regarding information seeking, business need and risk management which might 
be involved, and the influences they might be exerting on the phenomena identified in 1).  
 
There was a need in particular to focus on investigating an apparent disjunction in the import and 
effects of regulatory policies and practices in different areas. On the one hand these required that 
NHS staff should have appropriate access to training, support, education and professional 
development, and to resources for the conduct and implementation of research, and that clinical 
and management decisions be made according to the most current best practice evidence. On the  
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other hand they appeared to result in restrictions on access to, use and sharing of online published 
information (1.2). 
 
1.6 Research questions 
The specific research questions relating to this study are as follows: 
 
RQ1: What limitations currently exist on access to online published information to support 
professional development, clinical and management decision making, and research within NHS 
organisations arising from organisational strategies, policies and practices as they are implemented 
in relation to IT infrastructures and information technology use?  
 
RQ2: What effects do these limitations have on professional information seeking, use and sharing, 
on the working practices and working lives of health professionals, on the education of students, and 
on clinical and organisational effectiveness? 
 
RQ3: What are the organisational issues  within NHS Trusts (policy drivers, legal and regulatory 
requirements, organisational values, cultural attitudes and presuppositions, professional norms, and 
practices) which bear on a) how IT infrastructure enabling access to online published professional 
information, including e-learning content, is managed, and b) how acceptable use policies, social 
media policies and web content filtering are implemented? How do these issues interact? 
 
These three questions derive clearly from the objectives of the research as stated above. In terms of 
Blaikie’s (2009) categorisation of types of research questions, RQ1 and RQ2 are “what?” questions, 
and RQ3 is a “why?” question incorporating two subsidiary questions, a “what?” question relating to 
the identification of organisational factors, and a “how?” question relating to their interactions. 
Alternatively, RQ3 may be categorised in Mason’s (2002) terms as a combination of developmental 
puzzle and causal puzzle. In the course of the research, the focus of the questions broadened from 
an initial concern with information security, professional cultures and risk perception to include a 
wider range of organisational issues, such as staff engagement, diffusion of innovations and inter-
professional conflicts. 
 
There are particular subsidiary questions that need to be addressed in order to clarify issues that 
arise in consequence of the main questions:  
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SQ1: What technical or organisational rationales are offered for restrictions on access to information 
resources, or on the use of technologies supporting professional information seeking, use and 
sharing?  
 
SQ2: What differing stakeholder perspectives are involved here?  
 
SQ3: How do these stakeholders understand requirements for risk management in information 
security /cybersecurity and information seeking, in relation to organisational priorities and 
values?values?  
 
SQ4: What issues for the accessibility of information within the English NHS are posed by current 
approaches to IT infrastructure management and to information security /cybersecurity risk 
management?  
 
SQ5: In what ways are mobile devices (laptops, tablets, smartphones) being used by health 
professionals to access information?  
 
SQ6: How do patterns of such usage relate to professional norms of behaviour? 
 
SQ7: How is the use of mobile devices managed, technically and in policy terms? What support is 
available for staff using mobile devices professionally? 
 
SQ8: How are individual and corporate uses of social media and Web 2.0 applications managed, 
technically and in policy terms? 
 
1.7 Possible outcomes/benefits of the study 
The purpose of the research was to shed light upon and to generate knowledge of an issue affecting 
NHS library services, professional educators, and e-learning leads, i.e., that of reported difficulties in 
gaining access to online resources for information seeking, use and sharing. The study offered a 
multi-faceted approach to developing a better understanding of the issues; its results were likely to 
have implications at all levels for professional information seeking, use and sharing, and for teaching 
and learning within the NHS in England, leading (it is to be hoped) to more effective strategies for 
improving e-resource access. It was expected also for it to suggest areas for discussion and  
 
48 
negotiation between NHS and higher education library and e-learning leads and those responsible 
for information technology infrastructure and security policies, at national and local levels. 
 
1.8 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows. The introductory chapter (Chapter 1) is followed by the literature 
review (Chapter 2) and an account of methodology and methods (Chapter 3). The findings are 
presented in five separate chapters covering each major theme: background and context  (Chapter  
4), barriers to information seeking and use (Chapter 5), education and training arrangements 
(Chapter 6), organisational dynamics and professional cultures (Chapter 8), communications policies 
and practices (Chapter  9), and summarised in Chapter 10. A discussion of the findings, together with 
a proposed theoretical model of the major operative factors affecting access to published 
information online, is offered in Chapter 11. Conclusions and recommendations for further research 
and for policy are presented in Chapter 12. 
 
1.9 Summary and conclusion  
This introductory chapter has provided an outline of the research project described more fully in 
subsequent chapters, and some necessary background on the organisational nature of the NHS and 
its information technology, electronic library and e-learning services. The aims and objectives of the 
research and the research questions have been stated. It leads on to a more detailed review of 
previous relevant research and theoretical frameworks (Chapter 2).  
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Chapter 2. Literature review   
2.1 Introduction  
This literature review is thematic in approach and covers the five main areas which were perceived 
to be most important to the research problem: information behaviour within health services; 
aspects of organisational culture and behaviour; information governance and security; risk 
management, and diffusion of innovations.  It aimed to identify existing research in these areas, to 
inform the development and refinement of the research questions and methods, to identify gaps in 
the literature, and to provide an outline of frameworks or theories which were perceived as relevant 
to the discussion. The scope and structure are illustrated in Figure 2.1 below. An initial review was 
carried out to delineate the gap in the literature; this focused substantially on information 
behaviour, cybersecurity risk management, organisational culture, and social theories of risk. The 
other material on organisation theory and on the diffusion of innovations was added at a later stage 
following data collection, in conjunction with work on analysing and theorising the findings.The 
scope and structure are illustrated in Figure 2.1 below. 
 
2.2 Search strategy 
Keyword searches were conducted within relevant bibliographic databases, mainly Web of Science, 
Google Scholar, Scopus and Primo Central. The King’s Fund library database was included in the 
searches for NHS-related material. Important-seeming references within relevant papers retrieved 
were followed up, and citation searches were conducted using these databases to identify recent 
material citing major reviews or particularly interesting primary studies. Where available and when a 
highly relevant article was found, “related articles” and “cited by” features were used to broaden 
the searches. The researcher registered to receive tables of contents of relevant journals via 
JournalTOCs,29 and received notification of other possibly relevant articles via the Mendeley news 
feed and Google Scholar updates. She also “followed” selected other authors on ResearchGate30 and 
received advice of their new or updated publications. In order to keep up with policy initiatives, she  
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 JournalTOCs: http://www.journaltocs.hw.ac.uk/  
30
 ResearchGate: https://www.researchgate.net/home  
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also registered to receive a range of online newsletters relating to health service management and 
health IT. 
 
To identify studies of the information behaviour of health professionals, searches were undertaken 
also within OVID Embase (which includes MEDLINE records), PsycINFO, CINAHL, and LISTA, limited to 
1998 and later. Core journals: Health Information and Libraries Journal, Journal of the Medical 
Library Association, Journal of Information Science, Journal of Documentation, Information Research, 
Annual Review of Information Science and Technology, as suggested by Detlefsen (1998), were hand- 
searched. Other relevant papers were found incidentally. The researcher was aware of Edwards et 
al.’s. (2013) study of NHS health managers’ information behaviour, as she had been involved as the 
facilitator within her Trust for the research it described. References were managed using the 
Mendeley bibliography manager.31 
 
Search statements for the five main areas of the review are given in Appendix A. 
 
2.3 Scope and limits of the review 
The central questions of the research relate to five main subject areas:  
1) The information behaviour of clinicians and managers within the NHS: there was an evident need 
to scope the nature and extent of their information needs and use in support of clinical practice, 
teaching and learning, particularly in relation to online sources, in order to gauge the effects of non-
accessibility of information. Information behaviour theories were evaluated in terms of possible 
explanatory frameworks for the effects of barriers to information seeking, use and sharing upon 
information behaviour (Section 2.4); 
2) Organisational issues, including organisational culture and subcultures, professions and 
professionalism, the character of the NHS as an organisation, staff engagement, theories of power 
and of trust within organisations: these were relevant on account of the significance of professional 
groups and their subcultures, and of conflicts between them, in NHS organisations, the importance 
of information technology staff subcultures in some contexts, and the manner in which 
organisational issues often featured in discussions of aspects of information security (Section 2.5); 
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Figure 2.1 Literature review thematic map 
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3) The technical aspects of information security and cybersecurity management within NHS 
organisations: to engage in technical discussions, the researcher required a sound basic knowledge 
of NHS network infrastructure and of the types of security problems (particularly in relation to web 
applications) requiring to be addressed by NHS information technology specialists, and of the 
corresponding cybersecurity measures (Section 2.6); 
4) Information security / cybersecurity risk in relation to access to e-resources: a more balanced 
understanding in this area had been called for by medical educators (Prince, Cass, & Klaber, 2010). A 
similar call had been made by NHS Employers in relation to access to social media applications (NHS 
Employers, 2013a). The researcher perceived a need to set this in the context of the main social 
theories of risk, and of approaches to security risk analysis and management. Two issues in particular 
required to be addressed: those of trust in information security / cybersecurity, and of the 
management of personal web use (PWU) at work in relation to organisational risks (Section 2.7). 
5) Selected theoretical approaches to information technology innovation (including Rogers’ theory of 
the diffusion of innovations, the Technology-Organisation-Environment framework, and the theory 
of IT-culture conflict): were potentially applicable to user-driven technological innovations such as 
Bring Your Own Device and individual and corporate use of social media (Section 2.8). Material in all 
subject areas was drawn upon in the development of the research questions. That in 1), 3) and 4) 
relates most closely to the “core” issues of the research; the material in areas 2) and 5) informed the 
development of the interview scripts and conduct of the interviews, and was drawn upon in the 
coding of the data and in the analysis and discussion of the findings.  
 
The publication of Information for Health (NHS Executive, 1998) marked a watershed in NHS IT 
strategy. The material in 1) therefore covers work on health information behaviour published from 
this date until the present, with selective inclusion of earlier studies where these were deemed 
important, and exclusion (on the grounds of lack of currency) of studies published before 2003 that 
focused solely on use of the Internet by health professionals. It should be noted that, during the 
period covered by this review, i.e. 1998 to the present, the publication of journals and grey literature 
substantially moved online (Johnson & Luther, 2007; Mort, 2006), and online publication began to 
be viewed by users as “normal”, hence earlier studies, while possibly providing some useful insights, 
cannot be relied upon to provide an up-to-date picture of information resource usage. In the later 
work the World Wide Web features in health professionals’ perceptions, certainly as regards 
professional (as distinct from consumer) health literature, more as a publication platform than as a 
distinct information resource or entity in itself. The information behaviour of multi-professional 
groups (2.4.3), doctors (2.4.4), nurses (2.4.5) and health service managers (2.4.6) is considered in 
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some detail, primarily in respect of preferred sources and barriers. A brief account of the distinctive 
features of other clinical staff groups’ information behaviour is offered in Appendix C. 
 
Within the organisational culture section (2.5), summary coverage is offered of the work of 
influential authors on organisational subcultures, and a comprehensive treatment of work on 
information technology staff subcultures; no date limits for inclusion were set. Highly summative 
accounts are offered of Clegg’s circuits of power theory (Clegg, 1989), of actor network theory, of 
Kanter’s theory of structural power, and of organisational trust and staff engagement. The 
information security and web blocking sections focus on the most recent material on web content 
categorisation, and on web application security threats and counter-measures, drawing on 
professional and industry publications where suitable academic sources are not available, and 
focusing on current practice within the NHS. An eclectic approach was taken to the risk management 
literature, aiming to provide an overview of those theoretical approaches to risk which were of 
relevance for information security and governance; again, no date limits were set. 
 
2.4 Information behaviour 
2.4.1 Introduction and terminology 
Overall, the research was concerned specifically with problems with accessing, using and sharing 
published information online. The term “published” in this context refers to material that has been 
communicated or made available publicly (“Publish”, 2016). These can be broadly summarised as 
relating to technical, cultural and policy factors hindering, motivating or discouraging information 
seeking, time (or lack of it) for information-seeking, awareness of information, and perceptions of 
access to information, the accessibility, availability and usefulness of information, and convenience 
in accessing information. The term “online”, in current common parlance, generally equates with 
availability via the Internet, or via an organisation’s intranet.  
 
It should be noted that studies of information seeking and learning by groups within professional 
health services indicated an increasing use overall of web-based resources on a range of mobile 
devices (PCs, tablets and smartphones) as well as of desktop and laptop computers (e.g. 
Casebourne, 2012; Davies et al., 2012; Gaglani & Topol, 2014; Mickan, Atherton, Roberts, Heneghan, 
& Tilson, 2014; Moore & Jayewardene, 2014; Ozdalga, Ozdalga, & Ahuja, 2012). An increasing 
number of clinically-relevant mobile applications (apps) were available for mobile devices using the 
main mobile operating systems, including point of care resources, reference sources and textbooks 
(e.g. Haffey, Brady, & Maxwell, 2014; Havelka, 2011; Payne, Wharrad, & Watts, 2012). A few medical 
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schools were using tablet computers in medical education; contemporary developments in the use 
of tablets in medical education were reviewed by Fan, Radford, and Fabian (2016). Within the NHS in 
England, some Trusts were issuing staff with mobile phones, some of which could be categorised as 
smartphones, on the basis of operational need. Security and permissions on these devices were 
managed by IT departments. There was a trend also for staff to use their own mobile devices (tablets 
and smartphones) for professional purposes. Their use was in some instances officially sanctioned 
and managed via a Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) policy (Bodhani, 2012; Patel et al., 2015; Wood, 
2015). Use of these devices for information-related purposes (e.g. accessing e-books) was often 
supported by NHS libraries. It was relatively common for board members to be issued with iPads by 
their trust (e.g. “Expensive iPads go to NHS board members”, 2011; Kelly, 2014). A survey among 
librarians of how mobile technologies are being used, promoted and delivered within NHS settings 
was conducted by Chamberlain, Elcock, and Puligari (2015); this identified current trends, and also 
technical barriers to use (primarily inadequate network infrastructure, with some blocking of 
websites and applications). No comprehensive discussion was possible within this literature review 
of all the relevant issues relating to the use of mobile devices in health care, although they are 
mentioned again briefly in Section 2.8.2 within the discussion of user-driven innovations and 
“shadow IT”. Encryption requirements for mobile devices are discussed in section 1.4.4, and 
infection control issues in Appendix H. 
 
The term “Web 2.0”, while difficult to define in precise terms, is commonly given to a second 
generation of the World Wide Web that is focused on the ability for users to collaborate with each 
other and to create, upload and share information online; the term refers to a transition from static 
websites to a more dynamic web environment that is based on serving web applications to users  
(O’Reilly, 2005). McGee and Begg’s definition (2008) may serve: “A collection of web-based 
technologies … where users actively participate in content creation and editing through open 
collaboration between members of communities of practice”. Applications such as start pages 
(portals), mashups, folksonomies and podcasting are examples of Web 2.0 applications. Web 2.0 is 
said to reflect an egalitarian and unstructured approach which is fundamentally different from those 
of “traditional” IT, being readily accessible, relatively easy to use, and also free of the imposed 
structures (such as workflow, interdependency and decision right allocations) which are associated 
with traditional information technologies (Singh & Chandwani, 2014, citing McAfee, 2009). The 
concept may be broadened to serve as a conceptual frame for describing developments within the 
World Wide Web as a whole (Allen, 2008).  
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Social media constitute a subset of Web 2.0 applications. They “[involve] the explicit modeling of 
connections between people, forming a complex network of relations, which in turn enables and 
facilitates collaboration and collaborative filtering processes.” They may enable users to see what 
other connected users are doing; enable the automated selection of “relevant” information; enable 
reputation and trust management, accountability and quality control; foster the “viral” 
dissemination of information and applications; and provide “social” incentives to enter, update, and 
manage personal information (Eysenbach, 2008). Kaplan and Haenlein (2010, p. 61) define social 
media as follows: “A group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and 
technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of user generated 
content”. An alternative definition was proposed by van Osch and Coursaris (2013, p. 703): “Social 
media are technology artefacts, both material and virtual, that support various actors in a 
multiplicity of communication activities for producing user-generated content, developing and 
maintaining social relationships, or enabling other computer-mediated interactions and 
collaborations”. Having considered other possible alternative typologies (Anderson, Hepworth, Kelly, 
& Metcalfe, 2007; Dalsgaard & Sorensen, 2008; El Ouirdi, El Ouirdi, Segers, & Henderickx, 2014), 
Kaplan and Haenlein’s influential (2010) categorisation of Web 2.0 and social media types, which is 
both detailed in respect of the applications it includes and very general in scope, was used in 
analysing and presenting the results (Section 5.5).  
According to Husin and Hanisch (2011), corporate decision makers initially tended to perceive social 
media and Web 2.0 applications purely as recreational or time-wasting; however McAfee’s advocacy 
of the use of Web 2.0 applications for organisational knowledge management (McAfee, 2006, 2009), 
was influential in creating a more positive view.. Social media use within, and the social media 
policies of, hospitals in the United States and continental Europe (Barnett, Jones, Bennett, Iverson, & 
Bonney, 2013; Cain, 2011; Eysenbach, 2008; Fast, Sørensen, Brand, & Suggs, 2015; Gagnon & Sabus, 
2015; Hamm et al., 2013; Henry & Webb, 2014; Hughes, Joshi, & Wareham, 2008; Koh et al., 2013; 
Munson, Cavusoglu, Frisch, & Fels, 2013) and within academia generally (Doherty, Anastasakis, & 
Fulford, 2009; Pomerantz, Hank, & Sugimoto, 2015) have been widely studied, as has the use of 
social media within health sciences professional education (Gualtieri, Javetski, & Corless, 2012; Hall, 
Hanna, & Huey, 2013; Hanson et al., 2011; Juricich, 2014; Oakley & Spallek, 2012); cf. Section 
2.7.3.2.1. There have been relatively fewer UK-based studies  ( Anderson & Speed, 2010; Boulos & 
Wheeler, 2007; Hughes, 2010; Moorley & Chinn, 2014; Scragg, Shaikh, Shires, et al., 2017; Scragg, 
Shaikh, Robinson, & Mercer, 2017; Thomas, 2013; Ward, Moule, & Lockyer, 2009).  
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The systematic review of research on the uses of social media in pharmacy education conducted by 
by Benetoli, Chen, and Aslani (2014) found that many studies were descriptive in nature, with no 
controlled studies being conducted. Another systematic review, by  Moorhead et al. (2013) 
identified seven main uses of social media for health communication by professionals: providing 
health information on a range of conditions; providing answers to clinical questions; facilitating 
dialogue with other professionals and with patients; collecting data on patient experiences and 
opinions; use in health education and promotion; reducing stigma; and providing online 
consultations. The main benefit of social media use was identified in this review as the generation of 
peer-to-peer discussion. Limitations included issues of privacy, confidentiality and information 
quality. An earlier literature review of uses of social media applications within medical and health 
sciences education by  Paton, Bamidis, Eysenbach, Hansen, and Cabrer (2011), while recommending 
their use, was unable to find clear and specific evidence for their effectiveness. 
 
2.4.2 Theories of information behaviour 
The terminology used within these studies requires some clarification. Following Wilson (1997, 1999) 
and widespread subsequent usage (Pettigrew, Fidel, & Bruce, 2001; Li & Belkin, 2010), the 
researcher employs the term “information behaviour” to mean “those activities a person may 
engage in when identifying his or her own needs for information, searching for such information in 
any way, and using or transferring that information”, including within its scope the more specific 
concepts of “information need”, “information-seeking behaviour”, “information search behaviour” 
and “information use”. “Information need” in the context of the work environment and of 
professional activities relates to task, and has two separate aspects, firstly “the awareness of an 
individual that they are experiencing an uncertainty which requires a ‘stimuIus’ or piece of 
information in order to resolve that uncertainty”, and secondly the need for the individual to be 
equipped to recognise the existence of their uncertainty (Ford & Korjonen, 2012, p. 261).  
Work on health professionals’ information behaviour frequently refers to one or more of the 
established theoretical models. Wilson’s models of information behaviour (Allen & Wilson, 1998; 
Järvelin & Wilson, 2003; Wilson, 1981, 1997, 2006; Wilson & Walsh, 1996) have been highly 
influential generally within information behaviour studies. Wilson’s updated model (1997; 1999), 
shown in Figure 2.2 below, suggested that information seeking behaviour is influenced by contextual 
factors that he termed intervening variables. These had been referred to as “barriers” in his second 
1981 model (Wilson, 1981). Intervening variables may be “supportive of information use as well as 
preventive” (1999, p. 256) in their effects. According to the model they may be psychological, 
demographic, role-related or interpersonal, and environmental in nature. The external 
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environmental variables specifically considered by Wilson include geography, national cultures, and 
economic constraints (time, the direct costs of information seeking) as well as information source 
characteristics, which include accessibility (1997, p. 557). 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Wilson’s updated model of information behaviour 
Wilson, 1999, p. 257 
Reproduced by permission 
 
Wilson (Wilson & Walsh, 1999, p. 253) had expressed criticisms of his own earlier model of 1981:      
“ … [there is no] indication … of the factors that result in the perception of barriers, nor of whether 
the various assumed barriers have similar or different effects upon the motivation of individuals to 
seek information”. His later model (Wilson & Walsh, 1996) introduced a variety of theories to 
address these deficiences; however he has nothing to say about non-accessibility of information as a 
source characteristic and its effects on information seeking other than that “the lack of an easily 
accessible source may inhibit information-seeking altogether” (Wilson, 1997, p. 561).  
  
The concepts of “bounded rationality” and “satisficing” (Simon, 1956) are relevant to the study. 
Bounded rationality theory suggests that, faced with circumstances requiring a decision, people’s 
rationality is limited by the nature of the problem faced, their own cognitive limitations, and the 
time and attention they are able to devote to the issue; thus, they are “rational enough”, or “partly 
rational”, rather than being “absolutely rational” (Pomerol & Adam, 2008). It is common for people 
faced with shortages of time, with information overload, or with uncertainty, to employ a “least 
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effort” information processing strategy, using only those resources that they consider sufficient for a 
“good enough” outcome in the specific context and physical constraints such as of the information 
need; this constitutes satisficing (Prabha et al., 2007). Agosto (2002, cited by Mansourian & Ford, 
2007) suggested the following behavioural categories in relation to information seeking: for 
bounded rationality, time constraints (external or self-imposed), information overload, required 
effort, physical or mental fatigue levels; for satisficing, strategies of reduction (confining the search 
to known sites, using synopses, or categorising searches) and termination (“stop rules”, i.e. when to 
stop a search). Such “stop rules” can involve acceptance, fatigue, boredom and time constraints. 
Satisficing behaviour in information seeking by health professionals and students has been described 
by O’Leary and Ni Mhaolrúnaigh (2012) (Irish nurses), O’Carroll, Westby, Dooley, and Gordon (2015) 
(Canadian medical students) and Grant (2007, cited by MacDonald, 2011) (Canadian health service 
managers). It is readily apparent that non-accessibility of information can be a contributory factor to 
sub-optimal outcomes in “satisficing” behaviour relating to professional information seeking: people 
will look for alternative less suitable sources, or just do without the material that is unavailable.; 
compare the discussion in Section 11.3.2). 
 
Fourie and Claasen-Veldsman (2011) suggest that the concept of information source horizon is 
relevant to clinicians’ information behaviour. An imaginary field is posited in which the information 
seeker selects and positions information sources at different distances according to perceived 
relevance, accessibility, and quality. A horizon line indicates the outermost boundary of the field of 
interest; this is the information source horizon (Sonnenwald, 1999). Such horizons are created within 
the broader context of a perceived information environment, i.e. a set of information sources and 
channels which the information seeker is aware of and may have used in the past. Judgments as to 
how resources are positioned may be based on general values, past experiences; the views and 
attitudes of teachers, supervisors and peers; the situational demands of information-seeking; the 
content of information need; and perceived accessibility and quality of the resources. It is evident 
that such information source horizons will govern information seeking strategies, since they suggest 
which sources should be preferred or avoided (Savolainen & Kari, 2004). 
 
2.4.3 Multi-professional studies
The multi-professional studies based in specialist services examined for the literature review (see 
Table B.1 below in Appendix B) indicated wide variations in access to and use of the Internet and in 
preferences for the types of resources consulted. Overall, the findings represented a pattern of 
moderate online information resource usage. Categories of information need and preferences for 
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different types of online resource (databases, e-journals, e-books, and professional websites) varied 
widely by professional group. Doctors were shown to be more inclined to use online resources than 
nursing or allied health staff. Use of the Google search engine was high among all groups. Obstacles 
to information-seeking were cited in many of these studies. Shortage of time to carry out searches, 
and lack of training in methods of effective searching, were the issues that appeared to loom largest; 
shortages of computer facilities, lack of management support for information seeking, and lack of 
information resources were also mentioned. 
 
2.4.4 Studies of doctors 
Detailed typologies specifically of doctors’ information needs are offered by Gorman (1995), Smith 
(1996), Ebell and Shaughnessy (2003), Florance (1992) and Allen et al. (2003). Information needs 
within primary care and clinical specialties can be said to fall into two broad categories: keeping up 
to date with current research, and answering questions arising in the course of clinical contacts with 
individual patients. Davies (2011a) described the information needs of doctors as relating to 1) 
diagnosis, 2) treatment options for common diseases, 3) information on rare diseases and 
syndromes, 4) drug information, 5) information to give to patients; 6) information for study for 
further qualifications, 7) continuing professional development, 8) research, and 9) teaching. 
 
Doctors’ level of access to the Internet can now be presumed to be universal  (e.g. Davies, 2011a, 
2011b). The 2012 Elsevier survey of European physicians (cited by Walmsley, 2012; n=1093) found 
that use of mobile devices (smartphones, tablets) for professional purposes was widespread and  
increasing. Use of mobile devices may serve to alleviate the time issues that have been identified as 
a barrier to information-seeking (Davies, 2011a). 
 
The ever-increasing size of the biomedical literature, combined with the acute time pressures of 
clinical practice, inevitably creates information overload and major difficulties for clinicians in 
managing information, particularly within primary care, and in following the precepts of evidence-
based medicine (Gorman, 2001; Slawson & Shaughnessy, 2005; Smith, 2010).The volume of 
biomedical research doubles every 20 years (Wyatt & Sullivan, 2005). The use of pre-appraised 
synthesised evidence sources, and an exclusive focus on “patient-orientated evidence that matters”, 
employing a stringent calculus of usefulness, have been advocated as an alternative to the classic 
evidence-based medicine process of critical appraisal of the primary literature (Ebell & Shaughnessy, 
2003). Information needs may, of course, not be recognised. Estimates of the numbers of questions 
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generated in clinical practice vary considerably; a finding of two questions for every three patients, 
however, is typical (Booth, 2005).  
 
For the purposes of this study, which focused on barriers to information seeking and use, it was 
important to consider the following background questions:  
1) What leads an individual doctor to decide to pursue a question or not?  
2) What proportion of questions goes unanswered, and what negative impact do unanswered 
questions have on the quality of clinical care?  
3) What is the mean time allocated or available to answer each clinical question?  
4) What effects might barriers to information seeking have on the processes of clinical information 
seeking and use? Are they a contributory factor in clinical questions going unanswered? 
 
Studies of doctors’ source preferences for clinical information seeking are summarised in Table 2.1 
below. Booth (2005) suggested that as much as one-third of the total number of clinical information 
needs may go unrecognised. Del Fiol, Workman and Gorman (2014, p. 712-713) suggested as a 
conclusion from their systematic review that “Clinicians have many questions in practice—at least 1 
for every 2 patients they see, and although they find answers to most (78% to 87%) of the questions 
they pursue, more than half of their questions are never pursued and thus remain unanswered.” The 
only two significant factors in motivating a doctor to pursue information relating to a clinical 
question were found to be the belief that a definitive answer existed, and the urgency of the 
patient’s problem (Gorman & Helfand, 1995). Strangely, the generalisability of the answer to other 
patients was a negative predictor of information-seeking. Other factors, such as the difficulty of 
finding the answer, potential harm or help to the patient, or self-perceived knowledge of the issue, 
were not significant. 
 
The direct impact of questions going unanswered upon patient care is difficult to establish. Attempts 
have been made, however (e.g. by Schilling, Steiner, Lundahl, & Anderson, 2005), to demonstrate 
the positive impact upon patient care of answered questions, while Westbrook, Coiera and Gosling 
(2005) discussed studies of the impact of online clinical evidence on clinical practice. Bonis, Pickens, 
Rind, and Foster (2008) showed improvements in patient safety, reduced complications and shorter 
length of stay among patients in hospitals in which access was available to the point of care 
resource, UpToDate®, although it was unclear whether the effect was directly causative. Farnan, 
Johnson, Meltzer, Humphrey, and Arora (2008) reported substantially negative outcomes of 
unanswered questions: they analysed the impact of uncertainty in clinical decisions made by medical 
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residents while on call. Of the reported 18 incidents, 12 involved compromises to patient care: 
delays in procedure or escalation of care (n=8), procedural complications (n=2) and cardiac arrest 
(n=2).  
 
The relative merits of Google as a diagnostic aid have been the subject of discussion (Johnson, Chen, 
Eng, Makary, & Fishman, 2008; Lowes, 2007; Sim, Khong, Jiwa, & Moyez, 2008; Tang & Ng, 2006). 
The significance for the present research of the use of general search engines for information-
seeking is in the heterogeneity of the search results and lack of an overt quality filter. Anecdotal 
evidence suggested that YouTube was blocked within many NHS Trusts, and that bandwidth on NHS 
networks could be insufficient to support extensive use of online video. Hughes, Joshi, Lemonde, and 
Wareham (2009), in their study of online information use by junior doctors in the UK, suggested that 
53% of the information they used was Web 2.0 content.  
 
Technical obstacles to information seeking featured only very briefly in these studies, and were 
usually not described in detail. The main obstacles to information seeking were usually cited as lack 
of time, information overload, lack of sufficiently specific information, and lack of search skills. 
Bennett et al. (2006) found that the typical barriers participants encountered were difficulty 
downloading information (24.2%, n=2,385), system too slow (18.2%), too much information to scan 
(40.8%), and specific information not available (53.4%). 
 
The only specific mention of blocked websites found was that of Hughes et al. (2009, p. 651): 
“Improved access to sites was requested. This concern was not an issue of terminal availability, but 
the fact that ubiquitous sites such as Google were often blocked based on the policies of the hospital 
or clinic in question.” This was non-specific in detail, but indicated the blocking of online resources 
that were considered important .   
 
Reported figures for the mean time allocated or available to answer each clinical question vary 
widely according to context and to the resources available, ranging between less than two minutes 
(Ely et al., 1999) to 15 minutes (Ramos, Linscheid, & Schafer, 2003).  
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Authors / Date / 
Country 
Researchers’ 
background 
Research subjects Methods/ 
coverage 
Research focus Findings: preferred sources 
Coumou and 
Meijman 
2006 
Netherlands 
 
Papers from US 
(13), UK (4), 
Netherlands (3), 
Australia (4), 
New Zealand (1) 
 
 
General 
practitioner, 
clinical 
academic 
Studies using 
questionnaires, 
observation, and 
interviews (18); 
qualitative (1) and 
comparative (2) 
studies; and 
reviews (3) (n=21) 
Systematic 
review 
Changes in patterns of 
clinical problem solving by 
primary care physicians 
between 1992 and 2005  
Search strategies used?  
Time spent on them? 
Evaluation of search 
activities and information 
sources? 
 
 
Accessibility rather than quality a major determinant of which 
sources are chosen 
 
Patterns of clinical information seeking not fundamentally altered in 
character over the period in question 
Bennett et al. 
2006 
USA 
University –
based 
researchers, 
medical 
educators 
US-based doctors 
across all 
specialties 
Survey 
(n=2,200) 
 
Structured 
interviews 
with exercises 
411) 
(1) How and when 
physicians pose problems 
and raise questions that 
require information as part 
of reflective practice 
(2) whether setting 
influences patterns of 
Internet information-
seeking 
(3) How barriers to 
information seeking 
influence reflection, (4) 
change in information 
behaviour since 2001 and 
2003 
Preferred sources: 
E-journals (35.5%, n=2,364) 
Professional association websites (27.3%) 
Point-of-care databases (25.1%)  
CME resources (9.2%)  
Colleagues via email (2.9%) 
 
Consultation with colleague often a first preference 
 
Facilitators of Internet searching cited: 
Knowing preferred sites (59.8%) 
Access within the clinical setting (53.2%) 
Effort to improve and refine search skills (36.8%) 
Available technical support (12.5%) 
Protected time for searching (7.4%) 
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Authors / Date / 
Country 
Researchers’ 
background 
Research subjects Methods Research focus Findings: preferred sources 
Parekh, Mayer 
and Rojowsky 
2009 
USA 
Market 
researchers 
working for 
Google 
General 
practitioners, 
endocrinologists, 
psychiatrists, 
cardiologists 
Online survey 
incorporating 
search 
exercises 
based on 
clinical 
scenarios, 
interviews 
(n=411) 
Understand how physicians 
use the Internet in clinical 
practice: 
1) Outline how physicians 
use search 
2) Determine the impact of 
online searches 
3) Evaluate physicians’ 
perceptions of the Internet 
 
Web is major source of health information; 86% had used for 
professional information;  
78% used online CME courses 
77% peer-reviewed journals 
77% pharmaceutical sales representatives 
76% colleagues 
56% books 
54% health-related organisation 
35% magazines 
20% videos / DVDs 
Search engines the top online resource – 81% used (92% Google, 
13% Google Scholar) 
Google / 
Manhattan 
Research 
2012 
USA. 
Market 
research 
company / 
web search 
company 
(anonymous) 
Practising doctors 
 
Online survey 
with 
supplemental 
interviews 
(n=506) 
Reassess physicians’ digital 
adoption across devices and 
media channels, and 
ascertain their use and 
resulting impact 
Online resources (search engines, professional websites, drug 
references, mobile applications) used twice as much as print 
(journals and reference materials) 
 
Search engines main online resource 
Online video widely used for professional updating – mean 3h/wk – 
main platforms Medscape (67%), YouTube (44%) 
 
Davies 
2011 
UK 
USA-based LIS 
academic 
Hospital 
specialists 
GPs 
Online survey 
(n=636) 
Information needs of 
doctors 
Clinical question answering 
Use of computers 
Preferences in locating 
evidence  
Perceived barriers for 
accessing electronic 
information to support 
clinical decision making 
Preferred sources 
 Hospital GP 
Colleagues 
EBM resources 
F/T e-journals 
Other health professionals 
Hard copy textbooks or journals 
2
nd
 
4
th
 
1
st
 
5
th
 
3
rd
 
 
1
st
 
3
rd
 
4
th
 
5
th
 
2
nd
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1. Doctors’ preferred sources for information seeking
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The evident lack of time available highlights the importance of filtered evidence sources such as Map 
of Medicine32, TRIP33, UpToDate®34 and DynaMed35; it also throws into relief the effect of other 
obstacles, in particular system slowness and blocking of websites. It is clear from these findings that, 
if an information need cannot be satisfied within the available time “window”, it will very likely 
remain unmet. This issue is discussed further in Section 11.3.2. 
 
2.4.5 Studies of nurses 
Nurses are numerically by far the largest group of health care professionals, but, while the body of 
nursing research has grown substantially since the 1980s (Carrion, Woods, & Norman, 2004), nurses’ 
information behaviour has not received the same attention from researchers as that of doctors. 
Studies have focused more on hospital nurses rather than on nurses working in primary care settings 
(Randell, Mitchell, Thompson, McCaughan, and Dowding, 2009). Only one substantial literature 
review was found, that of Spenceley, O’Leary, Chizawsky, Ross, and Estabrooks (2008). All registered 
nurses had a professional duty to keep their skills and knowledge up to date and to underpin their 
practice with research evidence (Department of Health, 1999; Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2015, 
2011).  
 
Information about nurses’ access to and use of the Internet is relatively sparse. The general 
assumption in recent information behaviour studies is that Internet access, at least in principle, is 
universal. Nurses require to access professional information to answer questions that arise in clinical 
practice and to update and extend their professional knowledge, and consumer health information 
to provide or to discuss with patients and families, since patient education is an important aspect of 
nursing work in many contexts (Anderson & Klemm, 2008; Gilmour, Huntington, Broadbent, Strong, 
& Hawkins, 2011; Gilmour, Scott, & Huntington, 2008; Jones, Schilling, & Pesut, 2011). As in the 
studies of doctors’ information behaviour, research has focused mostly on the clinical decisions 
made by nurses as indicators of information need, which may not do justice to the exigencies of 
nursing work and resulting complexities of clinical uncertainty and information-seeking in nursing 
(French, 2006), or of implementing evidence-based practice in context (Rycroft-Malone, 2008; Scott, 
Estabrooks, Allen, & Pollock, 2008; Scott-Findlay & Golden-Biddle, 2005).  
                                                          
 
32
 Map of Medicine: http://mapofmedicine.com/  
33
 TRIP: Turning Research Into Practice: https://www.tripdatabase.com 
34
 UpToDate®: http://www.uptodate.com/home  
35
 DynaMed: http://www.dynamed.com/home/log-in  
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Estabrooks et al. (2005) found that nurses categorised information sources in four broad groupings: 
social interactions, experiential knowledge, documentary sources, and a priori knowledge. They 
discovered that nurses tend to prefer interactive and experiential sources of knowledge over more 
formal sources such as journal articles and texts. Studies of nurses’ information behaviour (e.g. 
Cogdill, 2003) generally report a preference for human information sources. Thompson et al. 
(Randell et al., 2009; Thompson et al., 2001a, 2001b; Thompson et al., s.d.; Thompson, Cullum, 
McCaughan, Sheldon, & Raynor, 2004) found in 180 hours of observation involving 1080 clinical 
decisions that only two forms of text-based information were used: local protocols or guidelines 
(four times), and the British National Formulary (50 times). Library use among the nurses within the 
services they investigated was almost exclusively associated with continuing professional 
development or formal education. Librarians were not perceived as accessible, although the 
information literacy training they provided was in heavy demand. The nurses tended to use sources 
they knew and trusted, regardless of the nature of the problem or clinical decision involved. In their 
survey based in two English hospitals, Marshall, West & Aitken's finding (2011) of a “pervasive oral 
culture” (p. 232) is typical: a preference for colleagues as information sources as being most useful 
and accessible, and a rejection of the possibility of using electronic resources owing to lack of time. 
The perceived usefulness of information appeared to be premised on ease of use and access rather 
than on accuracy and completeness.  
 
Nurses’ lack of access to information may reflect processes of social exclusion and disempowerment 
within clinical settings, relating in particular to the location of computers on the wards (Adams, 
Blandford, & Lunt, 2005; Adams & Blandford, 2002b, 2001). These researchers, who investigated 
digital library implementation within a large London teaching hospital, also found that many senior 
staff members perceived the Internet as a threat to their status, as providing open access to 
information sources while offering the potential for misuse (i.e. non-work-related use). “Although 
digital libraries do not deal with sensitive personal information, apparently innocuous data can also 
be perceived as a threat to social and political structures” (Adams, Blandford, & Lunt, 2005, p. 179). 
Senior staff members also expressed information literacy concerns regarding open access to 
information sources, and tended to think of computers as supporting research, and therefore not 
necessary on the wards. The influences of workplace cultural factors on information-seeking to 
promote evidence-based practice, particularly the importance of fostering a positive climate for 
learning and growth, and the encouragement of staff input into practice change, were emphasised  
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by Bertulis and Cheeseborough (2008), Bond (2009), Gifford and associates (Gifford, Davies, 
Edwards, Griffin, & Lybanon, 2007) and Veeramah (2004). 
 
Lack of time to search for information while at work is reported as the most significant barrier to 
nurses’ information-seeking in virtually every study that has been examined (e.g. Dee & Stanley, 
2005a; Dee & Stanley, 2005b; Gerrish, 2006; Gilmour, Huntington, Broadbent, Strong, & Hawkins, 
2011; Jones, Schilling, & Pesut, 2011). Nurses’ work is highly pressurised in nature, particularly in an 
era of financial stringency and inadequate staffing levels. Respondents in the 2004 Royal College of 
Nursing information needs survey (Bertulis & Cheeseborough, 2008) reported needing protected 
time to study. Staff may be unable to leave their clinical area to visit a library or to use computers 
elsewhere (Gosling, Westbrook, & Spencer, 2004). The perception of lack of time for information-
seeking may be associated with negative attitudes to computers: the view that use of information 
technology does not form part of “proper” nursing, “hands-on” patient care being the priority (Blair, 
2006; Bond, 2009; Carney et al., 2004; Farmer, Richardson, & Lawton, 1999; Gerrish et al., 2006; 
Gilmour et al., 2011; MacIntosh-Murray & Choo, 2005). Staff may experience conflict between using 
the Internet and providing clinical care (Eley, Fallon, Soar, Buikstra, & Hegney, 2009; Estabrooks, 
O’Leary, Ricker, & Humphrey, 2003; McKenna & McLelland, 2011). Thompson, O'Leary and Jensen 
(2008) suggest that nurses who complain of lack of time to utilise research are actually referring to a 
“culture of busyness” within nursing (p. 544) and to the mental time and energy needed to reflect 
on, plan and apply research results within complex environments. However, it is thought possible 
(e.g. Doran et al., 2010; Honeybourne, Sutton, & Ward, 2006) that use of mobile devices could offer 
an effective way of improving the accessibility and uptake of evidence-based practice information in 
a time-poor environment.  
 
A number of recent British studies (Callaghan, Doherty, Lea, & Webster, 2008; Raynor, 2009; Shaw & 
Lloyd, 2013) discuss the information needs and use of nursing and other health care students on 
placement. Participants in Shaw and Lloyd’s (2013) survey reported difficulties in accessing 
information resources within clinical areas caused by inability of students to obtain Trust network 
logins or by shortages of computers. They also reported problems with lack of Wi-Fi access in 
student residences, requiring students to purchase their own mobile Internet solutions (i.e. dongles) 
using public networks. It was apparent from the findings that students’ access to Trust computing 
facilities depended substantially on local Trust policies, notwithstanding all the efforts made by 
university and Trust library services to ensure equitable and timely access to information resources. 
The findings of Moule, Ward, and Lockyer (2010), who investigated the adoption of e-learning in 
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health sciences education, were similar regarding access to information resources within clinical 
areas. Health professional participants in the study of information skills training and mediated 
searching by Brettle, Hulme, and Ormandy (2007) reported “slow networks or lines” and lack of  
access to computers as barriers to search activity, partly on account of the lack of time available to 
conduct searches. 
 
Blocking or limitation of access to the web was referred to in a number of studies, although the 
information given was often insufficiently specific to be useful. Apart from actual blocking of access, 
slow Internet speeds and restricted access to computing facilities for nursing staff and students were 
reported. A general picture emerged of limited computer access, “protective” attitudes towards 
computer facilities on the part of some staff, and negative attitudes towards Internet use in the 
course of clinical work (Duffy, 2000; Raynor, 2009; Westerman and Hurt, 2007).  
 
2.4.6 Studies of health service managers 
Health service managers constitute a heterogeneous group, which includes substantial numbers of 
clinicians with management responsibilities, sometimes referred to as “hybrid” managers, and both 
specialist and general management roles. Their work is diverse, covering a wide range of strategic, 
policy and operational matters (Green, 2011).  Their attitudes and behaviour relating to information 
seeking are of particular interest; they not only involve their own work, but may also, via their 
influences in the shaping of workplace cultures of information seeking and evidence-based practice, 
substantially influence other professional groups’ access to published information;  cf. the discussion 
in Section 2.4.5 above.  
 
It is assumed for present purposes that this group have access to the Internet at work via desktop or 
laptop computers. It is suggested that the questions of interest for the purposes of the research are 
as follows:  
1) What level of priority do they accord to “evidence-based” management practice and 
decision-making? 
2) What are their preferred sources of information? 
3) What problems or barriers do they encounter in finding and using information? 
 
There have been relatively few studies of the information behaviour of health service managers 
from a LIS perspective. Other than MacDonald’s work, carried out in Canada (MacDonald, Bath, & 
Booth, 2008; MacDonald, Bath, & Booth, 2011; MacDonald, 2011) only the work of Niedźwiedzka 
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(2003) in Poland, of McDiarmid, Kendall, and Binns (2007) again in Canada, and the highly detailed 
study by Edwards et al. (2013) involving NHS managers in England, appeared directly relevant.  
According to Walshe and Rundall (2001, p. 441), “the managerial culture is intensely pragmatic, and 
values the application of ideas in practice more than it does the search for knowledge about those 
ideas. Managers … are sometimes actively suspicious of the motives and values of research and 
researchers”, and thereby neutral or antagonistic towards the ideas of evidence-based practice.  
 
Edwards et al.’s (2013) study indicated a wide diversity of habits and patterns of information 
resource use (internal, external, “academic”) by job role and type or work.  (The the extent to which 
each type of source is use is important in considering access to information, since external and 
academic information are most likely to be found online.) Explicit information need was associated 
with involvement in strategic planning, as were high-priority tasks, new tasks or high-risk tasks. 
Online sources of external information, such as search engines and “official” websites (NICE/NHS 
Evidence, the former DH website, etc.) and also internal sources (policy documents, etc.) were 
heavily used. Other people (own staff, experts, colleagues, peers in other organisations) were also 
extensively used and consulted. Generally, relatively low use was made of formal information 
sources and services such as health care libraries, bibliographic? databases, books and journals, 
although a correlation was demonstrated between use of “academic” sources and level of 
education, with those with postgraduate degrees being the most likely to use such sources. A 
considerable amount of information sharing and knowledge brokering took place, thereby 
facilitating understanding of other groups’ professional cultures (Lomas, 2007). Meetings, 
conference and workshops provided important information channels. The respondents’ rating of 
attitude statements indicated a preference for summaries of research, practical demonstrations or 
“what works” (cf. the comment of Walsh and Rundall (2001) quoted above regarding the intensely 
pragmatic nature of health service management culture), and the perception of a strongly “political” 
aspect to decision-making. Some differences were identified between NHS Trusts in the degree to  
which the culture supported information seeking and use. However, there was little evidence to link 
these with measures of Trust organisational performance. 
 
Significant barriers to information access and use by health service managers have been identified. 
Respondents in Edwards et al.’s study (2013) referred to lack of time (most important), information 
overload, lack of a central source of NHS information, delays in cascading information from the DH, 
“slow computers and out-of-date software” (p. 110), difficulty in searching for information resulting 
from lack of organisational stability within the NHS (NHS bodies keep disappearing or changing their 
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names), and the difficulty of understanding and applying academic research (least important). The 
majority of respondents were generally of the opinion that it was difficult to find information.  
 
2.4.7 Summary and synthesis 
This section has provided an outline of selected theories of information behaviour. It has also 
offered an overview of studies of the information behaviour of selected groups of health 
professionals: doctors, nurses, and managers. A high level of heterogeneity was apparent in health 
professionals’ information behaviour between professional groups, within professional groups in 
different job roles, and between comparable groups within different organisations. There were also 
differences in levels of access to information. Wide differences between professions in attitudes to 
information-seeking, and cultural attitudes to evidence-based practice, appeared to explain much of 
this variation. While time factors in information-seeking were frequently discussed indirectly, as in 
the many references to lack of time, and the comparative accessibility and convenience of online 
resources, very little direct consideration was given in the reported studies to time frames or 
degrees of urgency in seeking information; the work of Reddy and Dourish (2002) was an exception. 
This represents a research gap in an area related to the present study; without a wider range of 
studies being available that address time frames or degrees of urgency in information seeking, it is 
difficult to evaluate the impacts of barriers, in which time appears to be a major factor. Technical 
obstacles , including blocking of websites, slow network and Internet speeds, and (in the case of 
nurses and nursing students) restricted access to computing facilities were referred to in a number 
of studies (see 2.7.4 below), although the information given was often lacking in specific detail.  
 
As discussed in Section 2.4.6 above, Edwards et al. (2013) were able to demonstrate correlations 
between attitudes to information seeking and approaches to information seeking in general, and use 
of external academic sources of information in particular, among health service managers. Evidence 
was also found of negative attitudes to information seeking and to the Internet as a root cause of 
the problems of nurses, allied health professionals and nursing students on placement in securing 
access to computer facilities (Adams & Blandford, 2001, 2002; Raynor, 2009; Ward & Moule, 2007; 
Westerman & Hurt, 2007). Anandarajan, Paravastu and Simmers (2006) identified and described 
what they termed a “cyber-bureaucrat” profile of viewpoints in relation to personal web use at work 
(PWU), characterised by an emphasis on its possible adverse consequences, and on the need to 
exert managerial control it via technical methods, policies and monitoring. Such a profile appears to 
characterise accurately the attitudes described above, and appears generalisable to web use of any 
sort, not only PWU. 
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2.5 Organisational cultures and subcultures 
2.5.1 Theories of organisational culture 
Organisational culture is a complex and contested subject within organisation studies (Martin, Frost, 
& O’Neill, 2006; Smircich, 1983). There is no agreed definition of culture within the field of social 
anthropology; it is no surprise, therefore, that organisation theorists have taken up different 
concepts of culture from anthropology (Smircich, 1983) and that there is little agreement on 
definitions of organisational culture. The definition of Schein (1996) is the best known, and the most 
widely cited by information security specialists. His definition focuses on basic tacit assumptions: 
“how things are done around here” (p. 11). A longer version is as follows: “A pattern of shared basic 
assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal 
integration that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new 
members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.” (Schein, 
1992, p. 12, cited by MacIntosh-Murray & Choo, 2005). In this model, organisational culture 
operates at three levels: of deep tacit assumptions; of espoused values and the norms that derive 
from them; and of day-to-day behaviour and artifacts. Basic assumptions are taken for granted and 
therefore invisible; values and norms are more recognisable, particularly when they are challenged, 
but may remain hidden and unconscious (Kolkowska, 2011); artifacts are visible, but often 
indecipherable. Organisational culture may be reflected in organisational structure, control systems, 
and power structures (Johnson and Scholes, 1993, cited by Nord & Nord, 2007).  
 
2.5.2 Occupational cultures and subcultures 
It is easier than with the concept of organisational culture to offer a working definition of subculture. 
A subculture, according to Hatch (2006, p. 176), is “a subset of an organization’s members that 
identify themselves as a distinct group within the organization and routinely take action on the basis 
of their unique collective understandings”. Subcultures may reflect shared professional, gendered, 
racial, ethnic or occupational identities as well as national or regional cultural influences. The 
existence of subcultures can create “silos” and barriers to communication and effective teamwork 
(Van Maanen and Barley, 1984, cited by Hatch, 2006). Occupational communities represent a 
particular type of subculture; according to Van Maanen and Barley, 1984, cited by MacIntosh-
Murray, 2006), they are:  
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“ … groups of people who consider themselves to be engaged in the same sort of work; 
whose identity is drawn from the work; who share with one another a set of values, norms 
and perspectives that applies to but extends beyond work-related matters; and whose social 
relationships meld work and leisure” (p. 364).  
 
Occupational cultures relate to distinctive clusters of ideologies, beliefs, cultural forms, and 
practices; they arise from shared educational, personal and work experiences of individuals who 
pursue the same profession. Such cultures transcend organisational boundaries (Trice, 1993). 
Subcultures differ from the organisational culture in which they are embedded; they may intensify 
aspects of the predominant organisational culture or diverge from it entirely. Differences among 
occupational subcultures can lead to organisational conflict and dysfunction (Trice, 1993). A number 
of “signs” indicate the character of an occupational subgroup: ethnocentrism and feelings of 
superiority related to other groups; the use of esoteric knowledge; being subject to extreme 
demands; and complaints about members of other subcultures (Trice, 1993). 
 
2.5.3 Information technology staff subcultures and attitudes 
Several studies exist of putative information technology staff subcultures. With the intention of 
identifying the nature of the IT staff occupational subculture, and the extent to which subcultural 
conflict was contributing to dysfunction within the host organisation, Guzman et al. (2004) 
undertook semi-structured interviews (n=121) with information technology (IT) staff, end-users and 
managers across eight small to medium-sized non-profit-making organisations of different types, 
located in the United States. They found indications that IT staff formed a distinctive occupational 
subculture: within the responses, consistent with Trice’s claims about occupational cultures (see 
above, section 2.3.2), were evidence of esoteric knowledge (e.g. maintaining a system single-
handedly), extreme demands (heavy workloads and unsocial hours), and complaints about end-
users. The researchers also identified characteristic symbols (typical settings, unique vocabulary, and 
stories) and a marked ethnocentrism: feelings of superiority reinforced by the technical vocabulary 
of IT, and a tendency to blame end-users for systems failures, with a corresponding distrust of end-
users, and desire to restrict end-user functionality in an effort to retain control of the systems. IT 
staff tended to stereotype end-users as technophobic or distrustful of IT, difficult to communicate 
with, and ignorant of technical priorities. End-users, in turn, tended to stereotype IT staff as having 
poor communication skills, being poor at training, given to using impenetrable jargon, and 
unresponsive to requests for help. The managers expressed their need to rely on the IT staff to 
maintain systems and safeguard the organisation from external threats. The authors suggested that  
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communication dysfunctions between IT staff and end-users could potentially exert considerable 
negative effects on organisational functioning (Guzman et al., 2004). 
 
Doctoral research by Jacks (2012) involved semi-structured interviews (n=25) with IT workers in 32 
United States-based companies, on the basis of which survey instruments for IT staff and board 
members were developed, administered and analysed . His research aim was to explore the values 
which were collectively important to IT staff. He identified reverence for knowledge, innovation, 
structure, autonomy, precision and enjoyment as the most important values of the IT occupational 
culture, with reverence for knowledge central to the scheme as the value on which others depend. 
The opposites of these values (hacking, disorganisation, technological stagnation) were regarded 
with particular distaste and were to be avoided at all costs. Jacks suggested that a fundamental 
cause of the antagonism between IT workers and other groups was an apparent lack of regard for IT 
workers’ core values. Other aspects of the IT occupational culture have been identified: Chase (2008) 
highlighted the need for constant re-training and learning, and Ramachandran and Rao (2006) the 
insularity, while Kostera and Postuła (2011) identified a resistance to categorisation and a need for 
autonomy. The researcher was unable to locate any research in this area relating specifically to the 
public sector, or to the United Kingdom; this represents a research gap in a field bearing on the 
current study. 
   
2.5.4 Inter-professional conflicts: professional jurisdiction 
Professionalism in the so-called collegial professions can be seen as representing a form of 
organisation and social control of expert occupational groups. Evetts (2003, p. 4) suggested that 
there is an inherent link between professionalism and risk: professions can be viewed as structural, 
occupational and institutional arrangements for “dealing with work associated with the 
uncertainties of modern lives in risk societies”. The concept of the risk society is associated 
particularly with Beck (1992) and Giddens, who defineds it (1999, p. 3), as "a society increasingly 
preoccupied with the future (and also with safety), which generates the notion of risk". 
Freidson (1994, cited by Paton, Hodgson, & Muzio, 2013, p. 228) described the arrangement as a 
“regulative bargain”, “whereby the state protects professionals from unfettered competition but 
trusts them to put public interest before their own”. Hafferty (2006, p. 197), in the context 
specifically of medicine, similarly speaks of “a social contract between medicine and society”. A 
measure of self-regulation, occupational roles affording wide degrees of autonomy and self-
governance, (sometimes) chartered status for professional bodies, a monopoly of the relevant areas 
of work, and high monetary rewards, are afforded to these groups on condition of fulfilment of 
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requirements by their members, generally involving lengthy, professionally-governed training and 
adherence to prescribed standards of conduct. Members of these professions are thereby trusted by 
society to act in their patients’ / clients’ best interests, and are accorded a corresponding level of 
authority over their clients (Lambert, Herbert, & Rothwell, 2013). From this viewpoint, 
professionalism can be seen not only as a normative value system (Evetts, 2013), but as a strategy to 
gain occupational power (Fincham, 2006). As strategies of professionalisation are pursued, processes 
of conflict and completion between different professional and occupational groups are likely to 
occur.  
 
Abbott’s theory of professions (Abbott, 1988, 1998) provides a useful way for considering these. His 
work was based upon an extensive historical review of professions both in the United States and in 
Europe. He conceived of equilibrium within an interacting system of professions, where the 
individual professions compete with each other within the workplace and in the broader public 
arena to establish what he terms jurisdiction over intellectual and practical territory. “[A] jurisdiction 
is an abstract space composed of a set of tasks, often called professional problems.” (O’Connor, 
2009, p. 285). A profession establishes jurisdiction by identifying a set of tasks that comprise its work 
and then putting forward a convincing claim that it alone is qualified to perform those tasks 
(O’Connor, 2009). According to Abbott’s theory, 
“ … the chief characteristic of professional work is education in an abstract, academic 
knowledge base that provides the context in which to learn procedures … academic 
knowledge legitimizes a profession’s claims that its expert work effectively addresses the 
problems it has defined.” (Dalrymple, 2002, p. 314).  
 
Note that competitive tactics involve not only the acquisition of new skills or craft-based knowledge, 
but also a new intellectual framework: a profession will try to “expand [its] cognitive dominion by 
using abstract knowledge to annex new areas, to define them as [its] own proper work” (Abbott, 
1988, p. 102) and confirm the legitimacy of its practice. Membership of a profession thus inevitably 
creates boundaries in relation to other professions that are cognitive, as well as social; these 
boundaries may hinder the diffusion of innovations (Dopson & Fitzgerald, 2005).  
 
Within an particular institution, a profession is able, through its ability to create, legitimise and 
control knowledge and practices, to shape institutional arrangements that privilege its own 
jurisdictional claims (Currie, Lockett, Finn, Martin, & Waring, 2012). Once having established a 
jurisdiction, the profession needs then to accredit its members via the mechanisms afforded by 
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educational qualifications and professional associations, and possibly also campaign to establish a 
legally- protected monopoly. It is thereby able to protect its jurisdiction from two types of outsiders, 
the public and other professions, and to entrench its position within the labour market. External and 
internal developments, such as technological advances, organisational restructuring or changes in 
regulation, can disturb an existing equilibrium between professions, resulting in jostling for position 
and readjustments arising from new jurisdictional claims.  
 
According to this account of the mechanisms of professional jurisdiction, disputes over professional 
territory can be resolved in a number of different ways, with varying levels of stability. These include 
stratification, sometimes involving the development of hierarchies, within a professional group. This 
is apparent within accountancy, for example, with its clear differentiation into cost and management 
accountants, public sector accountants, and auditors (Kotb, Roberts, & Sian, 2012) or perhaps less 
formally in librarianship, where clear divisions exist between academic, public, and special librarians, 
health librarians constituting a large group of the latter. While processes of stratification may be 
observable within the health informatics professions, where, for instance, clear demarcations 
appear to exist between the main areas of the HICF, evidence will be presented in Chapter 4 of a 
blurring of boundaries, and consequent “turf wars”, in some areas within the case study 
organisations. The establishment and maintenance of a jurisdiction via the motivations and 
processes described by Abbott and others has been described as a “professional project” (e.g. 
Larson, 1977). Information technology practitioners (Ensmenger, 2001; Iivari, Hirschheim, & Klein, 
2008; Zwerman, 1999) and particularly information security practitioners (Burley, Eisenberg, & 
Goodman, 2014; Reece & Stahl, 2015) have historically been resistant to processes of 
professionalisation beyond the establishment of professional education and certification schemes. 
Information technology practitioners as a group within the United Kingdom are said to be marked by 
“weak professionalisation” (Fincham, 2006, p. 20); this has a bearing on how professional projects in 
health informatics are pursued. 
 
2.5.5 The NHS as an organisation  
2.5.5.1 Introduction 
As well as a general overview of the NHS (Section 1.4), it is essential to provide some account of its 
organisational character. As an organisation, the NHS has frequently been characterised as a 
“professional bureaucracy” (Hanna, 2008; Harrison & Smith, 2003, citing Mintzberg, 1991; Hyde et 
al., 2013) operating within an environment of New Public Management. It has a hybrid character, 
insofar as it is governed by bureaucratic norms in respect of routine administrative and accounting 
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functions, but governed by professional autonomy, exempt from bureaucratic constraints, in respect 
of its dealings with patients and with its own staff. The hallmarks of bureaucracy, as proposed 
originally by Weber (1947), are said to be: a hierarchy of officers, rational-legal authority exercised 
impersonally through the abstract application of policy or procedural rules to particular cases, 
authority of officials deriving solely from their official role, a systematic division of labour based 
upon functional specialisation, impersonality of interpersonal relations, appointment of officials on 
expertise and merit, and formal record-keeping. Bureaucratic organisational forms are associated 
also with a high level of centralisation in policy making and allocation of resources (Exworthy, 
Powell, & Mohan, 1999; Hall, 1963). 
 
New Public Management (NPM), an established trend within the public sector since the 1980s based 
on neoliberal principles, is said to consist of four main elements: an efficiency drive; cultural change; 
downsizing, flattening of hierarchies and decentralisation; and a public sector orientation (Currie & 
Procter, 2005). It is associated also with prominence given to targets established and monitored by 
external regulators, the fulfilment of which is financially incentivised, with competition introduced 
via market mechanisms (Dunleavy, 2005), with an emphasis on accountability and transparency, and 
with the adoption of private-sector modes of organisation and governance (Clatworthy, Mellett, & 
Peel, 2000). The practical effect of implementation of NPM has often been to strengthen political 
and senior management control and to increase bureaucratic tendencies; local managerial 
autonomy may be largely restricted by extensive centrally dictated targets (Hoque, Davis, & 
Humphreys, 2004). The impact of NPM upon professional groups is said to be highly variable 
according to the nature of the profession (Farrell & Morris, 2003; Fitzgerald & Ferlie, 2000).  
 
Historically, the medical profession has enjoyed a high level of autonomy within the NHS, considered 
at all levels: at the micro level (control over diagnosis, treatment and work patterns, evaluation of 
work, and nature and volume of tasks), the meso level (relations with the state) or the macro level 
(the status of the “biomedical model”). As well as management reforms following the principles of 
NPM, recent decades have seen the growth within the NHS of the evidence-based practice (EBP) 
movement and the introduction of clinical governance, all of which are widely considered to have 
limited medical autonomy (Allsop, 2006; Davies & Harrison, 2003; Greener, Harrington, Hunter, & 
Powell, 2011; Harrison & Ahmad, 2000; Harrison & Checkland, 2009; Harrison & Lim, 2003; Harrison 
& Smith, 2003; Hewitt & Thomas, 2007). Flynn (2002) suggests that , with the advent of clinical 
governance, the NHS is increasingly moving from a professional bureaucracy to a “machine 
bureaucracy”, i.e. one in which “encoded knowledge” –  that is, collective, explicit knowledge, 
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codified, subject to organisational control, and stored within policies, guidelines and procedures 
(Lam, 2000) – has become the dominant knowledge type, rather than the “embrained knowledge” 
characteristic of professional bureaucracies.  
 
Despite increasing levels of regulation and managerial control, NHS managers’ ability to control 
service delivery may still be considerably constrained by the need to have regard to the interests of 
the professionals who form the “professional operating core” of the organisation, i.e. doctors and 
other clinicians, with whom operational knowledge lies. Doctors in particular may exercise a 
collective power of veto over decisions that they perceive to be against their professional interests. 
Managers depend upon clinicians for the achievement of centrally-prescribed targets and objectives; 
if clinicians do not accept the legitimacy of processes or targets, they can withhold their co-
operation, even to the point of sabotage. Hence, managers need clinicians to trust them (Brown, 
Alaszewski, Pilgrim, & Calnan, 2011). 
 
2.5.5.2 Public distrust, risk and regulation 
Health services in Britain and elsewhere have witnessed since the 1990s, in response to a number of 
high-profile scandals involving poor practice and outcomes, the design and introduction of 
monitoring and surveillance frameworks that limit the capacity for individual discretion to manage 
risks. A variety of checking mechanisms (the introduction of the clinical governance system and 
national service frameworks, changes in professional regulation, the setting up of the National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence and the Commission for Health Improvement – now the Care Quality 
Commission) were introduced to ensure the quality of health care provided by clinicians and of the 
management of NHS organisations In Britain (Alaszewski & Horlick-Jones, 2002). The history of these 
developments is charted by Ham, Berwick, and Dixon (2016). These initiatives have been defended 
politically on the basis that they engender confidence and secure public trust in health service 
institutions. However, the underlying assumptions of this emphasis on regulation and inspection 
have been challenged by health policy researchers on a number of fronts, as they relate to: the 
nature of trust and of risk, the increased rationalisation of health service provision, the alterations in 
professional practice and relations, the erosion of embodied, tacit knowledge, and the contradictory 
pressures they can create within managers’ roles (Brown, Alaszewski, Pilgrim, & Calnan, 2011; 
Hillman et al., 2013). As such, although these systems and practices may improve the overall quality 
and consistency of care, they have the perverse effect of generating public distrust. Clinicians who 
were formerly trusted to manage their own performance are likely to experience governance 
systems as expressing mistrust in their professional abilities, and they may, in turn, exhibit mistrust 
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of those whom they perceive as advocates and implementers of the new system, i.e. middle and 
senior managers (Brown et al., 2011; Brown, 2008). Moreover, it has been found impossible in 
practice to eliminate the need for tacit knowledge in clinical decision making. Meanwhile, according 
to Maddock (2002), risk-averse cultures within the NHS and other public sector organisations create 
a barrier to positive organisational change; while the government continues its attempts to drive  
transformation, it does so “via closed-systems thinking and the belief in the risk-free solution”  
(p. 15).36  
 
In their discussion of medical professionalism, Currie et al. (2012) highlighted the concern of policy 
makers with managing risk, and thus the importance of theorising about risk as a basis for 
legitimating and maintaining professional power. From this perspective, theorising about risk and its 
management is particularly effective as a professional strategy, since it is likely to enjoy heightened 
legitimacy among a wide range of actors. The risk discourses of information governance and IT 
managers in the NHS – whereby a particular application or activity XXX is identified as an information 
security or cybersecurity risk requiring to be managed by themselves according to measures that 
they prescribe – can therefore be seen as a highly “political” in nature. It is suggested on the basis of 
the foregoing discussion that aversion to risk (Alaszewski & Horlick-Jones, 2002; Maddock, 2002; 
Matthews, 2009), high levels of regulation, and low levels of organisational trust are characteristic of 
the NHS as an organisation. Other aspects of risk are discussed below in Sections 2.6 and 2.7.1. 
 
2.5.5.3 Staff engagement, organisational values and organisational trust 
Three areas closely related to organisational culture are those of staff engagement, organisational 
values and organisational trust. The NHS Constitution (Department of Health, 2015) stated that: 
“All staff should have rewarding and worthwhile jobs, with the freedom and confidence to 
act in the interest of patients. To do this, they need to be trusted, actively listened to and 
provided with meaningful feedback. They must be treated with respect at work, have the 
tools, training and support to deliver compassionate care, and opportunities to develop and 
progress.” 
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Considerable attention to staff engagement has been paid as an organisational priority within the 
NHS on account of the clear relationships that have been demonstrated between engagement and 
aspects of organisational performance or effectiveness: staff health and wellbeing, staff turnover, 
absenteeism, morale, patient satisfaction, and clinical outcomes, including mortality (Harter, 
Schmidt, Kilham, & Agrawal, 2009; Mailley, 2011; Topakas & Dawson, 2010; West & Dawson, 2012; 
West, Topakas, & Dawson, 2014).  
 
Sir Robert Francis’s Report of the Mid-Staffordshire Foundation Trust inquiry highlighted in its 
recommendations the importance of “of a common culture shared by all in the service of putting the 
patient first” (Francis, 2013, volume 1, p. 13). To enable staff engagement, it is suggested that a 
coherent set of organisational values and behaviours needs be developed and adopted, preferably 
with extensive staff involvement, and thereafter upheld by senior managers and embedded within 
organisational processes (in particular human resources processes), so that formally stated values 
are reflected in everyday behaviour (Black, 2012; McLeod & Clarke, 2009, cited by Dromey, 2014). 
Among the organisational factors cited as leading to greater staff engagement are effective channels 
of communication, availability of the necessary information for staff to do their jobs well, learning 
opportunities, concern overall for staff health and wellbeing, and trust by staff in their supervisors 
and leaders. At the organisational level, it is considered necessary to build and develop cultures of 
reciprocal trust: staff need to feel both that they are able to trust their leaders, their managers and 
the system as a whole, and that they are themselves trusted within the organisation to do their jobs 
(Holmes et al., 2014; Robinson, Perryman, & Hayday, 2004; West & Dawson, 2012; West, Dawson, 
Admasachew, & Topakas, 2011). The latter is a form of what is sometimes referred to as ascribed 
trust (Sunderland, 2000) or attributed trust (Box & Pottas, 2014). Trust, according to Mayer and 
associates (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007), is based upon the 
trustor’s perceptions of the competence, benevolence and integrity of the trustee. This applies at 
interpersonal, inter-group, or inter-organisational levels. Managers’ trust of staff, according to 
Powell (2016, p. 8), is “based on the belief that people have a strong intrinsic motivation to perform 
to the best of their abilities” and is associated with the development of an organisational culture 
that encourages risk-taking and avoids blame. Bozeman and Kingsley (1998) found that perceived 
trust in employees by senior managers was a key determinant of risk culture, rather than internal 
organisational controls in general. They suggested that clarity of goals and organisational trust in 
general foster positive attitudes to risk; formalisation and “red tape”, however, inhibit them; cf. the 
proposed theoretical model in Section 11.1. 
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“Engagement” is a somewhat contested concept lacking an agreed definition at an academic level 
(Purcell, 2014; Truss, Alfes, Delbridge, Shantz, & Soane, 2013). One of the main persectives on 
engagement identified  by Shuck (2011) describes and defines engagement as the antithesis of 
burnout as defined by Leiter & Maslach (2003, p. 93), a state characterised by “a psychological 
syndrome of exhaustion, cynicism and inefficacy which is experienced in response to chronic job 
stressors”. Work engagement, in this perspective, is characterised by energy, enthusiasm and 
efficacy: the antithesis of burnout. The authors had previously identified (Maslach and Leiter, 1997, 
1999, cited by Leiter and Maslach, 2003) six areas of so-called job-person mismatch which are 
critically implicated in burnout: these are workload, control (employees’ perceived ability to 
influence decisions affecting their work), reward (the extent to which the rewards of the job – 
intrinsic, social and monetary –  accord with expectations), community (the overall quality of social 
interaction at work), fairness (the extent to which decisions at work are perceived as being fair, and 
people treated with respect), and values (alignment of the motivations and ideals that originally 
attracted a person to the job with the values expressed in its actual practice within the organisation).  
 
Within the Institute for Employment Studies (IES) model of staff engagement, the characteristics of 
an engaged workforce are summarised as “motivation, satisfaction, commitment, finding meaning at 
work, and pride in and advocacy for the organisation” (Mailley, 2011, p. 7). Since 2009, the annual 
NHS Staff Survey (NHS Employers, 2017)37 which is intended to gather views on staff experience at 
work in key areas, has included questions covering three key areas of staff engagement: staff 
advocacy, motivation, and involvement. The overall staff engagement score is computed from 
indicators relating to the characteristics of an engaged workforce given above.  
 
Staff engagement is closely related to the construct of empowerment as discussed in the previous 
section. Intuitively one might expect that those staff who perceive themselves as empowered within 
their organisation will also be more highly engaged than those who do not. This supposition is 
confirmed by much recent human resources management research. For Cattermole, Johnson, and 
Roberts (2013), empowerment is an important precondition of staff engagement. Greco et al. (2006) 
developed and tested a model that integrated Kanter’s organisational empowerment theory with 
Maslach and Leiter’s work engagement model as described above (Maslach & Leiter, 1997, cited by 
Greco et al., 2006), according to which empowerment should result in higher levels of engagement; 
                                                          
 
37
 NHS Staff Survey: http://www.nhsstaffsurveys.com/Page/1056/Home/NHS-Staff-Survey-2016/  
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their findings supported the proposed model (as shown in Figure 2.3 below).
 
Figure 2.3 Proposed model: the effect of empowering behaviours on work engagement / burnout  
Greco et al., 2006, p. 47, Reproduced by permission 
 
The relationships of structural empowerment with areas of work life, as identified by Maslach and 
Leiter, have been extensively investigated by Laschinger and associates (e.g. Laschinger & Finegan, 
2004; Laschinger, Finegan, & Shamian, 2001; Laschinger et al., 2010; Laschinger, 2008; Laschinger, 
Wilk, Cho, & Greco, 2009) in relation to nursing care outcomes. Within the same conceptualisation 
of engagement, a more direct relationship can be posited between engagement/burnout and job 
demands and resources. The job demands–resources model (Demerouti, Bakker, Nachreiner, & 
Schaufeli, 2001, cited by Crawford, LePine, & Rich, 2010) represents the job attributes and other 
related working conditions relating to engagement or burnout in terms of two overarching 
categories: demands and resources. Within the model, “job demands” refer to “those physical, 
social, or organisational aspects of the job that require sustained physical or mental effort and are 
therefore associated with certain psychological costs (e.g., exhaustion) and include aspects such as 
workload, time pressure and difficult physical environments” (Crawford et al., 2010, p. 835). They 
may be further categorised as presenting either challenges or hindrances. In principle, barriers to 
information seeking, such as inadequate IT infrastructure or obtrusive security, including the 
blocking of access to websites and web applications, could be categorised as hindrances; cf. Sasse’s 
(2015) comments cited in 11.4.2 below on user security fatigue and the need for security to be 
usable. “Job resources” refer to “those aspects of the job that are functional in achieving objectives, 
which stimulate personal growth and development, and which reduce job demands and their 
associated physiological and psychological costs … [They] include aspects such as control over one’s 
work, professional development opportunities, participation in decision making, varied tasks, 
feedback, and social support” (Crawford et al., 2010, p. 835). Challenge demands may elicit positive 
emotions; hindrance demands, however, tend to trigger negative emotions. According to Crawford 
et al. (2010), 
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 “… individuals should be less willing to invest themselves to respond to hindrance demands 
because the negative emotions they experience are likely to make them feel unable 
adequately to deal with these demands. Since people are likely to believe that using up 
resources to cope with hindering demands will block them from attaining meaningful 
outcomes, they are apt to have little motivation to cope with them actively. Resources 
consumed dealing with negative emotions and the psychological threat associated with 
hindrances are associated with decreased levels of motivation and engagement”  
(May et al., 2004; Porath & Erez, 2009, cited by Crawford et al., 2010, p. 838).  
 
The authors went on to propose a model of the relationships between job resources, hindrance 
demands, challenge demands, burnout and engagement, which is illustrated in Figure 2.4 below.38 
 
2.5.6 Theories of organisational power 
Power is a complex phenomenon that is, in Lukes’s (1974) phrase, “essentially contested”. This 
review limits itself to two limited and contrasting perspectives on organisational power which are 
particularly relevant to the study: Kanter’s (1979) theory of structural power and empowerment, 
and Clegg’s (1989) theory of circuits of power. The first proposes that access to information is one of 
the necessary structural conditions of empowerment within organisations. The second is relevant on 
account of frequent references to it within information systems studies, and its particular 
application within actor network theory, as described below (Sections 2.5.6.2 , 11.3.2). 
 
2.5.6.1 Kanter’s theory of structural power and empowerment  
Kanter (1979) defined power within organisations as “the ability to mobilise resources (human and 
material) to get things done” or as “the ability to get things done, to mobilize resources, to get and 
use whatever it is that a person needs for the goals he or she is attempting to meet” (Kanter, 1993, 
p. 166, cited by Manojlovich (2007). She saw employees’ behaviour and attitudes as arising from 
their working conditions and from circumstances within their workplace, far more than from 
personal attributes. 
                                                          
 
38
 Cf. Sasse’s comments on the need for security usability / user fatigue, below (11.2.2)
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Figure 2.4 Relationships between job resources, job demands, burnout and engagement 
Redrawn from Crawford et al. (2010), p. 841 (simplified) 
 
Power, according to Kanter, may be exercised productively (power to accomplish) or oppressively 
(power to punish, prevent, sell off, reduce, dismiss – without thought for possible consequences). It 
may be categorised either as formal or as informal. Jobs that are perceived as central to the overall 
purpose of the organisation, that have high visibility, and are constructed in such a way as to afford 
maximum discretion and flexibility, contain formal power. Informal power results from positive 
relationships with superiors (sponsors), peers, subordinates, and external professional contacts. 
Lines of supply, lines of information (formal and informal), and lines of organisational support all 
function in this theory as sources of power.  
 
According to Manojlovich (2007), Kanter identified four necessary structural conditions as 
contributing to organisational empowerment: 
“having opportunity for advancement or opportunity to be involved in activities beyond one’s 
job description; access to information about all facets of the organization; access to support 
for one’s job responsibilities and decision making; and access to resources as needed”. 
 
 Structural empowerment is thus comprised of formal and informal power as well as access to lines 
of power (Kanter, 1993, cited by Laschinger & Finegan, 2004). “Information” in this context includes 
technical knowledge related to employees’ job roles (for instance, nursing knowledge and skills), as 
well as internal information relating to developments within the larger organisation (Laschinger et 
al., 2010), hence would include published clinical evidence sources. Access to resources “relates to 
one’s ability to acquire the financial means, materials, time and supplies required to do the work” 
(Cho, Laschinger, & Wong, 2006, p. 45), hence could include IT infrastructure. Managers play a vital 
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role in ensuring that their staff have access to these sources of empowerment within the work 
setting.  
2.5.6.2. Clegg’s circuits of power theory 
The existing studies of concepts of power in information security (Fragos, Karyda, & Kiountouzis, 
2007; Jasperson, Butler, Carte, Price, & Saunders, 2002) refer extensively to Clegg’s (1989) circuits of 
power theory. The scenarios discussed by Inglesant and Sasse (2011a) are highly pertinent to the 
present study, and the researcher has followed these closely in the account that follows.  
Within organisations, so-called legitimate power derives from the structures and rules of authority 
(Silva, 2007, citing Mintzberg , 1983). However, Silva suggested that authority will always be 
contested, as formal rules are open to interpretation; he identified this (following Clegg, 1989) as the 
essential source of organisational politics. In order for an organisation to operate, authority and 
discretion within it needs to be delegated; the right to interpret rules, policies and procedures is 
thereby granted by senior managers to their subordinates. However, for organisational action to be 
effective, this delegated discretion needs to be disciplined; that is, those in authority need to ensure 
that these subordinates interpret the rules exactly as intended, thereby minimising the scope for 
politics. He suggests therefore that, to ensure their loyalty as delegated agents, formal authorities in 
organisations attempt to foster members’ identification with the aims of the organisation, and 
employ disciplinary techniques, such as reporting arrangements, policy sanctions or surveillance. 
Information systems, according to Silva (2007), constitute a key instrument of organisational control, 
and can radically alter work tasks in a manner which impact on workers’ identities.  
 
Clegg’s concept of power is illustrated in Figure 2.5 below. It is fundamentally relational; power 
circulates through the media of social relations and discourses (Silva, 2007). Clegg’s theory posits 
three circuits, a micro-level of agency and two macro-level circuits of social integration and system 
integration. These circuits correspond to three types of power, termed causal, dispositional and 
facilitative. The power that is expressed within organisations through information infrastructure 
controls such as passwords, smartcards, group policies, firewalls etc. is classified as causal power, 
and the corresponding power relations are described as episodic. They represent the overt type of 
power discussed in most organisational theories: that which is defined by Dahl (1957, cited by Silva, 
2007) as follows: A exercises power over B when A makes B do something that B would not 
otherwise do. In other words, A creates for B what is termed as an obligatory passage point.  
 
These so-called episodic power relations derive from, and lead into, the two macro-level circuits, 
those of social integration and system integration. These together make up a “field of force” within 
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which “rules, relations and resources” are reproduced or transformed, facilitated or restricted; 
within which “certain fixtures of meaning are privileged” (Inglesant and Sasse, 2011a, p. 10). Social 
integration involves “fixing or refixing relations of meaning and of membership” (Clegg, 1989, p. 
224). It centres on meaning, rules of practice, and membership categories; in the present instance 
on the meaning associated with the entities, human, social or technological, through which 
information security controls are exercised. From this meaning derives so-called dispositional power, 
defined as a capacity to wield power, whether or not it is actually exercised. Dispositional power is 
concerned with the capacities that prefigure the conditions required for the exercise of episodic 
power (Silva, 2007).  
 
System integration is the converse of social integration: it is concerned with “the empowerment and 
disempowerment of agencies’ capacities” (Clegg, 1989, p. 224) and in particular with “the 
technological means of control over the physical and social environment” (Lockwood, 1964, cited by 
Inglesant and Sasse, 2011a, p. 10). The corresponding type of power, termed facilitative power, is 
understood in terms of its “ability to produce and achieve collective goals” (Silva, 2007, p. 179). This 
facilitative power, or “power-to”, covers whatever an organisation uses, whether technology, 
physical constraints, or contractually enforced rules, to enforce its institutional patterns, and as such 
is subject to changes in technology. 
 
Actor network theory (ANT)(Elder-Vass, 2008; Law & Hassard, 1999; Walsham, 1997), which is widely 
used to analyse relations within socio-technical networks, is a key constituent of Clegg’s circuits of 
power theory. The basic premise of ANT is a rejection of any essential distinction between human 
and non-human actors within a social system; the word “actant” may be used to emphasise this.  
ANT thus eschews any distinctions a priori between what is deemed “technical” and what is 
considered “social” or “organisational” (Bloomfield & Danieli, 1995). 
 
In ANT, “actants” are perceived as “related not by pre-existing social structures but in networks 
which emerge through their own actions” (Inglesant and Sasse, 2011a, p.11). Central to these actor 
networks, and to the circuits of power theory, is the concept of an obligatory passage point. An 
obligatory passage point (OPP) is “an actor that mediates the transactions of other actors in the 
network, controlling and regulating activity by acting as a ‘gatekeeper’” (Goff, 2014, p.?). 
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Figure 2.5 Representing the circuits of power 
Clegg (1989), p. 214 
Reproduced by permission 
 
OPPs are established via a process of what is termed translation. There are four so-called moments 
of translation: problematisation, interessement, enrolment and mobilisation. Initially a first actor 
presents an issue in such a way to a second actor that “there is no alternative” to the solution they 
propose: this is the process of so-called problematisation, where one actor presents the solution to a 
problem in terms of that actor’s resources (Silva, 2007). Other actors are then said to be “enrolled” 
and “drawn into alliances” around this central problem (Inglesant and Sasse, 2011a). Initially the first 
group of actors must be isolated, i.e. other possible alliances or interference that represent a 
possible challenge the legitimacy of the OPP must be impeded; this is the process of interessement. 
The subsequent third translation step is termed enrolment. During this step, alliances are established 
and consolidated through negotiations. According to Walsham (1997, p. 469), “successful networks 
of aligned interests are created through the enrolment of a sufficient body of allies, and the 
translation of their interests so that they are willing to participate in particular ways of thinking and 
acting which maintain the network”. The fourth and final process is mobilisation of the allies. This 
step of mobilisation implies that actors will become the spokespersons for the groups they claim to 
represent; it consists in establishing the legitimacy of the spokesperson. The movement between 
steps of the translation process is known as displacement; when displacement occurs, episodic 
power is exercised. Information systems, or particular features of them such as enforcement of 
security measures, can be viewed as OPPs. 
 
It may seem odd at first sight for a professed critical realist (Section 3.2.5, below) to employ ANT, a 
pragmatist research tradition to which critical realism would appear at first sight to be radically 
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opposed. ANT appeared, however, to offer a novel, and potentially valuable, method for analysing 
detailed small-scale information security scenarios, on the grounds that it treats non-humans as 
important parts of social analysis (Tatnall, 2003; Tatnall & Gilding, 1999). It was also employed by 
Clegg within his circuits of power theory (1989), as applied to information security by Inglesant and 
Sasse (Inglesant & Sasse, 2011a, 2011b; see 2.4.9.2, 11.3.2). The researcher chose to pursue it on 
this basis (Section 11.3.2 below). For general discussions of the possible value and use of ANT 
concepts within a critical realist framework, see Elder-Vass (2008) and Mutch (2002). Faulkner and 
Runde’s expressly critical realist theory (2011, 2013) of the social position of technological objects, 
which is based upon Bhaskar’s Transformational Model of Social Activity (Section 3.2.5), might have 
provided an alternative; however this latter did not appear to have been applied so far to issues of 
power within information systems or information security, and was accordingly much less 
immediately applicable or usable. 
 
2.5.7 Summary and synthesis 
This section has covered a range of organisational issues of relevance to the research, relating to 
organisational cultures and subcultures in general, professions and professionalism, and power. In 
particular, it has addressed IT staff subcultures and attitudes, the characteristics of the NHS as an 
organisation, and issues of staff engagement, trust, risk and regulation within the NHS. There are 
clear indications of the existence of a distinct IT staff subculture, and of the effects of regulatory 
processes upon organisational trust and attitude to risk. 
 
Section 2.5.5.2 outlined issues of public distrust, risk and regulation relating to the NHS as an 
organisation: the introduction of systems of regulation in response to high-profile instances of poor 
quality of care, their implementation, and their organisational impacts (high levels of local 
regulation, conflicts between clinicians and managers, low levels of trust of staff by senior managers, 
cultural aversion to risk), that have been the subject of numerous health management and policy 
studies. Currie et al.’s (2012) study of medical professionalism appears particularly important, on 
account of its identification of the role of theorising about risk as a basis for legitimating and 
maintaining professional power. 
 
Section 2.5.3 addressed issues of IT subcultures and professional values. There were clear indications 
within the studies cited that IT staff can generate distinctive occupational subcultures, of which 
negative attitudes to end-users (poor ratings of their general IT literacy, web searching skills, and 
integrity, with consequent distrust and a desire to restrict the IT functionality available to them), are 
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an identifiable component. End-users, in turn, may develop negative attitudes to IT staff, tending to 
stereotype them as having poor communication skills, prone to using impenetrable jargon, poor at 
teaching, and being unresponsive to requests for support. These studies have clear implications for 
evaluating the perceived quality of IT support and of inter-professional interactions involving IT staff 
and managers as a factor relating to barriers to information seeking.  
 
Anecdotal evidence had suggested that barriers to accessing and using information could have a 
negative impact on staff morale and engagement (2.5.5.3). Concepts of staff engagement itself, and 
of organisational factors promoting staff engagement, have been extensively studied. The job 
demands–resources model posits a direct relationship between job resources (necessarily including 
professional development opportunities and access to information), job demands (including so-
called hindrance demands, such as poor IT infrastructure or the blocking of access to websites and 
web applications) and staff engagement, and thus provides a conceptual framework for evaluating 
the effects of lack of access to published online information. 
 
Sections 2.5.6.1 and 2.5.6.2 addressed issues of power in organisations relating to information and 
information security. Two relevant constructs were described, the structural empowerment theory 
of Kanter (1993), developed and extended within nursing by Laschinger and associates, and the 
circuits of power theory of Clegg (1989). Within Kanter’s theory, access to information is one of the 
key conditions proposed for staff empowerment. The circuits of power theory was applied by 
Inglesant and Sasse (2005a, 2005b) to information security scenarios very close to those frequently 
encountered within the NHS, providing a basis for later discussion and analysis. These were the only 
relevant studies identified; the numerous other studies of power in information security that were 
identified by the researcher, including conceptual models, related mainly to overall policy 
development , system development, or system implementation and enforcement, and were thus of 
only marginal relevance. 
 
2.6 Information security and cybersecurity: introduction 
2.6.1 Definitions 
The thesis is concerned with the effects both of information security and of cybersecurity measures 
upon access to published information. The term “information security” is often used interchangeably 
and inclusively of the term “cybersecurity”; Olijnyk's bibliometric analysis (2015) of the profile and 
evolution of information security literature included aspects of cybersecurity as a sub-category of 
information security. Until relatively recently, NHS policies (NHS Connecting for Health, 2007) 
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focused upon “information security” and did not specifically address cybersecurity as such. However, 
while there is a considerable overlap in scope (see Figure 2.6 below), the two terms are not 
synonymous: as Refsdal, Solhaug, and Stølen (2015) indicate, cybersecurity is defined in terms of the 
types of threats to information assets (both information and IT infrastructure) which it addresses, 
i.e. threats which arise within a cyberspace. Such threats are primarily technical in nature; while 
cybersecurity may focus primarily on the protection of digital information assets, it is not limited to 
this, but includes the protection of the related IT environment, i.e. cyber systems.  
 
Figure 2.6 Cybersecurity vs. information security and critical infrastructure protection 
From Refsdal et al. (2015), p. 31  
Reproduced by permission 
 
Many critical infrastructures involve cyber systems: critical infrastructure protection focuses on the 
protection of networked infrastructures of any sort, whether or not they involve a cyberspace. 
Definitions of the term “cyberspace” itself vary widely in scope and emphasis (Le & Hoang, 2016). 
These authors suggest that it should be defined as a space that embraces three main elements: real 
and virtual entities (interconnected digital devices of all types, and virtual abstraction of entities, 
such as data, information, software and services), interconnecting infrastructure (networks, 
applications, information systems and storage that support these entities) and the interactions 
among entities. These interactions include activities and interdependencies among the entities in 
cyberspace, including human agents. The International Telecommunications Union defines 
cybersecurity, as follows: 
“Cybersecurity is the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, 
guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and 
technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and organization and user’s 
assets … Cybersecurity strives to ensure the attainment and maintenance of the security 
properties of the organization agains relevant security risks in the cyber environment”  
(ITU 2008, cited by Maurer and Morgus, 2014, p. 31).  
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This definition, while comprehensive in the scope of activities specified, does not clarify the nature 
of the “relevant security risks”. These are more clearly spelt out by Amoroso (2006, cited by Craigen, 
Diakun-Thibault, & Purse, 2014, p. 14): “Cyber security involves reducing the risk of malicious attack 
to software, computers and networks. This includes tools used to detect break-ins, stop viruses, 
block malicious access, enforce authentication, enable encrypted communications, and so on.” More 
recently, with a perceived increased risk of cyber-attacks on NHS organisations, cybersecurity has 
been emphasised more distinctly within the NHS as an aspect of wider national measures, although 
cybersecurity measures are still considered overall within the framework of the IGT (Carlisle, 2015). 
The matrix in Appendix P below (Table P.1), which provides examples of common security measures 
within the different categories, may help to clarify the distinction.  
 
2.6.2 Web-based cybersecurity threats 
Generally the impacts of cyber-attacks on the confidentiality, availability and integrity of information 
can be considered under four headings: of interruption (denial of service, preventing access to 
information), interception (network traffic capture of confidential data), modification (altering 
captured network traffic, altering a user name, or source address for network traffic), and 
fabrication (replaying modified network traffic, spoofing identity) (Thomas, 2006). Cyber-attacks, 
which aim to sabotage an organisation’s IT infrastructure, can be far-reaching in their effects on its 
operations and services, often involving substantial down time, expense, and damage to safety-
critical systems. Attacks on health service providers may affect medical devices (Williams & 
Woodward, 2015).  
 
The high incidence of web-based attacks means that use of the Internet, while an integral part of 
people’s business and personal lives, represents in itself a considerable security risk to users and 
networks (von Solms, 2011). The aspects of cybersecurity within NHS organisations that are relevant 
to information seeking and use relate primarily to websites and web applications, and derive from: 
1) threats to network and system security from compromised websites unwittingly visited by staff 
using computers and other devices on NHS networks, including malware distributed via drive-by 
downloads, via so-called pharming, or via so-called phishing attacks, using either social media sites 
or email; 2) threats to NHS websites; and 3) data loss and theft. Overall, they include the targeting 
and exploitation of known vulnerabilities in software applications, in particular web browsers; the 
installation and use of malware of different types (e.g. viruses, browser hijackers, Trojans, worms, 
bots, rootkits, ransomware, spyware, adware); the exploitation of poorly-managed networks where 
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security protocols are not used, or are incorrectly applied; and the abuse of trust through social 
engineering (Harwood, 2011; Lord, 2012; Rouse, 2006). 
 
Ponemon (2015) provided a useful overview of web-based security threats. A user may be lured to a 
malicious website via so-called pharming or DNS cache poisoning (also known as search engine 
poisoning) (Imperva, 2013; Rouse, 2007), or via social engineering, typically using email: the so-
called phishing or spear-phishing attack (Chickowski, 2013; Howard, 2007). Phishing is defined as the 
act of sending an email or social media message to a user fraudulently claiming to be an established 
enterprise or trusted individual, with the aim of enticing the user to provide private information that 
will be used for criminal purposes (Webopedia, s.d.). Phishing requires user activity, i.e. clicking on a 
link to a malicious website. Cyber-attacks that obtain personal information (unlike drive-by 
downloads; see below) require some form of interaction by the user. Drive-by downloads and DNS 
cache poisoning (Appendix D) are the only forms of web-based security threats that can occur 
without the site owner’s knowledge.  
 
Drive-by downloads are a growing threat.39 A web page is considered malicious if it causes the 
installation of software without the knowledge or consent of the user (Provos, McNamee, 
Mavrommatis, Wang, & Modadugu, 2007; Rains, 2011). The mere act of visiting such a compromised 
or malicious website, without any interaction from the user being necessary, may trigger a malware 
infection of the user’s computer; they are thus arguably the most important category of web-based 
cyber-threat relating to information seeking. It should be noted that this process is invisible to the 
end-user (although small iframes may sometimes be visible on a compromised page (Howard, 
2007)), and there is no behavioural defence against it, since potentially any website can be 
compromised (Sjouwerman, 2013). Drive-by downloads are cited as the most serious current web 
security threat overall; more than 30,000 websites are infected every day, 80% of these being 
entirely legitimate (Marinos & Sfakianakis, 2012; McCormack, 2016). More technical detail relating 
to these types of threats is given in Appendix D. 
 
Web 2.0 and social media applications present a range of risks for individuals and organisations. 
These were reviewed by Baxter and Rudman (2010); Cole (2010); He (2012); ISACA (2010); Khidzir 
(2016); Kshetri (2012); Palo Alto Networks, (2009); Stritter et al., (2016); and Tennakoon, Ezingeard, 
                                                          
 
39
 A variant form of attack has been identified: the drive-by cache (Huang, 2011). 
91 
and Benson (2012). Different types of risk to individual users from social media, including security 
risks, were surveyed by Haynes and Robinson (2015). Such risks include breaches of privacy and 
confidentiality, exposure to litigation, and other risks to reputation, as well as those relating to 
cybersecurity. For individuals, inappropriate privacy settings relating to personal information and 
location may offer opportunities for crime (Cole, 2010). Also, owing to the possibilities they afford 
for rapid dissemination of compromised content, and via the availability of functionality (e.g. news 
feeds, rating systems, and comment functions) which incorporates security vulnerabilities, social 
media applications exacerbate existing cyber threats (Chi, 2011). Applications supporting user-
generated content (e.g. forums and blogs) may allow the injection of malicious code such as 
hyperlinks to images or other external content (Provos, Mavrommatis, Rajab, & Monrose, 2008). 
Insecure third-party applications may present other risks.  
 
Online advertising presents particular issues for organisations’ networks. It is typically syndicated 
through advertising networks such as Google’s DoubleClick,40 which act as intermediaries between 
publishers of websites and advertisers. Advertising content is pulled into web pages from third party 
servers via HTML content inserted into the publisher’s web pages, hence is not under the direct 
control of the site owner. As well as slowing down the display of the pages and consuming network 
bandwidth, such systems also have particular vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks, including so-called 
malvertising, a form of drive-by download. High incidences of malvertising have been found to be 
associated with sub-syndication processes in which advertising networks auction some of their 
advertisement slots to other networks (Vratonjic, Manshaei, & Hubaux, 2011; Zarras et al., 2014). 
Use of consumer online file sharing and collaboration applications such as Dropbox41, OneDrive42 
and Google Drive43, which from a corporate perspective represents a form of “shadow IT” (see 
Section 2.8.3 below) also presents a variety of information security and cybersecurity issues within 
organisations, arising from the possible lack of security of the application itself (i.e. its possible 
vulnerability to hacking, non-availability of local encryption), possible unauthorised sharing of 
information, the difficulty of permissions management, lack of visibility and control to the 
organisation, lack of strong authentication and access management, and possible abuse of system 
privileges (Lord, 2017; McClure, 2013; Salazar, 2015). The popular peer-to-peer (P2P) 
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 DoubleClick: https://www.doubleclickbygoogle.com/en-gb/  
41
 Dropbox: http://www.dropbox.com  
42
 OneDrive: https://onedrive.live.com/about/en-gb/  
43
 Google Drive: https://www.google.com/drive/  
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videoconferencing application Skype,44 which uses Voice over IP (VoIP), has been shown to be highly 
insecure in a number of aspects: it is vulnerable to malware attacks, and stores user data locally in 
an unencrypted form. It is also possible to determine a user’s IP address from their username using a 
Skype resolver (Gilbert, 2016; Rodrigues & Druschel, 2010; Solutionary, 2014). The researcher has 
not attempted to address here the complex issues of wireless network security or of the security of 
mobile devices such as smartphones, which are increasingly made available to NHS Trust staff. 
 
It was noted in Section 1.4.4 that the number of cybersecurity incidents occurring within the NHS 
increased markedly during the period of the study. This is likely to have related to a increase in the 
attack surface resulting from greater use of EPR systems, mobile devices and networked medical 
devices within an environment incorporating many obsolete systems; cf. the discussion in Section 
2.8.5 below of diffusion of innovations within the NHS. Overviews of the state of cybersecurity 
within NHS organisations were provided by Millar (2016) and by Sophos (2016b). Cybersecurity 
threats and trends within health services in general have been reviewed by Kruse, Frederick, 
Jacobson, and Monticone (2016) and by Luna, Rhine, Myhra, Sullivan, and Kruse (2016).  
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Proportion of malicious URLs by subject – random URL sample (7.2 million)  
From Provos et al. (2008), p. 9 Reproduced by permission  
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Figure 2.8 Proportion of URLs by subject – all malicious URLs (3.3 million) 
From Provos et al. (2008), p. 9 Reproduced by permission 
 
2.6.3 User behaviour and cybersecurity threats 
It was mentioned above that blocking of certain categories of web content was commonly 
recommended as a defence against web-based cyberattacks. A limited number of studies have 
attempted to relate malware risks to patterns of user behaviour in relation to Internet use. The 
findings from these are presented in Table 2.2 below.  Based on the findings of these studies, It is 
difficult to reach definitive conclusions as to what might be said to constitute “high-risk” web activity 
relating to possible malware infections. This has important implications for cybersecurity guidelines 
and acceptable use policies, and hence represents a gap in research that bears closely on the 
present study.  
 
Regarding “adult” websites, Provos et al. (2008) found that this category was ranked only 8th out of 
26 in percentage of drive-by downloads among the landing pages of malicious or compromised 
websites, although it was ranked 1st out of 26 in its percentage of malicious sites among the random 
sample of URLs (Figure 2.7, Figure 2.8), having almost twice the percentage of malicious sites 
compared with the next ranked category. Lalonde Lévesque et al. (2013) found that these sites were 
associated with lower rates of malware infection than seemingly innocuous categories. They 
identified eight “risky” categories of web content: P2P applications, social networking, software 
downloads, gambling, streaming media/MP3, sports, and computers/Internet. The first four of these 
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are perhaps unsurprising, whereas the latter two at least would normally be considered innocuous. 
Canali et al. (2014) found a weak correlation between numbers of pornographic / “adult” websites 
visited and malware risk, but a stronger correlation with time spent visiting such sites. Similar to the 
findings of Carlinet et al. (2008), the overall amount of time spent on web-related activity was found 
by Kent et al. (2013) and by Canali et al. (2014) to have a positive correlation with risk. 
 
Based on the known propensity of cyber-criminals to compromise popular websites, Keats and Koshy 
(2009), researchers based at the security vendor McAfee, claimed to have identified the most 
dangerous subject categories of web search terms. They collected approximately 2,658 popular 
search terms using a variety of marketing intelligence sources, and used McAfee’s own SiteAdvisor 
security tool to evaluate the security status and relative risk of 413,368 unique sites retrieved from 
the Google, Bing, Yahoo!, Live and Ask search engines.  “Adult” filters were on. SiteAdvisor tested 
sites for a range of common security threats, and categorised them as safe (green), requiring caution 
before using (yellow) or risky (red). Keywords were ranked for risk in two ways, using both 1) the 
mean risk of all results, and 2) the maximum risk of the riskiest page of results. 
 
They found that the subject categories with the worst mean and maximum risk profiles were music 
lyrics sites and “free” sites (e.g. free music downloads); health-related searches were among the 
least risky. The research was published in a brief report published by McAfee itself, but not in any 
peer-reviewed journals or conference papers. The researchers acknowledged limitations of their 
methods in respect of how search terms were identified and categorised. The findings were widely 
discussed in the popular computing press at the time of publication, but the work has not been cited 
in any subsequent academic study to the researcher’s knowledge.  Larsen (2015), a researcher for 
the security vendor Symantec, investigated subject categories of sites implicated in search engine 
poisoning attacks, and the search terms which had led users to them. The results were published 
informally on the company blog. He noted a trend for for searches for specific sites (Instagram in 
particular), and for non-English-language searches to lead to these sites.  “Adult” and health-related 
search terms did not feature strongly (Larsen, 2015).  
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Authors / Date / Country / 
Background 
Research setting and 
subjects / datasets 
Methods Research focus Findings 
Provos, Mavrommatis, 
Rajab, and Monrose, 
(2008); Provos, McNamee, 
Mavrommatis, Wang, and 
Modadugu (2007); Provos, 
Rajab, and Mavromattis, 
(2009) 
 
United States 
 
private sector – search 
provider 
 
Sites crawled by 
Google search engine; 
sites randomly 
sampled from Google 
index; sites reported to 
Google by users 
Presence of malware 
verified via honeypot 
using AV programs and 
execution-based 
heuristics 
 
Sites assigned DMOZ 
subject classifications 
Subject distribution of 
malicious websites 
compromised by drive-by 
downloads 
 
No strong association between web content category (thus browsing risk) 
and risk of exposure to drive-by downloads – though “adult” content 
appeared to present twice the level of risk within the random sample: see 
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 for details 
Carlinet, Mé, Debar, & 
Gourhant (2008) 
 
France 
 
private sector – telco / ISP 
Activity data from 
ADSL customers of 
telco / ISP 
Case control study of 
online behaviour of 
users in relation to types 
of traffic and malware 
risk 
 
Included non-web 
applications such as FTP 
 
Aspects of user behaviour 
in relation to risk of 
malware infection in 
general / personal 
computer use 
Use of Windows operating systems, streaming applications, high levels of 
web searching shown to be risk factors for malware infection 
 
Results for P2P and web chat applications were inconclusive 
 
Did not investigate type of URL visited or aspects of end-user computing 
environment other than operating system 
Lalonde Lévesque, 
Nsiempba, Fernandez, 
Chiasson, and Somayaji, 
(2013) 
 
Canada 
 
University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Activity data from 
University staff and 
students (n=50); 
survey responses 
Epidemiological study of 
online behaviour using 
experimental laptops 
issued to research 
subjects; used logistic 
and general regression 
analyses 
Behavioural risk factors for 
malware infection in 
general / personal 
computer use 
Computer expertise and age were possible risk factors for increased risk 
of malware infection 
 
Eight ‘risky’ categories of web content identified via regression analysis: 
streaming media / MP3, P2P, software downloads; Internet 
infrastructure, social networking, computers/Internet, gambling, sports 
 
Three further risky categories of web content identified via the general 
regression analysis: pornography, illegal/questionable, translator / cached 
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Authors / Date / Country / 
Background 
Research setting and 
subjects / datasets 
Methods Research focus Findings 
Kent, Liebrock, and Neil, 
(2013) 
 
United States 
 
university 
Activity data from end-
users within national 
laboratory 
 
Security compromise 
indicated by AV, 
intrusion response, 
phishing or proximity 
Relationship between 
‘early adopter’ behaviour 
within corporate setting 
and risk of security 
compromise 
Early adoption, i.e. visiting unique websites or visiting websites before 
others in the population, was associated with increased risk of security 
compromise, as was total unique location visit count.  
Yen, Heorhiadi, Oprea, 
Reiter, and Juels (2014) 
 
United States 
 
university / private sector 
 
McAfee AV security 
logs, network access 
logs, web proxy logs, 
employee database in 
relation to malware 
vectors, VPN logs, user 
demographics, 
browsing behaviour 
and place of use (on-
site vs. off-site) (hosts 
n = 85,000) 
 
 
Epidemiological study: 
logistic regression using 
demographics, web 
activity (categories of 
sites visited, web usage, 
blocked and low-
reputation domains), 
VPN activity 
Relationship between user 
demographics and 
behaviour and risk of 
malware infection 
 
 
Risk of malware infection associated with technical expertise, junior 
position in organisation, use of computers outside organisational 
network, use of external drives 
 
Recommendations made: user education, more refined content 
categorisation of websites by proxies 
 
Canali, Bilge, and Balzarotti 
(2014) 
 
France 
 
university / private sector 
Symantec dataset (n= 
160,229 users) of web 
pages visited by users 
of Symantec security 
products 
Correlation analysis, 
logistic regression 
analysis 
Relationship between web 
use and malware infection 
risk 
Level of malware infection risk is associated with nocturnal use, and is 
directly proportional to amount of time spent in web searching. ‘Adult’ 
content and use of URL shortening services are associated with increased 
risk. 
 
 
An individual’s level of malware infection risk may be derived from 
his/her browsing profile, as derived from 74 unique variables relating to 
web browsing behaviour. 
 
 
Table 2.2 Studies of malware risk in relation to web browsing behaviour
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2.6.4 Web-based security threats: counter-measures 
Cybersecurity and information security vulnerabilities may be categorised overall as arising from 
three possible sources: malicious activity, facilitating behaviour by end-users, and inadequate 
technical protection measures (Leitold, 2016; see Figure 2.9, below). The different types of defences 
and counter-measures may thus be classified as either technical or social. Either category may be 
further divided to include approaches of prevention, detection, reaction or deterrence (Fléchais, 
Riegelsberger, & Sasse, 2006): see Table 2.3 below. Cybersecurity is rapidly evolving: web security 
risks change over time as new vulnerabilities are discovered, and new defences and new versions of 
application frameworks, web servers, operating systems, browsers, plugins and extensions are 
developed (Sullivan & Liu, 2012). Vulnerabilities in browsers or browser extensions are widespread, 
particularly in older browsers (Cova, Kruegel, & Vigna, 2010; Grossman, 2012; McCormack, 2016). 
Acrobat Reader, and which render different languages, such as Flash, have proved to be a major 
security concern (Hoffman, 2012; Skoudis, 2005). While browser security has generally improved, 
plugins (software that interfaces with the browser) which play media files, including QuickTime and 
Acrobat Reader, and render different languages, such as Flash, have proved to be a major security 
concern (Hoffman, 2012; Skoudis, 2005). The ActiveX framework within Microsoft Internet Explorer 
has long been recognised as a security threat, although recent versions have been “sandboxed” to a 
much greater extent than previously (Lambert, 2013). (A sandbox may be described as “an isolated 
computing environment in which a program or file can be executed without affecting the application 
in which it runs” (“Sandbox”, 2005)). Recently Java has been targeted extensively by hackers, leading 
some security researchers to recommend that the Java Runtime Environment (JRE) should be 
disabled on end-users’ computers unless required for business reasons (F-Secure, 2012). 
 
Internet Explorer version 6 (IE6) was notoriously insecure, and its use was deprecated by Microsoft 
(Reisinger, 2011) and by the Department of Health Informatics Directorate, which, in 2010, 
recommended upgrading to IE7 (DH Informatics Directorate, 2010). However, its use was continuing 
in parts of the NHS, no doubt because of compatibility issues with a range of critical “legacy” 
applications (Arthur, 2010; NHS Networks, 2013).  
 
Recommended security measures to reduce the risk of drive-by downloads and other web-based 
attacks include standardisation of browsers, applications and plugins, auto-updating of browsers and 
critical applications; disabling of Java except where specifically needed; blocking of inappropriate 
categories of web content; reputation-based URL filtering to screen out compromised or malicious 
websites, use of strong passwords, and control of applications at the endpoint (Sophos, 2016a).  
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Figure 2.9 Triunal model of cybersecurity vulnerability 
From Leitold (2016), p. 4, Reproduced by permission
 
 
Further defences include browser-based warning services (Firefox, Chrome, Safari, IE8, IE9); and 
web-hosted link checking services (Bradbury, 2010). Technical and social information security 
counter-measures are illustrated in Table 2.3 above, and are discussed further in Section 2.7.3 
below. Technical defences against malware and unauthorised network access are of various types. 
 
Spam filters, as the name implies, filter out spam (unwanted and unsolicited email) and suspected 
phishing messages, and prevent them from reaching users’ inboxes. Anti-malware (anti-virus) 
systems afford varying degrees of protection against known threats. They are commonly required to 
be installed on all desktop machines connected to the network or with access to the Internet, on 
servers and on mobile devices. 
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Category  Description Examples 
Te
ch
n
ic
al
 c
o
u
n
te
rm
e
as
u
re
s 
Prevention Stop attacks from 
happening 
Firewalls, secure web gateways, intrusion prevention 
system 
Appropriate system permissions 
Encryption and / or password protection of portable media 
and devices 
Detection Notice and identify 
an attack 
Intrusion detection systems 
User monitoring 
Reaction Stop or mitigate an 
attack in progress 
Automated response mechanisms linked to intrusion 
detection systems 
Deterrence Discourage misuse Awareness / visibility of technical countermeasures, e.g. 
individual user monitoring, website blocking 
So
ci
al
 c
o
u
n
te
rm
e
as
u
re
s 
Prevention Stop attacks from 
happening 
End-user information security good practice: prohibition of 
password sharing, use of encrypted and / or password-
protected portable media and devices 
Acceptable use policies 
User education: detection of social engineering, basic 
security measures 
Detection Notice and identify 
an attack 
System administrators  
Alert users 
Audit 
Reaction Stop or mitigate an 
attack in progress 
System administrators or emergency response teams 
Deterrence Discourage misuse SWG warnings to users when websites are blocked 
Internal disciplinary sanctions 
Possibility of criminal prosecution for illegal activity 
 
Table 2.3 Technical and social information security counter-measures 
Based on / updated from Fléchais, Riegelsberger, & Sasse (2006), p. 1 
 
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) work rather like burglar alarms; they monitor network traffic and 
log or notify of any possible malicious activity. Host-based and network-based intrusion prevention 
systems (IPS) are able to exercise access control to protect computers or networks from exploitation, 
and also have the ability to take immediate action, based on a set of rules established by the 
network administrator. 
 
The firewall is a key component of any network security infrastructure: it is a device (hardware or 
software) which functions in a networked environment to prevent communications forbidden by the 
security policy. It has the basic task of controlling traffic between different zones of trust, e.g., 
between the Internet (low trust) and an organisation’s internal network (high trust). There are four 
main classes of firewall: packet filter firewalls, stateful inspection firewalls; application proxy 
firewalls, and deep packet inspection firewalls, also known as next-generation firewalls (Honan, s.d.). 
All types of firewall have common characteristics in that they distinguish good from bad network 
traffic according to a set of criteria (Gattine, 2014).    Network perimeter firewalls are unable to 
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prevent cyber-attacks on web applications. Next-generation firewalls , however, vary in the features 
they provide; they can be configured to provide control of access to websites and web applications 
at a detailed level, as well as bandwidth management (Ferrar, Wood, Penny, & Date, 2009; Sullivan 
& Liu, 2012). Data loss prevention (DLP) solutions relate to information security specifically, they 
may be implemented to protect against data loss via email or social media. 
 
An important type of security device commonly used within the NHS is the secure web gateway 
(SWG), a type of web proxy. The popularity of these as security devices has increased in response to 
the increased incidence of web-borne threats, as described above (Roiter, 2007). All web traffic has 
to pass through the SWG, which has two roles: 1) it performs security-related tasks such as 
authorisation and authentication relating to web content requests sent from a user’s browser, 
rejecting requests which do not meet the configured criteria; 2) it examines the requested content 
for malware and other threats before sending it to the user. SWGs are able to categorise URLs and to 
analyse and manipulate scripts on web pages (Blue Coat Systems, 2015).  
 
The Google, Yahoo and Bing search engines incorporate screening for compromised websites; safe 
sites are indicated as such in search results (Ranadive, Demir, Rizvi, & Daswani, 2010). All the 
browsers in common use offer extensively customisable security configuration options which can 
reduce the attack surface. Within an institutional network, such configuration options may be 
restricted by group policies. However, higher security settings may result in considerable loss of 
browser functionality and inability to access content or applications, thereby potentially conflicting 
with business need.  
 
It should be recognised that there is no such thing as an impenetrable digital defence (Austin & 
Darby, 2003): the overall aim should be to maximise network resilience (Scully, 2011). It is commonly 
recommended that a layered or integrated approach to network security is implemented within 
organisations, involving a combination of devices and strategies, to reduce the probability of cyber-
attacks, mitigate their impact when they inevitably occur, and to assist recovery from them. As well 
as implementing security devices as described above, it is advocated, in addition, that steps be taken 
to reduce attack surfaces, such as standardising user applications, implementing system policy 
restrictions limiting downloads to approved sources, “hardening” network operating systems 
through restricting system permissions, and segregating applications within the network (e.g. Ferrar 
et al., 2009; Oltsik, 2013). Security functions may be unified within a single unified threat 
management (UTM) system, or reports of security events from different systems may be integrated 
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via use of a security information and event management (SIEM) system. These latter are, however, 
expensive and complex to implement (Lawton, 2015).  
 
Sections 2.6 and 2.7, being closely related, are summarised and synthesised together in 2.7.4. 
 
2.7 Risk in information security and cybersecurity
2.7.1 Theories of risk; factors influencing risk assessment 
Risk is a complex and ambiguous concept with an interesting cross-disciplinary history, as outlined 
by Althaus (2005) and Hay-Gibson (2008). The Royal Society report of 1992 defined risk as “the 
chance, in quantitative terms, of a defined hazard occurring.” (Power, 2004, p. 53). In the context of 
IT, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) handbook (2001, cited by Gerber & von 
Solms, 2005) defined risk as “the net negative impact of the exercise of a vulnerability, considering 
both the probability and the impact of occurrence” (p. 21). Zinn (2005, p. 1) characterises this type 
of technical / scientific understanding of risk as “an objective concept relating to the management of 
future uncertainties through rational action based on calculations of probability”. For Douglas, 
(1994, p. 30), by contrast, the essence of the concept of risk is that of “danger from future damage”. 
This definition, unlike the previous one, does not make a conceptual connection between risk and 
measurable probability (Power, 2004, p. 53; Joffe, 1999).  
 
It should be noted that sociological approaches to risk may be classified as either “weak 
constructionist” or “strong constructionist” in their epistemology (Lupton, 2009). The “risk society” 
(Section 2.5.4) and “cultural symbolic” approaches may be classified as “weak constructionist”: risk is 
understood as socially constructed, but there is posited to be a world “out there”, although it is not 
directly knowable; risks are both socially constructed and objective (Zinn, 2006). This accords with a 
critical realist epistemology (see below, Section 3.2.5), and is broadly the approach followed by the 
researcher in this thesis. Within this perspective, undesirable events are always to some extent 
socially defined or socially constructed, and “real” consequences are always mediated through social 
interpretation and linked with group values and interests (Renn, 2008a).  
 
“Strong constructionist” approaches, by contrast, reject the notion that something can constitute a 
risk “in itself”; from these viewpoints a risk is never knowable outside particular belief systems and 
moral positions. Lupton (1999, pp. 49-50) offers a useful typology of epistemological approaches to 
risk in the social sciences: see Table 2.4 below. Realist approaches to risk and risk management are 
discussed in relation to information security / cybersecurity in Section 2.7.2. 
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Epistemological position Associated perspectives and 
theories 
Key questions 
Naïve realism: 
Risk is an objective hazard, 
threat or danger that exists and 
can be measured 
independently of social and 
cultural processes. Risk 
perceptions may be distorted 
or biased through social and 
cultural frameworks of 
interpretation 
Technico-scientific perspective What risks exist? 
How should we measure and 
manage them? 
How should information about 
risks be effectively 
communicated to the public? 
How to reduce ‘bias’ in the 
public’s responses? 
 
Cognitive psychology How do people respond 
cognitively to risks? What world 
views shape their responses? 
 
‘Weak constructionist/  
critical realism 
Risk is an objective hazard or 
danger that is inevitably 
mediated through social and 
cultural processes and can 
never be known in isolation 
from those processes 
‘Risk society’ perspective 
‘Cultural symbolic’ perspective 
What is the relationship of risk 
to the structures and processes 
of late modernity? 
How is risk understood in 
different sociocultural 
contexts? 
Why are some dangers 
understood as ‘risks’ and others 
not? 
How does risk operate as a 
symbolic boundary measure? 
What are the situated contexts 
of risk? 
 
‘Strong’ constructionist:  
Nothing is a risk in itself – what 
we understand to be a risk (or 
hazard, threat or danger) is the 
product of historically, socially 
and culturally contingent ‘ways 
of seeing’ 
 
Governmentality perspective 
Post-structuralism 
Biophilosopy 
How do the discourses and 
practices around risk operate in 
the construction of subjectivity, 
embodiment and social 
relations? How does risk 
operate as part of 
governmental strategies and 
rationalities? How are risk 
assemblages configured? 
 
 
Table 2.4 Epistemological approaches to risk in the social sciences 
Lupton (1999), p. 49-50 
Reproduced by permission 
 
An extensive body of research exists on how individuals perceive and act in the face of risk, which 
has been reviewed by Maule (2004), by Nurse, Creese, Goldsmith, & Lamberts (2011) and by 
Parsons, McCormac, Butavicius, and Ferguson (2010). One strain of this research suggests that 
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people’s cognitive capacities in relation to risk are limited and, as a result, they often use “heuristic” 
forms of thinking based on simple rules. Slovic (1982, cited by Quigley, Burns, & Stallard, 2015) 
suggested that heuristics in relation to risk may be classified in relation to two primary dimensions: 
unknown risk and dread risk. People may be more concerned with risks that are not observable or 
well understood (unknown), or with uncontrollable, hence potentially catastrophic, risks (dread). 
Their risk assessments may be based on how people feel about a situation (the affect heuristic) or on 
availability (the ease with which an episode can be recalled (the availability heuristic). This suggests 
that the perceived risks associated with events that are available (readily visualised, that are of 
recent occurrence, or are of high personal significance, and hence can readily be brought to mind) 
tend to be set too high; conversely, those that are associated with events that are hard to visualise 
or recall are often set too low. Representativeness is another heuristic, whereby decisions are made 
by identifying and classifying the problem as that of a known type based on previous experience 
(West, Mayhorn, Hardee, & Mendell, 2008). Use of such heuristics is likely to lead to biased 
judgements in relation to risk. 
 
Other forms of bias in risk perception and decision-making relating to risk have also been identified. 
These include the optimism bias (adverse events are far more likely to occur to others than to the 
subject), the omission bias (omissions are perceived as less risky than acts) and the influence of 
familiarity (familiar risks are perceived as less severe than unfamiliar ones). Pressures of time, and 
lack of knowledge and understanding of a risk, leading possibly to bounded rationality or 
“satisficing” behaviour (Section 2.4.2), may be a factor. Also, individual users and organisations may 
unconsciously maintain an “acceptable” level of risk, increasing their levels of risk-taking within 
environments in which security measures are increased, a process known as risk homeostasis 
(Kearney, 2016; Stewart, 2004; Wilde, 1998). 
 
The following section outlines three social theories relating to bounded rationality in the 
understanding of risk which are relevant to the research: the cultural hypothesis, the social 
amplification of risk, and the social representations theory.  
 
Douglas and Wildavsky’s cultural theory of risk, also called the cultural hypothesis, refers to the 
tendency of persons to form perceptions of risk that reflect their involvement with a particular 
“cultural way of life” (Kahan, 2008). Risk perception is considered specifically in relation to the two 
cross-cutting dimensions identified by Douglas and Wildavsky of grid and group. Group here refers 
to the strength of the group ethos, whereas grid is concerned with the extent of social constraints 
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on behaviour within the group. In relation to these two dimensions of social organisation, the 
authors identified four characteristic individual and group approaches to risk: hierarchists, 
egalitarians, individualists, and fatalists. Hierarchists (high group and high grid) are inclined to 
respect authority, to have confidence in institutions, to conform closely to group expectations and 
norms relating to risk, and to have a propensity to trust routine procedures for risk management; 
egalitarians (high group and low grid), are distrustful of externally imposed norms and have a 
participatory attitude to risk; individualists (low group and low grid) tend to take a positive view of 
risk-taking as bringing benefits, support self-regulation of risk, and are inclined to trust individuals 
rather than organisations; fatalists (low group and high grid) lack group cohesion but are otherwise 
constrained in their behaviour, tending to trust to luck or fate in relation to risk (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982b; Lupton, 2009). Renn’s (2008a, citing Thompson, 1980) development of the 
cultural theory of risk identifies similar categories: bureaucrats, egalitarians, entrepreneurs, 
atomized individuals, with the addition of a fifth category, hermits. Renn’s approach describes these 
typical combinations of values, world views, and convictions as what he terms “cultural prototypes”; 
these have characteristic specific viewpoints on risk topics, as well as corresponding attitudes and 
coping strategies; see Figure 2.10, below. 
 
The cultural theory of risk makes two characteristic claims. The first is that attitudes to risks tend to 
vary according to “cultural way of life”. The second is that individuals base their beliefs about the 
risks and benefits of a putatively dangerous activity on their cultural appraisals of these activities, 
based on the way of life to which they are committed (Kahan, 2008; Kahan, Braman, Slovic, Gastil, & 
Cohen, 2009, citing Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). It is suggested, moreover, that the different 
“cultural ways of life” each generate a characteristic set of general attitudes and values, variously 
referred to as a cosmology or cultural bias, which act as filters in evaluating information relating to 
risk; the notion of cultural cognition of risk (Rippl, 2002).  
 
The framework of social amplification of risk (Kasperson et al., 1988; Renn, 2008; Renn, Burns, 
Kasperson, Kasperson, & Slovic, 1992) was designed to integrate psychological, social, and cultural 
factors of risk perception and risk responses. It denotes “the phenomenon by which information 
processes, institutional structures, social-group behavior, and individual responses shape the social 
experience of risk, thereby contributing to risk consequences” (Kasperson et al., 1988, p. 181). 
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Figure 2.10 Cultural prototypes and their perspectives on risk 
Grid = extent of acceptance of formal systems of hierarchy and procedural rules 
Group = extent to identification with a social group  
Renn (2008a, p. 62) 
Reproduced by permission 
 
Processes of “amplification” in this framework include those which both intensify and attenuate 
indications of risk. These begin either with an adverse event (such as a data breach) or with the 
recognition of an adverse effect (such as the discovery of a cybersecurity flaw). In both cases, 
individuals or groups act as “amplification stations”: they select specific characteristics of the events 
or aspects of the relevant reports and interpret them according to their perceptions and mental 
models; these interpretations are subsequently communicated to other individuals and groups. 
Amplification stations can include the conductors of technical risk assessments, risk management 
organisations, professional and popular news media, individual opinion leaders, personal networks, 
and public agencies. Messages from the stations may contain meanings which are factual (relating to 
the message content), inferential (the conclusions that may be drawn from it), value-related (in 
relation to existing standards) and symbolic (evoking specific images and cultural associations).  
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Social interactions can heighten or attenuate perceptions of risk; by shaping perceptions of risk, they 
also influence behaviour relating to the risk. Behavioural patterns, in turn, may generate secondary 
consequences, such as litigation, regulatory responses, loss of trust and public concern. Such 
secondary effects can trigger demands for additional institutional responses and protective actions, 
or, in the case of risk attenuation, impede the installation of protective actions. The processes are 
illustrated in Figure 2.11 below. 
 
The social representations theory (Moscovici, 1988) concerns social cognition: it is relevant both to 
the theory of innovations (Section 2.8 below) and to risk. A social representation is “a system of 
values, ideas and practices with a twofold action: first, to establish an order which will enable 
individuals to orient themselves in their material and social world … and secondly to enable 
communication to take place among the members of a community by providing them with a code 
for social exchange and a code for … classifying … the various aspects of their world and of their 
individual and group history” (Moscovici, 1998, p. 12). 
 
It addresses the complexity of the meanings made by individuals positioned within specific social 
contexts, referring both to the process through which representations are elaborated and to the 
structures of thought that emerge from those processes (Duveen, 2000, cited by Joffe, 2003). It is 
interpretivist in its basis; it claims that representation is fundamentally a social process, and that 
particular social representations, once developed and elaborated, constitute our reality.  
 
Within the theory, social representations are viewed as socio-cognitive in nature, meaning that they 
are not merely imposed on the individual agent by the community, but are generated by agents’ 
own reflective process and experiences (Vaast, 2007). Two specific processes are used when people 
build representations of events: anchoring and objectification. Anchoring refers to the way in which 
new knowledge is understood and integrated through a process of relating it to familiar categories 
and concepts, so that new risks are understood in relation to existing ones; objectification is the 
process whereby an abstract theory is made concrete, or new meaning is given to objects: available 
information is classified, selected, simplified and de-contextualised (Abric, 1993; Vaast, 2007).  
Social representations are closely linked to social identity (Elejabarrieta, 1994) and to organisational 
culture (Kummerow & Innes, 1994). The theory maintains that common sense, or lay 
understandings, are all too often denigrated and seen as inferior to other forms of knowledge, such 
as scientific or expert knowledge (Flick & Foster, 2008). In a social representations perspective, 
expert knowledge is not privileged; different communities are not either “ignorant” or 
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“knowledgeable” about, for instance, a risk issue (such as information security), but know different 
things about it. Thus, in Vaast’s (2007) study of social representations of information security within 
health services, clinicians associated it with the security of patient information, respect of patients’ 
privacy, and regulatory compliance, whereas IT professionals saw it mostly as a technological issue 
and defined it in terms of systems security (hardware, software, network security and data 
integrity). The theory finds a particular application in relation to social media adoption (Kaganer & 
Vaast, 2010), as discussed in Section 2.8.4 below. The overall relevance of these social theories of 
risk to information security risk assessment and management will be readily apparent; compare also 
the discussion of the “political” aspect of risk identification in Section 2.5.5.2 above. 
 
2.7.2 Risk management and organisational trust in cybersecurity and 
information security 
 
2.7.2.1 Introduction 
Information security as well as cybersecurity risk management policies and practices can affect 
information seeking in a variety of ways, as will be evident from the discussions above of 
requirements for encrypted mobile storage (1.4.4), restrictions on forms of “shadow IT” (2.8.3), 
access and authentication requirements (1.4.5, 2.6.1), etc.  
 
A substantial element of information security / cybersecurity risk is considered to arise from user 
behaviour (e.g. Leitold, 2016; Theoharidou, Kokolakis, Karyda, & Kiountouzis, 2005). Internal threats 
may be categorised as passive / non-volitional (e.g. arising from lack of security common sense or 
forgetting to apply security procedures); volitional but not malicious (users taking inappropriate risks 
due to ignorance); and intentional / malicious or harmful (deliberately malicious or negligent acts) 
(Box & Pottas, 2014). Many questions therefore inevitably arise in relation to the risk management 
of web use within organisations, which the review endeavours to address: 
1. How can the inevitable risks arising from web-based security vulnerabilities and threats 
(as discussed in 2.7.1 above) be assessed appropriately? (2.7.2.3) 
2. How do end-users perceive information security / cybersecurity risk in relation to web 
use? (2.7.2.4.2)  
3. What factors underlie web-related computer misuse by employees, whether intentional 
or unintentional? (2.7.3.1) 
4. Do information security policies or acceptable use policies influence end-users’ 
behaviour? How far can users be trusted to comply with acceptable use policies? 
(2.7.3.2.1)  
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5. How effective are training and awareness interventions aimed at reducing user-related 
incidents involving web use? (2.7.3.2.2) 
6. How do organisations respond to information security incidents? (2.7.2.4.1) 
7. How do security managers perceive information security / cybersecurity risks in relation to 
web use, and how do they make decisions relating to them? (2.7.2.4.1)  
 
2.7.2.2 What constitutes risk management in cybersecurity / information security? 
Risk management in the context of information security / cybersecurity may be defined as “the 
process that allows business managers to balance operational and economic costs of protective 
measures and achieve gains in mission capability by protecting business processes that support the 
business objectives or mission of the enterprise” (Oost, 2010, p. 216, citing Peltier, 2004). The core 
aspects of risk management involve a Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle, as described by Jones (2007), 
consisting of the following processes: Identify risks [Act], Assess risks [Plan], Treat risks [Do] and 
Monitor and report risks [Check], the details of which are given in Appendix K. Such a process is 
prescribed for the NHS in the document Information security management: NHS code of practice 
(NHS Connecting for Health, 2007); see above, Section 1.4.4. Within [Act], risk evaluation criteria, 
impact criteria and risk acceptance criteria need to be established. Assets (data, hardware, software 
and network) in relation to the consequences of loss need to be identified, as do threats and 
vulnerabilities (Millar, 2016). Treating, monitoring and reporting risks ([Do] and [Check]) represents 
the work of risk management proper, described as “planning, monitoring and controlling activities 
which are based on information produced by risk analysis activity” (Gerber & von Solms, 2005, citing 
Scarff et al., 1993).  
Risks may be treated in four ways: risk modification, risk retention (accepting risks according to the 
criteria established in [Act]),  risk avoidance and risk sharing. Treating risks usually involves removing 
or reducing threat sources, addressing vulnerabilities, and lessening, as far as possible, the impact of 
negative events (Fischer, 2016 – add citation). Controls, the selection of which is generally based on 
a cost/benefit ratio unless the risk is particularly severe, are intended to treat risks by reducing them 
to an acceptable level (Millar, 2016). Controls ”promote a preferred behaviour of the system being 
controlled” (Aken, 1978, cited by Dhillon, 1999). An information security policy should determine the 
nature and overall framework of the controls applied (Dhillon, 1999). 
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Figure 2.11 The social amplification of risk 
Renn (2008b), p. 197 
Reproduced by permission  
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2.7.2.3 Assessment and analysis of cybersecurity / information security risks
While cybersecurity risks relating to specific forms of online behaviour, as described in Section 2.6.3, 
are not well understood, technical cybersecurity vulnerabilities in general are relatively well 
documented. Extensive research efforts have been devoted to developing taxonomies of them in an 
effort to provide frameworks for systematic security assessments; these are reviewed by Igure and 
Williams (2008) and by Joshi, Singh, and Tarey (2015). Taxonomies in common use include Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) (MITRE Corporation)45 and the Open Web Application Security 
Project (OWASP) Periodic Table of Vulnerabilities.46 It should be evident however that, given the 
complex and rapidly evolving threat landscape, which can present hitherto unknown risks, and the 
uncertain judgments involved in the identification of risks and in both quantitative and qualitative 
risk analysis methods, information security / cybersecurity risk management is an inherently chance-
ridden and subjective process, and can never be 100% certain of success (Gerber & von Solms, 2005, 
Igure & Williams, 2008). In any computer application there is almost always a trade-off between 
security and functionality (Besnard & Arief, 2004; Post & Kagan, 2007), and the relationships 
between risks, vulnerabilities, threats and security measures can be very complex: for example, one 
threat can attack several different vulnerabilities, one measure can protect against multiple threats, 
or one asset will require protection via several different security measures (Bojanc, Jerman-Blažič, & 
Tekavčič, 2012). Oppliger (2015) suggested that quantitative risk analysis approaches are impossible 
to apply outside laboratory settings, since insufficient information is available to estimate either the 
probability of occurrence or the extent of the expected damage in a meaningful way. Similarly Utin, 
Utin, and Utin (2008, p. 168) suggested that “information security risk management quantitative 
analysis is more an art than a science and cannot be relied upon to produce consistent and 
trustworthy data”. Stewart (2004) was strongly critical of much current professional thinking in 
information security risk assessment, contending that it is both precautionary in character and also 
commercially driven. He disparaged the current attitudes and predispositions of information security 
/ cybersecurity professionals as they related to the commercial security industry as a manifestation 
of groupthink (Pidgeon, 1998; Rose, 2011; Turner & Pratkanis, 1998). Quigley et al. (2015) concluded 
from their examination of cybersecurity discourse, based partly on the body of research on the 
psychology of risk perception discussed above in Section 2.7.1, that cybersecurity risks are often 
over-simplified and over-dramatised within popular literature, and that the probability of some 
                                                          
 
45
 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE): https://cve.mitre.org/   
46
 OWASP Periodic Table of Vulnerabilities: http://www.owasp.org  
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cybersecurity risks to critical infrastructures (such as health services) are over-estimated. Baskerville 
(1991) preferred to understand information security risk analysis methods as a means of recording 
and manipulating sociological, rather than natural, events, and as a valid means of generating 
contextually-situated professional knowledge using intuitive judgements. There appeared to be a 
wider issue of the applicability of different models of information security,   i.e., technical or social, 
and hence of different approaches to social theory, and of the application of different paradigms 
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979) to security (Jones 2002, Drake & Clarke 2001); cf. the discussion of 
information security service culture in Section 2.7.2.4.1 below. Drake and Clarke went so far as to 
suggest that information security had hitherto  been approached as a “pseudo-scientific domain” 
(2001, p. 2). They proposed a “critically normative approach” as an alternative.  
 
2.7.2.4. Characteristics of information security / cybersecurity risk perception and decision-
making 
2.7.2.4.1 IT professionals 
It is important to establish how decisions are made in respect of user-related cybersecurity 
/information security risks, particularly regarding the implementation of technical controls. The 
processes of information security managers’ decision-making were investigated by Pettigrew and 
Ryan (2012) via a series of 23 interviews with experts and leaders in the information security 
community. They found that a range of different criteria were used in self-evaluation: these included 
compliance; a combination of compliance, intrusion prevention, content filtering, and patch 
management; securing adequate investment for IT security; and degree of success in building a 
social environment. Njenga and Brown (2012), identified via hermeneutical analysis and 
interpretation of interview data a considerable element of improvisation in information security 
managers’ decision-making rather than a total dependence on rational choice techniques. Werlinger 
and associates (Botta, Muldner, Hawkey, & Beznosov, 2010; Werlinger, Hawkey, & Beznosov, 2009; 
Werlinger, Hawkey, Botta, & Beznosov, 2009) conducted a wide-ranging investigation of the human, 
organisational and technical factors in information security from the perspective of practitioners. 
They found that much decision-making in information security management was tacit in nature. 
Significantly, “open environments and academic freedom” were perceived as an organisational 
challenge for information security management: “’You’re constantly trading access versus risk’” 
(Werlinger, Hawkey, & Beznosov, 2009, p. 11). So also were the distribution of IT responsibilities 
across organisational units, and use of mobile devices. 
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Within the topic of IT staff subcultures (2.5.3) there is the particular issue of what Rastogi and von 
Solms (2012) describe as information security service culture: the pattern of shared values and 
beliefs among the staff responsible for information security. While many IT professionals and 
information security researchers would concur with the view that end-users are an important cause 
of security breaches, what Schneier (2000) described as the “weakest link”, their perceptions of end-
users and their role in information security may vary widely. It was noted above (2.5.3) that a 
tendency to blame end-users for systems failures, with a corresponding distrust of end-users, and 
desire to restrict end-user functionality, were identified as characteristic of IT subcultures. 
McFadzean, Ezingeard, and Birchall (2006) and Rastogi and von Solms (2012) related this difference 
in perspective to different paradigms operating within information security research and practice. 
Information security service culture, according to Rastogi and von Solms, depends critically on the 
assumptions made about end-users and about the organisation by information security managers 
and system developers. Such assumptions may be described in terms of the concept of technological 
frames (Orlikowski & Gash, 1994). Technological frames, which the authors define as “core sets of 
assumptions, expectations and knowledge of technology collectively held by a group or community” 
(p. 199), may powerfully influence overall design and use of technologies within the organisation.  
 
The authors also drew upon Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) account of paradigms in organisational 
analysis, as adapted by Hirschheim and Klein (1989), to characterise the mind-set of developers.  
According to this analysis, system developers, adhering to a functionalist paradigm,. and assuming a 
stable organisational reality, tend to assume the validity of the organisational objectives with which 
they are presented, failing to appreciate that they may be the subject of considerable disagreement. 
(Functionalism is defined by Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 26) as an overall approach which “seeks to 
provide essentially rational explanations of social affairs”.) Information security managers, for their 
part, adhering strictly to the same functionalist paradigm, see security primarily as a technical/ 
administrative matter which can be implemented simply via hardware and software controls. They 
typically approach their task in a “command and control” fashion, remaining isolated from actual 
end-users, being unwilling to understand their perspective or to negotiate with them, and continuing 
to rely on their own preconceptions (Ashenden, 2008; cf. Hedström, Kolkowska, Karlsson, & Allen, 
2011). The contrasting perspective sees cybersecurity / information security as essentially a socio-
technical endeavour (Hedström, Karlsson, & Kolkowska, 2013). The latter perspective, assuming as it 
does the “mutual constitution of people and technologies” (Sawyer & Jarrahi, 2014, p. 5-1), 
emphasises the need for security to be as usable as possible, and also the necessity of organisational 
commitment, that is of aligning security policy and practices with organisational strategy and culture 
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via the involvement of business areas other than IT in policy development and implementation 
(Fléchais & Sasse, 2009; Kayworth & Whitten, 2010; Koskosas & Siomos, 2011; Koskosas, 2013; 
Maynard, Ruighaver, & Ahmad, 2011; Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007; Spears & Barki, 2010; 
Woodhouse, 2007). 
 
Albrechtsen and Hovden (2010) suggested that relationships between end-users and information 
security managers are typically characterised by incorrect perceptions, distrust and antagonism; this, 
they claimed, leads to a bureaucratic, “policing” approach to information security policy and 
controls, and to a reliance on technological tools as a means of controlling and monitoring end-user 
behaviour. This, in turn, tends to lead to end-user resistance and non-compliance. Kolkowska (2011) 
investigated, via a qualitative case study, using both semi-structured interviews and documents, the 
respective attitudes and values of IT professionals and end-users (lecturers, research staff and PhD 
students) within two academic departments of a Swedish university regarding information security 
matters. Twelve end-users were interviewed in department one and seven in department two, with 
four IT professionals interviewed in each department. Schein’s three-tier model of organisational 
culture (artifacts, espoused values and basic assumptions) (Schein, 1996; see Section 2.5.1 above) 
was used to provide a conceptual foundation. Kolkowska’s study uncovered further complexities of 
information security service culture, in that she identified conflicts both between the basic 
assumptions held by IT professionals and users, and, within information service cultures, between IT 
professionals’ espoused values and their basic assumptions. Basic assumptions were identified from 
behaviour and from visible structures and processes (artifacts). Conflicting assumptions between IT 
professionals and end-users in department one concerned: security responsibilities; the scope and 
limits of end-users’ freedoms in relation to computer use; and protection of information and IT 
resources. Conflicting espoused values and basic assumptions in department one were observed in 
relation to protection of information: IT professionals stressed the responsibilities of end-users for 
protection of person-identifiable or confidential information, but the author found no visible 
structures or processes supporting this. In department two, information security was managed by 
the IT professionals in a top-down, “professionals know best”, fashion, in contradiction of their 
espoused values of respect, dialogue, communication and cooperation. Other conflicts arose in 
relation to standardisation and control (IT) versus creativity and flexibility (end-users); control (IT) 
versus freedom (end-users); planning (IT) versus flexibility in relation to support requirements; 
implementation of technical controls (IT) versus need for trust and respect (end-users); and 
appropriate level of involvement of end-users in information security strategy and decision-making. 
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It should be noted that the purpose of risk management is not solely about the avoidance of risk to 
minimise losses, but also about the need to take risks to reap rewards (Hirsch & Ezingeard, 2008, 
2009); the terms “risk appetite” and “risk tolerance” are used to refer to and define the quantity and 
nature of risk that organisations are willing to accept as they evaluate the trade-offs between 
perfect security and unlimited accessibility (Whitman & Mattord, 2010).  
A phenomenon of interest relating to the formulation of access controls in relation to information 
security or cybersecurity is that of the empathy gap, as identified by Smith and associates (Smith, 
2012; Wang, Smith, & Gettinger, 2012), rooted in forms of cognitive bias. Their work related to the 
specification of access controls within EPR systems, where they found that the wording of 
experimental scenarios (abstract / role-based, as compared with placing the participant in a live 
clinical setting), affected the extent to which access was constrained with the policies that were 
devised by the research participants. It seems possible that such empathy gaps could be a factor also 
in the setting of web access controls to published information or web applications, in addition to 
those relating to the differing professional backgrounds of IT and information governance 
professionals and clinician end-users; cf. Section 2.7.1. 
It was mentioned in Section 1.4.4 that information governance, including information security, 
tended to become a higher strategic priority in NHS organisations that had experienced data 
breaches. This informal observation accords with a number of research findings in other types of 
organisations. Goodhue and Straub (1991; cited by Farahmand, Atallah, & Konsynski, 2008), based 
on their questionnaire surveys of IT professionals and end-users, argued that managerial concern 
about an organisation’s security is a function of 1) the risk inherent in the industry 2) the extent of 
the effort already made to control these risks, and 3) individual factors such as awareness of 
previous security breaches, background in security work, etc. Ezingeard, Bowen-Schrire, and Birchall 
(2007), conducted interviews (n=26) among information security managers of companies in Sweden 
and the United Kingdom to test a number of hypotheses: that an organisation’s information security 
management practices are influenced by the board’s and senior management’s perception of risk; 
that there is a link between the perceived strategic importance of information security in the 
organisation and actual practice; and that adverse information security events, internal or external, 
are a significant influence on information security practice when deemed to be significant by 
decision-makers within an organisation. Positive correlations were observed between the frequency 
of information security reviews and the level of awareness of information security issues among the 
board (rated as high/medium/low), and between adverse events (n=16) and changes in information 
security practice, generally initiated by senior management. Volpentesta, Ammirato, and Palmieri, 
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(2011), who conducted a survey of information security managers of Italian companies (n=106), also 
found that adverse events heightened their perception of risk. In accordance with the known 
phenomenon of risk homeostasis, however, it would be expected that such heightened emphasis on 
security issues would revert over time to its previous level (see above, Section 2.7.1). 
 
2.7.2.4.2 End-users 
The importance of understanding end-users’ risk perceptions and security decision making as they 
relate to effective risk communication and user education in respect of cybersecurity and 
information security has been highlighted by Nurse (2013). Studies of end-users’ mental models of 
cybersecurity / information security have been reviewed by Volkamer and Renaud (2013). End-users’ 
perceptions of risk within the information security / cybersecurity domain have been investigated by 
Friedman, Nissenbaum, Hurley, Howe, and Felten, (2002), Huang and associates (Huang, Rau, 
Salvendy, Gao, & Zhou, 2011; Huang, Rau, & Salvendy, 2007, 2010), Harbach, Fahl, & Smith (2014) 
and Byrne et al. (2016); earlier studies were reviewed by Howe et al. (2012). These studies have 
generally been wide in scope, and focused on transactional online activities. The only work found 
which referred to end-users’ perception of risk in relation specifically to information behaviour was 
that of LeBlanc and Biddle (2012), which investigated users’ risk ratings of 20 different online 
activities in terms of possible benefits: likelihood; immediacy; temporal extent of impact, and 
severity of negative impact; and frequency. They found that users perceived online searching as a 
very low-risk activity in relation to possible loss of personal information. Vaast's (2007) study of 
social representations of information security among different groups of health professionals, which 
did not focus on risk as such but on threat perception, has been referred to above (Section 2.7.1). 
 
In relation to end-users’ risk perception and decision-making, many of the same heuristics and 
biases known in relation to risk perception in general (Section 2.7.1 above) have been identified 
within the information security / cybersecurity domain (Smith, 2012; Nurse, 2013). In relation to 
their online behaviour and security decision making, other important phenomena have been 
identified which are specific to the domain: security fatigue and the (related) compliance budget. 
These are relevant to any security-related behaviour involving decision-making and choice. Furnell 
and Thompson defined security fatigue in terms of a “threshold at which it simply gets too hard or 
burdensome for users to maintain security” (2009, p. 7). For Stanton, Theofanos, Prettyman, and 
Furman (2016), security fatigue is “a type of weariness, a reluctance to see or experience any more 
of something” as it relates specifically to security. The authors suggested that security fatigue “often 
manifests as resignation or a loss of control in people’s responses to online security” (p. 27). 
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Beautement and colleagues (Beautement & Sasse, 2009; Beautement, Sasse, & Wonham, 2008; 
Sasse, 2015; Steves et al., 2014) proposed the important concept of the compliance budget, defined 
as the level of effort that an individual is prepared to expend to comply with information security 
policies for no personal gain. It is suggested that where information security measures are not 
enforced technically, users will tend to comply with a security policy only as far as it does not require 
extra effort, or does not impede their work. 
 
While the relationship of cybersecurity / information security events to specific forms of actual 
online behaviour is imperfectly understood, end-users’ proneness to a variety of non-malicious 
insecure behaviours online has been conclusively demonstrated in a wide range of studies (e.g. Flinn 
& Lumsden, 2005; Howe et al., 2012; Stanton, Stam, Mastrangelo, & Jolton, 2005). A literature 
review by Derbentseva, Fraser, Gibbon, and Hawton (2016) identified ten categories of non-
malicious insecure behaviour, as related to: web use (visiting unsafe web pages, downloading files 
from unverified sources); e-mail practices (opening emails from unknown sources, falling victim to 
phishing attacks through opening links or attachments); password practices and account protection; 
removable media; use of network resources outside the organisational perimeter; Web 2.0 and 
social media; BYOD; system maintenance (failing to update operating systems or anti-malware 
signatures, not backing up data, ignoring security warnings); and AUP non-compliance. Such 
problems are highly complex in nature; they are thought to relate to security mechanisms’ usability 
and acceptability to end-users, and their relationship to attitude and motivation, and to decision-
making strategies, as well as to perceptions of risk (Derbentseva et al., 2016; Fagan & Khan, 2016; 
West et al., 2008). In consequence it is common within information security research for end-users 
to be cited as the “weakest link” in security (Schneier, 2000). Such an assessment may, however, 
relate primarily to social engineering attacks and users’ vulnerability to deception. In consequence, it 
is frequently thought appropriate to treat risks by applying security controls within organisational 
networks in a manner that removes users from security decisions as far as possible (Nurse, 2013). It 
is intuitively apparent that restrictive technical controls are likely to constitute a more prominent 
element of cybersecurity measures within a corporate environment in which there are limited 
resources for risk communication and user education in relation to web-related risks. As has been 
shown (Section 2.6.2 above, Appendix D), there are, in any case, no behavioural defences against 
some of the commonest threats that arise in the course of online searching, hence supposed 
deficiencies in risk perception and security decision-making are of limited relevance in relation to 
these. 
 
117 
Trust necessarily involves the acceptance of risk (Inglesant & Sasse, 2011b), which itself constitutes  
a risk management approach (Section 2.7.2.1). Consideration of information security risk 
management naturally leads on to discussion of the role of trust within information security, since 
trust is commonly defined as “an attitude of positive expectation that one’s vulnerabilities will not 
be exploited” (Trist & Balmforth, 1951, cited by Inglesant & Sasse, 2011b, p. 2). It is common, 
following Luhmann (1979, cited by Cofta, 2007), to cite the importance of trust as a social enabler 
that reduces complexity and transaction costs within organisations, leading to a reduction in 
management controls, and hence greater efficiency; compare this with the discussion of 
organisational trust in 2.5.5.3 above. The work of Kirlappos and Sasse (2014, 2015) emphasised the 
role of organisation-employee trust  in information security, and of practices that foster it. However, 
it is not within the scope of this thesis to pursue this subject in detail here. 
 
The enforcement of acceptable use policies (Section 2.7.3.2, 2.7.3.4.1) by technological means 
(secure web gateways, group policies etc.) is rarely total (Dubois & Mouratidis, 2010); the 
organisation has to trust its employees not to circumvent or otherwise negate policies, even if there 
is strong technological enforcement in place. In the case of policy requirements to uphold copyright 
legislation, in particular, it is difficult to envisage appropriate means of technological enforcement. 
The trust placed in employees is nearly always only one part of a web or social and technological 
power through which security is maintained; power is inscribed and normalised through micro- and 
macro-level circuits of integration (Clegg, 1989; Inglesant & Sasse, 2011; see above, Section 2.5.6.2). 
This leads on to the discussion of measures against inappropriate web use in the following section.  
 
2.7.3 Measures against inappropriate web use 
2.7.3.1 The problem 
As discussed in section 2.7.1, use of the web presents a variety of security risks in itself.All 
organisations need to address the issue of facilitating legitimate use of the web for work-related 
purposes by their staff while limiting inappropriate use, in a manner that is not intrusive or 
demotivating.  
 
Generally, the issue of  PWU is treated by researchers without reference to the wider field of 
behavioural information security; conversely, personal use of the web at work (PWU) , as a potential 
source of risk to an organisation, is only very occasionally addressed within behavioural information 
security research itself. Inappropriate PWU is varyingly conceptualised (Kim & Byrne, 2011; Schalow 
et al., 2013). The nature of its effects is strongly disputed; some research shows strongly positive 
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effects associated with  PWU, such as increased productivity and job satisfaction, improved morale, 
relief of stress and improved work-life balance (Anandarajan et al., 2006; Jiang & Tsohou, 2014; Lim 
& Chen, 2012; Oravec, 2002). It is self-evident, however, that some forms of personal use of the web 
at work (sometimes termed “Internet misuse”, “cyberloafing” or “cyberslacking”) can present 
productivity, security and legal risks to organisations (Bandey, 2011a; Stratton, 2010). Different 
categories of seriousness may be identified (Blanchard & Henle, 2008; Griffiths, 2010; Weatherbee, 
2010). In the United Kingdom and elsewhere personal use of the web at work is relatively common 
(Whitfield, 2005), and can have serious organisational consequences in terms of an employer’s legal 
liability for users’ acts. Illegal activities perpetrated by users via their workplace computers for which 
UK employers may be vicariously liable include possession and distribution of illegal (i.e. paedophile) 
pornography and other obscene material or racially inflammatory material, racial or sexual 
harassment, discrimination, hacking, the defamation of management, customers or competitors, 
software piracy, copyright infringement, fraud, and breaches of the Data Protection Act (Bandey, 
2011; Holt, 2004; Willson & Oulton, 1999). Network performance may be degraded as a result of 
bandwidth being clogged by excessive use of non-work-related sites, and productivity adversely 
affected. Access to non-work-related websites or web applications is also thought to present 
increased security risks to corporate networks.  
 
2.7.3.2 Measures against inappropriate web use: deterrence 
2.7.3.2.1 Acceptable use policies 
It is generally considered important, as a deterrent first step in minimising inappropriate web use, 
that an acceptable use policy (AUP) be in place and be clearly understood by staff (Siau, Fui-Hoon 
Nah, & Teng, 2002) as part of a wider framework of information security and governance policies. 
While an evidence base is lacking for the formulation of AUPs that are effective in preventing 
inappropriate web use (Henle, Kohut, & Booth, 2009), they are frequently cited as an essential 
component of information security management systems and processes (e.g. Guttman & Bagwill, 
2012). Acceptable use policies aim, through the establishment of clear limits on PWU by staff 
members and contactors, to improve productivity, to minimise or prevent excessive bandwidth 
consumption, and to mitigate legal liability risks arising from misuse of Internet resources. Among 
other things, they set out organisational policy on employees’ use of the web, specifying categories 
of material and activities that are proscribed and establishing the scope of allowable PWU. Individual 
staff members’ rights and responsibilities regarding Internet technologies are clearly set out, as well 
as disciplinary sanctions to be applied for infringements of the policy. The scope of PWU that is 
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proscribed may extend beyond that which presents security risks, or is illegal or potentially illegal, to 
include a wide range of non-work-related activities and subject matter.  
 
The HSCIC had set out a model AUP designed for adoption by NHS organisations which permitted 
users to access research material and other information relevant to their work, and to access 
websites and webmail accounts for personal use so long as this did not interfere with work: details 
are given in Appendix G. The emphasis here was clearly on the nature and purpose of the activity 
being pursued, rather than on what was being accessed as such; there was a clear recognition that 
some material that would otherwise be considered inappropriate could in principle be legitimately 
accessed by health professionals for work-related purposes.  
 
Social media use in organisations may be addressed as part of wider AUPs or within separate social 
media policies or guidelines. Policies may address general corporate use, individual use, or both: 
frequently, no distinction is made between on-duty and off-duty conduct in respect of individual use. 
The main content components of on-duty social media policies are generally confidentiality and data 
protection, authority (who is entitled to speak for the organisation on social media, with a 
corresponding requirement to state identity and issue disclaimers), and arrangements for 
establishing and managing departmental social media sites, including provisions for appropriate 
moderation. Regarding individual use, they relate to the mitigation of risks to organisational and 
professional reputation through the establishment of clear standards of online conduct (“e-
professionalism”). It should be noted that social media may be used by organisations either for 
externally facing functions (e.g. marketing and public relations, staff recruitment) for internal 
functions (e.g. internal communications, knowledge management), or both (Segers, El Ouirdi, El 
Ouirdi, & Hendrickx, 2014).  
 
Of the very few research studies have been published of social media policies within health service 
organisations (Cain, 2011; Fast, Sørensen, Brand, & Suggs, 2015; Henry & Webb, 2014; Scragg, 
Shaikh, Robinson, & Mercer, 2017), only the last of these was British and related to the NHS. This 
mixed group of radiography practitioners and academics undertook a grounded theory study of the 
tone and content of the social media policies of nine NHS Trusts in the north west of England. Tone 
was categorised as either discouraging, encouraging or enabling. In respect of tone, the policies 
were mainly discouraging through being prohibitive. In respect of the content, five main themes 
could be identified: training and education; productivity; security; conduct and behaviour; and 
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reputation. However, not all were addressed equally: training and education were relatively under-
emphasised in comparison with security, which was heavily emphasised. 
 
Acceptable use policies are not generally considered to be effective on their own in preventing 
inappropriate web use (Anandarajan, 2002; Galletta & Polak, 2003; Mirchandani & Motwani, 2003); 
they are commonly used in combination with education and training in web searching  and/or 
cybersecurity, preventive measures (web filtering), detection measures (monitoring) and remedial 
measures (the threat of disciplinary sanctions) as enforcement measures. However, it is suggested 
that periodic reminders to staff of the content of AUPs can be effective to a considerable extent in 
reducing inappropriate web use (Shepherd & Klein, 2011; Shepherd, Mejias, & Klein, 2014). There 
are differences of opinion among IT professionals as to how far non-work-related sites that are still 
considered acceptable within the terms of the organisation’s AUP should be blocked (’IT Slave’,  
2011). It should be noted that content filtering is not implemented centrally within N3 other than for 
gambling sites (Read, 2010).  
 
2.7.3.2.2 Security education, training and awareness 
While there is an extensive literature (e.g. Lebek, Uffen, Neumann, Hohler, & Breitner, 2014; 
Pfleeger & Caputo, 2012; Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010) on critical success factors for effective user 
security education, training and awareness (SETA) interventions, and in particular on the basis of 
users’ motivations to adhere to good security practices, such interventions are frequently reported 
as being ineffective in changing user behaviour (Bada & Sasse, 2014). There is little direct evidence, 
also, of the effectiveness of SETA in reducing unintentional user-related incidents. Proctor’s (2016) 
literature review of reports of effectiveness of SETA interventions failed to identify any clear 
statistically-based studies.  McElroy and Weakland's (2013) report for Educause discussed a survey 
concerning SETA of 95 higher education institutions in the USA, and subsequent case studies 
conducted within individual institutions. The main security issues were found to be phishing, 
compliance with national standards for information security and copyright, BYOD, and data loss. 
Tools or methods used to measure the effectiveness of SETA with the institutions covered included 
metrics on the numbers and types of security incidents, employee feedback, behavioural change, 
and user surveys. The case studies focused on phishing, compliance with standards, BYOD and data 
loss, as these were perceived by survey respondents to present the most serious problems: web-
based attacks, cloud security, social networking or wireless network security, which are the issues 
most relevant for information behaviour, were not covered. University A claimed a 40.9% decrease 
in phishing incidents as a result of three rounds of awareness campaigns on phishing. University B 
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cited a 71% decreases in breaches of copyright following an awareness campaign for new students. 
University C achieved a 99% adoption rate of a secure email system on user-owned smartphones 
through a SETA campaign. University D reduced the number of outgoing messages containing 
confidential information by 80% by implementing a data loss prevention (DLP) solution which sent 
“educational” messages to staff members who attempted to send such messages.  
 
2.7.3.3 Measures against inappropriate web use: detection 
Monitoring of website access can be used with allowable legal limits to detect inappropriate web use 
(see below) as an alternative or addition to web filtering, e.g. activity logs can be analysed to identify 
access to questionable sites, and spot checking processes can be instituted requiring staff to account 
in precise detail for their business reason for accessing particular sites. While such an approach does 
not of itself restrict access to information, and is therefore from the information behaviour point of 
view a far preferable approach to enforcing AUPs, monitoring can raise serious issues of data 
protection, privacy, and organisational values (Clarke, 2005). Use of monitoring, while effective in 
reducing PWU, has been found to lower the overall job satisfaction of the employees being 
monitored (Urbaczewski & Jessup, 2002). It can also affect workers’ performance (Whitty, 2004), 
and may even trigger deliberate computer misuse (Posey, Bennett, & Roberts, 2011). “Employees 
may feel they are no longer trusted, become stressed, and begin wondering if they cannot be 
trusted with the net why should they be trusted with anything else” (Canaan Messarra, Karkoulian, 
& McCarthy, 2011, p. 255). This may be compared with the following from a publication by NHS 
Employers: “We trust our staff with patients’ lives, so why don’t we trust them with social media?” 
(NHS Employers, 2013a, p. 9).  
 
All monitoring of Internet access within the workplace in the United Kingdom required to be carried 
out in accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000, following the Information Commissioner’s Office guidance, which 
had the force of law (Holt, 2004; Information Commissioner’s Office, 2005). The Act, while not 
precluding systematic or intermittent monitoring of Internet access, required in particular that 
employees be notified of the detailed arrangements of monitoring and of the business rationale for 
it, and that any adverse impacts on individuals resulting from monitoring be justified with reference 
to the anticipated benefits to the employer and others. Issues that required to be considered here 
include possible impact upon the relationship of mutual trust and confidence that it is desirable 
should exist between staff and their employer, and whether the monitoring itself could be 
considered oppressive or demeaning. Glassman, Prosch, and Shao, (2015) found that use of “quota” 
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and “confirmation” functions within a web filtering system substantially reduced  PWU and 
promoted compliance with the acceptable use policy. 
 
2.7.3.4 Measures against inappropriate web use: prevention 
2.7.3.4.1 Web filtering: technologies 
Web filtering in various forms (prevention) can be used to block access to websites and web 
applications that are deemed inappropriate to access in a work environment (see Section 2.6 above). 
Overviews of the various tools and technologies used by governments, internet service providers 
and organisations to block websites are provided by Banday and Shah, (2010); Bertino, Ferrari, and 
Perego (2006); Gomez Hidalgo, Sanz, Garcia, and Rodriguez (2009); Houghton-Jan (2010); Lovaas 
(2015); Murdoch and Anderson (2008); and Nicoletti (2009), on whose accounts I have depended in 
what follows.  
 
Some web filtering systems screen according to content rating via metadata systems such as the 
Protocol for Web Description Resources (POWDER, maintained by the World Wide Web Consortium; 
successor to the Platform for Internet Content Selection, PICS), and that of the former Internet 
Content Rating Association, ICRA (discontinued in 2010). These rely on good practice implemented 
by content providers, and involve a) a self-labelling system used to describe the content in terms of 
predefined categories (its sexually explicit nature, suitability for children etc.) b) a client-side filter 
that recognises content labels and matches them with the user’s access policy, delivering or blocking 
the content as indicated. Most popular browsers provide content filtering options using such 
schemes. However, the use by publishers of content labelling is purely voluntary; it is estimated that 
only a small percentage of web pages include these labels (Bertino et al., 2006). 
 
Commonly, content is filtered otherwise based on a combination of domain, URL and file type, with 
selective screening for “prohibited” words or phrases. Blocking of URLs and their associated IP 
addresses is most commonly carried out using blacklisting (listing of objectionable sites to be 
blocked; more common) or whitelisting (listing of permissible sites); blacklisting is the primary 
mechanism used by commercial web filtering products, combined with supplementary whitelisting 
to ensure that certain important sites are never blocked. Blacklists may be maintained and supplied 
to web filtering product vendors by third-party services. They may not necessarily be maintained in-
house; they are often purchased by web filtering system vendors as a third-party product.The 
requested web page’s URL and equivalent IP address is compared with a stored list of URLs. From 
the technical point of view this is a rapid and efficient approach; however, it requires that the lists be 
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constantly updated to be effective. This process can be partly automated using web spidering 
techniques and web analytics, focusing on websites that appear as the most popular. Content 
analysis and classification techniques are generally employed by web filtering systems to carry out 
this updating automatically and assign previously unknown sites to the pre-determined categories.  
 
URL blocking and content analysis are the primary filtering technologies used in commercial and 
open-source web filters. The most primitive form of content analysis is keyword matching, which 
blocks access to websites on the basis of the occurrence of “objectionable” words and phrases 
regardless of semantic context, comparing words in a retrieved page against those in a keyword 
dictionary of prohibited expressions. Such an approach is sometimes used by web filters in the 
preliminary screening of sites, “suspect” pages then being referred to a more sophisticated content 
analysis process. The two most prominent “intelligent” content analysis approaches used by 
commercial web filters are text classification and image processing using skin detection, the latter 
being particularly relevant to the detection of pornography. Of the available techniques for text-
based web content filtering, automated text classification using a machine learning approach is the 
most widely used. Details of these processes, or of the types of sites blocked and how they are 
categorised, are never made public by the system vendors, who are hence not accountable for their 
effects (Willard, 2010). Blocking by file type is possible with some filters, e.g. .jpg (still images), .avi 
(video), or .mp3 (sound). However, owing to the multiplicity of file extensions available for some file 
types, the ability to embed images in other file types, and the lack of metadata associated with 
images, blocking by file type cannot be applied selectively to “objectionable” content (Houghton-Jan, 
2008). Some filters provide for quota restrictions to be applied to particular types of content, or for a 
“warning / confirm” message to be displayed on the screen when an attempt is made to access 
questioned content, either requiring a simple click-through or entry of a password (cf. Figure 2.11 
above).  
 
Web filters are generally evaluated either in terms of percentages of false positives (blocking of 
legitimate websites) and false negatives (sites which should have been blocked according to the 
configured policy, but were not), or of precision (P) (proportion of items classified as positive that 
were really positive) and recall (R) (proportion of items classified as positive from the whole set of 
positive items). (In clinical contexts, the terms “specificity” and “sensitivity” are used as the 
equivalent of “precision” and “recall”.) An “ideal” filter that is totally error-free does not exist; 
moreover there is a trade-off between percentage of true positives and percentage of false positives 
(Resnick, Hansen, & Richardson, 2004; Resnick, Richardson, & Hansen, 2002). The trade-off can be 
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represented graphically using a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve. More details are 
given in Appendix L. Resnick et al. (2004) described two measures of over-blocking, one negative, 
one positive: the blocked-sites overblocking rate, i.e the fraction of all blocked sites that are 
legitimate, and the legitimate-sites overblocking rate, i.e. the fraction of legitimate sites that are 
blocked. 
 
Experimental evaluations of web filtering systems rarely translate into real-world conditions (Gomez 
Hidalgo et al., 2009). Resnick et al. (2004) presented a framework for designing and interpreting such 
evaluations.They stressed the need to use large test sets, to create the test sets in an unfiltered 
environment, for the collection process to be objective and repeatable, and for a range of filter 
configurations to be tested. They had earlier carried out an influential test of the effectiveness of 
commercial web filters, which can be taken as representing best practice in evaluating filtering 
effectiveness (Richardson, Resnick, Hansen, Derry, & Rideout, 2002; Rideout, Richardson, & Resnick, 
2002). They examined the effectiveness of commercial web filters in screening out pornography 
without hindering access to legitimate health information. They used a simulation approach, testing 
with results from searches approximating the results of adolescents’ web searching for health 
information and pornography. At the least restrictive setting, configured to block only pornography, 
the products tested blocked a mean 1.4% of health information sites; however, 10% of health sites 
found using search terms related to sexuality were blocked. The mean pornography blocking rate 
was 87%. At the most restrictive settings, the mean blocking rate was 24% for health information 
sites and 91% for pornography sites. Houghton-Jan (2008) also evaluated the accuracy of four 
widely-used commercial filters (Barracuda, CyberPatrol, FilterGate and Websense). Library 
workstations were set up, one without filtering, the others with each of the filters to be tested. Their 
accuracy in filtering “content of an adult sexual nature”, sexuality-related content “not of an adult 
sexual nature” (e.g. rape victim support sites, LGBT support sites) and also web proxy / avoidance 
sites, using the applicable categories on each filter, was tested using 135 test questions and 
scenarios. These included general keyword searches using three different web search engines, direct 
URL access to a variety of types of site and content, image searches, library catalogue searches, and 
bibliographic database searches. RSS feed content access was also tested. No attempts were made 
to find illegal material. 
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Table 2.5 Web filtering accuracy 
Houghton-Jan (2008), p. 7 
Reproduced by permission 
 
Houghton-Jan’s findings are summarised in Table 2.5 above. She found that the filters were far more 
accurate for direct URL access, keyword searches using search engines and bibliographic database 
searches than they were for image searches or RSS feeds. Results for library catalogue searches were 
less accurate than for bibliographic databases. She described her results as being similar to the 
findings of earlier studies, which she summarised, in indicating high levels of over-blocking of 
legitimate content. 
 
2.7.3.4.2 Web filtering technologies: impacts upon information seeking 
As stated above, the purpose of implementing website blocking and filtering technologies is to 
enforce the organisation’s acceptable use policy. NHS AUPs were not intended to constrain 
information seeking for work-related purposes. Anecdotal evidence, as collated by Blenkinsopp 
(Blenkinsopp, 2008a, 2008b) suggested that it was relatively common, however, for material even of 
a professional nature relating to subjects such as violence, sexual behaviour or drugs of abuse to be 
blocked entirely by NHS web filters which had detected particular terms out of context. This could 
have far-reaching consequences, such as the blocking of entire library catalogues and collections of 
purchased e-book or e-journal content; even government websites could become inaccessible. Web 
applications that were deemed to be in some way a security risk (e.g. peer-to-peer file sharing, 
webmail and Google tools, popular social networking platforms, web conferencing, instant 
messaging, and Skype), and resource sharing sites with a social component, such as SlideShare, 
Delicious and YouTube, were also frequently blocked. Interactive functionality within blogs could be 
disabled, and individual services, such as libraries, could be prohibited from running their own blogs. 
While processes for getting content unblocked generally existed, they were frequently reported to 
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be slow and bureaucratic (TDAG, 2009b); permission could, for instance, require to be given by a so-
called Information Asset Administrator within the service where a person was working before IT staff 
were able to act. There were prima facie indications, therefore, that actual website blocking and 
filtering practices with NHS organisations did not correspond with the intentions of the NHS model 
AUP. Within the NHS, guidance from the HSCIC on content filtering had at the time of writing  
apparently been “in preparation” for several years. It should be noted that content filtering was not 
implemented centrally within N3, other than for gambling sites (Read, 2010).  
 
Web filtering is “of its nature intrusive and disruptive” (Gomez Hidalgo et al., 2009, p. 270); it 
represents a denial of autonomy in information-seeking, and inevitably involves a form of 
censorship. It is controversial within organisational settings mainly on account of its questionable 
accuracy, particularly in respect of over-blocking, as described above. However, the underlying 
socio-cultural and moral values of web filtering vendors have also been questioned. Willard (2002) 
documented the existence of close links between conservative Christian lobby groups and eight of 
the vendors supplying web filtering systems to American high schools. Numerous instances of 
apparently values-based categorisation or blocking of websites by mainstream vendors were 
documented by Ayre (2004a) and Houghton-Jan (2010). Blenkinsopp (2008a, p. 10) reported that, 
within the NHS, “… sites on HIV/AIDS have been blocked as ‘having gay or lesbian content’”. It was 
clear that health information presented a particular problem as regards over-blocking, particularly 
within areas such as sexual health and behaviour, maternity services, child protection, dermatology, 
substance misuse, and forensic psychiatry, where access to professional information is frequently 
found to be blocked. (Lehmann, Cohen, and Kim (2005) described the problems of maintaining 
legitimate access to an online dermatology atlas while controlling pornography seeking.) Within 
mental health services there was a particular issue in respect of content accessed by patients (for 
example, sites promoting illicit substances, encouraging eating disorders or self-harm, providing 
information about methods of suicide, supporting violent political extremism etc.) which clinicians 
could need to investigate for purposes of diagnosis, case formulation and therapy. 
 
The concerns of NHS librarians, as outlined by Blenkinsopp (2008a, 2008b), regarding the blocking of 
websites in particular led to the former Strategic Health Authority Library Leads’ (SHALL) Technical 
Design and Authority Group (TDAG) undertaking a survey of NHS librarians (n=151) in December 
2008 (TDAG, 2009a, 2009b). A summary of the survey findings was circulated to NHS librarians via 
the customary channels; otherwise this important work was not published. The survey found that 
access to a variety of e-resources was blocked within NHS Trust networks, including e-books and e-
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journals purchased locally or nationally, as shown in Figure 2.10 below. It identified (as well as the 
blocking of websites) the following: lack of required software on PCs to access audio-visual media; 
lack of administration rights by library staff to install it; blocking of browser functionality required to 
run applications; restrictions on size of email attachments; storage problems, including limited 
access to encrypted memory sticks, coupled with restrictions on USB connections and the disabling 
of CD/DVD writers and floppy disc drives; and slow networks. Follow-up measures subsequently 
agreed by TDAG in consequence of the findings are described in Section 1.4.5. 
 
The consultant paediatricians Prince, Cass, and Klaber (2010) undertook a survey within 37 NHS 
Trusts in England of accessibility of web-based resources to postgraduate medical trainees, the 
results of which were published in a relatively brief article within a peer-reviewed journal. It was not 
stated how these Trusts were selected, nor to which clinical specialties the respondents belonged. In 
each Trust, a doctor working on a computer within a clinical area tested access to a sample of 22 
different online resources. The websites were selected to cover common online file format types, 
including text and audio files, images, video and dynamically driven e-learning sites.  
 
Figure 2.12 Blocking of access to e-resources in NHS libraries 
TDAG, 2008, Reproduced by permission 
 
It was found that, while established resources such as the National Library for Health were 
accessible in over 95% of Trusts, important clinical resources were blocked, and it was sometimes 
difficult to download PDF or PowerPoint files. Their findings are summarised in Figure 2.12 above. 
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Online video and audio (podcast) content was often difficult to view, and sound was usually absent. 
YouTube was blocked in most Trusts, and iTunes University was not accessible, as it required iTunes 
to be installed. The DH’s “E-learning for Healthcare” programme modules were fully functional for 
only 32% of respondents. YouTube and webmail applications were sometimes blocked. The authors 
drew some far-reaching conclusions: that IT managers’ approach to risk management in relation to 
web content was flawed: “Shouldn’t we be managing the risks more effectively in order to allow 
learners the freedom to use IT resources to better effect?” (p. 437), and that the technical logistical 
obstacles they had identified presented a potential obstacle to the future development of medical e-
learning which required to be addressed at a national policy level. 
 
Childs et al. (2005) conducted a qualitative multi-method study aiming to identify barriers to and 
solutions/critical success factors for e-learning in health sciences. It included a systematic review, 
semi-structured telephone interviews and a questionnaire survey. A total of 57 articles and reports 
relating to conditions in the United Kingdom, the United States and elsewhere were identified as 
suitable for review, based on their subject content. Thirteen telephone interviews were conducted 
with managers and training staff. The survey aimed to elicit the views of users and non-users of e-
learning; 149 questionnaires were returned. Details of the samples, and of the percentage response 
rate for the survey, were not stated. As well as organisational problems, the study identified a 
variety of technical barriers to e-learning, which included network bandwidth problems, and 
deficiencies in hardware, peripherals, software and technical support for e-learning. The authors 
also found evidence of computer skills deficits and a variety of pedagogical issues acting as barriers 
to effective e-learning.  
 
The more recent overview by Lafferty (2015), provided a detailed account of technological barriers 
of various kinds to technology-enhanced learning (TEL).47 This was a technical report prepared for 
Health Education England, and was based primarily on her own experiences with delivering e-
learning within NHS settings, with contributions from other e-learning practitioners; other work was 
not referenced. Issues she highlighted included lack of support for users’ mobile devices, lack of 
access to adequate Wi-Fi connectivity including non-availability of eduroam on many NHS sites, 
blocking of e-learning support resources, including social media, by Trust web filters, lack of 
appropriate hardware and software (sound cards, video cards, or appropriate browsers or media 
                                                          
 
47 The researcher is identified as one of four contributors of content to the final version (2.1) of this document. 
An updated version (2.8) was recently published by Health Education England (Lafferty, 2017). 
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players) and inability to transfer large files owing to restrictions on portable media and access to 
external network resources. Many aspects of her account were borne out by the comments of 
participants in a Tweet chat conducted by #WeNurses (2015) on the theme “Are barriers to the use 
of technology in learning a real issue for healthcare professionals?”  
 
Studies have been carried out of the negative impacts on information seeking of web content 
filtering in other contexts: Australian (Broucek, Turner, & Zimmerli, 2010) and South African 
(Rensleigh, 2002) universities, in American schools (Simmons, 2005; Sutton, 2005a, 2005b, 2006) and 
colleges (Stanley & Stovall, 2008), also in American (reviewed by Cooke, 2006, and Shearer, 2010) 
and British (Brown & McMenemy, 2013; Cooke, 2006; McMenemy, 2008; Payne et al., 2016; 
Shearer, 2010; Spacey & Cooke, 2014; Spacey, Cooke, Creaser, & Muir, 2013; Spacey, Cooke, Muir, & 
Creaser, 2013) public libraries, and on consumer health information seeking in particular (Richardson 
et al., 2002; Rideout et al., 2002). In particular the effects of web filtering on secondary education in 
the United States have been extensively investigated, although most of this work exists in the form 
of dissertations and theses. Sutton (2005), for example, found that web filters frequently blocked 
legitimate web content that the students needed for their assignments, giving rise to considerable 
wasted time, frustration, annoyance and alienation on their part. She concluded that information 
literacy training in use of the Internet was a far more effective way than using web filtering of 
keeping students safe from potentially harmful content; cf. Ofsted (2010; Willard (2010). Web 
filtering in public libraries raises issues of democratic accountability and transparency, particularly in 
instances where web filtering policy is outside the control of library staff. Studies of the impact of 
web filtering or monitoring within organisations (e.g. Whitty, 2004) have tended to focus on 
employee attitudes in general rather than on information seeking specifically. The only work found 
specifically relating to information behaviour was that of Deisz (2005), who undertook a 
questionnaire survey for his MSc thesis of workers in 24 Norwegian companies, both filtered and un-
filtered, found that more than 33% of respondents (n=48) felt that filtering in their company blocked 
too many sites and hindered their work. 
 
2.7.4 Summary and synthesis 
Sections 2.6 and 2.7 have provided an overview of relevant issues relating to information security / 
cybersecurity risk management, including social theories of risk, cognitive biases in decision-making 
under conditions of uncertainty, and the relationship between security management approaches 
and adverse events. It has also discussed in detail the measures adopted by organisations  
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(acceptable use policies, training, monitoring and filtering) to address risks related to use of the web, 
their effectiveness or otherwise, and their impacts on individual workers’ information behaviour.  
 
Web-borne malware presents a well-attested and growing threat to corporate networks. However, it 
is apparent that the relationship between malware infection risk and web users’ browsing behaviour 
is not well understood; in particular, the correlation between subject content and frequency of 
compromise has been found to be relatively weak (2.6). While there may be valid legal and 
governance reasons for subject-based filtering of web content, the practice of restricting access on 
security grounds based on website subject categories, therefore, cannot therefore be said to be 
strongly supported by the available research evidence. 
 
All organisations and societies emphasise certain risks and ignore or downplay others (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982b). Sociological theories of risk and risk perception (2.7.1) would seem to indicate 
that risk management in general is subject to a range of organisational and cultural influences. End-
users’ decision making in relation to online risks has been shown to be subject to a variety of 
cognitive biases, as well as to the security fatigue phenomenon. The relationships between end-
users’ perceptions of online risks and actual security behaviour have been demonstrated to be 
complex, with very little evidence for any direct effect of training interventions on levels of security 
incidents. Two contrasting approaches to information security management were identified and 
described, the functionalist and the sociotechnical (2.7.2.4.1). Risk management in information 
security / cybersecurity has been shown to be a matter of professional judgement rather than a 
precise science. Decision-making by security professionals has been shown to be largely tacit in 
nature (2.7.2.4.1). Studies were identified specifically of decision making in information security 
management within the private sector and in academia, but not within health services (2.7.2). 
Kolkowska (2006, 2011) characterised what she described as different information security cultures 
within an academic context, and described their impacts upon end-user computing activity 
(2.7.2.4.1). A relationship was identified between information security management approaches and 
adverse events (2.7.2 .4.1).  
 
The organisational rationale for web filtering derives from the productivity, security and legal risks 
that some forms of PWU at work can present. However the nature of the phenomenon and its 
effects are contested (2.7.3). PWU itself, and the effectiveness and organisational appropriateness of 
measures to prevent or minimise it (via deterrence, detection, and prevention) has been extensively 
studied, although not in health service contexts. The technical deficiencies of web content filtering 
solutions, and their adverse impacts on information seeking, were discussed.  The evaluation 
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methodologies of Resnick and associates and of Houghton-Jan (2008) were outlined. A range of 
studies were identified that discussed the negative impacts of web filtering in non-health settings, 
mainly education services or public libraries. The only studies found which related specifically to 
health-related information seeking were those of Resnick and associates (2.7.3.4.2). These studies 
demonstrated negative impacts arising from the lack of accuracy of filtering technologies and lack of 
accountability in their implementation. The only two studies found relating to web filtering and 
other security-related technical barriers to information seeking in general within the NHS were the 
unpublished TDAG survey (2009) and that of Prince et al. (2010). Technical obstacles to information 
seeking, i.e. related to deficiencies in computer systems, were mentioned in some studies, and 
occasionally blocking of websites (Beke-Harrigan et al., 2008; Gilmour et al., 2011; Hughes et al., 
2009; Jones et al., 2011), but generally in insufficient detail to be informative. Childs et al. (2005) 
identified a variety of barriers within NHS settings to e-learning, which included deficiencies in 
hardware, software and technical support for e-learning. Chamberlain et al. (2015) identified 
technical barriers (inadequate infrastructure, blocked websites and web applications, lack of BYOD 
implementation), to the use of mobile technologies by health professionals in NHS settings. Lafferty 
(2015) documented in detail a range of technical and related policy obstacles to e-learning 
encountered within NHS environments, relating particularly to social media policy, and briefly 
indicated their impacts, but did not discuss organisational issues in any depth.  
 
2.8 Diffusion of innovations 
2.8.1 Rogers’ theory of diffusion of innovations  
Theories of the diffusion of innovations are relevant to the literature review as a whole in that they 
address the responses of individuals, organisations and societies to new technologies. They are 
treated here mainly with reference to Web 2.0 and social media. Innovation is discontinuous and 
transformational in character (Brown & Osborne, 2013). It may be defined as “new ideas that work”, 
or, more precisely, “the intentional introduction and application within a role, group or organization, 
of ideas, processes, products or procedures, new to the relevant unit of adoption, designed to 
significantly benefit the individual, the group or organization or wider society” (West & Farr, 1990, 
cited by Brown & Osborne, 2013, p. 188).  
 
Within the theory of diffusion of innovation popularised by Rogers (1967/2003), diffusion is defined 
both as “the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time 
among the members of a social system”, and the process by which an innovation is adopted and 
gains acceptance among members of that system (Koçak, Kaya, & Erol, 2013, citing Rogers, 1983). 
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The theory is applicable both to individuals and to organisations. Rogers suggested that in most 
cases an initial few people (innovators) are open to the innovation and adopt it. Early adopters also 
invest early on in new technologies as a means to address their specific problems. As these 
innovators and early adopters (who may be influential opinion formers) spread the word within their 
communities, the innovation is adopted by more and more people, leading to the formation of a 
critical mass. Once this critical mass is achieved, diffusion of the innovation becomes self-sustaining. 
Over time the innovation becomes diffused among the population until a saturation point is 
achieved. The process can be represented by an S-shaped curve.  
 
With interactive innovations such as Web 2.0 / social media, the innovation becomes involved in its 
own diffusion, and later adopters influence earlier adopters as well as vice versa; this process is 
termed reciprocal interdependence (Markus, 1987). It is shown in Figure 2.13 below: 
Regarding organisational use of Web 2.0 and social media, a distinction needs to be made between 
internal and external use; it is perfectly possible for an organisation to use social media applications 
for public and supplier engagement, while blocking or strictly limiting their use by individual staff 
members within the network perimeter (Saldanha & Krishnan, 2012).
 
Figure 2.13 Diffusion curve for an interactive innovation 
After Rogers (1966/2003) Diffusion of innovations, 5th ed., p. 344 (amended)  
One aspect of the theory concerns the manner in which characteristics of innovations influence the 
rate of their adoption. Five key characteristics are proposed: 
1) Relative advantage: to what degree is an innovation perceived as an improvement on what it 
replaces? (Rogers, 2003, p. 229) 
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2) Compatibility: to what degree is an innovation perceived as consistent with the existing values, 
past experiences and current needs of prospective adopters (Rogers, 2003, p. 240)? 
3) Complexity: to what degree is an innovation perceived as being difficult to understand and use 
(Rogers, 2003, p. 257)? Perceived complexity correlates negatively with the likelihood of 
adoption. 
4) Trialability: to what extent can an innovation be experimented with on a time-limited or trial 
basis (Rogers, 2003, p. 258)? 
5) Observability: to what extent are the results of an innovation observable by others (Rogers, 
2003, p. 258)? Observability correlates positively with the likelihood of adoption. 
 
Another aspect describes the process of decision making regarding innovations. Five basic stages can 
be identified: knowledge, persuasion, decision, implementation and confirmation (see Figure 2.14, 
below). The process may be further described in terms of phases of agenda setting, matching, 
restructuring, clarifying and routinising, as shown in Figure 2.15, below. This sequential process can 
be observed both in individual and in group or corporate decision-making (Rogers, 2003, p. 170ff.); 
however, many studies of social media adoption and use within organisations have focused on the 
individual user rather than on groups (van Osch & Coursaris, 2013, 2015). 
 
Organisational readiness for innovation may be defined as “the availability of the needed 
organisational resources for adoption” (Iacovou, Benbasat & Dexter, 1995, cited by Geenhuizen & 
Faber, 2015, p. 4). The stuctural characteristics of organisations identified by Rogers (2003) as 
related to innovativeness within organisations, or organisational readiness for innovation, include 1) 
characteristics of individual leaders 2) internal characteristics of the organisation, and 3) external 
characteristics. The internal characteristics include degree of centralisation (the extent to which 
power and control are held by relatively few individuals); complexity (members’ level of training and 
range of professional and occupational specialities); 4) degree of formalisation (relative importance 
of procedures and rules ); 5) level of interconnectedness (degree to which units within the 
organisation are linked by interpersonal networks); 6) degree of organisational slack (availability of 
uncommitted resources) and 7) size, although he suggests that size is probably a proxy measure for 
other characteristics, such as total resources, slack resources, employees’ technical expertise, and 
organisational structure. 
 
These variables may have different effects at different stages of the innovation process, e.g. low 
formalisation or high complexity serve to facilitate initiation of the adoption process, but inhibit 
implementation. A more general concept relating to organisational readiness for innovation is 
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absorptive capacity, defined as “dynamic capability pertaining to knowledge creation and utilisation 
athat enhances an organisation’s ability to gain and sustain a competitive advantage” (Zahra and 
George, 2002, cited by Geenhuizen & Faber, 2015, p. 6). 
 
Prior contextual conditions which influence the decision-making processes of individuals and groups 
may also be categorised under the headings of Technology-Organisation-Environment (TOE) (Oliveira 
& Martins, 2011). Technology includes IT governance, existing IT infrastructure and IT support, IT 
security, and satisfaction with existing systems (Geenhuizen & Faber, 2015). Organisation includes 
communication processes, size, social norms, professional heterogeneity (Ferlie, Fitzgerald, Wood, & 
Hawkins, 2005) and levels of technology literacy and readiness. Processes of diffusion may be 
“messy, dynamic and fluid” rather than linear (Ferlie et al., 2005, p. 118, citing Van de Ven et al., 
1999). 
 
Figure 2.14 Decision-making processes in innovation 
Redrawn from Rogers (2003), p.170  
 
Internal organisational politics may be a factor, in that groups and individuals are more inclined to 
adopt an IT innovation if they perceive that the innovation will support their position of power 
within the organisation; conversely, if they perceive a potential threat presented by the innovation 
to their power base or professional autonomy, they will resist (Markus, 1983). 
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Environment includes external regulation and legal issues, competitive pressures, and political 
pressures. In relation to the organisational component of this framework, the theory of IT-culture 
conflict is applicable (2.8.3). Characteristics of the decision-making unit itself, namely socioeconomic 
position, personality variables and habits of communication, bear upon the “knowledge” phase. 
Characteristics of the innovation itself, as enumerated above, influence the “persuasion” phase. 
Some writers refer to “culture of innovation” as a factor influencing uptake of innovations. Apekey, 
McSorley, Tilling, & Siriwardena, 2011) identify five dimensions of culture of innovation: risk, 
resources, information, targets, tools, rewards, and relationships. The issue of risk is discussed 
further below (Section 2.8.2). 
 
Figure 2.15 The innovation process in an organisation 
Re-drawn from Rogers (2003), p. 421 
 
In relation to information and communications technology innovations within health services, 
attitudes of health professionals to information technologies (an aspect of “organisation” within the 
TOE framework) have a particular bearing on organisational readiness. According to Svensson, Snis, 
Svanberg, and Svensson (2009), attitudes of practitioners are a signficant factor in the level of 
acceptance and consequent efficiency of the use of IT in practice. The main evidence published in 
English for attitudes of health professionals to information technology in general was set out in a 
comprehensive literature review conducted by Ward, Stevens, Brentnall, and Briddon (2008). The 
authors found that  the issues predominantly affecting health professionals’use of information 
technology in their everyday practice were hardware availability, design of content and provision of 
user training programmes. The majority of workers felt that there were pervasive issues relating to 
usability and fitness for purpose. Needs were expressed for more education and training prior to the 
implementation of new IT systems, and more use of e-learning in continuing professional education. 
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Experienced IT users were found to have more positive attitudes towards the introduction and use 
of IT in their work settings; this was the only consistent indicator found of likely attitudes to IT. In 
some contexts gender differences in access to computer systems were identified. 
 
2.8.2. Innovation and risk 
Innovation and risk-taking are inextricably linked: innovation is “uncertain both in process and 
outcome” (Hartley, 2013, p.53). Flemig, Osborne, and Kinder (2016) distinguish between risks (that 
can in principle be evaluated and planned for) and uncertainties (considered to be unquantifiable, 
and which cannot be planned for). They also distinguish between “hard” (top-down) and “soft” 
(people-driven) risk management approaches: “hard” approaches are well suited to managing 
evolultionary innovation, but stifle innovation when applied to uncertainty.  
 
A key concept here is that of organisational attitude to risk (also referred to as appetite for risk or 
risk culture): it may be defined as “the organisation’s propensity to take risks as perceived by the 
organisation’s managers” (Bozeman and Kingsley, 1998, p. 111) (compare the discussion in 11.1 
below). Attitude to risk is considered to be a component part of an organisation’s overall culture of 
innovation (Mulgan & Albury, 2003); compare the discussion in 2.8.1 above. It may vary across 
different parts of an organisation (Power, 2004), and is subject to change. Welbourn (2013, p. 1) 
recommended that, to establish the right conditions for the adoption and diffusion of innovations, 
“leaders should establish an appetite for risk that is nurtured by a culture of trust and openness 
capable of treating failure of new ideas as the occasional price for learning” The need for a “risk-
taking climate” is mentioned also by Greenhalgh, Stramer et al. (2008) as a necessary antecedent of 
innovation, this being one in which “one in which experimentation is encouraged; failed projects 
lead to reflection and efforts to improve features of the system” (p. 5); compare Powell’s (2016) 
observations concerning organisational trust cited in Section 2.5.5.3 above. 
 
Flemig et al. (2016) suggested that risk aversion may not be an inherent characteristic of public 
sector organisations, but a result of exogenous factors, such as organisational size or media scrutiny: 
normal organisational processes of innovation, which involve learning and evolving from mistakes or 
failed innovations, cannot occur, because risk and failure are both perceived as normatively “bad”, 
and structural incentives, in particular, statutory regulation, are set to minimise or avoid blame, both 
corporate and individual (cf. the discussion in 2.5.5.2 above).  
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2.8.3 IT consumerisation 
From the perspective of diffusion of innovations, use of personal cloud storage, Web 2.0 and social 
media applications can be classified with other aspects of IT consumerisation (which is described by 
Leclerq-Vandelanoitte (2015, p. 2) as “the adoption and adaptation of consumer applications, tools 
and devices in the workplace as a means to carry out work tasks”) under the category of user-driven 
technologies.  As a means of enhancing productivity, it seems appropriate, from the users’ point of 
view, to wish to use in a work context the technologies with which they have become comfortable in 
their personal lives, rather than to draw a line between the personal and the corporate (Baxter & 
Rudman, 2010). From an IT services management perspective, however user-driven or user-led 
technologies are often categorised negatively as shadow IT, defined as “the use of unauthorised 
applications within a corporate environment, and the processing or storage of business information 
on unapproved devices” (Johnson, 2013, p. 5). Such a characterisation reflects the perceived risks 
presented by the holding of organisational data (shadow data) within such applications or devices. 
The existence of shadow IT can be taken as indicating problems of communication, deficiencies 
within formal structures or other misalignment between business and IT functions, as presenting 
risks to the operational performance or security of IT systems, or as creating problems for IT 
governance (Betts, 2016; Györy, Uebernickel, Cleven, & Brenner, 2013; Johnson, 2013; Kettinger & 
Lee, 2002; Rentrop & Zimmermann, 2012; Sullivan, 2015). It is evident that its existence and use 
represents a loss of centralised decision-making power and control for the IT department (cf. 
Andriole, 2015). It has, however, been shown to provide considerable benefits to the organisation in 
terms of innovation (Silic, 2015). The issue of shadow IT is not addressed within best practice 
frameworks such as ITIL and COBIT. Strategies adopted to address IT consumerisation (Harris, Ives, & 
Junglas, 2011) include authority (banning or tightly limiting the use of consumer devices and 
applications: common in highly-regulated sectors such as financial and health services), anarchy 
(allowing new devices and applications to enter the workplace without restriction: common in start-
ups, venture partnerships and universities) and a number of different approaches to carefully 
managed adoption, of which Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) implementation is one (French, Guo, & 
Shim, 2014; Leclercq-Vandelannoitte, 2015; Tokuyoshi, 2013). Measures adopted to regulate or 
restrict shadow IT can include the blocking of unauthorised web applications on corporate networks. 
Schalow et al. (2013) highlight the blurring of boundaries between work and private life that mobile 
devices and applications have facilitated, which is important from an information security 
perspective.  
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Despite the sometimes high overheads for IT departments (Wood, 2015), a number of NHS 
organisations have begun to allow BYOD (Amedume, 2012; Azzurri Communications, s.d.; Phillips, 
2013; Thorne, 2012). It has been reported that many NHS doctors and nurses are unofficially using 
their own smartphones for work purposes (Stephenson, 2015). The relation of BYOD to social media 
adoption was discussed briefly by Lafferty (2013, 2015).  
 
2.8.4 IT and organisational culture: IT-culture conflict 
The theory of IT-culture conflict presents another perspective on information technology 
innovations and organisational factors that serve to facilitate or inhibit them. According to Scholz 
(1990, cited by Thompson & Kaarst-Brown, 2005) the values of system developers and champions 
are embedded in both the explicit and the tacit design features of new systems, including security 
systems and network controls. Information systems are not culturally neutral; they may come to 
symbolise a host of different values driven by underlying assumptions and their meaning, use and 
consequences (Koch, Leidner, & Gonzalez, 2013; Robey & Markus, 1984). The theory of IT-culture 
conflict (Leidner & Kayworth, 2006) posits that the values embedded within a work practice that is 
supported by a particular information technology (such as, for instance, smartphones enabling any 
time / anywhere work) can be said to be embedded within that technology. System conflict, which is 
one type of IT-culture conflict, is said to occur when the values of group members are unsupported 
by, or are contrary to, the values embedded within a specific information technology which is being 
implemented within the group members’ workplace.  
 
Koch et al. (2013) set out, in tabular form, how workplace values may contradict the values inherent 
in social media applications (Table 2.6 below). Disagreements about social media policy and 
restrictions on access to social media applications within the workplace may thus reflect an IT-
culture conflict. The authors suggested that the perceived inherent conflict with organisational or 
professional values may serve to inhibit staff from exploring how and when different forms of social 
media / Web 2.0 functionality (e.g., discussion forums, blogs and wikis) may be used within the 
workplace. The theory is applicable in principle also to SWGs and their implementation within 
specific organisational contexts (Section 2.6.4 below). 
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Table 2.6 The theory of IT-culture conflict as related to social media applications 
Koch et al. (2013), p. 206 
Reproduced by permission 
 
2.8.5 Diffusion of information technology innovations within the NHS 
The overall relatively low level of expenditure on IT within health services in the United Kingdom 
compared to other sectors of the economy is shown in Figure 2.16. There is a considerable body of 
work which attempt to address issues of adoption and implementation of information technology 
within the NHS; however much of this is either very broad in scope (Greenhalgh, Robert, Bate, 
Macfarlane, & Kyriakidou, 2008; Liddell, Adshead, & Burgess, 2008; Welbourn, 2013) or is focused 
specifically on electronic patient record systems (Dickinson & Scott, 2012; Fernando, Choudrie, 
Lycett, & de Cesare, 2012; Greenhalgh & Stones, 2010; Greenhalgh, Stramer, et al., 2008; 
Wainwright & Waring, 2007; Walley & Davies, 2002), so there is little of direct relevance to social 
media adoption. Liddell, Adshead and Burgess (2008) list, among the critical factors hindering 
technological and other innovation, the following: lack of strategic leadership, narrow decision-
making processes; lack of availability of resources to deal with changes; complexity of procurement 
processes; lack of incentives for clinicians to adopt technologies that are not directly clinical; and 
lack of awareness of the benefits of technologies among decision makers.  
 
A number of other factors are cited by researchers as presenting barriers to innovation within the 
NHS and as possible contributory factors to low levels of commitment to and expenditure on IT 
infrastructure and innovation at Trust level. These include poor levels of computer literacy 
(Robertson et al., 2010; Sheikh et al., 2011; Warm, Thomas, Heard, Jones, & Hawkins-Brown, 2008); 
aversion to computer use and deficiencies in health informatics knowledge among clinical staff 
(Kirshbaum, 2004; Devitt & Murphy, 2004; Ward, Stevens, Brentnall, & Briddon, 2008); deficiencies 
of existing infrastructure (Sheikh et al., 2011), and low levels of usage of everyday technologies such 
as email and online booking systems (Liddell et al., 2008). The hitherto problematic and politically 
contentious nature of information technology implementations within the NHS, as well as 
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perceptions of inadequate infrastructure, have engendered a perception exemplified by one nurse 
commentator, “The NHS is terrible at practitioner sensitive, patient-centred, joined-up technology” 
(Rickards, commenting on Merrifield, 2015), and a consequent unwillingness on the part of many 
clinicians to engage with innovative information technologies (Kirshbaum, 2004; Royal College of 
Nursing, 2006). 
 
Attitude is a necessary constituent of technology acceptance (Ward, 2013), which in turn is an 
essential aspect of information technology innovation; however, studies focusing specifically on the 
professional attitudes, values and norms health service staff in the UK relating to use of IT, including 
in relation to technology acceptance, are relatively few in number. They have focused on particular 
types of applications, such as EPR (Kirshbaum, 2004; Poulter & Bath, 2012), other systems and 
platforms such as simulation, social media / Web 2.0, and mobile devices (Brailsford et al., 2013; 
Moore & Jayewardene, 2014), on the attitudes of a particular profession or group (e.g. Bond, 2009; 
Hall, Hanna, & Huey, 2013; Scragg et al., 2017) or on specific contexts (e.g. Ayatollahi et al., 2013). 
 
As reported below in Section 4.8.5, T1’s IT department had self-rated using the Informatics 
Capability Maturity Model (ICMM) (Health and Social Care Information Centre, s.d.) and National 
Infrastructure Maturity Model (NIMM). Use of ITIL within NHS IT departments as best practice 
guidance for IT service management was referred to in Section 1.4.4, while the Digital Maturity 
Assessment (DMA) was referred to in Section 1.4.3. Results of the latter were published only after 
data collection was complete (NHS England, 2016). While there has been some critical discussion of 
published health informatics digital maturity assessment instruments in general (Carvalho, Rocha, & 
Abreu, 2017, 2016; Carvalho, Rocha, & Vasconcelos, 2016), the actual results of ICMM and NIMM 
assessments were generally not made available for comment. Results of the DMA were discussed 
briefly in the Wachter review (2016) and in the computing trade press (e.g., Clark, 2016; Evenstad, 
2016). Tools such as IT ServQual (Pitt, Watson, & Kavan, 1995) and the ten-point IT service climate 
evaluation instrument  of Jia and Reich (2011, 2013) have not been applied to health services IT to 
the researcher’s knowledge. 
 
While much theoretical work has been carried out in the area of information technology innovation 
in health services to elaborate Rogers’ diffusion of innovations theory (Cranfield et al., 2015), 
relatively little theoretical literature exists on adoption of Web 2.0 and social media. That which 
does exist is mostly concerned with social-psychological aspects of individual adoption; there is little 
socio-technical material (Osch & Coursaris, 2015).  
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There are some studies extant of factors underlying adoption of Web 2.0 and social media 
technologies at the individual employee level in settings other than health services (e.g. Saldanha & 
Krishnan, 2012, p. 322). Jacobs and Nakata (2012) used organisational semiotics methods to assess 
readiness within organisations for internal uses of social media. The work of Kaganer and Vaast 
(Kaganer & Vaast, 2010; Vaast & Kaganer, 2013) presents another instance of the application of a 
socio-technical perspective within studies of organisational social media adoption and use. 
 
Figure 2.16 Annual expenditure per employee on ICT in the UK in different economic sectors, 2000. 
Quam and Smith (2005), p. 532, reproduced by permission 
 
These authors applied social representations theory to the analysis of social media use and policy 
formulation in organisations, within a theory of diffusion of innovations framework. As a means of 
eliciting social representations of social media within corporate governance mechanisms, they 
undertook a thematic analysis of the social media policies of 25 organisations. The focus of their 
research was on emerging social representations of social media use in the enterprise held by 
organisational decision makers. They found that the policies applied governance practices to the use 
of social media which were rooted in other organisational domains, notably communications and 
human resources; they evinced a limited comprehension of the possible organisational uses of social 
media applications, and a strong focus on mitigation of the possible risks and threats they might 
present. In social representations theory terms, these policy responses were rooted in processes of 
“anchoring” and showed little movement towards “objectification” (cf. above, Section 2.7.1). 
In the traditional pattern of technological innovations, decision makers first develop a shared 
understanding of the new technology; this builds upon and sustains an organising vision for the local 
innovation, resulting in a local social representation. Decision makers then decide: whether or not to 
implement the technology; if yes, how to facilitate end-users’ adoption and learning processes. They 
maintain that the adoption of Web 2.0 technologies, which is primarily end-user-driven, conflicts 
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with established business application infrastructures and traditional IT decision-making processes, 
and also requires revision of views on the diffusion and assimilation of new technologies (cf. 2.8.1 
above). The comprehension or shared understanding element has thereby shifted into the time 
frame of implementation and assimilation. With an end-user-driven technology, decision makers 
must 1) develop an understanding of the innovation, and 2) decide how to respond to it on behalf of 
the organisation as a whole. They therefore have to 3) develop ways to guide and direct end-users, 
which involves deciding a) what end-users may and may not do with the technology, and b) whether 
(and, if so, how) the technology is to be officially adopted and used within the organisation. Their 
comprehension helps them react to it and to communicate about it. Their conception 1) is made 
explicit as the basis of policy. Decision makers are thus faced with a pressing need to devise policies 
just as they are starting to make sense of the innovation themselves. This perspective offers a ready 
explanation of the type of policy response to social media observed at T1: a complete block on use 
of social media until a Trust policy had been developed (9.2.3). 
 
Chretien and Kind (2014) offer a possible explanation for this form of shift of perception and attitude 
within medicine and health care in terms of an analogy with Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. According 
to Maslow’s theory, basic levels of needs have to be met before higher, aspirational levels can be 
attained. The three levels in the social media in medicine hierarchy of needs posited by the authors 
are security, reflection, and discovery. In this model (Figure 2.17, below) the essential need for 
security must be respected in order to move towards the reflection and discovery phases.  
 
Figure 2.17 Social media in medicine hierarchy of needs pyramid 
Chretien and Kind (2014), p. 1139 
Reproduced by permission 
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2.8.6 Summary and synthesis 
This section has provided an account of three key theoretical frameworks relating to innovation: 
Rogers’ theory of diffusion of innovations, the Technology-Organisation-Environment framework, 
and the theory of IT-culture conflict. It has also discussed IT consumerisation in terms of user-driven 
innovation, and offered a critical overview of studies on information technology innovation within 
the NHS and hindrances to it. Kaganer and Vaast’s social representations model of social media 
adoption and use within organisations, and Chretien and Kind’s model of attitudes to social media 
adoption within health services based on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, were proposed as being of 
possible relevance to social media adoption and use within the NHS. 
 
Theoretical frameworks for studying diffusion of innovations and organisational readiness for 
innovations, in particular Rogers’ theory (2.8.1) and Vaast and Kaganer’s work on decision processes 
in organisations’ social media adoption (2.8.4), can be applied to processes of social media adoption 
and IT consumerisation occurring within the NHS. The theory of IT-culture conflict presents another 
useful perspective, both on social media adoption and on secure web gateway (SWG) 
implementations (2.8.4). Few studies appeared to have been carried out of NHS staff attitudes to 
information technology, and none of NHS IT service quality (2.8.5). Many of the studies identified of 
information technology innovation in the NHS were either very broad in scope, or focused 
specifically on electronic patient records, with little of relevance to social media adoption; however, 
a number were found that identified organisational and other factors hindering NHS innovation in 
general and NHS IT innovation in particular (2.8.5). 
 
2.9 Overall summary  
In Section 2.5.3, there were clear indications of the importance of IT staff subcultures in the 
development of reciprocal stereotyping and mutual antagonism between IT staff and end-users, the 
role of which in determining access to published information appeared to be worth investigating.  
The syntheses of research on the technical aspects of information security / cybersecurity and on 
cybersecurity and risk perception in Sections 2.6 and 2.7 presented interesting problems and 
findings in a number of areas which illustrated the overall complexity of the issues facing NHS 
organisations in managing information security / cybersecurity risk in relation to use of the Internet. 
Specific areas included the phenomenon of personal web use at work (PWU) (2.7.3.1); the 
relationship between malware infection risk and web users’ browsing behaviour (2.6); the technical 
shortcomings of web filtering devices in relation to categorisation of online content; end-users’ risk 
perceptions of online activities (2.7.2.4.2); the character of professional judgements in information 
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security (2.7.2.4.1); and antagonism between IT professionals and end-users in relation to security 
(2.7.2.4.1). The work of Kolkowska (2006, 2011) influenced the present research in respect both of 
its findings and its research methods. It used semi-structured interviews and observations of 
behaviour and practice to study different security cultures within two academic departments of a 
single university, and their impacts upon end-user computing activity. It demonstrated the existence 
of a disjunction between the information security values and actual practices of IT staff, which it was 
thought could possibly be paralleled within the study settings (2.7.2.4.1). 
 
Section 2.4 outlined current overall trends in clinical information behaviour and gave an account of 
those of its features and characteristics which are of relevance to assessing the effects upon it of 
technical and organisational barriers, which are the focus of RQ2 (1.6). The importance of time 
constraints upon information seeking was emphasised. As described in Section 2.4.7, several 
information behaviour studies referred to the importance of cultural attitudes to information 
seeking in determining access to computer facilities for accessing the Internet, contributing to the 
focus on these in RQ3. The “cyber-bureaucrat” view of personal web use (PWU) identified by 
Anandarajan, Paravastu and Simmers (2006) was identified as a possible accurate definition and 
description of negative management attitudes to use of the web in general  for information seeking,  
again highlighting the importance of cultural attitudes and presuppositions in determining levels of 
access to published information.  
 
Generally, the specific frameworks and theories which were discussed informed the analysis and 
discussion rather more than the actual research design. While the examination of information 
behaviour theories in Section 2.4.2 (Wilson’s second model, the satisficing and information horizon 
concepts) yielded some useful conceptual frameworks for considering the effects of non-availability 
of information (see below, Section 11.3), these did not strongly inform the research questions, aims 
and objectives.   
 
Risk management is a fundamental problem for NHS organisations. The discussions of issues of 
public trust, risk and regulation as they bear upon the cultural and organisational characteristics of 
the NHS, and of conflicts between powerful professional interests (as presented, for example, by 
Brown et al. (2011) in Section 2.5.5.2), strongly informed RQ3. They were also central to the analysis. 
The work of Currie et al. (2012) in relation to risk identification and professional power (2.5.5.2) can 
be highlighted in particular. The job demands-resources model (2.5.5.3; Figure 2.4) provided a 
conceptual framework for evaluating the effects on staff engagement of lack of access to published 
online information. Kanter’s theory of structural empowerment, as developed by Laschinger and 
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associates (2.5.6.1), highlighted the importance of access to information in staff empowerment and 
engagement, while Clegg’s (1999) circuits of power theory using ANT, as applied to information 
security by Inglesant and Sasse (2005a, 2005b)(2.5.6.2), addressed an information security scenario 
commonly experienced within the NHS. Both theories provided important bases for later discussion 
and theory building.  Consideration of the nature and influences of occupational subcultures was 
informed by Schein’s (1996) organisational culture framework (2.5.1).  
 
The importance of organisational approaches to the management of risk was highlighted in the 
previous paragraph. The sociological theories of risk and risk perception outlined in Section 2.7.1 
clarified the organisational and cultural influences to which risk perception and risk management 
could be subject.  The typology of approaches to information security risk management which were 
identified and described in Section 2.7.2.4.1, and the range of innovation frameworks discussed in 
2.8.6, were important in characterising the risk culture of the NHS in relation to user-driven IT 
innovations and to web filtering. Prince et al.’s (2010) framing of information access issues in terms 
of approaches to risk management in IT services strongly influenced the research design and data 
collection in this study.  
 
As stated above (2.7.4), references to technical barriers to accessing information made within 
studies of information behaviour or e-learning implementation were brief and generally 
uninformative. Also no studies appear to have been conducted of IT service quality or IT service 
climate within NHS settings, hence of the quality of infrastructure and technical support (2.8.5), and 
no British studies of IT subcultures were identified. Recent LIS-oriented British studies of web 
filtering and its impacts have focused solely on public library services, and not addressed the issue 
elsewhere within the public sector (2.7.3.4.2). The studies of Resnick et al. (2004) were important in 
establishing an evaluation methodology for web filters; however, they were conducted ten years 
before the present study was undertaken. Since Resnick et al.’s work concerned consumer health 
information, and was based in the United States, it had limited applicability to the NHS context 
(2.7.3.4.2). Only four studies in all (2.7.3.4.2) were identified that directly addressed technical and 
organisational obstacles to information seeking and e-learning within health contexts in any detail. 
One of these (Childs et al., 2005) related to e-learning, another (Chamberlain et al., 2015), to the use 
of mobile devices, the latter published only during the analysis and writing-up phase of the research. 
The only two detailed studies relating to web filtering and other security-related technical barriers to 
information seeking, use and sharing in general within the NHS have been the unpublished TDAG 
survey (2009) and that of Prince et al. (2010). Personal web use, and the effectiveness and 
organisational appropriateness of measures to prevent or minimise it (via deterrence, detection, and 
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prevention) has not been studied in health service contexts. No studies were identified of 
professional Web 2.0 / social media use within the NHS, or of IT acceptable use policies relating to 
the NHS, and social media policies in particular; the work of Scragg, Shaikh, Shires et al. (2017) and 
Scragg, Shaikh, Robinson, and Mercer (2017) was published only at a very late stage of the research 
process. Lafferty’s (2013, 2015) detailed report on obstacles to social media use for e-learning within 
the NHS and their impacts did not discuss organisational issues in any depth.  No studies were found 
of decision making in information security management within health services; all the published 
work identified related to the private sector or to academia (2.7.2). 
 
Reference was made earlier (2.5.3) to the value-laden nature of IT in general. Within a secure web 
gateway (Section 2.6.4) the vendor’s cultural values and priorities could be envisaged as implicit 
within the available categorisations of website content and the recommended or default security 
settings (2.8.4 above); cf. the comments of Willard (2002), Ayre (2004) and Houghton-Jan (2008) 
regarding value-laded categorisations of web content by vendors (Section 2.7.3.4.2). The possibility 
thus arises that the value systems of the commercial developers of web security gateways, 
embedded within the technology, are being imported into the NHS without adequate reflection or 
consultation, and may represent a poor “cultural fit” with aspects of the culture of the NHS. 
 
The literature across the relevant subject areas has thus been reviewed and synthesised, and gaps 
identified, from which the research questions have been developed. An opportunity has been clearly 
identified 1) to characterise the nature of technical and policy-related restrictions on access to 
published professional information within the NHS (RQ1); 2) to assess their effects upon information 
behaviour and working practices (RQ2); and 3) to investigate the underlying organisational issues 
(RQ3). Owing to the wide range of issues involved and the lack of previous work in the area, the 
study needed be wide in scope and of an exploratory character (Yin, 2009).  
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Chapter 3. Methodology and methods 
3.1 Introduction 
The aims and specific objectives of the research, and the research questions, were set out in Section 
1.5. The overall aim was to investigate barriers to online professional information seeking, use and 
sharing within the English NHS and their possible effects.  Its specific aims were threefold:  to 
establish in detail the nature of these barriers; to determine their effects within the contexts of 
clinical and management practice, education and research, and their possible consequences; and to 
investigate cultural factors among the different stakeholder groups which could bear on information 
seeking, use and sharing, and the influences they might be exerting, 
An important clarification requires to be made regarding the usage of the terms “methodology” and 
“method”. “Methodology” may be used 1) simply to refer the study of methods; 2) to refer to the 
actual methods used in a particular piece of research, so that each study is considered to have its 
own methodology; 3) to refer to particular combinations of methods that occur many times in 
practice or are designed a priori, or to structured sets of guidelines or activities; Checkland’s soft 
systems methodology or grounded theory would be examples; 4) to characterise the process of 
research. It may also be used in a much more fundamental sense 5) as equating to “philosophy of 
methods” (Sapsford, 2006), “ways of acquiring knowledge” (Stahl, 2007), or “overall logic of enquiry” 
(Cecez-Kecmanovic & Kennan, 2013), including a set of philosophical assumptions or a particular 
paradigm as a foundation for the selection of particular research methods, and an overall strategy of 
conducting research, including the construction and justification of knowledge claims (Cecez-
Kecmanovic, 2011). “Method” generally refers to well-defined sequences of operations (e.g. focus 
groups, surveys, interviews, ethnography, documentary analysis, walk-throughs) that, if carried out 
proficiently, yield useful results (Mingers, 2001, citing Checkland, 1981, and Livari, 1998). 
3.2 Methodology / philosophy of social science  
3.2.1 Introduction 
Methods of social research are not neutral tools; they are closely connected with different visions of 
how social reality should be studied (Bryman, 2008) and hence to different theoretical perspectives 
(Crotty, 1998) and philosophical assumptions concerning the nature of social reality (Creswell, 2007). 
The areas of philosophy concerned may be identified as follows: ontology (the nature of reality), 
epistemology (how knowledge claims are established), axiology (the purposes served by the 
research, and the values it embodies) and logic (the nature of scientific explanation) (Cecez-
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Kecmanovic, 2011). These are inter-related, insofar as epistemology depends upon ontology 
(explanations of how knowledge of the world is attained depend upon what that world is believed to 
be) and particular ontological, epistemological and axiological assumptions may lead to the choice of 
certain methodologies rather than others (Dobson, 2001, citing Rowland, 1995) and to particular 
viewpoints regarding the nature of scientific explanation. It is therefore important that researchers 
should be clear and explicit about their ontological and epistemological assumptions before starting  
any research project (Guba & Lincoln, 1994 cited by Andrade, 2009). Scholars differ in the role they 
assign to philosophical background in actually determining methodology: some (Cecez-Kecmanovic 
& Kennan, 2013; Dobson & Love, 2004, citing Garcia & Quek, 1977) suggest indeed that 
philosophical and theoretical assumptions should provide the the starting point for a choice of 
methodology and initial guidance for the research process, while others more open to multi-
paradigm or mixed-method approaches (e.g. Crotty, 1998; Patton, 2002), take a more pragmatic – or 
possibly pragmatist - view, regarding the research question as the primary determinant of the 
research approach. 
Social science research is shaped, explicitly or otherwise, by what are often referred to as paradigms. 
There is no agreed definition of what is meant by the term “paradigm”. As originally employed by 
Kuhn (1970, cited by Mingers, 2004a) the term referred to a broad underlying theoretical and 
conceptual framework (e.g. Newtonian physics) that is not questioned within “normal” scientific 
activity. This framework is considered to inform all actual experimentation. A paradigm is said to 
develop from a high degree of professional consensus established within particular communities of 
scientific researchers regarding aspects of theories, standards for research and established findings; 
it involves aspects of fundamental philosophical beliefs. Within the classical Kuhnian account, one 
paradigm is normally dominant, to the exclusion of others: only at times of “revolutionary science”, 
when many problems in explaining research findings within the prevailing paradigm become 
manifest, do rival paradigms compete. The newer, theoretically more satisfactory paradigm that 
emerges within a scientific field must then totally supplant its predecessor. However, within social 
science, Burrell and Morgan (1979), whose own typology of paradigms has been highly influential 
within organisation studies, put forward the idea that competing paradigms (defined more broadly 
than in Kuhn’s usage to refer an explicit combination of assumptions about the world and of 
knowledge) can co-exist within a discipline. They maintained moreover that social research methods 
are bound to particular paradigms, and that paradigms themselves are incommensurable, i.e. that 
their ontological and epistemological presuppositions are so pervasive that it is literally impossible to 
compare them (Mingers, 2001). A substantial body of scholarly opinion (including Bryman, 2011; 
Lincoln, Lynham, & Guba, 2011; Mingers, 2001, 2003, 2004b; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991; Venkatesh, 
Brown, & Bala, 2013) now disputes this position, however, arguing in favour of methodological 
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pluralism in various forms. The issue of paradigm relationships in the information systems field is 
discussed extensively by Fitzgerald and Howcroft (1998), Goles and Hirschheim (2000), and Mingers 
(2004b). 
 
Chalmers (1982, cited by Willis, 2007) identified five components of a paradigm: stated laws and 
theoretical assumptions; standard approaches to applying these in particular contexts; characteristic 
experimental methods and techniques, guiding metaphysical principles, and general methodological 
prescriptions. A paradigm is thus not solely a philosophy of science; it includes relevant theoretical 
perspectives and their associated research frameworks, and the manner of their application to 
practice (Willis, 2007). Overall, research paradigms have been variously classified; the categorisation 
of research paradigms that has been most influential within information systems research is that of 
Chua (1986): into positivist, interpretivist, and critical (Mingers, 2004c; Myers & Klein, 2011). A 
comprehensive and very useful overview of paradigms within organisational and management 
research is provided by Cunliffe (2010). 
An overview of the main social science research paradigms is offered below in Sections 3.2.2  to 
3.2.5.  
3.2.2 Positivism 
The positivist paradigm48 is based on an objectivist ontology and epistemology: it is claimed that 
there is a world of objective reality that exists independently of human beings and that has a 
determinate nature or essence that is knowable (Chua, 1986). Moreover, subject and object are held 
to be distinct, hence the researcher is considered to be independent of the object of the research, 
and observations and generalisations are free from temporal and situational constraints. Positivism 
embraces also a correspondence theory of truth, i.e. the notion that research is concerned with 
producing accounts which correspond to an independent reality of objects and structures, 
knowledge being achieved when a subject correctly discovers and “mirrors” this (Dobson & Love, 
2004; Hirschheim, 1985). Positivist research is characterised by formal propositions; the use of 
quantitative techniques which emphasise the quantification of constructs (although qualitative 
research can also be carried out within the positivist paradigm (Myers, 1997); the assignment of 
numerical values to perceived qualities of things; the use of variables; the drawing of inferences 
                                                          
 
48
 The researcher does not discuss here different forms of positivism, or historical controversies between 
positivists and anti-positivists; a useful summary treatment is offered by Hirschheim (1985). 
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concerning a phenomenon from the study sample to the specified population; and experimental or 
statistical control for sources of error. It tends to assume that human activity is intentional and 
rational, or at least boundedly rational, and that conflict within organisations or societies is 
dysfunctional. It claims that real, uni-directional cause-effect relationships exist that are capable of 
being identified and tested via hypothetico-deductive logic and analysis, in an attempt to improve 
predictive understanding of phenomena (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). Qualitative research can also 
be carried out within the positivist paradigm (Myers, 1997). 
Positivism is claimed to be nomothetic (Greek νόμος "law" + τίθημι "to put, place, lay down"): it is 
said to be concerned with establishment of causal laws, i.e. formal expressions of causal relations, 
and hence also with prediction and control (Hirschheim, 1985; Myers, 1997). The 
nomothetic/idiographic distinction is ascribed to Windelband (1894, cited by (Hirschheim, 1985). 
Positivism is thus concerned with generalisability of a theory or theoretical statements. From the 
positivist viewpoint, theory can be tested against irreducible statement of observation, “the facts”. 
Positivists hold the “naturalist” viewpoint that the method of the natural sciences is the only rational 
source of knowledge, and should therefore be applied within the social sciences. This implies that 
understanding social phenomena is to be seen primarily a problem of modelling and measurement, 
of developing an appropriate set of theoretical constructs and an accurate set of instruments. 
Sample surveys and controlled experiments are the primary data collection techniques. Positivism is 
concerned with replicability, internal validity, external validity, and reliability as quality criteria 
(Cecez-Kecmanovic, 2005; Johnson & Duberley, 2000; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991; Pather & 
Remenyi, 2004). It claims to be value-free, i.e. that there is a total disjunction between facts and 
values, that selection of the objects and methods of study can be determined by objective criteria 
rather than by human beliefs and interests, and that researchers are detached from the phenomena 
they study (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). Positivism remains the dominant paradigm within 
information systems research (Chen & Hirschheim, 2004; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991; Walsham, 
2013) and indeed within most scientific disciplines (Hirschheim, 1985). 
3.2.3 Interpretivism  
The interpretivist paradigm emerged historically in opposition to positivism in efforts to comprehend 
and explain human and social reality (Pather & Remenyi, 2004). It is often linked to the claim of 
Dilthey (later taken up by Weber) that human phenomena had to be understood in their social and 
cultural context and that the task of the social sciences is that of verstehen, of recognising meanings, 
understanding, contrasted with erklären, explaining, focused on causality, that is the approach of the 
natural sciences (Crotty, 1998; Johnson & Duberley, 2000; Willis, 2007). The roots of interpretivism 
are claimed to lie in the work of Geertz and others in ethnography, of Gadamer in hermeneutics, and 
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of Husserl and Heidegger in phenomenology, particularly the latter’s concept of intentionality: the 
notion that all mental phenomena have reference to a content or direction towards an object 
(Crotty, 1998; Lee, 1991; Stahl, 2013). It is sometimes stated by interpretivists that the approach of 
the social sciences should be idiographic (Greek ίδιος, -α, -ον, “one’s own” + γραϕϖ, “to write”), 
focused on the individual, rather than nomothetic, concerned with the establishment of general 
laws. Interpretivism is based on the notion that “people create and associate their own subjective 
and inter-subjective meanings as they interact with the world around them” (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 
1991, p. 5). Through such social interactions, meanings and norms become inter-subjectively real, 
and are perceived as a given social reality which presents to the individual in a fashion analogous to 
that of the natural world. The meanings and intentions of action are “retrospectively endowed” and 
are “grounded in social and historical practices” (Chua, 1986, p. 615). Interpretive research thus 
attempts to understand social phenomena through accessing the meanings that they hold for 
participants: it takes an insider (emic) rather than an outsider (etic) perspective (Morey & Luthans, 
1984). Also it “does not predefine dependent and independent variables, but focuses on the 
complexities of human sense making as a situation emerges” (Myers, 1997, p. 245).  
According to Walsham (1995, p. 376),
 “… interpretive methods of research adopt the position that knowledge of a reality is a social 
construction by human factors. In this view, value-free data cannot be obtained, since the 
enquirer uses his or her preconceptions in order to guide the process of enquiry, and 
furthermore the researcher interacts with the human subjects of the enquiry, changing the 
perceptions of both parties”.
 The implication here is that not merely social reality but “all meaningful reality, precisely as 
meaningful reality, is socially constructed” (Crotty, 1998, p. 55). While embracing a form of realist 
ontology - objects in the world may be considered to be “always already there” (Crotty, 1998, p. 44, 
citing Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, passim) - the doctrine of intentionality, which requires the 
interaction of subject and object, means that there can be no dichotomy between objective and 
subjective. Interpretivism therefore, unlike postmodernism, does not embrace a subjectivist 
epistemology. Regarding the relationship between natural and social sciences, interpretivists 
typically hold that “the social world is entirely different from the natural world, being constituted 
through language and meaning, and thus involving entirely different hermeneutic, 
phenomenological or social constructivist approaches.” (Mingers, 2000, p. 6). The argument here has 
two foci: it can be an ontological one, the idealist view that social objects do not exist in the way that 
physical ones do (i.e. as subject-independent), and/or it can be an epistemological one, that “there is 
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no possibility of facts or observations that are independent of actors, cultures or social practices” 
(Mingers, 2000, p. 6). In the case of social phenomena a so-called double hermeneutic or subject-
subject relation is required (Giddens 1976, cited by Crotty, 1998): an interpretation of social actors’ 
interpretations, involving interplay of lay and academic language. This is said to contrast with the 
task of the natural sciences researcher, who is able to study nature as it were from the outside, a 
subject-object relation, and to construct a theoretical meta-language, avoiding or minimising the use 
of lay language. According to Walsham, “interpretive methods of research in information systems 
are aimed at producing an understanding of the context of the information system, and the process 
whereby the information system influences and is influenced by the context” (Walsham, 1993,  
pp. 4-5). 
 
Research methods within the interpretive paradigm include action research, case studies, 
ethnography, diary studies, phenomenography and grounded theory (Myers, 1997; Webb, 2008). 
Interpretive studies rely on naturalistic techniques for investigating the phenomena of interest, such 
as interviews, observation, and documentary analysis. It should be noted that “interpretive” is not at 
all coterminous with “qualitative”: interpretivist research can include quantitative data, and 
positivist research can include qualitative data (Myers, 1997). The procedures of interpretivism as a 
research strategy are characterised as inductive, emergent, and “shaped by the researcher’s 
experience in collecting and analysing the data” (Creswell, 2007). The researcher does not seek to 
generalise from the research setting to a wider population; rather, the intention is to attain a deeper 
understanding of the nature of a phenomenon, in order to inform other settings (Orlikowski & 
Baroudi, 1991). Social order is assumed (Chua, 1986; Hardy & Clegg, 2007). Klein and Myers (2001) 
provide an overview of types of interpretive research in information systems. 
3.2.4 Critical theory 
Scholars and practitioners within the critical theory paradigm tend to focus on the impacts of power 
relations in human societies. Its approach is rooted in the neo-Marxist critical social theory of the 
Frankfurt School, and its later development within the work of Habermas and of post-modernists 
such as Bourdieu and Foucault. Critical social theory is not a single body of work, but denotes a 
range of approaches and theories (Cecez-Kecmanovic, Klein, & Brooke, 2008; Myers & Klein, 2011). 
Key concepts include knowledge interests, communicative action, lifeworld (Habermas); genealogy 
of knowledge, panopticon, disciplinary power (Foucault); habitus, form of capital (cultural, social, 
symbolic) (Bourdieu) (Myers & Klein, 2011). Although, like interpretivism, the critical theory 
paradigm in social research emerged in opposition to positivism, the focus within the critical 
tradition is less on methodology than on axiology, the purposes of research being generally aimed at 
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uncovering such relations, and conveying to its readership both their existence and their 
disenfranchising of some groups while granting excessive power and resources to others (Willis, 
2007); to this extent, its orientation is explicitly and consciously ideological. According to Stahl 
(2008), the most important defining feature of critical social research is its intention to promote 
emancipation. Alvesson and Deetz (2000, cited by Myers & Klein, 2011), identify three elements of 
critical research: insight, critique, and transformative redefinition. its general principles are 
summarised by Ngwenyama (1991) as follows: people have the power to change their world; 
knowledge of the social world is value-laden; reason and critique are inseparable; theory and 
practice must be interconnected; and reason and critique must be reflexive in practice. According to 
Cecez-Kecmanovic (2001, p. 143), while interpretive researchers within the information systems field 
aim to understand and describe multiple meanings ascribed to an information system and its 
impacts in one or more contexts, critical researchers:   
“ … go further to expose inherent conflicts and contradictions, hidden structures and 
mechanisms accountable for those influences … [they] aim to reveal interests and agendas of 
privileged groups and the way they are supported or protected by a particular information 
system design or use. More generally, they aim to discover and expose attempts to design 
and misuse [information systems] to deceive, manipulate, exploit, dominate and disempower 
people. By doing do they aspire to help them resist these attempts, hinder such misuse of 
[information systems] and promote liberating and empowering IS design and use”. 
Critical theory claims that the social reality experienced subjectively by actors within organisations is 
historically, socially, culturally, politically and materially conditioned and produced; it may be 
conceptualised as a series of “layers” (Cecez-Kecmanovic, 2005). Key concepts within critical 
research are ideology (a particular and dominant worldview that privileges certain interests while 
hiding this fact by making the present state of affairs appear “natural”), hegemony (the mechanisms 
by which this is achieved), reification (“the process whereby social structures become solid, become 
things, which then cease to be the subject of social negotiation” (Stahl, 2008, p. 3)), and 
commodification (the process by which, once something has become reified, it can then become a 
commodity, something to be bought and sold (Stahl, 2008; Stahl, Doherty, & Shaw, 2012; Stahl, 
Tremblay, & LeRouge, 2011). Like interpretive research, critical research is idiographic in character 
(Myers & Klein, 2011); however, unlike interpretive research, critical theory assumes that social 
change, conflict, coercion and disintegration is endemic to human societies (Hirschheim & Klein, 
1989). Critical social theory does not have a distinctive research methodology; it adapts interpretive 
research methods (e.g. ethnography, documentary analysis, interviews, focus groups) to its needs, 
while stipulating that these be of a practice-oriented, participatory and reflexive kind (Ngwenyama, 
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1991; Stahl et al., 2011). Myers and Klein (2011) suggested that critical researchers should organise 
their data collection and analysis around the core concepts and ideas from one or more critical 
theorists.  
3.2.5 Critical realism 
Several scholars in the information systems field have proposed the critical realism of Bhaskar (1978, 
1998) and others as a possible philosophical solution to its methodological disputes (Smith, 2006); it 
is the philosophical position favoured by the researcher, to whom it has a strong intuitive appeal. 
Critical realism is characterised by a so-called transcendental realist ontology (a belief in the reality 
of the world independent of our knowledge of it, and of mechanisms of cause and effect within that 
world; the so-called intransitive dimension) combined with a form of epistemological relativism 
according to which it is held that knowledge is always socially constructed: different observers may 
apprehend different realities according to different transitive transactions - the varying 
paradigmatic, metaphorical or discursive conventions employed through their human agency (Al-
Amoudi & Willmott, 2011; Johnson & Duberley, 2000; Steinmetz, 1998). A stratified ontology is 
proposed, whereby reality is said to comprise three layers: causal structures or generative 
mechanisms; the actual events that these generate or produce, and the subset of effects from these 
events that are mediated empirically, i.e. experienced or observed:  According to Mingers (2000, p. 
1261), these layers are known as the domains of the real, the actual and the empirical. “The real 
contains mechanisms, events and experiences, i.e. the whole of reality; the actual consists of events 
which do (or do not) occur, it includes the empirical, i.e. those events that are observed or 
experienced.” 
 Domain of real Domain of actual Domain of empirical 
Mechanisms X   
Events X x  
Experiences  x x 
 
Table 3.1 Stratified ontology of critical realism  
Redrawn from Wynn and Williams (2012, p. 791), after Bhaskar (1975, p. 13) 
 
Stratification is also held to exist within the realm of objects themselves, in that “causal powers at 
one level (e.g. chemical reactions) can be sees as generated by those of a lower level (e.g. atomic 
valency)” (Mingers, 2004c, p. 162). Individual phenomena are described as emergent from a 
particular level, but as not reducible to that level. Once emerged, a phenomenon has properties that 
are proper to it as a system at that level (Mutch, 2010). The domain of the real is thus to be 
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conceived of as “a complex interaction between dynamic, open, stratified systems, both material 
and non-material, where particular structures give rise to certain causal powers, tendencies or ways 
of acting” (Mingers, 2000, p. 1262). Both physical and social sciences are held to involve “socially 
mediated transitive transactions with the ‘common referent’, i.e. an intransitive reality” (Johnson 
and Duberley, 2000, p. 162). With regard to the subject matter of the social sciences, critical realism 
maintains that social structures are not simply a product of social discourses, but have distinctive, 
real properties (Ackroyd, 2004). For the critical realist, the enduring structures of social reality and 
human agency reciprocally presuppose each other, but cannot be reduced to, nor reconstructed 
from, nor explained in terms of each other. Society as a separate entity emerges from the activities 
of individuals (Mingers, 2004c). Social structure is a necessary condition of any human activity, but 
pre-existing structures are reproduced and transformed through human agency (Elder-Vass, 2008; 
Johnson & Duberley, 2000). Social structures can be considered causal in that they have an 
“objective influence which conditions action patterns and supplies agents with strategic directional 
guidance’’ (Archer, 1995, cited by Smith, 2006, p. 202). 
This principle is elaborated within Bhaskar’s (1989, cited by Faulkner & Runde, 2013) 
Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA), in which he posits both a duality of structure 
(human agency and social structure are recursively organised, i.e. that social structure is constantly 
reproduced as an ongoing consequence of human activities, where those activities both presuppose 
and are conditioned by the structures that are being reproduced) and a duality of praxis (the 
reproduction and transformation of social structure is a generally unconscious and unintended 
consequence of human action). It features also in the work of Archer (1995, cited by Mutch, 2002, 
2010) via her concept of morphogenesis. Archer argued that, in examining a particular social 
interaction, analysis must start not when the actual interaction itself takes place (time T2 to T3) but 
at time T1 when the related structural conditioning occurred, itself the result of human activities. 
The social interaction results in a so-called structural elaboration at time T4. This structural 
elaboration then forms part of the structural conditioning for the next morphogenetic cycle. For the 
purposes of analysis, both approaches hold apart the categories of agency and structure. It is 
thereby implied that social science is essentially similar to natural science, while incorporating 
modifications and differences of method reflecting the particular character of the social world 
(Mingers, 2004b; Sayer, 1992). In particular the nature of Giddens’s “double hermeneutic” is 
recognised: the theory that “social science is not only affected by society, but at the same time an 
effective agent in shaping society; that is, social science is internal to its ‘subject matter’ in a way 
natural science is not” (Giddens, 1984, cited by Özel, 2002, pp. 16-17).  
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Critical realism understands the aim of social science to be the identification of the structures which 
generate behavioural tendencies through the examination of social phenomena (Johnson & 
Duberley, 2000). The task of the researcher is thus to use perceptions of empirical events to identify 
the mechanisms through which underlying (real but unobservable) structures give rise to those 
events (Volkoff et al., 2007, citing Collier, 1994). “To the extent that individual human actors are 
components of the structures in which a given set of events takes place, they are considered as 
bearing causal powers based on their thoughts and beliefs [as to] how given actions are linked to 
consequences … As a result, critical realism views an actor’s reasons as the generative mechanisms 
which are the cause of a given action” (Wynn & Williams, 2012, p. 791). Other entities within the 
research environment, such as social structures, physical objects, and technological artifacts, are 
also considered to bear causal powers, capacities or liabilities. A liability may be described as “a 
susceptibility to the action of other entities” (Easton, 2010, p. 120). 
The production of knowledge occurs, however in what is termed the transitive dimension; it is a 
social process and thus subject to epistemic relativity. Studies based on critical realism may 
therefore involve interpretive forms of investigation (Raduescu & Vessey, 2009). The position of 
critical realism is thus that, while our knowledge of the world is inevitably fallible and socially 
constructed, and it is not possible to establish an absolute foundation for knowledge, there are 
rational criteria for preferring some theories to others, on the grounds of providing better 
explanations (Johnson & Duberley, 2000; Mingers, 2004c; Sayer, 1992; Smith, 2006; Wikgren, 2005; 
Wilson & Greenhill, 2004). Critical realism shares with pragmatism the epistemological doctrine of 
fallibilism: that knowledge is never certain, but always hypothetical and subject to correction. A 
primary objective of social science research conducted in accordance with critical realist principles is 
to conceptualise and construct theories, and to develop explanations of phenomena through 
explicating their specific mechanisms: how they are generated by structures, actions and contextual 
conditions involved in a particular setting (Wynn & Williams, 2012). This corresponds closely with 
the aims and objectives of the present research, as framed in Section 1.5.  
Causality and the identification of causal mechanisms is a primary focus in critical realism, which 
gives research conducted under critical realist principles a particular relevance to policy (Ackroyd, 
2004). “Causes” here can include reasons for action or for thought (Sayer, 2000). This is a major 
difference from interpretivism, which rejects any notion of the causal power of the natural and 
social worlds, and which tends to generate explanations of phenomena in terms of how actors 
understand their roles in a particular social setting, and of how subjective meanings are developed 
and sustained (Smith, 2006; Wynn & Williams, 2012). The outcome of a mechanism is considered to 
be dependent upon context. The context-mechanism-outcome framework (Pawson & Tilley, 1997, 
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cited by Bygstad & Munkvold, 2011) may be applied in the description of mechanisms. Explanation 
of causal mechanisms within natural phenomena or social structures should be generated via a form 
of inference termed retroduction, which asks “what must be true in order to make this event 
possible?” (Easton, 2010). The process of retroduction is distinct entirely from generalisation, which 
charts the extent of phenomena (Carlsson, 2003, citing Layder, 1993; Sayer, 2004). Retroduction 
involves “the postulation of a hypothetical mechanism(s) or structure(s) that, if they existed, would 
generate the observed phenomenon” (Mingers, 2000, p. 1262). It is related to Peirce’s concept of 
abduction (Mingers et al., 2013), although focusing on causality rather than on the creation of new 
conceptual frameworks (Dobson, 2012). The component phases of the overall process has been 
summarised as follows: by as: “What is happening? Why is it happening? How could the explanation 
be different? And, so what?” (Mingers 2001, p. 246). Critical realists accept that patterns of causality 
may be complex, and that some causal mechanisms may be non-physical and non-observable (Angus 
& Clark, 2012). Explanatory theories need to include enabling conditions, stimulus conditions or 
releasing conditions for causal mechanisms, as applicable. The open nature of complex social 
systems makes it generally impossible to predict events that might arise from a given initial event or 
change in social structure; however it does not preclude the manifestation of a particular causal 
mechanism in different but similar settings, or the recurrence of the mechanism in the same setting; 
these so-called demi-regularities are taken to indicate the occasional realisation of a causal 
mechanism within those settings. The identification of widely differing outcomes across similar 
settings may also contribute to the understanding of causal mechanisms (Wynn & Williams, 2012).  
A key question must be: what are the rational criteria for evaluating the causal explanations offered 
by scientists of observed events? How may the “generative mechanisms” proposed by scientists – or 
social scientists – be distinguished from fictions of the imagination, or fantasy, without involving a 
retreat into some form of idealism (the notion that “reality is in some way mental” (Lacey, 1976))? 
“What restrictions are there upon the mechanisms that can be invoked as causal explanation … why 
not demons or witches’ spells?” (Halfpenny, 1995, cited by Johnson & Duberley, 2000, p. 156) How 
can science involve socially mediated transitive transactions with the “common referent” – an 
intransitive reality – without falling into the problems either of traditional forms of empiricism 
(“experience cannot provide us with knowledge of intransitive reality”) or of postmodernism and  
relativism (“science is exclusively self-referential, as in postmodernism”) (Johnson & Duberley, 2000, 
p. 162)?  
 
Although he does not use the term, Sayer puts forward what appears to be a pragmatist form of 
argument to answer this challenge: “Knowledge claims involve practical commitments, that if one 
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does such-and-such, certain things will result”. “Truth might better be understood as ‘practical 
adequacy’, that is in terms of the extent to which it generates expectations about the world and 
about results of our actions which are realised” (2000, pp. 42, 43). “They are realized because of the 
nature of the associated material interventions … and of their material contexts. … Although the 
nature of objects and processes … does not uniquely determine the content of human knowledge, it 
does determine their cognitive and practical possibilities for us.” (1992, p. 70). As well as stressing 
the theory-dependent nature of perception, the role of metaphor in constructing conceptual 
systems, and the difficulty of separating the conceptual and the empirical, Sayer emphasises the 
practical context of knowledge: “We develop and use concepts not only through and for observing 
and representing the world but for acting in it … conceptual systems concern not only what we 
(think we can) observe, but what we can do and how we do it” (1992, p. 59). Other critical realists 
have proposed so-called judgmental rationality as a means of evaluating and comparing alternative 
explanations of phenomena, in which explanatory power in terms of existing knowledge becomes 
the criterion for selection and adoption (Wynn & Williams, 2012). 
This “pragmatist” argument of Sayers invites comparison with the “pragmatic maxim” of Peirce: 
“Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of 
our conception to have. Then, our conception of those effects is the whole of our conception of the 
object.” (Peirce, 1878, cited by Haack, 1976) However, for Peirce, the entire meaning of a concept is 
identified with “the conceivable practical consequences,—that is, the consequences for deliberate, 
self-controlled conduct,—of the affirmation or denial of the concept” (Peirce, 1904, cited by Haack, 
1997). Put more simply, meaning is solely about “what works”, experientially or practically (Haack, 
2003); Peirce’s form of pragmatism thus equates criteria and definitions of truth (Haack, 1976). This 
type of view is characterised as “instrumentalism” by Sayer, who regards its criteria of truth, which 
focus on outputs, as insufficiently rigorous. Sayer’s own position is arguably closer to that of another 
of the American “classical” pragmatists, Dewey (Johnson & Duberley, citing Dewey, 1897, p. 17); 
Sayer’s concept of practical adequacy maintains that inputs (assumptions, categories) to a theory are 
important as well as its outputs (usually predictions). It also requires theories to work in other 
contexts and to be consistent with other knowledge and practices. 
 
Sayer (2004) believes critical realism to be compatible in principle with some post-structuralist or 
postmodernist social theories. Walsham (2006) believes an interpretivist research strategy to be 
compatible also with a critical realist philosophical standpoint; critical realism does, of course, have 
common ground with interpretivism in that it holds a view of social phenomena as concept-
dependent and requiring interpretive understanding (Zachariadis, Scott, & Barrett, 2013). Critical 
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realism embraces the hermeneutic production of meaning (Bhaskar, 1979, cited by Wikgren, 2005) 
and accepts the necessity of a hermeneutic phase of inquiry.  
Critical realism is said to support a variety of quantitative and qualitative research methods, on the 
grounds that it recognises the existence of different types of (physical, social, and conceptual) 
objects with different ontological and epistemological characteristics (Mingers, Mutch, & Willcocks, 
2013; Zachariadis et al., 2013). These include ethnography, participant observation, interviews both 
structured and unstructured, descriptive statistics, and action research. The only methods effectively 
excluded are those based in strong social constructionism, such as discourse analysis (Georgaca & 
Avdi, 2011; McEvoy & Richards, 2003; Reed, 2005). Critical realism does not, however, offer a ready-
made set of concepts which can readily be applied swithin subject domains (Mutch, 2010) or 
guidelines on the actual conduct of empirical research. (Raduescu & Vessey, 2009).  The role of 
critical realism has rather been perceived as one of “offering guidelines for social science research 
and starting points for the evaluation of already established methods” (Danermark et al., 2001). 
Raduescu and Vessey (2009, citing Merton, 1968) have suggested that the research methods 
adopted in critical realism-based studies should be determined by the relative strength and 
availability of the mid-range domain-specific theories that relate to the research problem. According 
to their scheme, such theories determine the degree of so-called problem structure, which in turn 
should determine the degree of structure in the problem-solving method. They categorise the latter 
as follows: Type I: structured (strong domain-specific theory exists), Type II: structurable (extant 
theory is related only indirectly to the research problem, or is not readily identified as relevant), and 
Type III: unstructured. Unstructured problems require the use of research methods that are 
unstructured or exploratory in nature. They propose different schemata for the three types of 
problem; that for Type III, to which the present study is closest, is shown below in Figure 3.1. 
 
Critical realism has gained ground within the information systems field as an underlying philosophy 
(Mutch, 2002, 2010; Raduescu & Vessey, 2009; Smith, 2006). Issue 37(3) 2013 of the journal 
Management Information Systems Quarterly was entirely devoted to theory building, research 
methods and applications of critical realism within information systems. It has been argued that 
critical realism, on account of its clear separation of structure and agency as set forth in Bhaskar’s 
TMSA and Archer’s concept of morphogenesis (above), and its implicit recognition of the materiality 
of technology, provides a sound basis for analysing the interplay between an organisation and its 
technology (Raduescu & Vessey, 2009; Volkoff et al., 2007). However, only a very small corpus of 
work, based upon qualitative case studies, makes explicit use of retroduction, as described above 
(Strong & Volkoff, 2010; Volkoff, Strong, & Elmes, 2007). Critical realism has been discussed by 
writers on LIS research methodology (Budd, Hill, & Shannon, 2013; Hjørland, 2000, 2005); however, 
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the researcher was unable to identify any explicitly critical realist studies within the information 
science field.  
 
Figure 3.1 Unstructured research method with weak domain-specific theory (Type III) 
Modified from Raduescu & Vessey, 2009, p. 8 
 
Critical realism includes an emancipatory axiology (an ethical critique of social structures and 
mechanisms, based on principles of equity), although this is relatively undeveloped (Benton & Craib, 
2011).  
 
3.3 Research approach and design 
Since the study was investigating factors impacting upon learning, and also the “practices, attitudes, 
values, and presuppositions” (and therefore experiences, perceptions, meanings, and 
understandings) of staff within NHS organisations relating to information behaviour and information 
security, the objectives of the research pointed clearly towards the adoption of a interpretive (and 
primarily qualitative) research strategy, using interviews of some form as the main data collection 
method. Two possible approaches were considered initially, ethnography and grounded theory.  
 
Ethnography has been described as “the study of social interactions, behaviours, and perceptions 
that occur within groups, teams, organisations, and communities” (Reeves, Kuper, & Hodges, 2008). 
It is concerned with the meanings that participants in a social phenomenon or process assign to it 
(Cavaye, 1996), its focus being on culture rather than on individual experience (Roberts & Priest, 
2010). Ethnographic interviewing and observation within an NHS Trust IT department was 
considered initially as a possible component of the study, since it could potentially have offered a 
rich and detailed picture of the putative IT subculture and of the decision-making processes of IT 
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staff. Such methods have been employed within studies of information security practitioners 
(Werlinger et al., 2009; Werlinger, 2008) and of NHS managers (Hyde et al., 2013; Matthews, 2009; 
Nicolini & Powell, s.d.). Such an approach was rejected, however, on the grounds both that the focus 
of investigation would be too narrow, and that the phenomena of interest would occur too rarely for 
time spent in direct observations to be productive, involving spending a disproportionate amount of 
time attempting to address only one of the main research questions.  
 
Grounded theory is a method of qualitative enquiry in which data collection and analysis reciprocally 
inform each other through an emergent, iterative process (Charmaz, 2011). Raduescu and Vessey 
(2009) recommended grounded theory as an approach to analysing data in critical-realism-based 
studies in information systems where no single domain-specific theory can be identified ex ante as 
either directly or indirectly applicable to the research question. Its application in LIS research was 
described in detail by Mansourian (2006). This approach was therefore given initial consideration, as 
being a rigorous method generally considered suitable for theory development that appeared, at 
first sight, to fit the circumstances of the study. However, the main purpose of grounded theory is 
said to be to generate theories regarding social phenomena (Lingard, Albert, & Levinson, 2008). In 
particular, it can be used to discover social-psychological processes (Ploeg, 1999) and to explicate 
patterns of behaviour, particular where these are problematic for those involved (Glaser 1987, cited 
by Scragg, Shaikh, Robinson, & Mercer, 2017, p. 2). The research did not, however, have social 
processes or patterns of behaviour, as such, as a primary focus; hence, grounded theory would not 
have been appropriate to address the research questions (1.6) in their existing form.  
 
A case study approach using a combination of qualitative methods was eventually selected as the 
most suitable research strategy, for a number of reasons. Case studies involve “intensive study of a 
single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of similar units … observed at a single 
point in time or over some delimited period of time” (Gerring, 2004, p. 342). A case study should be 
of a “functioning specific” i.e. “a bounded and integrated system, with working parts and patterned 
behavior”, in which “consistency and sequentialness are prominent” (Stake, 1994, p. 236, cited by 
Pickard, 2007). Case studies lend themselves to investigations seeking to explain some present 
circumstance: “how?” or “why?” (Easton, 2010; Yin, 2009), using the case as a specific illustration 
(Creswell, 2007), which fits well with the overall research problem. They aim at a form of “rich” or 
“thick” description (Pickard, 2007; Wynn & Williams, 2012). They are appropriate for investigating 
phenomena where 1) a large variety of factors and relationships are included, which require to be 
disentangled, 2) no basic laws exist to determine which factors and relationships are important, and 
3) the factors and relationships can be directly observed (Fidel, 1984). They can be used, as in this 
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case, where the boundaries between phenomena and context are not clear (Yin, 2009). In the 
information systems field, case studies have demonstrated their appropriateness for generating a 
“well-founded interpretive comprehension of human/technology interaction in the natural social 
setting” (Andrade, 2009, p. 44). Case studies are geared to exploring a complex situation in depth, 
since they “focus on a sustained consideration of activities and behaviour in a particular location” 
(Ackroyd 2010, cited by Wynn & Williams, 2012). They can be iterative, allowing the researcher to 
revisit the research site to test their understanding (Easton, 2010; Yin, 2009). A case study design, 
while basically linear in character, can evolve as a study progresses; it should not be too prescriptive 
initially, but should be allowed to emerge and respond to circumstances; the post-fieldwork plan 
especially should allow for considerable flexibility (Becker, 1970, cited by Fidel, 1984; Pickard, 2007).  
 
Case studies use multiple sources of evidence, which should intersect in a triangulating fashion 
(Simons, 2008; Yin, 2009). The metaphor of triangulation within research methodology was 
proposed initially by Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, and Sechrest (1966, cited by Bazeley, 1999); it 
derives from techniques used in navigation and surveying, in which the location of a point may be 
determined by taking bearings to it from points at each end of a fixed baseline. These authors 
suggested that “the use of multiple data sources, methods, investigators, and theories contributed 
to greater reliability and validity of results in social science research” (Bazeley, 1999, p. 279). The aim 
of triangulation is to achieve a more accurate measurement and consequently a better 
approximation of a social phenomenon (May, 2010). Techniques or sources can be selected that are 
complementary, which have different biases or different strengths (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 
2014) or which aim to corroborate the same facts or phenomena (Yin, 2002, cited by Pickard, 2007, 
p. 86). Triangulation is not necessarily about corroboration, however; it may show divergences, 
which are potentially important in understanding a case (Simons, 2008). Methodological 
triangulation as a term often refers to the use of a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
methods, although it may refer equally well to a combination of qualitative methods (Shenton, 
2004).  
 
Case study as a research strategy is widely used within many social science disciplines (Creswell, 
2007); for example, within the health information field they have been used within studies of health 
information services (Beverley, Booth, & Bath, 2003; Dowse & Sen, 2007; French, 2006; Wilkinson, 
Papaioannou, Keen, & Booth, 2009), information behaviour (Addison, Whitcombe, & Glover, 2012; 
Bawden & Robinson, 1997; MacDonald, Bath, & Booth, 2008), e-learning (Booth et al., 2005; Wong, 
Greenhalgh, Russell, Boynton, & Toon, 2003), information systems (Maguire & Ojiako, 2007) and 
information security (Fernando & Dawson, 2009; Kolkowska, Hedström, & Karlsson, 2009). 
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Authors on case study methodology have proposed differing categorisations of the types of case 
study. Stake (1995, cited by Baxter & Jack, 2008) distinguished between intrinsic and instrumental 
case studies; in the former, as the name implies, the case is of interest in itself, whereas in latter the 
case is of secondary interest, but is used to gain insight into an issue or to refine a theory. Yin (2009) 
distinguished between exploratory and explanatory case studies; the former is considered 
appropriate for addressing “what?” questions, whereas the latter seek to identify mechanisms and 
causal links via “how?” questions; it is however common for case studies to be both exploratory and 
explanatory (Tellis, 1997a). Levy (1988, cited by Tellis, 1997b) recommended the single-case 
explanatory- exploratory methodology as the most suitable choice for the investigation of 
information technology. The research questions in the present study (Section 1.5 above) were of 
both “what?” and “how?” types.  
 
It was therefore decided to carry out an intrinsic, exploratory and explanatory case study  using a 
combination of qualitative methods (semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis). The 
interviews were intended as far as possible to incorporate explication of critical incidents relating to 
information access (Urquhart et al., 2003). The study was planned to follow a nested or embedded 
single-case design, treating the NHS in England as the actual case (unit of analysis), with the 
individual Trusts (which provided clearly bounded organisational settings) as the nested sites of data 
collection (Thomas, 2011; Yin, 2009).  
 
The choice of this particular form of case study design, and in particular the choice of sites to 
include, requires some explanatory comment. According to Thomas (2011), a nested case study 
differs from a multiple study in that it gains its integrity from the wider case. The case itself (the NHS 
in England) was considered intrinsic, since it was of inherent interest. The choice of sites, however, 
was instrumental in character; it reflected the considerations cited by authors on case study 
methodology in relation to selection of cases. According to Wynn and Williams (2012, p. 804), “the 
selection of a case usually reflects the existence of events which are representative of the 
phenomena a researcher is attempting to explain”. Creswell (2007, p. 75) recommended the 
selection of cases that show different perspectives on the problem, process or event at issue. 
Although the disparities had narrowed since the 1990s, IT infrastructure provision were widely 
recognised within the NHS LIS community as still being better developed within acute Trusts than 
within mental health or community health services Trusts. Anecdotal evidence indicated as well that 
there were wide differences between Trusts in overall corporate culture and climate, including 
prevailing attitudes to information seeking and evidence-based practice; also that their IT 
departments could vary considerably in levels of resource, quality of service and what might be 
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termed “customer focus”. Not all the phenomena which were of interest in this investigation were 
likely to be manifested within an individual NHS Trust. Tellis (1997a, 1997b) suggested that the 
selection of cases should offer the opportunity to maximise what can be learned, knowing that time 
is limited; selected cases should be “easy and willing subjects”. The selection of Trust(s) was 
intended to span the widest possible variation: in size, type of organisation (district general hospital, 
teaching hospital, mental health / community services), category of service (acute, mental health / 
community services), and in level of research and teaching activity, as described in Section 1.4.1. The 
inclusion of a large teaching hospital Trust located within a metropolitan area followed a strong 
recommendation from one of the pilot interviewees, P1, to do so on the grounds of there being 
major differences in culture between teaching hospitals and other acute general hospital Trusts. It 
was constrained in practice by considerations of geographical ease of access (proximity to the 
researcher’s home and quality of transport links) and the relative ease (or otherwise) of negotiating 
local research governance processes and gaining access to interview subjects. The three Trusts 
selected (a small district general hospital T1, a medium-sized mental health/learning 
disabilities/community services Trust T3, and a very large teaching hospital T4 with extensive 
research activity) were all located in the north of England. An approach to a smaller teaching 
hospital Trust (H9), located adjacent to one of T3’s sites, was not pursued, since a negative response 
was received from the Trust research manager to the researcher’s initial enquiry. The researcher 
subsequently approached T4, which, while offering the advantage of providing a wider constrast of 
organisation type and culture to the other Trusts than H9 would have done, was much larger, 
presenting issues in relation to data saturation (discussed further in Section 3.7.2 below).  
Case study research is often thought not to tie in closely with any particular methodological 
approach (Cavaye, 1996). It is holistic in character rather than reductive (Verschuren, 2003). In terms 
of its methodological basis, it may be primarily positivist (Benbasat, Goldstein, & Mead, 1987; Dubé 
& Paré, 2003; Yin, 2009), or interpretivist (Klein & Myers, 1999; Oliver, 2006; Walsham, 1995a) in 
character, and its design may involve quantitative, qualitative or “mixed” methods. Easton (2010), 
Mingers (2004b) and Wynn & Williams (2012) argue, however, that critical realism fits well with use 
of the case study research design. They view the case study method, with its inherent explanatory 
focus and use of mixed methods and triangulation, as the best means of approaching the interaction 
of structures, events, actions and context in a manner that can identify and explicate the causal 
mechanisms which are the focus of interest (see section 3.1 above). Studying a limited number of 
NHS Trusts could be considered justified from a critical realist perspective, the intention being to 
“build an explanatory theory that matches the empirical facts as closely as possible”, and to “utilize 
the detailed causal explanations of the mechanisms at work in a given setting to obtain insights into 
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how and why a similar mechanism could lead to different, or perhaps similar, outcomes in a 
different setting” (Wynn and Williams, 2012, p. 804, citing Becker, 1990).  
3.4 Research process overview 
The overall process of the research is outlined in the flowchart and Gantt chart below (Figure 3.2, 
Figure 3.3). The flowchart illustrates the overall sequence and inter-relationships of the various 
processes of the data collection and analysis, while the Gantt chart provides more detail about the 
temporal sequence of the steps. It should be noted that data analysis began as soon as data became 
available; the ongoing analysis thereby both informed and was influenced by the later stages of data 
collection, as was desirable (Green et al., 2007; Thorne, 2000). 
 
The external theoretical frameworks were applied only at the interpretation stage, i.e. was applied 
only after the data had been analysed and the results and background information written up in a 
near-final form, as described in Section 3.7. The overall process followed the recommendations of 
Eisenhardt (1989, cited by Andersen & Kragh, 2010) regarding the desirability of postponing 
consideration and discussion of existing theory until the later stages of a case study, as a means to 
minimise bias and undue limitation of the findings. It was thus comparable in character with 
Raduescu and Vessey’s diagram of an unstructured research process with weak domain-specific 
theory, as shown above (Figure 3.1). As indicated above, the success (or otherwise) of research 
governance applications informed the selection of Trust sites, and the nature of the data required a 
change in the proposed method of analysis.  
 
3.5 Data collection 
3.5.1 Interviews: introduction 
Case studies typically use interviews as a major method of data collection (Yin, 2009). Approaches to 
interviewing for qualitative research range along a continuum from from the highly structured to the 
unstructured, according to the degree of control that the interviewer maintains over the interaction 
(Breakwell, Hammond, Fife-Schaw, & Smith, 2006) They are variously categorised by writers on 
research methods, as reviewed by Joungtrakul, Sheehan, and Aticomsuwan (2013). 
 
It was planned to conduct interviews with a stratified sample (Pickard, 2007) of NHS staff within 
each Trust. The sample was to include one or more representatives of each of the following seven 
key professional groups who were known to hold roles relating to access to published professional 
information, and whose perspectives were therefore considered relevant to the study: participant 
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category 1) information governance, information technology, library and information services, 
training and development, human resources, communications; and participant category 2) 
education or professional development specialists from the medical, nursing, allied health, and 
pharmacy professions. (“Allied health” in the context of the NHS in England includes the following 
professions: art, drama and music therapists (arts therapists); chiropodists/podiatrists; dietitians; 
occupational therapists; orthoptists; physiotherapists; prosthetists and orthotists; radiographers, 
both diagnostic and therapeutic; and speech and language therapists (Health and Social Care 
Information Centre, 2016). 
 
The study used semi-structured interviews as its main data collection method. Semi-structured 
interviews appeared to be the best means available within this context of obtaining the required 
detailed information from participants, while also providing an in-depth initial understanding of staff 
experiences, assumptions, values, attitudes and perceptions, perceived priorities, and rationales; 
that is, of addressing the “what?”, “how?” and “why?” questions of the study, while ensuring a 
degree of focus and specificity within the interviews and comparability of responses between 
members of the same group across the three sites (Patton, 1990, cited by Joungtrakul, Sheehan, & 
Aticomsuwan, 2013).  
 
One approach to semi-structured interviewing is to use an interview guide, which specifies the 
questions and topics and themes that must be covered and the way in which they should be 
approached with each interviewee, in a manner which allows flexibility and fluidity in the conduct of 
the interview, including the topics covered, the sequence of questions and the manner in which they 
are asked (Mason, 2003). The researcher considered that, under the circumstances of the study, a 
single guide covering all groups, or a collection of index cards, would necessarily have been highly 
complex in nature, containing numerous branch points and alternatives, and thus unwieldly and 
very difficult for her to use within the interview situation. For the sake of simplicity and practicality, 
she therefore developed a series of interview guides customised for each of the main staff groups. 
These included formulated questions that were specific to,and appropriate for, each group, but 
based on a common set of themes and sub-themes, as shown below in Table 3.3. These focused on 
strategies, policies, implementations of policies, technical issues, culture, attitudes and individual 
experiences related to online information behaviour, e-learning and use of social media. A 
customised interview guide was also developed for the NICE manager NICE-01.The basis for the 
development of these guides, the content of the questions, and the manner in which the first 
interview guide was piloted, are described in more detail in Sections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 below. 
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Figure 3.2 Research process flowchart with key to symbols
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3.5.2 Interview questions 
Patton (1990, cited by Joungtrakul et al., 2013) classified the possible types of interview question as 
follows (Table 3.2): 
 
1 Experience / behaviour  Focus: what a person does or has done 
Aim: eliciting descriptions of experiences, behaviours, actions 
and activities that are in principle observable 
2 Opinion / values Aim: understanding a person’s cognitive and interpretive 
processes 
Elicit: opinions, objectives, intentions, wishes, values 
3 Feeling Aim: understanding a person’s emotional responses to 
experiences and thoughts 
4 Knowledge Aim: finding out what factual information the person has 
5 Sensory Aim: finding out what is seen, heard, touched, tasted or smelt 
6 Background Focus: the demographic characteristics of the person being 
interviewed 
 
 
Table 3.2 Types of interview questions 
The primary aim with participants in category 1) above (3.5.1) was to explore attitudes to and 
assumptions about information-seeking as part of professional work, and their understanding of 
their own roles and of organisational priorities in managing access to published information online, 
including e-learning material, within Trust networks (question type 2 in Table 3.2 above). The 
interviews with IT staff also provided the main means of obtaining relevant technical information 
about relevant aspects of the Trust’s IT infrastructure, such as the detailed configurations of SWGs 
used, policies regarding PC hardware and software procurement and upgrading, and approaches to 
desktop management and browser security configurations (including virtualisation). The aim with 
members of category 2) was to gain their perspectives i) on possible problems with access to e-
resources within the organisation, and on information technology staff practices and attitudes; ii) on 
organisational readiness, in terms of overall strategic commitment, and in particular of technical 
infrastructure and support, for e-learning (question types 1, 2 and 3). 
 
169 
 
Figure 3.3 Research process Gantt chart 
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The seven groups of staff interviewed held widely differing roles and responsibilities with respect to 
systems and policies which bore on access to online learning resources and published material; 
these could be categorised as follows (Table 3.3): 
Policy formulation IT, information governance, communications, clinical  
Policy implementation IT, information governance, HR, T&D 
System procurement and  
configuration 
IT (SWG, DLP, spam filter), T&D (LMS), LIS (library system), NICE 
(link resolver, OpenAthens, core content) 
System administration /  
intermediary  
IT; HR (ESR); LIS (link resolver, OpenAthens, library system),  
T&D (LMS) 
E-content creation T&D, clinical, communications, LIS 
Staff training provision T&D, IT, LIS  
End-user All  
 
Table 3.3 Differing roles of staff groups in relation to access to online published information 
 
This required the issues of the research to be explored in differing ways with each of the groups, 
within the framework of the common themes (Table 3.4), leading the researcher to formulate 
specific questions which reflected their different organisational positions and responsibilities  
(Table 3.3).   
 
The interview questions included all categories in Table 3.3 other than (5). In most cases questions 
did not arise directly from the literature as such, but from the researcher’s prior knowledge and 
experience, informed by the literature) but the literature served to inform the ensuing discussion of 
the question with the participants, e.g. regarding the blocking of websites (2.7.3.4), and social media 
policy and organisational risk (2.8.4, 2.8.5) and the analysis and interpretation of the data. However, 
the following directly influenced the development of questions aimed at exploring security and 
governance issues with IT and information governance staff: Prince et al.’s (2010) framing of 
information access problems in terms of inappropriate risk management (2.7.3.4.2); and discussions 
of the information security and cybersecurity risks presented by users (2.7.2.1, 2.7.2.4.2), in 
particular the well-known quotation from Schneier (2000), “people are the weakest link”.  
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IT services Strategic priorities and procurement 
Quality of IT support and provision /  
Attitudes of IT staff towards end-users 
SWG implementation and administration 
Staff experiences of infrastructure-related problems, including 
availability and functionality 
Cultural attitudes to IT 
Information governance 
and security 
Security policies and practices – implementation and effects 
Sources of professional information and guidance re: cybersecurity / 
information security 
Information governance incidents and their impact 
Web / social media 2.0 policies and their implementation 
Attitudes to Web 2.0 / SoMe 
Barriers to information 
seeking, use and sharing 
Levels / quality of provision of LIS 
Other information systems and sources 
Problems encountered with provision of LIS services 
General problems encountered with access, use and sharing of online 
published information  
Attitudes to EBP and to information seeking, use and sharing 
Effects of barriers on information seeking, use and sharing 
E-learning Extent corporate, professional and academic e-learning use 
Platforms for e-learning 
Cultural aspects of e-learning 
Staff support for e-learning 
IT support for e-learning 
Problems with managing e-learning 
Problems with existing e-learning infrastructures 
Web 2.0 / SoMe Web 2.0 / social media policies and their implementation 
Attitudes towards social media  
Extent and nature of use of SoMe / Web 2.0, individual and corporate, 
in relation to communications strategies 
Mobile devices Use of mobile devices (own or Trust) for information purposes, 
including e-learning 
Cultural aspects of mobile device use 
Provision of Trust devices 
Level of support for use of own devices / provision of support 
 
Table 3.4 Interview themes and sub-themes 
 
3.5.3 Interviews: piloting 
It is commonly recommended for semi-structured interviewing that the interview guide or protocol 
be piloted, the aim being to ascertain how well it will work as a research instrument within the main 
study. Pilot interviews using the guide may highlight ambiguities and difficult and unnecessary 
questions, may identify gaps in the coverage of the interview questions in relation to the research 
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questions, and may determine whether each question elicits an adequate response, They also 
provide the researcher with an opportunity to practise and improve interviewing techniques (Dikko, 
2016; Turner, 2010; van Teijlingen & Hundley, 2001). 
Initially, an IT-focused interview guide was prepared, and checked by supervisors. Two pilot 
interviews were then conducted using it to test its effectiveness and suitability (Arthur, Mitchell, 
Lewis, & McNaughton Nicholls, 2014); one was with a retired IT manager (P1), the other was the IT 
manager of a specialist acute trust (P2). IT managers were chosen for the pilot interviews, as IT 
managers in the Trusts were perceived by the researcher to be the most “critical” category of 
participant. Following these pilot interviews, changes were made as a result to the phrasing of some 
of the questions and their overall grouping and order; some questions were omitted as redundant, 
or combined with others. Further (very minor) changes were made as the study progressed; copies 
of all versions were retained for reference. Because the changes made to this interview guide were 
deemed to be relatively minor, it was decided to include the data from these pilot interviews, some 
of which were very valuable and informative, in the overall analysis.  
3.5.4 Interviewee sampling and recruitment 
Morse (1994, p. 228, cited by Andrade, 2009) defined the good interview participant as the “one 
who has the knowledge and experience the researcher requires, has the ability to reflect, is 
articulate, has the time to be interviewed, and is willing to participate in the study”. The precision 
and rigour of a qualitative research sample is assessed by “its ability to represent salient 
characteristics which enable detailed exploration of the central themes and questions which the 
researcher wishes to study”  (Ritchie, Lewis, Elam, Tennant, & Rahim, 2014, p. 113).  
 
In Trusts T1 and T3, potential representatives of the key staff groups specified in Section 3.3 above 
were identified initially via recommendations or suggestions from a senior librarian; in some cases 
the librarian actually contacted such potentially suitable participants on the researcher’s behalf and 
ascertained provisionally their agreement to participate. (The librarians’ offers to contact potential 
participants on the researcher’s behalf in their respective Trusts were accepted on account of the 
difficulties anticipated or experienced in recruiting participants; the researcher felt that potential 
participants would be more likely to accede to a request to participate in the research project if 
mediated via a Trust manager.) The research office at T1 was not able to assist the researcher in 
identifying potential participants. In T3, two participants within community nursing services were 
initially identified and contacted by the research manager at the researcher’s request; he also 
contacted a clinical psychologist, who was unwilling to participate. In Trust T4, the research manager 
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insisted that potential participants be selected by a junior member of the R&D support staff. In all 
three Trusts, efforts were made by the researcher herself also to identify potential participants via 
the respective intranets or websites. In T1, however, this was unsuccessful, as the staff information 
on the T1 intranet (to which she had been given access via the library staff) was not up to date.  
The potential for bias in referring along a line of contacts who may give similar information is 
acknowledged (Erickson, 1979); however, the use of insider contacts and knowledge was needed 
here to supplement the researcher’s initial selection of potential participants, as otherwise it would 
have been difficult for her to determine among the individuals listed within the available information 
sources the most appropriate people to interview (Bryman, 2012; Noy, 2008). It was appropriate 
particularly with IT staff, since, as Botta and his fellow researchers have indicated (Botta, Werlinger, 
Beznosov, et al., 2007; Botta, Werlinger, Gagné, et al., 2007), not only can they be difficult to recruit, 
as was the researcher’s experience in T1, but also roles within information security can be widely 
distributed among staff members in a manner that cannot be readily ascertained other than via 
referrals or recommendations. According to Streeton, Cooke, and Campbell (2004, p. 38), “… this 
weakness [of depending on referrals] may be balanced by the benefits of providing contacts in 
otherwise researcher-inaccessible areas. Insider knowledge gained through this type of contact is of 
particular use in finding the best person to approach in an organisation, irrespective of their job 
title”.  
The initial contacts via the librarians in some instances meant that recruitment processes were not 
fully standardised. It could possibly have led participants to frame their understanding of the 
research topic primarily in terms of information services managed by the library, which was not the 
researcher’s intention. In terms of identifying suitable potential participants, librarians may have 
been more likely to approach staff who were in regular contact with library services; however, the 
clinical participants sought were already likely to have been in regular contact by nature of their staff 
development responsibilities, and members of non-clinical staff groups via their specific work roles. 
Also, the highly stratified nature of the sample sought meant that the pool of potential participants 
available to the librarians was, in any case, limited. Ten participants in all were recruited through 
referrals from intermediaries: three in T1 (two via the librarian T1-01, another via the HR manager 
T1-03), six in T3 (all via the librarian T3-01), and two (one, T4-07, via the librarian T4-6, and the other 
T4-19, via the nurse educator T4-05) in T4. 
Individuals identified initially were contacted by the researcher via email or letter with information 
about the study and an invitation to take part. In some instances, where participants asked for 
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specific information regarding the scope and nature of the questions, the relevant version of the 
interview guide was provided to participants in advance.  
It was apparent from the literature review, from one of the pilot interviews, and from initial contacts 
with potential research participants that problems of access to online published information are a 
“site of silence”, that is, they are known about, but not paid attention to or discussed (Clarke, 2003; 
Sen & Spring, 2013). Some prospective and actual research participants (e.g T2-02) seemed to have 
difficulty understanding the nature of the enquiry. Several published studies (e.g., Hughes, Joshi, 
Lemonde, & Wareham, 2009) referred only briefly to technology- or policy-related barriers to 
information seeking and use, and did not attempt to describe or analyse them in any detail. To 
address the difficulty that participants might have in recalling, conceptualising or paying attention to 
the phenomena of interest, and to focus their reflections on them in advance of the interview, those 
who agreed to participate were sent two brief research reports: Prince, Cass, & Klaber (2010) and 
Technical Design Authority Group (2009), referred to subsequently as the “TDAG survey”. It was felt 
by the researcher that the TDAG survey could provide a useful checklist of information access 
problems; also that provision of this material could serve as a “trigger”, engaging the attention and 
interest of participants, and stimulating their recall and reflection in relation to their own 
circumstances, far more effectively than could her initial email invitation and information sheet 
alone. Trigger material is commonly used in problem-based learning as a means of engaging 
students (e.g. Murray & Savin-Baden, 2000). The perceived advantages of providing participants with 
this material were felt at the time to outweigh substantially the possible risk that the conclusions of 
Prince et al. (2010), in particular, might unduly influence their views. The TDAG survey report, being 
just a summary statistical report without comments or conclusions, was not thought to present a 
risk. However, it could be argued that this strategy could have been avoided; other approaches to 
addressing the perceived site of silence, such as developing possible probes within the interview 
guides to follow up on questions in more detail, or providing participants with a simple checklist to 
prompt recall of barrier phenomena, could have been adopted instead (cf. den Outer, Handley, & 
Price, 2012).  
 
For clinical staff, LIS staff and T&D staff, the TDAG survey was used as a checklist. The interview 
guide for clinical staff included an invitation to comment on both articles, although this was intended 
as a subsidiary question, and frequently not pursued.  
 
Only one participant (T4-10) offered any comment specifically on their content. The Trust-based 
participants' comments relating to information access problems, as described within the results 
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chapters, were all detailed and specific, avoiding generalisations. They also varied widely according 
to individual circumstances, and by Trust. Contrary to Prince et al.’s claims of robustness of 
infrastructure, they indicated a variety of IT infrastructure problems in addition to policy issues. 
Since the terms of the latter’s analysis and conclusions (relating to risk management policy and 
platforms for delivery of e-resources) did not appear to be reflected within the results, it is 
suggested that the overall impact of sending participants the two articles is likely to have been 
limited. 
 
Interviews were  sought and conducted with key informants in selected external organisations 
whose importance was apparent from background information or indicated by participants: the 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), the local medical school, and a secure web 
gateway (SWG) vendor with a sizeable NHS market share. This particular SWG (identified within the 
results as SWG3) was in use within both T3 and the specialist acute trust where one of the pilot 
interviewees, P2, worked. To provide a broader perspective on issues in the NHS in England as a 
whole, it had originally been planned to conduct semi-structured interviews also with publishers of 
e-resources. In the event, however, all the researcher’s attempts to contact publishers proved 
fruitless. The researcher’s attempts to recruit a participant at the outsourced IT provider S3 were 
also unsuccessful. 
 
3.5.5 Interviewing style and approach 
The process of qualitative interviewing requires the researcher to be active and reflexive (Mason, 
2002); Guba and Lincoln (1994, cited by Andrade, 2009) describe the researcher role as that of 
becoming a “passionate participant” through close interaction with interview participants. Roulston 
(2010) proposed a typology of conceptions of qualitative interviewing: romantic, neopositivist and 
localist. The “romantic” conception is described as follows: the interviewer endeavours to establish 
rapport with the participant and to establish a trusting relationship with them; is friendly, open, 
honest and forthcoming with participants; and may express their own interest in and involvement 
with the research topic. Multiple interviews may be used with particular participants as a means of 
establishing ongoing relationships. The interview itself is interactive and conversational in tone. The 
“neoposivist” approach emphasises the the adoption of a neutral role by the interviewer, who takes 
care to minimise possible biases via the formulation of effective, open, non-leading questions and by 
avoiding expressing opinions relating to the research issues. It tends to assume that “the interview 
conversation is a pipeline for transmitting knowledge" (Holstein & Gubrium (1997), cited by Alvesson 
(2003, p. 15). The “localist” approach, which shares certain features with postmodernism, but is also 
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associated with research approaches such as conversational analysis and discourse analysis, 
emphasises that interview statements must be seen in their social context; participants are not 
reporting external events, but producing situated accounts.  
 
The researcher’s own approach to interviewing lay somewhere between the “romantic” and the 
“neopositivist”; While closely focusing on eliciting information and knowledge, she adopted a 
conversational manner, seeking to generate rapport and trust with participants as a means to elicit 
rich data of high quality. Particularly with the IT managers, where shortage of time was a particular 
factor, not all questions in the interview guide could necessarily be pursued. For the interviews with 
IT managers in T1 and T3, which took place relatively late during data collection at the respective 
sites, she compiled and brought to the interview detailed lists of technical issues that had arisen in 
the course of earlier interviews in the respective Trusts about which she was seeking clarification. 
She did not conduct multiple interviews with participants. In some instances, notably withT1-01 and 
T4-20, missing information or clarification of ambiguities was sought from participants by email 
subsequent to the interview. 
 
3.5.6 Conduct of interviews   
The researcher compiled a checklist of essential items for the researcher to bring to interviews (site 
map where applicable, participant’s telephone number and email in case of unexpected delays, 
recording devices, instructions for backup recording device, copies of the interview information 
sheet and consent form (Appendix E.3), copy of interview guide (Appendix F), research notebook, 
copies of articles sent to the participant for pre-reading). She used another brief checklist as a 
prompt to carry out standard tasks at the start of the interview (obtain consent, start recording 
devices, etc.) Interviews were conducted in the participant’s office or in other suitable quiet 
locations which they had arranged in advance. Following the interview, an email was sent to each 
participant to thank them for their input and their time. 
 
3.5.7 Recording and transcription of interviews 
Face-to-face interviews were recorded using two password-protected portable devices concurrently, 
one as a backup.49 As soon as possible thereafter they were downloaded to the researcher’s 
                                                          
 
49
 This approach worked well other than for the interview with T4-05, for which the main recording device was 
afterwards found not to have been switched on and the recording from the backup device was found to be 
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(password protected and encrypted) home desktop hard drive and university file server. Kowal and 
O’Connell (2014) argue that all transcription is in principle selective, therefore that the choice of 
transcription method needs be appropriate to the specific purposes of a given research project. The 
researcher transcribed the pilot interviews and the initial three interviews at Trust T1 herself, but, 
finding this excessively time-consuming, subsequently used a transcription service recommended by 
one of her supervisors. This transcriber was familiar with the NHS via her work as a medical 
secretary, and produced work of good quality that required very few corrections, following an 
“intelligent verbatim” approach. In intelligent verbatim, the transcriber chooses which pauses and 
detail are relevant, but is careful to make sure that the exact wording of the dialogue is recorded, 
while omitting verbal fillers. This approach, which identifies the verbal content of the interviews, is 
the one generally used for qualitative research other than discourse analysis, and was therefore 
suitable for the study (Turner, 2010). Once received by the researcher, transcriptions were checked 
for accuracy and anonymised before being saved locally and remotely, and uploaded to NVivo for 
analysis. Interviewees were asked by email for clarification of unclear words or phrases where 
appropriate. A password-protected spreadsheet, which incorporated an anonymisation log, was 
used to track progress with arranging and conducting interviews and in processing interview 
recordings and transcripts (Burke, 2011). The anonymisation scheme adopted is described in Section 
4.1 below. 
 
The two (relatively brief and informal) telephone interviews were conducted using a recording 
application on the researcher’s smartphone, and again downloaded as soon as possible thereafter to 
her home desktop hard drive and university file server. The two telephone interviews were not 
transcribed. Following the interview with the SWG product manager SWG3-01, the researcher 
discovered that a problem had occurred with her recording application, which had registered only 
the researcher’s contributions to the dialogue and not the participant’s. The interview with U3-Med-
01 was relatively brief and informal, and accordingly was not deemed worthwhile to transcribe. For 
both telephone interviews the researcher’s detailed contemporaneous notes were drawn upon 
instead for analysis purposes (cf. Halcomb & Davidson, 2006).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
heavily affected by interference. The researcher herself attempted to transcribe this, getting as far only as 30% 
of the way through the audio file. Fortunately this covered the most critical content, the discussion of website 
blocking. 
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3.5.8 Documents 
Documentary analysis offers a number of advantages as a research method. Within public sector 
organisations, such as the NHS, documents are generally widely available and easy to collect; the 
process of data collection is non-instrusive; they are readily compared across different organisations; 
they do not generally present issues of privacy, anonymity or confidentiality; and their preparation 
and content are not influenced by the research processes. The data they provide may usefully 
supplement, contexualise or clarify that obtains via other methods, e.g. interviewing (Shaw, Elston, 
& Abbott, 2004). 
 
The following categories of documents were obtained for each Trust: 
 Policy and guidance: communications and media, training and development, information 
security, information governance, Internet acceptable use policies, etc. 
 Quality accounts 
 Annual reports 
 IT / Informatics department business strategy 
 Library service, training department, communications strategies 
 Professional strategies 
 Website content 
 Statements of values and behaviours 
 Promotional material for SWGs (white papers, etc.) 
Freedom of Information (FoI) requests placed via the “What Do They Know?” website50 or directly to 
the Trust information governance department(s) were needed to obtain some of the policy and 
strategy material. Other material, however, was readily downloadable from Trust websites, or was 
provided by participants. The choice of the types of document to be included was determined by 
their roles and functions within NHS organisations in relation to access to published information. 
Comparable categories of documents were obtained for each Trust site. To provide contextual 
information, specific data relating to Trust activity and performance were obtained also from 
national NHS websites, as described in Section 4.1. Other documents, such as Health and Social Care 
Information Centre (HSCIC) Good Practice Guidelines, reports, and national policies in relevant areas 
                                                          
 
50
 WhatDoTheyKnow: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/  
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(e.g. IT strategy, library and knowledge services, workforce development, e-learning, and mobile 
devices), were also obtained. It did not prove possible, as had been hoped, to obtain detailed 
technical documentation (as distinct from marketing material) for the different SWGs in use within 
the Trusts. 
3.6 Data analysis 
Framework analysis (Gale, Heath, Cameron, Rashid, & Redwood, 2013; Ritchie et al., 2014; Ritchie & 
Spencer, 1994; Spencer, Ritchie, Lewis, & Dillon, 2003; Spencer, Ritchie, O’Connor, Morrell, & 
Ormston, 2014) was initially preferred as an analytical method. It provides a clear “audit trail” from 
data to findings and conclusions, and can be carried out within a relatively tight time frame; it is an 
appropriate analysis approach for applied, policy-related work; and it was supported by the NVivo 10 
qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS) software package, which the researcher was intending to use 
for her analysis. 
In the event, the richness, heterogeneity and complexity of the data appeared to preclude its 
application; it appeared impossible to identify themes and sub-themes in advance in the manner it 
requires. Thematic analysis following the approach of Braun and Clarke (2006, 2013) was adopted 
instead as an analytical method. Braun and Clarke describe thematic analysis as a recursive process 
with six main phases: familiarisation with the data; coding; searching for themes; reviewing themes; 
defining and naming themes; and writing up. The researcher began initial coding of the material 
using NVivo during the latter phases of data collection, identifying, refining and linking the emerging 
themes via a process of classification and re-classification of codes at progressively more analytical / 
conceptual levels. In the course of data collection and analysis, the researcher wrote for herself a 
variety of memos in NVivo concerning possible questions, thoughts or issues arising within the 
research. Her analysis was informed by ongoing reading (Tuckett, 2015). To facilitate comparisons 
between the Trusts, and to gain a fuller initial picture, data from the three Trust sites and from the 
external participants were analysed together rather than separately.  
 
Bazeley (2013, p. 191) suggests that “identifying themes … falls somewhere in the process between 
coding and theory development”. According to Green et al. (2007, p. 549), the generation of themes 
in thematic analysis “requires moving beyond a description of a range of categories; it involves 
shifting to an explanation or, even better, an interpretation of the issue under investigation … 
specifically referring to the theoretical concepts relevant to the study”. The researcher’s initial open 
and axial coding of the data using NVivo had yielded 18 main categories, some of which contained a 
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higher number of sub-categories than was desirable, while others were more thinly populated 
(Boeije, 2010). After undertaking this process she was eventually able to identify several broad 
themes within the data. The problem then presented itself to her, however, of how to relate these 
and their associated categories to the detailed specific findings relating to barriers encounted by 
NHS staff in accessing information. As a strategy for doing this, she experimented, at her supervisors’ 
suggestion, with a matrix format for presenting the results, as recommended by Miles, Huberman, 
and Saldaña (2014); she mapped the main themes identified via the thematic analysis (columns) 
against the main interview themes (rows). As a first stage, each cell of the matrix was populated with 
appropriate data from the coding scheme. During the later stages of this process, she added to the 
scheme a “background” row theme, to incorporate material relevant to the overall analysis which 
was not otherwise classifiable. This scheme appeared to work well as a basis for further analysing 
and structuring the data, and she used it as the basis for presenting the results in their eventual final 
form. Examples of the output of these processes are given in Appendix R. To provide a visual aid to 
the structure and sequence of the discussion of results, she drew detailed thematic maps (Figures 
3.1, 5.1, 6.1, 7.1, 8.1, 9.1) for each major theme, as well as an “overview” map representing the 
findings as a whole (Figure 4.0). 
 
Thematic analysis is an appropriate strategy for analysing documentary data, particularly as a 
method of providing background and context (Bowen, 2009; Coffey, 2014). Documentary analysis, 
combining processes of qualitative content analysis and thematic analysis (Bowen, 2009; Prior, 2003, 
2010; Vaismoradi, Turunen, & Bondas, 2013) was selectively undertaken of the documents described 
in 3.5.8 above. The documents were analysed together with the interview data.  
 
According to Bryman (2008, p. 551),“people who write documents are likely to have a particular 
point of view that they want to get across”. The researcher attempted to bear in mind that 
documents, rather than straightforwardly representing organisational reality, constitute a distinct 
level of “reality” in their own right, possessing significance in terms of their intended readership and 
the purposes for which they were written (Atkinson & Coffey, 2010; Bryman, 2008; Prior, 2003, 
2008). Documents may contain only a limited level of detail, and therefore offer a partial or 
superficial account of what they describe. Policy documents in particular may represent aspirations 
rather than realities (Shaw, Elston, & Abbott, 2004). They are also designed to address problems, 
and as containing (explicit or implicit) solutions to them, which require to be identified and analysed 
(Bacchi, 2009, cited by Hammond & McDermott, s.d.). Accordingly, she aimed to conduct the 
analysis of the semantic content at a latent, as well as at a manifest, level. The checklist for 
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acceptable use policies developed by Gallagher, McMenemy, and Poulter (2015) in assessing the 
AUPs of public library services was applied to the Trusts’ AUPs as part of the process, as described in 
Section 8.2. 
3.7 Interpretation and explanation of findings 
Theoretical frameworks were not applied to the analysis of the data until after the presentation of 
the results had been finalised. A wide variety of possible theories within the fields of organisation 
studies and information systems were examined for possible “fit” and explanatory relevance, in a 
process of what has been described as analytical generalisation (Meyer, 2001, citing Eisenhardt, 
1989). The discussion of the findings and development of the explanatory model (Section 11.1) was 
developed in tandem with an extensive revision of the literature review, which was extended 
beyond its initial scope (information behaviour, information security and cybersecurity, 
organisational culture, power within organisations) to cover perspectives on interprofessional 
conflicts and technological innovation; this material informed the content of Sections 11.4 and 11.5.  
3.8 Specific quality issues 
3.8.1 Introduction: quality and validity in qualitative research 
Interpretive research approaches often adopt as its criteria of quality and validity credibility, 
transferability, dependability, and confirmability, together with trustworthiness (of reported 
observations and of interpretations – the extent to which the investigator’s constructions are 
empirically grounded in those of the study participants) - and authenticity (Lincoln et al., 2011; 
Patton, 2002). The measures described below (3.7.2) and in the account of the design and conduct 
of the study (3.3 - 3.5) aimed to fulfil these criteria. 
3.8.2 Number of interviews conducted  
Under ideal circumstances the researcher would have expected to cease conducting interviews with 
a particular group of participants once it was felt that data or theoretical saturation had been 
reached, i.e. that redundancy or replication of data was occurring, no new findings or insights were 
being generated, no new themes were being identified, and no issues were arising regarding a 
category of data (Francis et al., 2010; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006). It can, 
however, be difficult to establish the point at which data or theoretical saturation has been 
achieved, and there are few extant guidelines relating to this (Baker, Edwards, Adler, Becker, & 
Doucet, 2012). It can depend in practice on a number of factors, including the quality of the data, 
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the nature and complexity of the research topic, and the amount of useful information obtained 
from each participant (Morse, 2000). Pan and Tan (2011) suggested that 15 interviewees per 
organisation should be a minimum number to aim for, with the overall number of interviews not 
exceeding 50 (Ritchie et al., 2014). In the present study, the researcher carried out 45 interviews 
with a total of 48 participants (three of the interviews involved pairs of workforce development 
staff): 15 participants in T1 and T2, 15 in T3, 15 in T4, with three external participants; further details 
are given in Table 3.1. It should be noted that the number of NHS Trust staff working within a 
particular area was in some cases very small: within library and information services, for instance, 
none of the Trusts had more than five professional members of staff, while the training and 
workforce development departments generally had fewer than ten. In several instances, just one key 
individual within each professional group was identified as having educational or staff development 
responsibilities. Regarding the degree of data saturation achieved, it appeared to the researcher that 
a reasonably clear overall picture was emerging from T1/T2 and T3, whereas the size and complexity 
of T4 as a teaching and research institution inevitably meant that, while the main impacts of web 
security measures and social media policies (which were Trust-wide) were clear, a considerable 
amount of local detail may have been missed, particularly where information use by clinical 
researchers was concerned.  
3.8.3 Audit trail 
Audio files and written transcripts of interviews, successive versions of interview guides and copies 
of all email and hard copy correspondence with participants and research managers were retained. 
Research notebooks were kept, recording issues arising in interviews and other relevant matters. 
The anonymisation log and progress monitoring spreadsheet were mentioned above (Section 3.4.4). 
Queries run in NVivo on the contents of documents and interview transcripts were saved. Memos 
were written during the process of analysis, as detailed above (Section 3.5). 
3.8.4 Member checking 
It is considered desirable, for reasons both of research ethics (fairness to participants who have 
freely given their time and energy to participation in a study) and of accuracy, to incorporate some 
form of member checking of research findings (Pickard, 2007). Member checking may be defined as 
“the practice of taking research products back to those researched for review and evaluation” 
(Locke, 2008). The relational complexities and epistemological ambiguities of various different 
approaches to sharing study findings with participants were comprehensively discussed by Locke 
and Velamuri (2008). They stated that participant transcript review, while it allows participants the 
chance to amend or clarify information they had provided in the original interview, also has 
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potential disadvantages, such as a bias created by inconsistent data sources, or the loss of data 
when a participant decides to withdraw valuable material; also, the process is time-consuming. They 
observed only marginal gains in accuracy of data from the process.  
Rather than sending each participant a copy of their interview transcript for review, a brief narrative 
synopsis of the findings was submitted to all participants for review and comment once the full 
report of the results had been completed. No disagreements or negative comments were expressed, 
although the librarian T3-01 asked for more detail regarding some of the reported findings which 
related to her own service. 
3.8.5 Triangulation 
The study used two qualitative methods, allowing only limited possibilities for methodological 
triangulation. However, data triangulation, i.e., detailed assessment and comparison of information 
between different groups of participants and individual participants within the same organisation, 
and comparison between documents and interview reports,  was intrinsic to the research design; it 
was carried out as far as possible as part of the analysis (see Section 3.3 above). The wide 
divergences that appeared to be occurring in some instances between documentary sources, such as 
policy documents and reports, and de facto practices as described in interviews by participants, 
were important findings in themselves (e.g. regarding Web 2.0 and social media access in T1: 5.5, 
9.2.1, and encryption of USB memory sticks in T4: 5.2.1 ).  
3.8.6 Other quality issues and measures 
A great deal of background information, as provided in Chapter 4 and elsewhere, was gathered in an 
effort to ensure that descriptions of the research participants and their organisational settings were 
sufficiently detailed to allow for transferability of findings, without indirectly identifying them or 
their organisations. Other quality issues have been discussed elsewhere within this chapter: 
adequacy and appropriateness of data (sampling issues, numbers of interviews collected, and data 
saturation), piloting of the interview guide, and transcription quality.  
3.9 Position of the researcher 
Given the emergent nature of knowledge within interpretive research, and the numerous ways in 
which a researcher’s values can impinge upon the research process (Bryman, 2008), the researcher 
needed to be self-reflective on her own position in relation to the subject matter of the research and 
hence to demonstrate reflexivity (Steier, 1991). Her background knowledge of the research setting 
as a former LIS practitioner provided an important basis for the design and conduct of the study 
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(Reed & Procter, 1995); within these authors’ typology, her position could be described as “hybrid”.  
She acknowledged that her professional identity affected both her own perceptions and perceptions 
by interview participants of her (Bourke, 2014). With a professional background as an NHS library 
manager, she was aware of a strong commitment to evidence-based health care (Isetta, 2008) and 
information literacy development (Brettle & Urquhart, 2012), and, in terms of general professional 
values as a librarian, a commitment to freedom of inquiry, as a vital aspect of professional autonomy 
as well as a basic social and cultural right (Byrne, 2005; CILIP, 2005; IFLA & UNESCO, 2006). 
 
She was also aware that the library and information profession is both female-dominated, while the 
information technology workforce, by contrast, is heavily male-dominated (Munn, 2011; Reid, Allen, 
Armstrong, & Riemenschneider, 2010), with a culture that may be hostile to women (Harvey, 1997; 
Kirk, 2009); both groups are heavily subject to negative stereotyping (Akbulut-Bailey & Motwani, 
2011; Blackwelder, 1996; Green, 1994; Joshi & Schmidt, 2006; Lutz, 2005; Trauth & Quesenberry, 
2006). She also bore in mind gender imbalances within many of the health professions (Zurn, Dal 
Poz, Stilwell, & Adams, 2004), suggesting the possibility that gender stereotyping could contribute to 
conflicts between information technology staff and groups of clinicians. More recently she had 
become aware of the political context of evidence-based practice (McLaughlin, 2001; Rycroft-
Malone, 2006; 2005), and of the significance of information systems as an arena of conflict between 
organisational groups and subcultures, in particular between clinicians and managers within the NHS 
(Adams & Blandford, 2005b; Currie & Guah, 2007; Nord & Nord, 2007; Potter, 2007). 
She recognised, in principle, a general need for information security practice to “balance the 
competing rights, interests and requirements of different stakeholders” (Broucek, Turner, & 
Zimmerli, 2010, p. 190) and believed that the maintenance of effective cybersecurity / information 
security and appropriate use of computing resources should be not solely a technical matter, but the 
concern and responsibility for all staff within an organisation, being closely aligned with business 
requirements and organisational values (Inglesant & Sasse, 2010, 2011). She acknowledged also, 
however, that her experiences with information governance and security in her former NHS library 
manager post, while providing extensive background knowledge and insight into the general issues 
of the research, had sometimes been negative, and had considerably influenced her thinking.  
Previously to undertaking the study, the researcher had been employed for four years (between 
March 2008 and May 2012) as the library manager of a large mental health and learning disabilities 
Trust in the north east of England. It should be noted that this was not the mental health and 
community health services Trust T3 in the study. Forensic services (both mental health and learning 
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disabilities) were an important element of this Trust’s overall provision, occupying more than half of 
one of the three main hospital sites. It also provided prison in-reach and forensic adolescent 
psychiatry services. This characteristic of its services could in itself have led to a strong emphasis on 
security.  
 
Two very serious information governance incidents took place during the researcher’s time in post. 
The first of these involved the distribution of pornographic images via email, some of them illegal, 
among staff and patients in the medium secure unit; the second involved a loss of patient records 
via portable media. In consequence of these incidents, as well as policy changes, a notable shift 
appeared to take place in the organisational climate in relation to information governance and 
security. Her experiences of its effects led to her proposal for undertaking the present research.  
 
3.10 Ethics  
The ethical issues of the study were those that are intrinsic to the practice of social research in 
general, which Savin-Baden and Major (2013) categorise as being concerned overall with 1) efficacy 
of design 2) excellent treatment of individuals 3) transparency of process, and 4) plausibility of 
products. They included those of what Guillemin and Gillam (2004) term “research in practice”. The 
researcher has to the best of her ability and knowledge fulfilled her general duty to safeguard the 
interests of interview participants through adhering strictly to the legal principles of data protection 
and to other aspects of good research practice, including 1) the provision of clear information to 
participants in advance about the study and its risks and benefits; 2) fairly obtaining and recording 
informed consent using paper forms retained on file; 3) managing research data securely; 4) 
safeguarding the anonymity of the participating organisations and the anonymity and confidentiality 
of individual survey and interview participants, including eliminating as far as possible, through the 
use of generic role descriptions for participants (Section 4.1) and through substitutions of specific 
information occurring within quoted sections of transcribed interviews and documents, any risk of 
their being identified indirectly (Huws, 2004; Israel & Hay, 2006). She has also fulfilled the duty of 
reporting and disseminating the research findings in a manner consonant with intellectual property 
law, in particular by seeking the requisite copyright permissions before reproducing illustrations and 
tables (Huws, 2004). It was anticipated that the relative sensitivity of information security as a 
research topic might lead to difficulties in recruiting interview participants or in establishing effective 
relationships with them, or to restrictions being placed on the use of the information being made 
available to the researcher. However she did not appear to encounter any particular problems of this 
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sort, other than that she found it impossible to obtain any IT system documentation, either from 
vendors or from any of the Trusts (Kotulic & Clark, 2004). 
NHS Research Ethics Committee approval via the Integrated Research Application System (IRAS: 
https://www.myresearchproject.org.uk) was not required for this research, since it did not involve 
patients in any way; this was established via the Health Research Authority decision tree 
(http://www.hra-decisiontools.org.uk/ethics/). However, local research governance approval 
needed to be negotiated for each participating Trust. The administrative processes varied 
considerably in complexity and required lead time. One minor complication encountered by the 
researcher was that the allied health professionals working within Trust T1 were at the time all 
employed by another acute Trust, T2; thereby requiring the researcher to obtain research 
governance approval at T2 as well as at T1 in order to interview three participants within this 
category.  
Copies of the Information School Letter of Approval and Research Ethics Review Outcome, and the 
participant information sheet and consent form, are included in Appendix E. Copies of 
correspondence relating to research governance approval requests, and the research approval 
documents from the individual NHS Trust sites, which included a Research Passport for T3 and T4, 
are not included, on the grounds that, since the document layouts were potentially recognisable by 
anyone familiar with communications from the respective research offices, even in a “redacted” 
form, anonymity could thereby have been breached.51 
3.11 How results are reported 
3.11.1 Preliminaries 
Within the report of this study, the individual Trusts are referred to as follows: 
District general hospital Trust: T1 
(District general hospital Trust employing AHPs in T1: T2 – see comments in Chapter 3) 
Mental health Trust: T3 
Teaching hospital Trust: T4 
Other Trusts referred to are assigned numbers similarly. 
                                                          
 
51
 These can be made available to the examiners for checking in confidence if required. 
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The community health services division of T3 is designated as T3-WPH. Individual hospital sites may 
be designated with two-letter suffixes to the Trust designation, e.g. T1-LH or T4-IN. 
Universities are assigned numbers beginning with U, e.g. U11. Individual university departments may 
have faculty codes assigned to them, e.g. U3-Med is the medical school of university U3. NHS or 
NHS-related bodies have codes that begin with S, e.g. S3. The clinical systems in use within T3 are 
referred to as C1 (mental health) and C2 (community services), and the secure web gateways (web 
proxies) used in each of the Trusts T1, T3 and T4 are designated correspondingly as SWG1, SWG3 
and SWG4. The particular publishers or aggregators referred to are assigned the codes Pub1, Pub2, 
Pub3, Pub4 and Pub5. 
 
Key documents are also assigned reference codes: 
T4 had separate policies governing Internet and email use and computer and network security. The 
former is designated as AU4Int; the latter as AU4Sec. Acceptable use policies of the other Trusts are 
numbered AU1 and AU3. Social media policies, or media policies addressing social media use, are 
similarly designated SoMe1, etc. The social media guide produced in T4 for researchers is designated 
as SoMe4-Res. Annual reports and quality accounts are designated AR1/14-15, QA3/13-14, etc., 
where the numerical range denotes the year covered by the document. 
 
Participants have both short-form and long-form designations, as exemplified by the following: 
 
Long-form designation: [job role], [Trust], [participant number] 
e.g. Occupational therapist, T2, 1 
 
Short-form designation: [Trust]-[participant-number] 
e.g. T2-01 
 
Extensive use is made of verbatim quotation from interview participants in the reporting of results 
(Corden & Sainsbury, 2006). The long form is used in the attribution of quotations. Where a 
participant is quoted several times in succession, only the final quotation carries the attribution. The 
short form acts as a form of subsequent reference to the participant and as the unique identifier for 
that participant within the text. The assigned generic job role descriptions are intended to be 
informative as to an individual’s roles and responsibilities, but sufficiently general as to preclude any 
risk of their being identified indirectly. Where, as was the case in several instances, a job role or title 
applied to only one person within a Trust, a more general designation has been provided. In some 
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cases this may indicate a role more junior in character than the participant’s actual one. In the first 
reference within the chapter to a particular participant, the person is described as follows: “the IT 
manager T1-12”, “the records and governance manager T3-03”, etc. Thereafter they are referred to 
simply as T1-12, T3-03, etc. 
 
Participants’ comments have been edited to remove hesitancies, repetitions and verbal fillers (“sort 
of”, “you know”, “I mean”, “kind of”, “like”). In some instances the recording device skipped a few 
words, as indicated in the transcription; here a tentative reconstruction of the missing word or 
phrase has been made from the context, and indicated in non-italicised characters, e.g.: 
“we can’t … [18.48 – skips] use it sensibly” reconstructed as:  
“we can’t … trust staff to use it sensibly” 
A table listing the participants for each Trust by category of role is given below (Table 3.5). 
Comments made in emails from other Trust staff members or external correspondents are cited in a 
few instances. The Trust staff members are assigned codes in a similar manner to the interview 
participants; external correspondents are assigned codes beginning with E, e.g. E6. 
 
3.11.2 Structure  
Following a description of the organisational contexts and background within the case study Trusts 
in Chapter 4, the arrangement of the results in Chapters 5 to 9 broadly follows a matrix structure: 
the major themes emerging from the data are mapped (rows) against the key themes of the end-
user interviews (columns). The themes of the rows, which constitute the subject matter of the 
chapters, are as follows: information access and barriers (5), professional education (6), 
organisational dynamics and professional norms (7); information governance and security (8) and 
communications policy (9). The column themes, which constitute the sub-sections within each major 
section, are: 1) IT infrastructure, 2) published information resources,3) e-learning, 4) social media,  
and 5) mobile devices. The background material in Chapter 4 derived in some instances from 
interviews, as well as from documents and general fact-finding. A final results chapter (Chapter 10) 
presents a tabulation and summary of the key findings. 
 
On account of the lack of content in some areas, and the need to accommodate specific content in 
others, it was not possible to establish a uniform numbering scheme across the results chapters. 
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Role T1 (T2) T3 T4 
librarian 1 T1-01  1 T3-01 2 
T4-06 
T4-07 
IT manager 1 T1-11 1 T3-06 1 T4-20 
IT staff member - - 1 T3-17 - - 
records/governance 
manager 
1 T1-09 1 T3-03 1 T4-09 
senior governance and risk 
manager 
1 T1-12 - - - - 
communications officer 1 T1-03 1 T3-12 1 T4-03 
clinical tutor  
(medical education) 
1 T1-06 1 T3-02 - - 
medical education 
administrator 
-  1 T3-21 1 T4-11 
AHP clinical lead (3) 
(T2-01) 
(T2-02) 
(T2-03) 
- - 2 
T4-08 
T4-10 
senior nurse manager 1 T1-07 - - - - 
clinical teacher  
(nursing, HCAs, AHPs) 
1 T1-08 3 
T3-07 
T3-19 
T3-20 
2 
T4-05 
T4-12 
non-clinical teacher -  1 T3-04 -  
training / e-learning officer 
(e-learning specialist) 
2 
T1-05  
T1-10 
2 
T3-05 
T3-10 
3 
T4-01 
T4-02 
(T4-22) 
pharmacist 1 T1-04 1 T3-18 1 T4-04 
consultant (surgeon) -  -  1 T4-21 
human resources manager 1 T1-02 1 T3-09 - - 
Total 
12 
(3) - 15 - 15 - 
 
Table 3.5 Interview participants within Trusts by job category 
 
Colour-coded thematic maps are provided. An overview map (Figure 5.1) illustrates the main themes 
and links between column areas across row themes. More detailed maps illustrate the background  
and organisational context (Figure 4.1), and the content of each of the row themes (Figures 5.2, 6.1. 
7.1, 8.1, 9.1). Within the theme colour, sub-themes and sub-sub-themes are indicated with 
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successively lower levels of saturation. Direct thematic links are denoted with solid lines, indirect 
links with dashed lines. Where applicable within the overview map, the solid lines denoting row 
theme links are colour-coded using the same scheme.  
 
Table 3.6 (below) lists other participants interviewed as part of the study: 
 
Interview type  Code Role 
Face-to-face  Pilot interview P1 Retired IT manager, teaching 
hospital Trust 
Face-to-face Pilot interview P2 IT manager, specialist acute 
Trust 
Telephone   U3-Med-01 E-learning lead 
Face-to-face  NICE-01 Senior manager, NICE 
Telephone   SWG3-01 Product manager, SWG3 
vendor 
 
Table 3.6 Non-Trust participants  
 
The colours used in the thematic maps are as follows (Table 3.7): 
Information governance Khaki 
IT infrastructure Grey 
Published information resources Blue 
E-learning Crimson 
Social media Orange 
Mobile devices Purple 
 
Table 3.7 Thematic map colour code 
3.12 Summary  
This chapter began by setting forth an account of methodological principles in general and of the 
main research paradigms (positivism, interpretivism, critical theory and critical realism) which are 
believed to have been relevant to the study. It put forward an argument for the use of a case study 
approach based upon a critical realist epistemology. It continued with accounts of the overall 
research approach, of the specific methods adopted, including the specific measures taken to ensure 
methodological rigour. It then set out how the background to the study and its results are presented 
within Chapters 4 to 10.  
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Chapter 4. Background and organisational context 
 
It should be noted that this chapter covers both background information derived from Trust 
documents and material derived from interviews which could not readily be incorporated within the 
matrix structure of Chapters 5 to 9 (3.6). 
 
4.1 General information about the Trusts 
4.1.1 Introduction 
T1 was categorised as a small acute and community services Trust and associate teaching hospital. 
T3 was comparable in size with other mental health Trusts within its NHS England area. While T3’s 
services included two low-secure forensic inpatient wards and a forensic community support service, 
forensic services were not a large element of the Trust’s services overall. It provided both community 
and residential learning disabilities services, including an inpatient treatment and assessment unit 
and respite care facilities. T4, by contrast, also an acute and community services Trust, was among 
the largest in the country in terms of staff size, though not in terms of numbers of beds. It was a 
major teaching and specialist centre, treating approximately one million patients each year across its 
hospitals. It had grown within the last two years through its takeover of a neighbouring acute Trust 
which had been in financial difficulties; the technical and organisational processes involved would 
not have been complete at the time of the study. Some general information about the Trusts is 
provided in Table 4.1; figures given are for the financial year 2014-2015, and taken from annual 
reports, unless otherwise indicated.  
 
T1 was nearing completion with several major capital projects, including the building of new 
operating theatres and critical care facilities. The workload for the training department had hugely 
increased; in relation to the opening of one of the new facilities it had faced an enormous workload 
delivering face-to-face training for new staff, leading to the researcher’s interview with the training 
officers being delayed for two months. No capital projects on a comparable scale were in train at T3, 
though re-provision of several services was planned. At T4, a large-scale Public Finance Initiative 
(PFI)-financed rebuild of several of its specialist h ospitals had been completed within the previous  
five years, along with the provision of new education facilities. 
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Figure 4.1: Background and organisational context 
 
At the time of the study it was in process of building another general hospital to replace existing 
premises, and planning redevelopments of its A&E, outpatient and research facilities. It also planned 
to invest substantially in its IT infrastructure and systems. The reconfiguration of services following 
the takeover was not yet complete. Public consultations were taking place on a proposal for major 
restructuring of health services within T4’s geographic area. 
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4.1.2 Policy and regulatory environment   
4.1.2.1 National events and policy initiatives 
Within the public domain, a range of information relating both to performance of the Trusts and to 
their strategic planning was readily available. The sources available included strategy documents, 
annual reports, quality accounts, national statistical reports, and ratings from regulatory bodies. 
Organisational dynamics within the three Trusts reflected the influence and impacts of 
contemporary national events and policy initiatives. These include the publication of the second 
Francis report into failings of care at Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust (Francis, 2013), 
subsequent reports on health care assistants and patient safety commissioned by the government of 
the day (Cavendish, 2013; Keogh, 2013; National Advisory Group on the Safety of Patients in 
England, 2013), and the policy responses thereto (Department of Health, 2013b, 2014).52 
The profound impact of the Francis and other reports was apparent in the strategic focus of the 
acute Trusts, as described in their annual reports and quality accounts, on organisational culture, 
core values and behaviours and staff engagement as a means of promoting quality of care and 
patient safety; on aspects of patient safety in general; on the reporting of incidents; on the training 
of nurses and health care assistants; on mortality rates; and on staffing levels (Davies & Mannion, 
2013; Dromey, 2014; Steven, Magnusson, Smith, & Pearson, 2014). T1 had conducted public 
consultations on the findings of the Francis report and their implications for the Trust’s services. T4 
had undertaken an in-depth review and gap analysis of the reports, and developed an action plan to 
implement their recommendations. It had also made efforts to improve its level of staff 
engagement. 
National events had also included publication of the report of the inquiry into abuse of patients at 
Winterbourne View Hospital (Department of Health, 2012e), bearing on the quality of care provided 
for patients with learning disabilities and challenging behaviour within health and social services, 
and hence relevant to T3’s learning disabilities in-patient services (4.3.1). Recent national initiatives 
in information technology (Department of Health, 2012d; NHS England, 2013a; Wyatt, 2012) and 
dementia care (Department of Health, 2009a, 2012b, 2013a) are reflected also in these documents.  
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 http://www.engage.dh.gov.uk/francisresponse/  
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 T1 T3 T4 
Date established  
as FT 
2008 2007 2009 
Population served 300,000; small and 
medium town and rural 
>1 million; mixed urban 
and rural 
>500, 000; large urban; 
population of region 
for tertiary services 
Sites District general 
hospital, other hospital, 
intermediate care 
centre, community 
health services 
>90 sites approx. 
including inpatient and 
community-based 
facilities; non-clinical 
services (IT, training 
suites) separately 
located 
Six specialist and 
general hospitals 
providing secondary 
and nationally 
commissioned 
specialist services; 
community health 
services 
 
Number of beds  
(third quarter  
2014-15)53 
>550 >350 >1200 
Clinical specialties Acute, child health, 
maternity, 
intermediate care 
Adult, children’s and 
older persons’ mental 
health; low secure in-
patient forensic mental 
health; learning 
disabilities; substance 
misuse; community-
based physical health 
 
All acute specialties; 
dentistry; community 
health services; child 
and adolescent mental 
health  
 
Number of staff 3500 approx. >3300 >10,000 
Income from patient 
services 
>£170 million >£150 million >£1,000 million 
Operating surplus / 
(deficit) 
(£1.1 million) >£1 million from 
normal operations 
>£120 million 
 
Table 4.1 Trust background information 2014-1554 
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 Figures taken from KH03 NHS England Bed Occupancy Data:  
https://www.england.nhs.uk/statistics/statistical-work-areas/bed-availability-and-occupancy/bed-data-
overnight/ [accessed 23/01/2017] 
 
54
 The information provided was derived from a variety of documents relating directly to the Trusts, including 
public websites 
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4.1.2.2 Organisational performance 
Table 4.2 provides selected quality metrics relating to the Trusts’ services. All the Trusts faced 
financial challenges resulting from national funding constraints on public spending and increasing 
demands on services. In respect of financial management, T1 was in deficit, while the other Trusts 
were in surplus. T1’s deficit in terms of comprehensive income from patient care activities for the 
previous financial year (2013-14) had been much higher, at over £14 million. T1’s financial problems, 
and its strategic priority of reducing management costs (AR1/13-14) are likely to have related to the 
observed low staffing levels in non-clinical services (communications, information governance, 
training, research support and human resources) (cf. the discussion in Section 11.4 below).  
Anecdotal evidence suggested that T1 for many years had experienced medical staff shortages, 
commonly attributed to its relative lack of prestige as an associate teaching hospital. T3’s level of 
research activity was high in comparison with T1’s; as indicated by its research department’s levels 
of activity, including its proactive approach to supporting researchers and to publicising Trust-based 
research locally, T3 appeared to have a relatively strong research culture. As indicated by numbers 
of studies and patient recruitment, clinical research activity was declining at T1 and T3; at T4 it was 
increasing at T4 in terms of studies recruiting, though not in overall numbers of participants. There 
were indications within T4’s communications strategy and annual reports of problems with 
organisational cohesion and staff engagement, with individual hospitals tending to function  as 
discrete communities; a range of actions to improve staff engagement had been taken by the board 
following relatively poor NHS staff survey scores a few years previously. Staff engagement scores 
from the NHS Staff Surveys which did not differ greatly between the three Trusts, were all higher 
than the national mean for NHS organisations, and showed slight improvements from 2014 to 2015; 
to preserve anonymity, the figures are not given. There were indications in Trust documents that 
staff cohesion was perceived to be a an issue at T4, and also that staff tended to identify with, and 
be loyal to, their individual hospital rather than to the Trust as a whole. A few years previous to the 
study, T4 had engaged a management consultant to improve its staff engagement scores, which at 
the time had been below the national mean.  
External awards may be taken as an approximate indicator of organisational performance. Within 
the period 2013-15, T1 had also won a national award from a professional association for one of its 
high-profile clinical services. In terms of national awards, T3 appeared to be a high-performing 
organisation: it had won several for its people management and for its clinical and patient 
information services. One of its board members had also recently won a prestigious national award.  
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While a number of awards had been made to both clinical and non-clinical services at T4 during 
2013-15, there were considerably more recipients of awards among individual clinical and research 
staff. 
4.2 Information resources 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Participants were asked at interview about their use and experiences of their Trust’s library services. 
Trust intranets, business intelligence systems and a medicines information system were mentioned 
by respondents as being important information resources for their work.  
 
4.2.2 Library services 
While the scope of health professionals’ information behaviour is evidently not limited to resources 
provided or managed by NHS libraries, they provide an important resource to inform many areas of 
NHS work, both clinical and non-clinical. A description is therefore offered in this section of the three 
Trusts’ library services by way of background. Other aspects of library services are discussed in 
Section 5.3 below. T1’s library was managed by the Trust in a partnership with a local university, U2, 
and with T2. U2 provided funding for a member of staff and provided computer facilities and its own 
book stock, which was maintained separately from the Trust book stock. The library at T4 was based 
within a postgraduate centre on the Trust’s main hospital site and was able to offer walk-in access 
for staff and visitors to the university e-resources, offering considerable advantages to the staff 
working there.  
 
T3’s library employed four professionals, including an outreach librarian shared with T2; it had been 
established in 2005 by the present library manager, who had built it up subsequently. It ran largely 
as a virtual service, although it held a small number of books at one of its sites, and provided local 
acute Trust libraries with psychiatry textbooks as a means of promoting psychiatry as a clinical 
specialty to medical students on rotation. (Psychiatry was a relatively unpopular clinical specialty, 
and there existed a national shortage of psychiatrists at all levels. One strategy commonly adopted 
by Trusts in addressing this was to promote psychiatry to undergraduate medical students by 
optimising their experiences of psychiatry rotations.) The library manager was peripatetic between 
sites, and fulfilled a clinical librarian role as well as a management one. She was assisted by a part-
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time assistant librarian, a part-time library assistant, and a temporary clerical assistant. The Trust’s 
knowledge manager was also officially part of the library team.55 
 
T4’s library had two sites, one at each of the main acute hospitals. It was both well-staffed and very 
well stocked; five professionals were employed there. As well as providing services to staff of the 
Trust and students on placement, it provided some access within the terms of a local co-operation 
and access scheme to other NHS staff and students working or studying within its locality. The library 
manager was a member of a national working group on health library collections, and was a 
recognised expert in this area. The OpenAthens administrator for the area Local Education and 
Training Board (LETB) was employed by the library. 
 
All libraries necessarily used the link resolver and EduServ OpenAthens authentication system 
procured centrally for NHS libraries in England by NICE to provide an authentication service for 
nationally- and locally purchased electronic content (see Section 1.4.5 above). The Health Databases 
Advanced Search (HDAS) interface for e-resources (1.4.5) was used to varying degrees. Librarian 
respondents alluded to the known problems with the functionality of HDAS rather than discussing 
them in any detail. The library at T4 had procured the EBSCO Discovery Service,56 which provided an 
alternative search interface to a library’s holdings, and Elsevier’s ClinicalKey service57, which 
provided a point of care search engine as well as much valuable content. Access to the relevant 
aggregators’ “native” interfaces was available via OpenAthens, although this was not mentioned by 
participants. Librarians did, however, identify several specific administration problems with 
OpenAthens (see Sections 1.4.5, above, and 5.3, below). 
 
The nature of T4, as a teaching hospital and constituent organisation of a major research centre, 
provided many of the more senior clinical staff with access to information resources above and 
beyond those of the Trust library, such as those of the nearby universities.  
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 Staffing information relating to the libraries in the study was checked via the Health Library and Information 
Services Directory, http://www.hlisd.org  
56
 EBSCO Discovery Service: http://www.ebscohost.com/discovery/about  
57
 Elsevier ClinicalKey: (http://www.elsevier.com/elsevier-products/clinicalkey)  
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Table 4.2  Selected Trust performance measures for 2013-15 
 
Some clinical researchers would in addition have had access to e-resources provided by the major 
medical charities funding their work, although this was not mentioned by any of the participants.  
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 See Chapter 1, Section 1.4.1 
59
 Data taken from NIHR Research League Table: http://www.nihr.ac.uk/research-and-impact/nhs-research-
performance/league-tables/league-table-data.htm  
  [accessed 26/01/2017]  
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 See Section 1.4.4 
    
    
    
    
 T1 T3 T4 
CQC overall rating58 (1/15) Good (6/15) Good (6/16) Good 
Monitor rating  
 
3 Green 4 Green 3 Green 
Clinical research 
activity 59 
 
2013/14 >490 patients 
>45 studies 
recruiting 
>875 
30 studies approx. 
recruiting 
>15000 (patients 
and volunteers) 
>300 studies 
recruiting 
2014/15 470 patients approx. 
>40 studies 
recruiting 
>850 
20 studies approx. 
recruiting 
>10,000 (patients 
and volunteers) 
>310 studies 
recruiting 
Information Governance 
Toolkit rating  
2014-1560 
 
80% / 42 out of 45 
satisfactory at level 2 
or above / Red 
94% / 44 out of 45 
satisfactory at level 
2 or above / Red 
75% / all satisfactory 
at level 2 / Green 
Information governance 
incidents 2014-15 
Not reported in 
QA1/14-15 
Two serious 
incidents at SIRI 
Level 2 – no 
regulatory action 
taken by ICO 
212 (all types – none 
at SIRI level 2 or 
above) – 66 
reported by staff 
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4.2.3 Intranets 
All of the Trusts had intranets. Two of the Trusts were engaged in implementing new intranets. In 
both, the process was perceived by participants to be lacking in transparency and contested 
between departments. The content of T3’s was managed by the communications department, with 
back-end support from the IT department. However, the Trust’s knowledge manager was reported 
to be leading on implementing a new intranet using Hadron 8020, based on Microsoft SharePoint 
2010.61 (The Hadron intranet implementation is discussed also in Section 6.2, particularly in relation 
to e-learning.) The Trust was already using SharePoint 2007 for its existing intranet. The strategic 
aim was to move to distributed authorship and management of intranet content, although there 
were perceived uncertainties as to how this should work in practice and what content was 
appropriate to be included:  
“When we get the new SharePoint the execs. are very keen, or the exec. lead is very keen 
that actually we all own it, it is not just owned by Comms., who will dictate where everything 
goes and what you can and can’t do … whether that will happen I don’t know, but she is very 
keen that -- at the moment, you know, they are deciding what we can all put there, and -- 
but actually they don’t know, they don’t know what is appropriate and what is not.” (Medical 
education administrator, T3, 21)  
 
The existing intranet was accessible to mental health staff but not to staff working within community 
health services on the outsourced network.  
 
T1’s existing intranet was described by the librarian T1-01 as “not particularly good”. According to 
the senior governance and risk manager T1-12, it was managed by the Trust’s IT services, with the 
communications officer being responsible for management of much of the content. The clinical 
teacher T1-08 reported that, although the search tools within the intranet were reasonably good, it 
could be difficult to find particular documents on it. The researcher had been given access to it 
herself by the library staff for the purposes of researching possible participants, and found that 
much of the contact information for services was out of date. The library had been involved in 
authoring content for and usability testing of the Trust website, and was running training sessions on 
use of the existing system for newly recruited Spanish nurses. The new system, which used the same 
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 Hadron: https://www.cloud2.co.uk/solutions/hadron/.  
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content management system as the Trust website, was being implemented and managed by the IT 
department, with completion of the project expected by November 2015. T1-12 was keen on making 
the intranet as simple and straightforward as possible for clinicians to navigate: 
“… We are trying to streamline … getting all our policies and guidance and clinical pathways 
in one place, because at the moment, they are in different places on our … intranet.” 
“… It is IT understanding the language of clinicians and making it work …“ 
(Senior governance and risk manager, T1, 12) 
 
The library was anticipating having a de facto role in managing the content, although this was not 
mentioned specifically by T1-12: 
“They haven’t rolled it out across the Trust, and we’re currently trying to – to support the IT 
department when they do it, that we’ll actually help add content to it and manage it on 
behalf of the departments, and … I’ve done some work on metadata for leaflets before, as 
well. We’re not exactly embedded in the process, but we’re not off the radar, either …” 
(Librarian, T1, 1)  
 
Access to the existing T1 intranet required a login to the Trust network, and was hence not available 
to student nurses other than via a staff member’s login (T1-01). However, the AHP clinical lead T4-08 
reported that the intranet at T4 was available on the Trust library computers to students and visitors 
without any login being required. The pharmacist T4-04 described it as being “really good”. Available 
resources included the Trust library catalogue, which was not available via the web. The consultant 
surgeon T4-19 mentioned that they also included a comprehensive collection of resources for 
medical training. 
 
4.2.4 Business intelligence services 
The consultant surgeon T4-19 attached considerable importance, as an information source, to a 
central intelligence service integrating internal Trust clinical and corporate performance data. He 
found it of particular use in reviewing mortality and related clinical indicators. Nothing of this sort 
was mentioned by participants at T1. An FoI response from November 2014, however, indicated that 
the Trust used the QlikView business intelligence system.62 The medical education administrator T3-
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 http://www.qlik.com  
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19 reported that the implementation of a business intelligence infrastructure had been previously 
planned at T3, but was never fully implemented. 
 
4.2.5 MiDatabank 
A pharmacist at T3, T3-18, reported using MiDatabank heavily for drug information searches.63 
MiDatabank is a Windows application commonly used to record, manage, store and search 
enquiries. According to T3-18, it incorporated links to particular web search tools within it. He 
described it as a powerful tool on account of its cross-referencing capabilities. T3-18 was responsible 
for teaching other pharmacists how to record the results of queries.  
 
4.3 Education and training 
4.3.1 Education and training priorities  
General requirements for NHS staff training are discussed in 1.4.2. Specific issues relating to 
education and training are reported in Chapter 6. 
 
The senior nurse manager T1-07 emphasised the strategic importance of learning from adverse 
events as a priority for training activity within T1: 
“… One of our big challenges, we know, is that we need to work hard to encourage our staff 
to learn from … things that haven’t necessarily gone right here. So if something has gone 
wrong on one ward, how do we make sure that that same issue doesn’t happen again on the 
ward next door to it?” 
 
She mentioned also that it was difficult to get staff away from the ward to undertake training, 
leading to an emphasis on ward-based training. 
 
In T1, a critical report on the quality of care delivered to patients with dementia had led to the 
establishment of mandatory e-learning on dementia care for nurses. The report had found that staff 
felt that they did not have the appropriate training in understanding the needs of patients with 
dementia, and that senior staff were not always familiar with the most recent guidance on caring for 
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 http://www.midatabank.com/About/SummaryofMiDatabank.aspx 
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these patients. Some Trust initiatives to improve the quality of support provided to these patients 
were still at the planning stage or had started very recently. 
“… There is also as much pressure on other types of training so … and that tends to be, 
pushed through from clinical need, so dementia, so we know there is a huge increase in the 
numbers of patients with dementia, we know that we are getting -- 40% of our patients at 
any one time have probably got a form of dementia … that is a huge number, we have got to 
make sure that our staff understand how to care for patients with dementia, so there are e-
learning modules around for dementia …”  
(Senior nurse manager, T1, 7) 
 
No similarly-driven training initiatives were reported at the other Trusts. 
 
4.3.2 Academic and research links  
Pre- and post-registration training for health professionals was delivered by higher education 
institutions as contracted by Health Education England and co-ordinated locally via its 13 LETBs 
(Davies, 2013; Health Education England, 2015a). All pre-registration students were supernumerary. 
Placements within a Trust, of varying lengths, were co-ordinated by practice education facilitators in 
consultation with the relevant university. In order to provide students with the required access to 
Trust systems and to educational resources, such placements required to be supported by Trust IT 
and library services (cf. Sections 2.4.5, 5.2.1, 5.2.2.3, 5.6, 6.2). 
 
As reported by T1-08, a local university U2 had about 180 (T1-08) pre- and post-registration nursing 
and midwifery students at T1, where the main hospital site T1-LH was also a university site. One of 
the medical schools within the region, U3-Med, used T1-LH as one of its 18 associate teaching 
hospitals for undergraduate medical students’ clinical rotations. According to the librarian T1-01, 
another university, U4, had diagnostic radiography and dietetics students on placement within T1; a 
radiography clinical tutor was in post. Pharmacy students from another local university, U6, 
undertook placements at T1-LH, and a member of the university teaching staff from U6’s pharmacy 
department was partly based there. There were also considerable numbers of AHP students from a 
range of other universities. The AHP clinical lead T2-01 stated that the hope and expectation within 
T2 was that these students, once qualified, would consider applying for posts within the Trust, so 
placements were generally offered to students who lived locally. The number and length of AHP 
placements varied considerably by profession (T2-01). 
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U2 also had students from its mental health branch on placement within T3, and undergraduate 
medical students from U3-Med undertook their psychiatry rotations there. As reported by the 
clinical teacher T3-07, there were also small numbers of occupational therapy, physiotherapy, 
speech and language therapy and podiatry students on placement within T3. Unlike some other 
mental health Trusts, T3 had only a very few trainee clinical psychologists undertaking extended 
placements as part of professional doctorate programmes, and there were no Improving Access to 
Psychological Therapies (IAPT) trainee cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) practitioners based 
within it.  
 
T4 had total responsibility for U3-Med medical students during the clinical years of their training. It 
also provided placements for large numbers of students from the other local universities U3, U9, and 
U15 studying nursing, midwifery, physiotherapy, occupational therapy, dietetics, and biomedical 
science. According to the AHP clinical lead T4-08, physiotherapy placements lasted for five weeks. 
 
T4 was extensively involved in joint NHS and academic research structures. T2 was a member of the 
local Academic Health Science Network, and listed as such on its website (NHS England, s.d.) AR3/14-
15 mentioned partnership working with an Academic Health Science Network, although it was not 
listed as a member on the website of the local one. T1 did not appear to be involved in any research 
partnerships of this nature. 
 
4.4 Trust IT services 
4.4.1 Strategic and operational priorities 
The T4 informatics strategy was focused heavily on the replacement of “legacy” patient 
administration and other clinical systems, and on implementing an e-prescribing solution. The long-
term aim was to develop and implement an EPR system that provided a single “clinical view” of the 
patient, bringing together information from multiple systems. The Trust had previously been 
committed to implementation of the Lorenzo suite of clinical and administrative systems as part of 
the National Programme for IT in the NHS (NPfIT), but the vendor had conspicuously failed to 
deliver, and T4 had left NPfIT shortly before the programme was dismantled nationally as a whole. 
Other priorities for T4 informatics were integration of systems following the incorporation in 2012 of 
a neighbouring acute hospital and its community services into the Trust, and further development of 
an already highly successful business intelligence service (cf. Section 4.2.3 above). According to the 
strategy document, an EPR in one division of the Trust was due to be piloted from April 2014. T3 and 
T4 did not have any plans to integrate access to point of care information resources within the EPR 
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workspace. T1-01 was hoping to integrate evidence summaries, however, within T1’s  proposed EPR 
system. 
 
According to the IT manager T1-11, the (hugely detailed) T1 strategy had been developed in 
consultation with an external contractor, which had carried out a series of interviews with staff at 
various levels. T1-11 himself had provided technical input, but not been involved in developing the 
document. It also was strongly focused on implementing a full EPR system across the Trust as 
required by the local CCGs, which, according to T1-07, the Trust did not have at present. However, 
its haematology and medical imaging systems were fully electronic, e-prescribing had been partly 
implemented, an electronic handover system was in use within emergency care, and an EPR system 
had been implemented within one specialist service. A self-rating of T1’s informatics services using 
the Informatics Capability Maturity Model (ICMM) (Health and Social Care Information Centre, s.d.) 
and National Infrastructure Maturity Model (NIMM) 64 65 was referred to in its 2012 IT strategy; this 
had rated the Trust at Level  2 or Level  3 on all of its indicators for ICMM, and Level  3 for NIMM, 
with the intention of progressing to Level  4. The full results of these assessments were not publicly 
available. No mention was made of ICMM or NIMM in either of the other Trusts’ IT strategies.  
Following a successful trial, T4 had been an early adopter of an electronic recording and alerting 
system for clinical observations (AR4/14-15). The mental health service of T3 already had an 
established EPR system, one commonly used within mental health and community services, 
designated here as C1. Its community services used a well-established primary care system, 
designated here as C2, managed by the outsourced IT services provider S3. T3 and T4 had both 
successfully bid to the Nursing Technology Fund (NTF) (1.4.3) for mobile technology-based systems 
to support community-based staff at the point of care. T1 had not bid in the first round of the NTF, 
but T1-07 reported that it planned to bid in the second round for mobile devices with which to 
record clinical observations, which could then be uploaded to the EPR system. When the results 
were announced, however, T1 was not listed among the successful bidders. 
 
The IT manager T3-06 cited the senior management team meetings of the Trust’s locality services, to 
which he was regularly invited, and the meetings of the user groups for key applications such as C1 
and C2, as the main conduits of input into the Trust’s IT strategy. Otherwise, he said he was made 
                                                          
 
64
 ICMM: http://content.digital.nhs.uk/article/4931/Informatics-Capability-Maturity-Model-ICMM  
65
 NIMM: https://digital.nhs.uk/NHS-infrastructure-maturity-model  
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aware of other issues via the IT helpdesk. T3-06 had plans to replace the outsourced T3-WPH 
network with an in-house solution, which he believed would yield improved performance at lower 
cost. 
 
The need to upgrade PCs from Windows XP before the end date for extended support in April 2015 
presented an operational priority for all the Trusts. Microsoft support for Windows XP had ceased in 
April 2014; however, an additional support package, including security updates, for Windows XP had 
been purchased for the entire UK public sector for a further year (Gibbs, 2014). 
 
At T1, 50% of the PCs were still running Windows XP (T1-11). The IT managers at T3 and T4 both 
reported that they were migrating to Windows 7 at a rate of about 80 machines per week, aiming to 
have completed the process before the end date for extended support in April 2015.  
According to an email from the library manager T2-04, T2 was still using Windows XP, but a 
modernisation programme was planned involving upgrading all PCs from Windows XP to Windows 7. 
At T3, a programme of upgrading users’ PCs had been undertaken, but a degree of rationalisation, to 
one user per device, would have been required to achieve this target (T3-06). Large numbers of the 
PCs at T4 were due for replacement, and T4-20 was not sure whether the funding for this was going 
to come from any source other than from departmental budgets; cf. the discussion of IT hardware 
procurement in Section 5.2. No plans for the migration to Windows 7 had been publicised (T4-09, 
T4-10). The lack of funding for migration from Windows XP presented the possibility that the project 
could not be completed on time for the scheduled end of UK public sector support in April 2015, 
thereby presenting a serious potential security risk (Worth & Neal, 2015).  
 
The T1 IT manager (T1-11) reported that about 80% of the Trust’s computers (n=1800) were running 
Office 2010, with the remainder running Office 2003, for which support was also due to cease in 
April 2015. All of T2 was mostly using Office 2007, but some staff had Office 2010 (T2-04). The older 
versions of Microsoft Office in use at T1 and T2 were reported by several participants as causing 
format incompatibility problems.  
 
At T2 the planned modernisation programme was to include updating to Office 2010 (T2-04). T1-08 
expressed the view that many of the problems that she and her colleagues had encountered while 
hot desking within the Trust were related to file format incompatibility issues. 
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A mixture of different versions of Microsoft Office was also reported to be in use at T4, but the 
participant who mentioned this (T4-04) said that she was not aware of any problems of this nature. 
 
Other areas of background information relating to the Trusts’ IT services are discussed elsewhere 
within the results chapters. Local procurement of hardware and software is covered briefly in 
Section 6.2, and in more detail in Section 7.2.2. User support is discussed in Section 7.2.3.   
 
4.4.2 Outsourcing 
Outsourcing arrangements for IT security, which at the time were relatively common within NHS IT 
services (Sophos, 2016b), were highly relevant to accountability for and local control over the 
provision of IT services, bearing on the findings of Chapter 5 and Chapter 8 in particular. However, 
T1, T3 mental health services and T4 did not outsource any of their IT services; all were managed in-
house. The IT service for the community health services division of T3, however (referred to 
hereafter as T3-WPH) was still outsourced to an external commissioning support unit (CSU), referred 
to as S3. This arrangement was a “leftover” from T3-WPH’s previous location within a primary care 
Trust (see Section 1.4.1, above). IT services at the Trust (T2), which employed the allied health 
professionals in T1, were wholly outsourced to the same provider. S3 also provided the IT service for 
the local authority social services departments operating within the Trust area.  
 
4.4.3 Internet connectivity and wireless networks  
T1 and T3 used the standard shared N3 connection to the Internet via the N3 Internet gateway 
(British Telecommunications, 2012). T4, however, as was typical of teaching hospitals, connected to 
the Internet via a network link to its main partner university, U3, and the Joint Academic Network, 
JANET, providing a higher bandwidth connection. High bandwidth traffic (e.g. YouTube) and 
inappropriate traffic was restricted. Wireless networks were provided in all three Trusts. Those in T1 
and T3 were reported to be of varying quality according to location. In addition to the main Trust 
network, T1 had a postgraduate centre network, to which undergraduate medical students 
connected when using their iPads. In T4, medical students connected to an eduroam network 
provided through the use of a direct connection between the Trust and U3 (Teague, 2014). T4 had 
also implemented a Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) network specifically set up for staff to connect to 
using their own mobile devices (T4-20). This provided facilities to access personal information 
management, but not “line of business”, applications. At the time the study was being conducted, 
this was in process of being implemented across all Trust premises. Neither of the other Trusts had 
any current plans for BYOD implementation, although T1-11 stated that BYOD was being “looked at” 
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within the current financial year. He did not anticipate a large uptake, however, on account of the 
requirement to implement a MDM system on personal devices. An expensive retro-fit of eduroam 
Wi-Fi had been required following the redevelopment (see Sections 4.4.1, 6.5); according to T4-20, it 
was not available fully across the site. U3-Med implemented a MDM system on student iPads, 
enabling them to be remotely wiped if lost. According to T4-20, T4 did not implement a full MDM 
system on personal devices connecting to the BYOD network, but required that users set up a PIN 
code protection and remote wiping facility. 
 
4.4.4 Secure web gateways 
General features of secure web gateways (SWGs), a type of web proxy, are discussed in Section 
2.7.3.4.1 of the literature review. The SWGs used at the three Trusts all used a combination of 
blacklisting and real-time content classification using proprietary “engines”. 
 
The IT manager, P2, referred to his Trust’s use of a particular SWG, designated hereafter as SWG3, 
for which several case studies of NHS implementations were available on its website. One of these 
referred to the need for clinicians to access information which might be inappropriate for other 
users, and to significant problems, both for the IT department and for clinicians, caused by the over-
blocking of legitimate health websites by the predecessor SWG. The vendor’s product manager, 
SWG3-01, with whom the researcher conducted a telephone interview, stated his opinion that over-
blocking was a huge problem for the NHS, whereas, by contrast, in the primary and secondary 
education context, under-blocking of inappropriate material was the main concern. SWG4’s website 
also included case studies of NHS implementations. By contrast, no references to over-blocking were 
made in any of the documentation for SWG1 and SWG4, the focus of which seemed to be solely on 
preventing inappropriate web use. SWG3-01 made the observation also that not everything that is 
illegal or potentially illegal (Section 2.7.3.1 above) can or should be blocked; compare the discussion 
of the role of AUPs in Section 2.7.2). P2 was not aware of any instances of blocking of legitimate 
websites within his Trust. 
 
The device implemented at T1 was one rated as a market leader by several different technology 
research companies; it is referred to hereafter as SWG1. The vendor was based mainly in the 
southern United States. Anecdotal evidence and informal web searching indicated that the 
company’s web, email and data loss preventions solutions were in fairly widespread use within the 
NHS. It afforded the ability to set time quotas for usage of particular applications, which T1’s IT 
department implemented to limit the usage of social media websites, cloud storage and other online 
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applications within the Trust network; it also offered “granular” controls on social networking 
availability (see Section 9.2.1). According to T1-12, all members of staff had the same level of web 
access; no policies specific to particular staff groups had been set up. The quotas were flexible in 
that users had the ability to request more than their quota for particular business purposes, with 
their usage subsequently being audited. T1 had accepted the default categorisations of web content 
available within SWG1 (T1-12). The SWG1 website offered a facility for analysing security threats 
posed by particular URLs or IP addresses and reporting incorrectly categorised websites, although 
this was not readily accessible via the company home page; it is unlikely that end-users within the 
Trust would have accessed it. 
 
The T1 IT department did not appear to have publicised across the Trust this setting of time quotas 
for certain web applications. For the only participant who mentioned receiving a quota notification 
(the pharmacist T1-04), it had come as a total surprise:  
“I tried to … access YouTube and I got a message I never had before, that said I had a quota 
of 60 minutes. I don't know what that is over, and I could use 10 minutes for accessing this 
site or sites of this nature.” (Pharmacist, T1, 4). 
 
One cannot but conjecture as to what extent the setting of time quotas had been discussed and 
agreed within the relevant integrated governance committees. 
 
T3 used the same SWG as P2; it is referred to hereafter as SWG3. Its vendor had offices and a 
manufacturing presence both in the United States and in the United Kingdom, and was a leading 
player in the education market. SWG3, in a similar fashion to SWG1, afforded the ability to set time 
quotas on particular websites and read-only controls on social networking applications, although 
these facilities were not reported as having been implemented at T3. It also offered the facility to set 
bandwidth limitations by policy, which was used within T3 to limit the speed of YouTube downloads 
(T3-06) (see above, Table 1.5.2). It offered comprehensive reporting facilities, with an extensive 
range of reporting templates available. The IT manager T3-06 mentioned an aspiration to set up 
different access levels for different categories of user according to job role, using another facility 
available with SWG3, but had not implemented such a policy. SWG3 also offered a facility for 
delegated temporary unblocking of blocked content to selected users and managers, although use of 
this was not mentioned at T3. 
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T4 used a British-manufactured SWG, referred to here as SWG4. In the IT’s department’s evaluation 
exercises it had narrowly beaten SWG3 as the preferred choice of SWG on account of its load-
balancing facilities, which at that time SWG3 had lacked (T4-20). T1 had formerly used SWG4; the IT 
manager T1-12 felt that SWG1 was “really good” compared to SWG4, which the Trust had used 
previously, and which, in his view, was “cheap and cheerful”.. SWG4 did not, according to the 
available documentation, provide fully granular controls of social media, although it did offer a 
“read-only” facility. (According to the release notes on the vendor’s website, fully granular social 
media controls were not implemented until October 2014, when a new version was issued.) It 
afforded the facility to set up multiple access policies customised to the needs of specific groups of 
staff, although the T4 IT department was not making use of this. Filtering sensitivity levels were 
apparently set within T4 for the numerous categories of proscribed content as recommended by the 
supplier. The health services case study provided by the company made no reference to possible 
over-blocking, nor to the nature of clinical information needs, and focused solely on enhancing 
productivity and security through the enforcement of acceptable use policies. An educational 
reviewer of SWG4 had commented on an online forum that it did not in his opinion provide enough 
of the detailed features felt to be required to keep students safe without affecting their ability to use 
the Internet as a resource for learning (2012). All three SWGs offered the facility to set up user 
profiles offering different levels of access for different staff groups. None of the IT departments, 
however, had implemented different levels of access across their Trust. 
 
4.5 Information governance 
This section provides background for the findings relating to information security and information 
governance reported in Chapter 8.  
 
4.5.1 Information governance structures 
Within T4, the information governance function was closely integrated with informatics.66 The role 
of Senior Information Risk Owner (SIRO) for the Trust lay with the executive director of finance. 
Primary responsibility for information governance lay with the associate director of informatics. An 
information governance group was in existence, the role of which was to monitor compliance and 
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progress against the information governance agenda and the Information Governance Toolkit (IGT) 
(Section 1.4.4). The head of information, information governance managers and representatives 
from major clinical divisions were represented on this group ex officio. (The records and governance 
manager T4-09 reported that, since coming into post, he and his colleague had striven to include the 
divisional representatives as a means of better embedding information governance across the Trust; 
the group had previously been very small and informatics-based.) Specialist staff from other 
departments, such as information technology, health records, data quality, clinical coding and risk 
management, were invited to attend meetings as required. The information governance managers 
also acted as the Freedom of Information leads for the Trust. The group reported to a patient 
records board, which in turn reported to an IM&T strategy board, which had direct input into the 
Trust board. It could also report directly to the SIRO and to the medical director, who was 
designated as Caldicott guardian. Recently a Head of Risk Governance and Control had been 
appointed, to whom the information governance managers had begun to report. However they 
themselves had no direct reporting links either to the Senior Information Risk Owner (SIRO) or to the 
Caldicott guardian, which they felt to be unsatisfactory (T4-09). 
 
T4-09 was aware from his conversations with colleagues in other local Trusts that the information 
governance function could sit in different places within the organisation: planning, finance, IT, 
governance, or other corporate areas. He felt that the close identification of information governance 
with informatics in T4 was fundamentally wrong: 
“We don’t think informatics is the right place for it. We think it is a corporate function that 
should fit more in the risk side. Because although a lot of it is informatics that tends to force 
the issue, the thinking it is just about informatics and information systems in IT and that was 
how it used to be here, which is very wrong, they forget everything else out in the divisions 
and departments.“ 
 
Related to his observations about its organisational position, T4-09 felt that information governance 
did not have the prominence within T4 that it warranted. He was particularly concerned not to be 
involved in the development of the Trust’s new EPR system: 
“I don’t think personally that IG has really had the prominence within this organisation; it has 
more been seen as an afterthought … rather than an enabler, something that underpins 
everything that should be going on across the organisation, not just in informatics.” 
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“I think generally it’s the understanding of involving IG in developing new systems and 
technologies. I think it’s never really been considered. We get more and more requests now, 
more and more people are coming to us, but they are looking to develop their own EPR in-
house here, we have not really had many instances of involvement with that to date. It is 
ongoing, being written, but when we keep mentioning it, and I have touched upon issues, but 
nobody has really sat down and said, ‘This is what we need to consider for an EPR’, it is 
almost like it will be an afterthought ((laughs)).” 
 
He had been successful, however, in getting information governance embedded in the management 
of some smaller projects: see Section 7.2.3.8, below. 
 
Within T3 the overall strategic plan, however, was one of integrated risk governance, following 
Department of Health guidance (Deighan & Bullivant, 2006). Here again the role of SIRO for the Trust 
lay with the executive director of finance, although it was possible for it to be held by other 
executive directors. The head of clinical governance acted also as the information governance lead. 
Much of the operational responsibility for information governance lay within the role of a single 
records and governance manager (T3-09), including compilation of IGT annual returns. According to 
her and the HR manager T3-03, this role could include, for instance, ensuring information 
governance compliance of proposed new software, data curation in joint working, and devising 
appropriate security questions to allow staff to identify themselves over the telephone to corporate 
services such as IT, payroll and HR. In connection with her IGT role, T3-09 had jointly rewritten the IT 
acceptable use policy (AU3) with the head of IT, replacing a previous one which was very out of date 
(T3-03). Responsibility for information governance was devolved to managers across the Trust with 
respect to their specific roles and functions, particularly for corporate services, e.g. to human 
resources managers for governance issues relating to smartcard management and access to staff 
records, with T3-09 acting in an advisory role. This structure meant in practice that she was often 
operating in isolation (T3-09).  
 
The main decision-making body for information governance within T3 was a records and clinical 
systems group, of which T3-09 and the IT manager T3-06 were members ex officio. (There had 
originally been a standalone information governance group, but it had merged with the health 
records group and the clinical systems group to form the current group (T3-06)). Standing agenda 
items at its bi-monthly meetings included the following: breaches of confidentiality, inappropriate 
access to electronic clinical systems, system security, subject access requests, and freedom of 
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information requests. Its remit included policy-related issues, such as external requests for access to 
the Trust network, and the approval of policies (T3-03). It did not routinely consider website blocking 
issues (T3-09). The records and clinical systems group reported to a patient safety and effectiveness 
committee, which in turn reported to a quality committee of the Trust board. The communications 
officer T3-12 reported that in this Trust the Head of IT role occupied by T3-06 was perceived as the 
provider of a service; T3 no longer had a “head of informatics” role as such.  
 
Information governance at T1 also sat within an integrated risk governance structure. Here a records 
and governance manager (T1-09) reported to a senior governance and risk manager (T1-12), whose 
role pulled together all aspects of risk management, including patient safety, manual handling, 
health and safety, fire safety, clinical governance, information governance, management of policies 
and procedures, clinical audit, and research and development. The post holder also managed the 
Trust risk register and board assurance framework, and acted as deputy Caldicott guardian. The role 
of Caldicott guardian was fulfilled by the medical director, who also held responsibility at board level 
for IT. As with T3, the information governance manager held responsibility for IGT annual returns 
and for compliance with information rights legislation. The information security role within 
integrated governance, giving responsibility for planning and supporting information security 
assurance, was assigned to the two most senior managers in IT. Information governance risk 
assessment was owned by the information governance committee and IT security policy by the IT 
security committee. The information governance committee, on which risk and governance 
managers from every clinical division of the Trust were represented (T1-12), was accountable to an 
operational integrated governance committee, which in turn was accountable to a strategic 
integrated governance committee, which then provided input to the board of directors. According to 
T1-11, the information governance committee was responsible for developing policies and 
periodically conducted surveys among Trust staff on the impact of information governance policies; 
however, the response rate was only about 1% (30 out of a possible 3000)(T1-09). Possible 
amendments to policies were discussed in information governance team meetings, which were held 
regularly (T1-11). 
 
4.5.2 Information governance working relationships 
T3-03 referred to good working relationships with the IT department, with no issues of concern. T3-
09 also referred, as an example of effective working relationships, to the consultative processes 
involved in some joint work between IT, information governance and HR on suitable security 
questions with which staff members could identify themselves to helpdesks. 
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T4-09 described working relationships with T4’s IT department as poor, despite their physical 
proximity within the same building. He gave three examples, one relating to the use of e-mail 
encryption software, where the IT department had purchased an email encryption solution which 
they had not publicised, for which information governance had eventually written the procedure, 
which had not been their responsibility. Another example also related to encryption software: 
“…The other day someone e-mailed us about wanting to send some notes electronically on a 
CD and how did they go about encrypting that. What did they need to do? And we just 
explained that national guidance was: it needed to be encrypted to a minimum of 256-bit, 
but in terms of a technical solution they had to speak to IT about what IT solution was 
available. The two-way process isn’t there. IT don’t tell us what is available, we passed them 
to them, but that would be it …” 
 
As his third example, T4-09 cited the fact that the IT department did not inform him of their staffing 
structure, which meant that he had no idea who held which responsibilities relating to information 
security. This made it very difficult to obtain information to provide evidence for IG T returns, for 
instance. 
 
T4-09 felt there were tensions generally between the information governance function and IT: 
“I think we are seen as the stumbling block in everything we do. We are there to help people, 
and IG should underpin everything, but we are just seen as a barrier. People think we are 
awkward, but we need to balance that. It needs to be lawful, it needs to be secure, we need 
to keep it confidential, we don’t want to stop people doing the jobs, but we need to visit all 
those things.” (Records and governance manager, T1, 9) 
 
He concurred with the researcher’s suggestion that communication from the IT department to end-
users was also poor. 
 
From the IT side in T4, however, relationships were viewed as working satisfactorily. The IT manager 
T4-20 reported that the only contact he had with information governance staff was if there had been 
a security breach, and an investigation by IT was needed: 
“No, only if there is a breach … they come to me and we do the investigation. We do the 
investigation technical side of things so as to pull out any data that is required by the 
governance team.”  
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He reported that this worked well: 
“There doesn’t seem to be any issues there. We have a couple of guys in the information 
governance team, we, quite often they ask us for … discovery searches on a particular user’s 
mailboxes for any reason if there has been a security breach ...”  
(IT manager, T4, 20) 
 
T1-12, a senior governance and risk manager, felt that T1’s structure basically worked well. It was 
useful, she felt, that both IT security and integrated governance reported to the same executive 
director. However, she felt that integrated governance and IT could work more closely together, 
particularly where policy development and updating (AU1) was concerned: 
“I am not sure we are always on the same page, if I am being truly honest … I think they see 
themselves very much as the technical guys sometimes … and you do the governing bits …”  
 
“I think it’s very … particularly when we are trying to get policies up-to-date, so policy 
updates … business continuity plans, disaster recovery plans, so we are very process driven, 
version control, timescales, you know… and also write it in a language we can understand.“ 
(Senior governance and risk manager, T1, 12) 
 
T1-11 provided an example of a project relating to ambulance Trust use of N3 on which IT had 
worked jointly with governance on setting up shared use. 
 
On the matter of policy development, T1-11 spoke as follows: 
“We tried to put it in one giant IT policy … there is always discussion with governance around 
what is in the IT policy. They would always like to tighten things down … there is issues 
around how can you send patient information off site, and historically… it has always been if 
it’s one person’s … data you can send that in an e-mail, any more than 10 it needs to get … 
encrypted and sent, and so there was all these … little, I wouldn’t say arguments but there 
was always …”  
 
He characterised his own general stance on information security as essentially a pragmatic one: 
“… my main … role is making sure that things keep on working here, systems work, and [the] 
network … works, people can come in, log on to the computer, and do their job, and that is … 
what my … role is in its basic terms. And the more tighter [sic] we have the security, the 
easier my job becomes, but it is not really very pragmatic to … think that everybody will have 
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the same desktop, everybody will have the same restricted access; no, you can’t … do that, 
and so, the approach that we … take is firm: … everyone will have AV, everybody will have 
updates pushed out to them, but if some people … require access to different things …, we 
will allow that as long as it is followed up by the correct documentation, so that we can 
approve that.”  
 
T1-11 and T1-09 both felt that relationships between information governance and IT, despite minor 
niggles involving communication, were positive:
 
“We work well with governance … we have got a good relationship with them … we have 
regular meetings with them to discuss these sorts of issues that we have.”  
(IT manager, T1, 11) 
 
“There is a good awareness here, and I run the information governance committee and IT sits 
on that.” (Records and governance manager, T1, 9) 
 
T1-11 also mentioned the drawing up of information sharing agreements with external suppliers as 
an area of joint working between IT and information governance. 
 
4.5.3 Sources of professional information and guidance  
When asked by the researcher about her main sources of professional information and guidance in 
making decisions about information security and information governance, T3-03 reported referring 
to cases in her own past experience, and to the regional network of information governance 
managers.  
 
P2, one of the pilot interviewees and an NHS IT manager, also spoke of the existence of local 
networks of information governance managers and their importance as a source of information and 
advice. In his experience they included people both from policy backgrounds and from technical 
information security backgrounds. The communications officer T3-03 mentioned the Trust solicitors 
and the national network of Caldicott guardians as possible additional sources of information and 
advice about information governance issues. The Health and Social Care Information Centre in her 
experience did not function as a useful resource: “None of my colleagues have ever been able to get 
an answer out of them for anything”. 
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On the information security side, T1-11 referred to information bulletins produced by CERT and by 
security specialist vendors. Other than that, he was dependent upon previous experience, 
knowledge of security incidents that had occurred in the past, and discussions with colleagues, also 
the security bulletins recommended by the Trust’s internal and external auditors. He was not aware 
of security material produced by the Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC). T4-20 
referred to bulletins from the HSCIC regarding security breaches, and HSCIC good practice guidance; 
otherwise he used Google to search for security information when required.  
 
4.5.4 Decision making, tasks and priorities 
On account of the different perspectives represented, it is interesting to compare the 
characterisation by information governance and IT staff of joint working with the views of T1-02, a 
human resources manager. T1-02 perceived the attitudes both of IT and information governance 
staff as very risk-averse (compare the comments of the senior nurse manager T1-07 and discussion 
of these in Section 9.2.3 below). In her view they preferred to block access to resources via technical 
means rather than to trust the staff to any degree, while monitoring and controlling the access to 
and use of them: 
“The emphasis is very much on, well, we just won’t give people access because then that 
completely minimises the - the risk there, and we just won’t worry about the other stuff 
because – actually, that’s not – you know – that’s too hard ((laughs)).”  
 
She said that in her experience, despite the existence on paper of swingeing penalties, people were 
not disciplined for breaches of policy such as sharing smartcards: 
“We’ve got it written into policies that … if you access - things that you shouldn’t be 
accessing, then … you’d be dismissed. I mean, I’ve written something myself about the use of 
smartcards around the implications of poor usage. There isn’t a huge amount of monitoring 
… on things like that, and … sitting within the HR Department, I’ve never come across 
anybody that’s been disciplined for leaving a smartcard in - in a machine, or … so all of that 
kind of – there’s talk, but – “ 
 
As well as noting a lack of emphasis on information management, T1-02 observed that the IT 
department felt under-resourced to manage anything other than clinical systems: 
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“… Their focus is very much on the implementation and maintenance of clinical systems … so 
once you step outside of that, they then, they don’t feel they’ve got the resources to do it, so 
there’s a gap. We aren’t putting enough resources into our own infrastructure outside of the 
… clinical departments, and IT don’t really think that they’re resourced to do it either…“ 
(Human resources manager, T1, 2) 
 
T1-09 felt that the information governance function was underdeveloped in T1 and across the NHS 
as a whole compared with other sectors; indeed she felt that there were no effective records 
management policies and practices in place within the Trust. In their roles she felt she and her 
assistant faced an uphill task in dealing with enquiries and attempting to ensure awareness of and 
compliance with information governance requirements: 
“IG is quite under-developed in the NHS in particular… really in terms of… profession it is not 
as embedded as other ones like … HR and finance, it should be up there and respected at that 
level.”  
“It is an upward struggle all the time to make sure that staff are, are complying with 
information governance … in that respect that is what I mean by it being a fairly new 
profession; it is not as well, I don’t know if respected is the right word, but it is not as well 
acknowledged, so we don’t have as much resources as other areas, so … that is our biggest 
challenge trying to…” (Records and governance manager, T1, 9) 
 
T1-12 wished to draw attention to the enabling role of information governance within the Trust, for 
instance in a recent successful implementation of electronic prescribing, and to counter negative 
perceptions of the governance role. T1-09 would have liked to be able to do more on the 
communication and education side to embed an information governance culture within T1: 
“I suppose that the communication and the educational side would be brilliant it we could 
expand that because that would start to change the culture a bit more rapidly, the more 
communication you get out there the better it is.” (Records and governance manager, T1, 9) 
 
By contrast, T3’s records and governance manager, T3-03, was positive about her Trust’s 
information governance performance and culture. She summarised general attitudes within T3 
towards staff information-seeking access to published information as follows: 
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“I think this Trust has had a fairly relaxed attitude towards it because our IG performance has 
been good, and maybe that’s the reason, I don’t know, … but I think there is this … 
assumption that staff will behave decently unless they prove us otherwise.”  
(Records and governance manager, T3, 3) 
 
In terms of the range of possible attitudes to end-users, this appears noteworthy as an indication of 
a relatively positive and trusting one. 
 
IT managers were asked about their perceived priorities in information security. For P1 and P2, 
securing patient data was the highest strategic priority:  
“… In order to access patient-level data … the highest security … processes, both 
technological and administrative, need to be in place … and I can’t stress that enough”  
(Retired director of IT, P1) 
“The main focus where information security is concerned is … related to patient-identifiable 
or person-identifiable data … “. (IT manager, P2) 
 
P2 identified cybersecurity as a priority: 
“There are other priorities, obviously … in terms of ensuring that we are protected against … 
computer virus attacks … and other information security breaches which could potentially 
cause disruption or data loss or … actually in some cases have a direct impact on the 
provision of services to patients – if … information systems aren’t available … because they 
have been affected by some kind of security breach … “. (IT manager, P2) 
 
For T1-11, the priorities in technical information security were operational and related to what he 
termed “basic housekeeping things”: keeping antivirus software signatures up to date, ensuring that 
Windows security updates were automatically rolled out to end-users’ PCs, reviewing and 
monitoring the logs generated by the intrusion prevention system, monitoring the emails relating to 
malware generated automatically by the antivirus system, setting up access rights correctly for 
vendor access to new systems in accordance with the N3 code of connection, implementing and 
monitoring data sharing agreements with other organisations, and ensuring that IT trainers carried 
out security training for end-users. 
 
T3-06 was less sanguine than his information governance colleague T3-03 about possible staff 
breaches of acceptable use policy. He was sure that some staff in the Trust were misusing IT 
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facilities. In order to monitor and report usage of Trust resources more closely, and to combat 
misuse more effectively, he would have liked to appoint an information security lead, rather than 
distribute information security functions between three or four different posts, as at present. He 
said that his staff budget, however, did not permit this. T3-06 stated that the most pressing practical 
security issue he faced was establishing the whereabouts of the desktop and laptop computers for 
which his department was responsible. The Trust lacked an RFID tracking system for computer 
equipment, and ownership of it was frequently contested with the clinical services. 
 
T3-06 felt that clinical services were sometimes reluctant to pay for upgrades and replacements 
when they were required:  
“… I have been trying for some time within this organisation to … effectively for the ICT 
department to deliver a desktop service, and we take responsibility for that desktop estate … 
and ensuring that it is fit for purpose, so we have nine-year-old machines connecting to the 
network, the services have the budget, they say that they don’t.”  (IT manager, T3, 6) 
 
This scenario invites comparison with T4-10’s and other accounts of “legacy” hardware and 
distributed procurement responsibilities in 7.2.2. It was evident in these situations that the 
importance of providing staff with sufficient PCs of adequate specification and performance was 
insufficiently recognised by budget holders, who viewed the equipment as “theirs” and possibly 
resented what they perceived as interference from the IT department. It leads to a wider question of 
overall ownership and governance of IT within the organisation; (cf. Andriole, 2015). 
 
T4-20 felt that his main priority in information security was just “to keep on top of everything”, 
which was difficult owing to lack of resources: 
“I think the difficulty is really keeping on top of every area that we have to cover such as e-
mail security. There are times when we need to spend a day on … say the [trade name] e-
mail filter, just to check and update and to keep on top of everything, but unfortunately due 
to resources we are unable to do that so and again there is, the same with the web filter to 
go through any suspect … sites that have been accessed, or for any reason there was a 
breach in security, with the user going to a site that they shouldn’t have been, then it is really 
having time to investigate further on those.”  (IT manager, T4, 20) 
 
T4-20 expressed the view that information security risk management in particular was an area that 
could be improved: 
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“Managing the risks is again -- we could manage the risks better, but a resource, resources 
are much more of a constraint really to do that. I would like to be able to manage risk a lot 
better than we currently do … it is staff resources. That is the main constraint.” 
 
This, he said, would involve him undertaking more monitoring of web traffic and investigating 
security risks and issues more thoroughly. The risks, he felt, were primarily of the introduction of 
malware on to the Trust network, which he felt presented an increased risk where staff members 
were accessing inappropriate sites: 
“… Because I am quite sure that staff … on this site do go to sites they shouldn’t be. It is not a 
case of really… because they are doing that it is creating more risk for us, because these sites 
potentially have malware attached to them and it is to be able to fully monitor the traffic that 
comes in and out of this Trust.“ (IT manager, T4, 20) 
 
In view of the findings of research investigating the relationship of web-borne malware infection 
rates to user behaviour (see literature review, Section 2.6), it is interesting here that T4-20 and T3-06 
both expressed the belief that staff members’ accessing of websites proscribed by their Trust’s  
AUPs, but not blocked by the SWG, was putting their Trusts significantly at risk of malware 
infections.  
 
T4-09 felt that senior management attitudes to information governance and security within T4 were 
generally lax, and that improvements would likely result only from a major data breach involving ICO 
sanctions: 
“The person who came here as the Trust Secretary, in another Trust where she had been she 
was the SIRO, they had three major breaches, in a short space of time got fined on the back 
of it, and that gave that organisation the kick they needed. But we say a lot here, that is the 
kick we need. It is not the right attitude, because we shouldn’t be in that position, but that is 
the only way you get these things across the bow of the people who need to know about 
them. If the Board aren’t interested they will soon look up from the parapet when they see a 
fine coming in at up to £100-200,000.” (Records and governance manager, T4, 9) 
 
His suggested that previous recent data breaches had had only a limited impact on Trust policy and 
practice. 
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In some of the interviews, participants in IT services and information governance offered comments 
on Schneier’s dictum, “Users are the weakest link” (Schneier, 2000). The responses varied widely in 
nature. The ease with which email could be sent to the wrong person by staff working under 
pressure was uppermost in T4-09’s mind: 
“I have sent stuff to the wrong person by e-mail; it is easily done, and when you are 
pressurised and trying to do everything it is very easy to just get one digit wrong in 
somebody’s e-mail, because we have so much technology as well to assist us in our lives -- 
that often causes the problems, though.” (Records and governance manager, T4, 9) 
 
The security risks presented by phishing emails were cited by T4-20 in his account of a recent 
incident in which a phishing message had evaded the spam filter, but had been detected and 
disinfected before it had caused any damage. T3-03 described to the researcher an incident where 
PII had been inadvertently sent to the wrong person, whose email address had auto-completed in 
her email client. Her response to this had been to conduct training on the use of email within the 
department concerned. 
 
P1, in the course of describing how he had dealt with incidents of Internet abuse at his former Trust, 
offered a striking statement: “People assume that abusing the Internet is an IT problem … it isn’t an 
IT problem, it’s a management problem”. Some of the participants in IT and information governance 
were asked for their comments on this. For T3-06, it indicated the manager’s discretion in managing 
abuse of the Internet: 
 
“I would agree with that … but obviously there is an element of, there is always that caveat 
within that policy, it is at manager's discretion as well.” (IT manager, T3, 6) 
 
T1-02 was led to contrast the view expressed in the comment with how she perceived the approach 
within T1, particularly in relation to social media: 
“Here we have an IT …-led - approach to computer misuse, so things are very tightly 
controlled, often blocked, and – … that’s the approach that this Trust takes, which in terms of 
… cultural progress down those sorts of, like – … thinking about social media and the uses of 
social media, … it’s really restrictive.” (Human resources manager, T1, 2) 
 
Social media issues are discussed in detail in Section 9.2 below.  
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4.5.5 Internal and external assessments  
None of the Trusts had had action taken against them within the last two years by the Information 
Commissioner’s Office (ICO) in respect of breaches of the Data Protection Act, though T4-09 
reported that a number of recent data breaches were under investigation.  
 
The ICO was reported by T1-09 to have recently conducted an audit of information governance at 
T1. Areas for improvement identified were secure storage and transport of patient records, the 
currency of the information asset register, and clarity of risk ratings. It was also observed that the 
information governance structures of the Trust were “quite complex” and that the SIRO did not sit 
on some relevant committees, thereby hindering a clear oversight of key issues. T1’s IGT assessment 
report overall score for 2015 was 80%, but with a “red” rating, only 42 out of 45 requirements being 
rated at level 2 or above, the same as the previous year (T1QA/14-15). Information governance 
incidents reported by participants related to patient notes left in a supermarket (T1-01, T1-02; 
according to T1-09 they were handover notes) and a breach of confidentiality by a clinical staff 
member via Facebook, which had resulted in her dismissal (T1-01, T1-07, T1-02). A junior doctor 
then working at T1 was also reported to be under investigation for inadvertently uploading patient-
identifiable information to an open access website in the course of his previous work at another 
Trust (T1-06). According to T1-09, the handover notes incident had not had a major impact on 
information governance policy: her predecessor had reviewed and tightened up procedures relating 
to handover sheets, and publicised them heavily. The policy response to the Facebook breach of 
confidentiality is discussed in Section 9.2.1.  
 
Information governance arrangements in T3, in particular its IGT submission, had recently been 
audited by an internal audit agency (S15) and received a “significant assurance” rating; relatively few 
areas of improvement had been identified. Its IGT report score overall in 2014-15 was 94%. 
According to T3-03, reportable information governance incidents included the inadvertent sending 
of 61 unanonymised staff records to a local authority recipient in a spreadsheet, and the accidental 
sending of a staff record via email to a member of the public with the same name as a Trust staff 
member (the email system had stored the former’s address) (T3-03). These incidents were described 
in detail in AR3/14-15; both had been rated at SIRI Level 2, but in consequence of the Trust’s prompt 
response, no regulatory action had been taken against it by the ICO. An incident had also occurred 
with the physical health services extranet whereby a web editor had uploaded in error a document 
containing patient contact information to the public-facing element of the extranet that should have 
been uploaded to the internal-facing one (T3-06). A penetration test of the T3 network had been 
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conducted at the end of 2012, with another planned for the end of the financial year 2014-15. The IT 
manager T3-06 reported that in 2012 the Trust Wi-Fi had been given “a clean bill of health”. 
 
The IGT report score overall for T4 in 2014-15 was 75%; all indicators were at level 2, which had 
achieved the rating of “green” (satisfactory) from the grading scheme. The only external audit of 
information governance arrangements appeared to have been one relating to a national clinical 
database which the Trust had formerly hosted. A number of information governance incidents were 
stated by T4-09 as being currently under investigation, including some which had needed to be 
reported to the ICO; details were not disclosed. Information governance incidents were reported in 
detail within the annual report for 2014-15: one table indicated that a total of 207 information 
governance incidents had occurred during the year, all at SIRI Level  1 or below (see Section 1.4.4, 
which appears inconsistent with what T4-09 had reported). Elsewhere in the report it was stated 
that 66 information governance incidents had been reported by staff, as compared with 49 the 
previous year. Internal audits undertaken during the year had given information governance a 
“limited assurance” rating in April 2014, but a “significant assurance” rating at a follow-up review in  
September 2014. The information governance managers in T4 were perceived by clinical staff (e.g. 
T4-08) as being very helpful and knowledgeable in dealing with information sharing and FoI queries.  
 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter has presented basic information about the Trusts, background information relating to 
national and local policy drivers and to organisational performance, and contextual findings relating 
to the main topical themes under which results are presented in the chapters that follow. A 
substantial section on information governance and security was included, covering structures, 
working relationships, sources of professional information and guidance, decision making, and 
external assessments. This relates more directly to the research areas of interest of this thesis; 
information governance and security are discussed also in Chapter 8. A thematic map (4.1) illustrates 
the contents of the chapter. Chapters 5 to 9 go on to present the main findings of the research; 
Chapter 5, which follows, presents the findings relating to barriers to information seeking, use and 
sharing. 
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Chapter 5. Findings: barriers to information seeking 
and use 
 
5.1 Introduction  
As previously stated (Section 3.10), the findings overall are presented in a series of chapters (5-9) 
covering the main themes which were identified in the course of data analysis, as follows: 
information access and barriers (5), professional education (6), organisational dynamics and 
professional norms (7); information governance and security (8) and communications policy (9). A 
final results chapter (10) presents a tabulated synopsis of key findings, and relates the findings for 
each Trust to background material and performance data in order to present a holistic view. An 
overview thematic map is given below (Figure 5.1). 
 
The present chapter discusses barriers to information seeking, use and sharing which relate mainly 
to aspects of IT infrastructure. These are represented in Figure 5.2 below. It should be noted that 
much of what follows has relevance also for e-learning (discussed in Chapter 6). Issues specific to e-
learning are discussed separately in Section 6.4. IT problems are described as reported by end-users.  
 
While it is understood that end-users’ reports of IT problems are likely to involve confusions or 
misunderstandings, or lack of knowledge, the reports are important in what they indicate about 
roles and relationships between stakeholders, and prioritisation of issues, as well as about the state 
of IT provision and use within the NHS. 
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Figure 5.1 Overview thematic map 
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5.2 Trust IT infrastructures and their management 
Within Trust networks, negative effects upon access to published information were experienced in 
respect of: 
 Network access, availability and performance (5.2.2) 
 “Legacy” software etc. (“legacy” hardware is discussed in 7.2.2) 
 System policies and permissions (e.g. inability to download updates to browser plugins, or 
files of a particular type) 
 Insufficient numbers of PCs in clinical areas 
 
Figure 5.2 Barriers to information seeking and use 
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Negative effects upon storing and sharing information were experienced in respect of: 
 The requirement to use encrypted portable media and devices 
(e.g. laptop and tablet computers, mobile phones, USB memory sticks)(5.2.1) 
 Lack of access to approved cloud storage, internal file storage or external institutional file 
storage 
 Issues with webmail 
 Issues with email attachments 
 Spam filter and data loss prevention system false positives 
Blocking of websites, being related specifically to information governance and security, is discussed 
in Chapter 8. 
 
5.2.1 The requirement to use encrypted portable media and devices  
The requirements of national NHS policy regarding the encryption of portable media and devices 
were described in Section 1.4.4. However, it is apparent from the study findings reported below that 
there were wide variations between Trusts in how, and how effectively, the requirements were 
being implemented. 
 
A confusing situation was encountered at T4 regarding encrypted USB memory sticks. The Trust’s 
code of practice for the use of IT (AU4Sec) stated clearly that “Trust approved USB pens can be 
obtained through the Informatics Service Desk”, and that “Sensitive data must not be stored on any 
removable media unless the device meets the Trust’s encryption standards”. T4-20 informed the 
researcher that, “We use; we deploy IronKeys … and encrypted USB devices”. An e-learning 
specialist (T4-22), however, stated that encrypted USB memory sticks were no longer being issued 
by the IT department. He had apparently attempted to order one via the helpdesk, and was told 
they did not have any in stock and probably were not going to order any more. He was not aware of 
any facility for encrypting existing memory sticks. On account of the large file sizes of some of the 
content he was using (video clips, etc.) he had begun using his own portable hard drive to transfer 
files, the use of which was not blocked on Trust PCs. 
 
Difficulties in obtaining Trust-approved USB memory sticks could act as a barrier to saving, storing 
and using information retrieved online, and also present a security risk. Staff at T1 and some staff at 
T4 reported restrictions on access to, or bureaucratic hurdles to obtaining, encrypted USB memory 
sticks. The IronKey devices used at T4 had apparently cost about £80 each, which could have been 
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prohibitively expensive for some services (T4-09). Encrypted memory sticks were not available to 
students on placement in T1, creating problems for them working on case presentations at home 
(T1-04). In T3, difficulties in obtaining USB memory sticks were not reported; they appeared to be 
readily available to staff who needed them. However their use away from NHS sites for non-core 
purposes (e.g. research or study) required specific permission from the information governance 
manager (T3-03). In T1, permission was required from the IT department or from information 
governance for any use of encrypted removable media away from Trust sites. 
 
The requirement to use encrypted USB memory sticks commonly caused inconvenience to visiting 
presenters on NHS sites, who were obliged either to use their own laptop for the presentation or to 
email it in advance (P1). The encrypted USB sticks themselves were perceived to have inherent 
limitations, mainly relating to slow loading of content, causing problems when giving presentations 
at events (T3-21). T3-21 complained that hers could not be used on her Macintosh at home. T4-10 
felt that the use of USB memory sticks for transferring information was old-fashioned in an era of 
mobile devices and widespread use of cloud storage:  
“… I just think, ’Oh wow, in this day and age, I am still carrying sticks around!’ which actually 
goes back, doesn’t it, to your point about a tablet? If I am going to work at [H15-WH] I 
essentially have to take a stick of stuff to that … we are still there, we are still at that point.” 
(AHP clinical lead, T4, 10) 
 
A specific learning and simulation issue involving USB memory sticks is reported in Section 8.6. 
 
5.2.2 Network access, availability and performance 
5.2.2.1 Authentication and access management 
Anecdotal evidence suggested that policies controlling the availability of network logins, including 
generic logins, could present barriers to accessing and using published information. This could 
particularly affect library services, restricting the services they were able to offer to NHS staff from 
other organisations under reciprocal access agreements. The issue of network access is discussed in 
more detail in Section 6.2 below. 
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5.2.2.2 Remote access 
All the Trusts in the study provided remote access to their systems using Microsoft Virtualization 
Desktop Interface (VDI)67 or Virtual Private Networks (VPN) via authentication tokens, although in 
practice within T1 the facility was reported to be generally available only to “consultants and people 
like that” (T1-01). It was readily available in T3; several participants referred to using it. Remote 
access was not mentioned by participants in T4, although its availability was confirmed by reference 
to the relevant policy document. In T1, problems with it affecting user profiles were reported. It was 
unclear from T1-08’s comments whether this was an issue that had been reported to or was being 
addressed by the IT department. Problems of this type were not reported in the other Trusts. 
 
5.2.2.3 Access to systems across organisational network boundaries 
A number of general problems accessing systems across organisational boundaries were reported. 
T2 staff working on T1 sites reported problems accessing some T2 systems from within the T1 
network, particularly the NLMS for e-learning (T2-01, T2-02).  
 
In T3, where the community health part of the Trust (T3-WPH) was on an outsourced network, 
problems were reported of inability to access the Trust intranet. Also, in addition, T3 e-mail 
addresses in Microsoft Outlook did not auto-complete on PCs linked to the outsourced network, 
slowing the process of inserting addresses. A community nurse educator at T3 (T3-20) indicated that 
access to T3’s systems from local authority premises or GP surgeries, where many of the staff were 
situated, often presented a problem, since it could depend entirely on the relevant organisation’s 
information security policies, over which the Trust had no control. 
 
The radiographer T4-12 reported an inability to access U9’s databases or Blackboard (VLE) site from 
within the Trust network. The situation she described appears to reflect failures of communication 
and project planning, notably between the Trust and university IT departments, regarding provision 
of access to the university resources from within T4’s network. Enabling students on placement to 
have access to their university databases and Blackboard might have required merely some simple  
 
                                                          
 
67
 Virtualization Desktop Infrastructure: http://www.microsoft.com/en-gb/windows/enterprise/products-and-
technologies/virtualization/operating-system/default.aspx. (VDI hosts the desktop environment in a virtual 
machine (VM) that runs on a centralized or remote server (“What desktop virtualization really means,” s.d.), 
(“What is desktop virtualization?,” s.d.) 
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changes to firewall settings; cf. the arrangements for e-journal access at T4 described in Section 5.2 
below. It would have been interesting to find out more about this pilot project. 
 
5.2.3 “Legacy” software 
“Legacy” software, in particular older versions of Microsoft Office and the Internet Explorer browser, 
and the now-obsolete Windows XP operating system, was still widely in use within all of the Trusts. 
An account was given in Section 4.4.1 above of their respective plans and processes for upgrading. 
 
Users were also likely to have encountered a variety of problems with displaying web-based content 
owing to lack of browser support for front-end web technologies such as Cascading Style Sheets 
(CSS), HTML 5, and JavaScript (“Can I use... support tables for HTML5, CSS3, etc.,” s.d.; McCarthy, 
2013). In T2, the standard browser was due to be updated from IE6 to IE7, and the library computers 
had been upgraded to IE8; however, Google Chrome was not standard on library staff computers, 
leading to “a problem with functionality with some databases” (T2-04). The NLMS content required 
pop-ups to be enabled. Some web applications required particular versions of Java to be installed on 
the user’s PC (T1-10). Lack of the appropriate browser add-ons, notably Adobe Flash and Adobe 
Shockwave, could also present problems. A particular issue relating to browsers and library services 
is discussed in Appendix J, and a support issue with Java versions on users’ PCs and e-learning is 
reported in Section 6.2.  
 
All these problems, in particular the continuing use of older browsers and Java versions, would have 
presented some level of security risk (cf. Sections 2.6, 8.4), as well as hindering access to and use of 
published online information in varying degrees.  It should be noted that legacy systems for software 
used in different departments within hospitals and the NHS had long presented a major problem 
also for sharing patient data across departments, e.g., radiology systems, pathology, etc. (P. A. Bath, 
personal communication, 2016). 
 
5.2.4 System policies and permissions 
Issue 5.2.3 above is generally often linked with that of system permissions or system privileges, in 
particular those required to download files of certain types, including software updates, or to enable 
security permissions relating to browsers or browser add-ons, e.g. enabling pop-ups or JavaScript. 
(Software downloads were specifically prohibited within the Trust’s AUPs.) T1-08 spoke of inability 
to enable cookies when required, inability to download ActiveX controls, lack of required Adobe 
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software configurations or versions, and incompatibility of applications with Windows XP as 
hindrances to accessing e-resources. 
 
 T4-22 spoke of a system locking policy on Trust laptops that interfered with presentations, and 
presented a particular hindrance for external presenters: 
“In effect they have had these carte blanche rules that say, for instance … any computer that 
we have in the Trust, has to lock itself out if you don’t use it, it locks itself out after … 10 
minutes …  
 
He felt that staff in the IT department were being inflexible in their response, insisting that laptops 
be networked when this was not really necessary: 
“ … What happens when we have external people coming in to present? Because, quite 
clearly, as soon as we are going to leave the room it is going to lock itself out, so the only 
thing we can then do is to give them our password, so that is instantly against everything so 
… ” (E-learning specialist, T4, 22) 
 
The work of this specialist in promoting and sharing current work in e-learning development was 
thereby being adversely affected. 
 
5.2.5 Availability of PCs in clinical areas 
It was mentioned also by T1-03 that nurses on the wards were unlikely to be able to access the 
Internet owing to a shortage of computers. The shortage of PCs on the wards at T1 and their 
constantly being in use for clinical systems updating was referred to also by T1-07; it underlay the 
decision to purchase tablets for e-learning (Section 6.6). Shortages of PCs in T4 were referred to also, 
by the AHP clinical leads T4-08 and T4-10. 
 
A cluster of frustrating issues were reported relating to information storage and sharing and the use 
of email to transfer information resources. These are discussed in Sections 5.2.6 and 5.2.7 below. 
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5.2.6 Access to approved storage 
Board members at T1 had available to them a cloud storage solution called Content Locker 
(AirWatch)68 which had been implemented as part of the Trust’s mobile device management (MDM) 
solution. This was intended for board members and divisional general managers to use with their 
iPads (T1-11). BoardPad, a secure collaboration and document management solution, provided a 
similar function for senior managers in T4 (T4-20)69. These applications were not available to other 
staff. A “quota” was applied by the T1 secure web gateway to the use of personal cloud storage 
applications such as Dropbox, OneDrive etc., i.e. the use of them was “rationed”, even for work 
purposes (T1-11). Some staff, e.g. T1-04, had found them to be blocked entirely. Staff at T4 were 
able to use Google Drive for file storage and sharing, although T4-20 stated that he would have 
preferred to block it on security grounds. To do so, however, would apparently have been difficult 
for technical reasons. Access to Dropbox, however, was blocked (T4-04). T1-01 reported that junior 
doctors and others had difficulty accessing their personal Trust network drives from home or from a 
university network; the facility to use virtual private network (VPN)-based remote access via a secure 
token tended to be limited to consultants. Generally staff were unable to access their Trust network 
drive from within the university network and vice versa. Since access to Dropbox and other web-
based cloud storage and sharing applications had been blocked, staff generally resorted to email as a 
means to share information with colleagues or to transfer content between Trust and external 
filespaces (e.g. T4-22). T4-04, a pharmacist, reported that the inability to use Dropbox presented a 
significant hindrance to sharing information with colleagues outside the Trust. T4-03, a 
communications officer, raised the matter of possible data protection issues with popular cloud 
storage applications, i.e. that the data centres might not be situated within the European Economic 
Area, and hence that use of them to store personal information could breach the eighth principle of 
the Data Protection Act. The discussion of the risks of shadow IT in Section 2.8.3 may be recalled. 
 
5.2.7 Email  
5.2.7.1 Webmail 
As we have seen (1.4.3), the Trusts in the study (other than T2) used domain-based email rather 
than NHSmail. Anecdotal evidence suggested that it was common for junior doctors within some 
Trusts to use services such as Doctors.net.uk rather than Trust email addresses or NHSmail. Access 
                                                          
 
68
 Content Locker: http://www.air-watch.com/solutions/mobile-content-management/  
69
 BoardPad: http://www.boardpad.com/ 
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to webmail applications was allowed within T4; The IT manager T4-20 said that he would have 
preferred to block it on security grounds, but to have done so “would [have] cause[d] a riot”; it 
“would have caused the users too much pain”. According to T4-03, Hotmail had been blocked at one 
point, but doctors had complained about it en masse, so the decision to block it had been rescinded 
almost immediately. Remote access to Trust email via Microsoft Outlook Web App was available to 
all staff. T4-08 reported that, at one stage, it had not been possible to download and read 
attachments in Hotmail messages. In T1, remote access to Trust email via Microsoft Outlook Web 
App was available to all staff via a login on the Trust intranet (T1-03, communications officer). T1 
also allowed webmail (T1-09). T2 blocked access to all webmail applications (T2-03, T2-04). T3 
allowed the use of webmail applications, but not for Trust business; they were only to be used with a 
line manager’s permission. It was stipulated in AU1 that attachments to webmail emails must not be 
opened, on account of the possibility of their containing malware. AU1 also required the exclusive 
use of Trust email for Trust business. 
 
5.2.7.2 Email attachments 
In view of the high level of use of email for transferring files (see above, Section 5.2.6), limits on 
email attachment size presented problems for some users. All the Trusts in the study ran their own 
Microsoft Exchange mail servers, with limited use being made of NHSmail. T1’s size limitation for 
email attachments was stated by the IT manager T1-11 to be 22 MB. This high limit was apparently 
intended to allow for the large size of tender documents sent out by the supplies department and of 
reports considered by board members. T4-19, a consultant surgeon, reported occasions when emails 
with attachments to his work email from his home email had been blocked; he did not know why 
this had happened, but the matter had been resolved via a call to the IT helpdesk. The pharmacist 
T4-04 reported experiencing difficulty sending presentations from her Trust email to her home one, 
even splitting them across several messages. She was unsure what the attachment size limit was 
within T4. The same issue was also reported by T4-22, an e-learning specialist, whose work involved 
transfer of large video files. He said that he thought the attachment size limit was 10 MB. A related 
problem was the inability to create or send compressed files in the .zip format; these were blocked 
by the Trust email filter as a potential security risk. (Email attachments of this type were widely 
recognised as a method of spreading malware: Great White North Technologies (s.d); WinZip (s.d.)). 
He had resorted to using his own portable hard drive to transfer files between networks; he was able 
to do so on account of the non-blocking of USB ports within the Trust (see below, Section 8.5). 
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5.2.7.3 Spam filter and data loss prevention false positives 
The clinical tutor T1-06 reported a problem relating to attachments in email circulars received from 
Public Health England (PHE). The attachments were encrypted, with a password sent separately, and 
the Trust spam filter had blocked the email providing the password. PHE, when it was initially 
established, had not been “recognised” as legitimate by the Trust spam filter, unlike its predecessor 
body, the Health Protection Authority. T1-12, a senior risk and governance manager, also reported 
occasions when legitimate incoming email had been blocked as spam. 
 
Several participants (e.g. T1-07) reported occasions when they had been unable to send out emails. 
According to T1-11, T1 had implemented a data loss prevention application called Proofpoint.70 T4 
had also implemented a DLP solution, but used it for monitoring the possible sending of patient-
identifiable data, not for blocking (T4-20). 
 
In describing these issues, and also their inability to access information resources, participants 
tended to refer to “the firewall”; they did not distinguish between possible different security 
applications. They also tended to attribute their experiences of false positives to the robustness and 
strength of the application concerned, or failed to distinguish the attributes of sensitivity and 
specificity (see Section 2.7.3.4.1 above, and Appendix L): 
“I am told our firewall security is that military spec that some stuff can’t penetrate through, 
we have problems with people … trying to send us stuff sometimes because of our level of 
security.” (Senior governance and risk manager, T1, 12) 
“We can’t always access some of the university databases from here because of the 
firewall…I understand why the NHS protects its firewall because you do get a load of rubbish 
through etc., and we have got a lot of patient sensitive information ... but that … has been a 
problem.” (Radiographer, T4, 12)  
 
The senior nurse manager T1-07 spoke also of difficulty sending information caused by “the 
firewall”. It would have been interesting to explore in more detail how IT staff represented security 
applications (SWG, DLP, spam filter, IDS, firewall etc.) in discussions and in Trust documents, and 
also non-technical participants’ constructions of cybersecurity measures at their respective Trusts. 
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These would be expected to reflect the content of their previous discussions with IT staff members, 
as well as contemporary media coverage and their independent reading. 
 
5.3 Published information resources 
Most clinicians reported making use of e-resources made available by Trust libraries and accessed 
via an OpenAthens login. Participants tended to equate “using the library” with “visiting the library” 
(e.g. T4-04) and did not always appear to realise that access to the full text e-journals they habitually 
accessed and used was administered by their Trust library (e.g. T4-19). T1-04 reported only two 
occasions when she had been in contact with the library, both related to a need to obtain a book 
which was available only in hard copy. The AHP clinical lead T2-02 spoke of using an online current 
awareness and full-text e-journal service from the British Dietetic Association which obviated any 
need to use the Trust library’s services. The radiographer T4-12 mentioned a comprehensive 
collection of e-journals and other material available to members of the Society of Radiographers. 
The physiotherapist T2-03 stated that access for physiotherapists to electronic content was poor, 
affecting his ability to answer clinical questions in a timely fashion, that neither Trust library service 
(i.e. T1’s or T2’s) could provide the full text online of many physiotherapy and rehabilitation journals, 
and that access via document supply was not really adequate. There were apparently two 
physiotherapy research facilitators with a link to U6 who were sometimes able to obtain articles for 
other staff. This participant, however, did not appear to be aware of the walk-in access to some of 
U2’s journals available within T1’s library on the university computers. 
 
T1-08 reported that the NHS Evidence search interface for bibliographic databases, Healthcare 
Databases Advanced Search (HDAS) was very prone to crashing, resulting in wasted time. The overall 
problems with the functionality of HDAS (described in Section 1.4.5 above) were acknowledged by 
NICE-01, a senior manager at NICE, as raising major questions about strategic responsibility within 
the NHS for the overall quality of IT infrastructure provision within Trusts, which was perceived to be 
a major contributory factor: 
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“… I am the person that gets shouted at when these things don’t go right, so I would come 
back into my organisation and say, ‘This is ridiculous, you know; we need to do something 
about this.’ Eventually … we did start to test and we did go out to NHS libraries and look at 
HDAS on the system, and we could see the difference, then we started to realise actually this 
performance difference, is massive … so … that was initial -- so you are talking three years 
ago that … I recognised that, but I think it had been recognised obviously long before that, 
but it was something that I was quite passionate about -- was trying to address, because we 
needed …” (Senior manager, NICE) 
 
NICE-01 stated that she had wished to pursue the matter at policy level, but owing to her 
uncertainty regarding lines of responsibility for IT infrastructure, had felt unable to do so. 
 
T4-04 reported making considerable use of Google in her research for teaching sessions: 
“See, I am a bit of a Google fiend, I have to be honest, which is quite unusual for pharmacists 
because usually we are very -- as a profession we are quite scornful of people who Google … I 
am perhaps a bit maverick in that I do love a bit of Google -- (Pharmacist, T4, 4) 
 
All the library managers in the study other than T2-04 reported that they or their staff had access to 
the appropriate browsers to manage the link resolver and OpenAthens (see Appendix K). T3-06 
could not recall seeing the letter sent from NICE, however. The standard browser within T3 was IE8; 
the upgrade to IE8 had apparently taken place across the Trust just as the new OpenAthens interface 
was implemented, hence the library service avoided major problems at the time of the transition. 
The Chrome browser was available as an alternative browser within T3 should one be required (T3-
01). In T1 the standard browser was Internet Explorer 7 (IE7), but the library staff had been given 
access to Google Chrome (T1-01). Browser availability was not mentioned by librarian participants at 
T4; however the researcher was informed that, while IE7 was standard within the Trust, Chrome and 
Mozilla Firefox were available as alternative browsers for people whose work required them (T4-04). 
 
Librarian participants (T4-06, T4-07, T3-01 and E10) reported a number of ongoing problems in 
accessing e-resources that were affecting all the libraries, NHS or otherwise, using the OpenAthens 
system. These included problems with a major general medical journal published by Pub6. When 
attempting to log in to the content of two major scientific and medical (STM) publishers, Pub2 and 
Pub3, at article level via OpenAthens, readers were being taken back to the publisher’s home page, 
and needed to use their browser search history to locate the correct page again. In attempting to 
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access content at article level of another publisher, Pub1, either OpenAthens authentication was 
failing or users were being taken to the home page rather than to the correct article page, as with 
Pub2 and Pub3; Pub1 was not believed to have implemented OpenAthens. Several infrastructure 
changes had occurred at once for library services, namely implementation of a new link resolver and 
of OpenAthens, making it difficult to identify where problems were occurring; publishers which had 
implemented OpenAthens had experienced teething problems, and confusion was reported to have 
persisted for about 18 months overall (T4-06). 
 
T4 library conducted monthly IP checks for its e-resources (T4-06, T4-07). T4-07 was not able to use 
the DNS ping function to check availability (ping was presumably blocked by T4’s firewall), but noted 
any changes to IP addresses and passed them to a named person within the IT department who was 
responsible for managing the Trust firewall, for him to make the necessary changes to settings. This 
was normally done very quickly, sometimes within the hour. She reported that IP address problems 
mainly affected Pub1, occurring as often as weekly. 
 
T1-04 drew the researcher’s attention to a significant problem at T1 with access to an essential 
reference guide for prescribers and dispensers, the British National Formulary, generally known as 
the BNF.71 It was available in print, online, as an e-book, and as a mobile app. The BNF was updated 
monthly online via NICE Evidence Services, and via the NICE BNF mobile app. The print edition was 
updated every six months. However, NICE purchased hard copies and distributed them to Trusts only 
once a year (T1-04, T3-18). The shortage of PCs on the wards in T1 has already been noted (5.2.5), 
and departmental policy precluded the use of mobile devices within clinical areas (see Section 7.6, 
below): 
“… Most of the wards have three terminals ... one of which is the ward clerk's domain and 
you are not allowed to touch that; you are fighting for them with doctors, and as an internal 
thing within pharmacy, we are not allowed to take smartphones on to the ward.” 
(Pharmacist, T1, 4) 
 
The result was a lack of access on the wards to the most current version of BNF, leading potentially 
to the use of out-of-date print editions; this could have led to problems during CQC inspections, and 
could potentially have resulted in patient safety incidents (cf. National Pharmacy Association, 2016). 
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According to T1-12, a senior risk and governance manager, efforts had been made at T1 to address 
the problem by making the BNF available via any Trust PC. She said that the possibility was also 
under consideration of providing tablet computers which had the BNF app installed on ward drug 
trolleys for quick reference by nurses. T1-08, however seemed to think that this or a similar proposal 
had been discounted on grounds of cost. T1-08 was clear that having the electronic version of the 
BNF available via Trust PCs was not sufficient for nurses preparing to administer drugs to patients: 
“… It is not accessible. When you are in the clinical room getting the drug ready, you would 
have to come out of there -- you would have to try and get on to a computer, you would have 
to then get on to the intranet, you would have to access that, and that, is too many steps for 
staff to consider … yes, the tablet was too costly and that was then … put aside.”  
(Clinical teacher, T1, 8) 
 
T3-18 reported that the electronic version of the BNF was available there on all Trust PCs via an icon 
on the desktop. However, he had also raised concerns with the Trust senior management about the 
lack of ready access to the BNF within T3. T3’s mobile devices policy also precluded the use of 
personal smartphones in clinical areas. (The BNF could not be accessed via the Trust’s BlackBerry 
devices.) T3-19, who was responsible for the professional development of school nurses and health 
visitors, reported that access to the BNF was a particular problem for community nurses undertaking 
domiciliary visits. 
 
While library services at all three Trusts were provided with adequate IT infrastructure to manage 
the provision of e-resources, the library staff at T4 mentioned a problem in managing the library 
pages on the Trust website, which they were supposed to be able to edit: 
“I think what happened was from my understanding … they had a content management 
system and they just migrated along the internal pages on to the external ones, but they don’t 
work the way they should do.” (Librarian, T4, 6) 
 
Clearly this presented a hindrance to the library’s promoting its resources and services effectively. It 
is possible that other Trust services with an external web presence were also affected. 
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5.4 E-learning 
Use of e-learning resources specifically for purposes of information seeking was not mentioned or 
discussed by participants. This at first sight is an odd finding, given the overall wide availability of e-
learning resources. It is possible that participants did not categorise them separately from others 
when considering their use of online information resources. 
 
5.5 Web 2.0 and social media  
It should be noted that the researcher found that the term “Web 2.0” was not readily understood. 
While she asked them about access to and use of particular applications which are frequently 
classified as “Web 2.0”, she accordingly used the term “social media” rather than “Web 2.0” in 
discussions with participants. 
 
In T3, a clinical tutor reported that he and his trainees were unable to download externally-produced 
podcasts, indeed to download anything other than PDF documents (T3-02). The medical education 
administrator T3-20, however, indicated that it was bandwidth problems that gave the appearance 
of podcasts being blocked; they were in fact just very slow to download. There had, however, been 
an instance where a podcast had definitely been blocked, and T3-02 had asked the IT department for 
it to be unblocked and been refused; he was unable to ascertain the precise reasons given for 
maintaining the block on this content, although his recollection was that an intellectual property 
issue was involved; if validly applied, this would in principle have provided a legitimate reason for 
blocking access. At both T1 and T3, plans were in hand to use internally-produced podcasts to 
disseminate information, making them downloadable from the planned new intranet sites (T3-20, 
T1-12). Downloading of externally-produced podcasts was not reported to be blocked within T4  
(T4-10). 
 
The library at T4 had developed social media platforms to support information seeking – a 
Pinterest72 site with infographics, and a library website/ current awareness portal using the 
WordPress blogging platform.73 Staff who were not approved to access social media from their  
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desktop PCs were able to access these sites via personal mobile devices using T4’s Bring Your Own 
Device (BYOD) network (T4-06). 
 
Other than the viewing of YouTube videos for educational purposes, very little use of social media 
and Web 2.0 resources or applications within workplaces was reported. According to T3-12, 
researchers within T3 frequently used Twitter to disseminate their research. An AHP clinical lead in 
T4, T4-10, reported that the only information-related use of Trust Twitter feeds there at present was 
to publicise research. T4-04 reported that professional online forums were often the preferred 
method of information sharing and professional networking for AHPs. However, T2-02 reported that 
those of her professional association were not accessible within T1, and in any case use of them 
would not be encouraged at work. 
 
In terms of different categories of Web 2.0 and social media applications and their availability status 
within each of the Trusts, the findings are set out in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 below. The categorisation 
employed of Web 2.0 and social media types is that of Kaplan and Haenlein (2010), which focuses on 
different types of information content; see above, Section 2.4.1. The findings are discussed further 
within Chapter 9. It should be noted that some types of Web 2.0 applications relevant to information 
behaviour, such as social bookmarking (tagging), folksonomies, recommender systems and RSS , 
were not mentioned specifically by participants. 
 
5.6 Mobile devices 
The libraries at T1 and T3 were actively involved in supporting the use of mobile devices for 
information seeking. A list of medical iPhone apps that had originally been produced by a library 
assistant based in the acute Trust H12 (locally to the main T3 site) was being maintained by the 
library staff at T1 (T1-01). They had changed the list to a spreadsheet format, and were now, since 
they lacked the requisite clinical expertise themselves to review apps, were focusing on including 
apps that were recommended by university departments or which had received good reviews in 
journals. They were looking for a national organisation to take over its management. T1-01 
mentioned that the Department of Health had recently indicated an intention to create a similar  
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resource for clinical apps. T3-19, who was unaware of this list before it was mentioned to her by the 
researcher, stated that she felt it would meet a significant need.74 
 
The library at T1 supported both iOS and Android devices (T1-01), there being considerable personal 
use of Android devices in the Trust. Library staff participated in an iPad online user support forum 
run by H3. There was a library iPad which had been procured via funding from T2. Library staff had 
been trained in its basic functions; it was also used by the outreach librarian to conduct training 
sessions, and for testing apps related to information products. T1-01 anticipated that Trust tablets 
procured for clinical use might also be used as e-readers.  
 
The library staff at T4 did not mention supporting mobile devices as such. The social media websites  
maintained by the library, which staff often accessed using mobile devices using the Trust BYOD 
network, were mentioned above (5.5). 
 
The IT manager P2 suggested to the researcher that use of personal mobile devices, in conjunction 
with wide availability of 4G and later-generation mobile networks, would in a few years’ time 
entirely resolve problems of access to information for NHS staff. The e-learning specialist T4-22, 
however, remarked that newer NHS buildings, on account of their energy-efficient manner of 
construction, often blocked access to mobile networks (Hamblen, 2008; Ofcom, 2014). Installation of 
signal-boosting devices would therefore be required in future in order for staff to be able to use 
their own devices.  
 
One participant in T3 (T3-19) stated that her team’s Trust-issued mobile phones were “archaic” and 
did not provide any web browsing facilities. T4-10 stated similarly that the mobile phone she was 
obliged to use was a “Nokia brick” with very limited functionality. This represents a degree of 
disempowerment in her work as a clinical manager through the failure to provide her staff with 
adequate technology to support their work; the discussion of factors relating to staff empowerment 
and engagement in 2.5.5.3 is thus relevant here. 
 
T1-08 had observed a group of her students (U2) using their mobile phones and tablets to find e-
resource to address a task she had given them, rather than (as she had expected) going to the 
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library, and finding information very quickly: “it was instant access to the information they needed”. 
Mostly, participants had not observed much use being made of mobile devices for information 
seeking. T4-08 stated that she had not observed colleagues or students using mobile devices to 
access educational or professional reference material, nor was she aware of any educational 
initiatives involving mobile devices. T3-19 reported that she did not use her own iPhone for work-
related information-seeking, preferring to use her desktop PC. She was aware of other staff 
downloading and using the BNF iPhone app. She also expressed her enthusiasm for health apps 
aimed at patients to provide them with necessary information to manage their conditions. T4-10 
reported that, despite shortages of PCs available to students on placement, she was not aware of 
any students using their own mobile devices to circumvent this. The clinical tutor T3-02 stated that 
he had observed colleagues in meetings using their own smartphones to look for information, but 
that it was more usual to use laptops, which could connect to the Trust Wi-Fi in most areas. The 
BlackBerry devices issued to staff by T3 were not suitable for accessing the Internet, owing to their 
slowness and small screen size. 
 
5.7 Summary 
In summary, this chapter discussed participants’ accounts of barriers to accessing information arising 
from problems with network access, availability and performance, “legacy” software (operating 
systems, browser and Java versions), system policies and permissions, and insufficient numbers of 
PCs in clinical areas. Students on placement, in particular, could be affected by policies relating to 
network and system access. Access to the BNF was affected particularly by a shortage of PCs in 
clinical areas, and the lack of an alternative means of access to the most current version. Participants 
also reported problems with particular national systems: in respect of access to e-learning, relating 
mainly to limitations in the functionality of the NLMS, and in respect of access to and use of 
published information, with the functionality of HDAS and OpenAthens, creating potentially serious 
barriers to effective literature searching and retrieval of full text. They reported experiencing 
problems with storing, using and sharing information which related to the implementation of 
requirements to use encrypted portable media, coupled with lack of access to appropriate 
alternatives in terms of network or cloud storage. They also cited a variety of email-related 
problems: with webmail, with email attachments, and with spam filter and DLP system false 
positives. 
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 T1 T3 T4 
Podcasts Trust was starting to 
use podcasting on 
intranet 
 
Sometimes unable to 
download from web / 
appear blocked owing to 
inadequate bandwidth – 
but podcast content 
planned for new Trust 
intranet (T3-21)  
Podcasts created by 
SLTs for ENT training  
(T4-10) 
Availability of 
externally-produced 
podcasts not known 
Podcasts produced 
internally for training 
purposes (T3-10) and used 
for PG medical education – 
but T3-02 mentioned an 
external one being 
blocked 
Participants unclear 
about availability of 
externally-produced 
podcasts – thought not 
to be blocked  
(T4-04) 
File storage and 
sharing 
applications 
Time quota set for use – 
‘personal storage’ 
Not mentioned Dropbox blocked  
 
Google Docs OK 
Web 
conferencing 
Skype prohibited and 
blocked as ‘peer to 
peer’ application 
Skype blocked 
 
WebEx, GoToWebinar 
used 
Able to access 
Elluminate 
(Blackboard) –  
used by U9 
Start pages / 
portals 
Not mentioned Not mentioned Accessible to users - LIS 
had several Weebly 
formerly blocked  
Table 5.1 Access to Web 2.0 applications 
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  T1 T3 T4 
Blogs / 
Microblogs 
Unable to access or create 
blogs – prevented library 
using for current awareness 
purposes or film club 
 
Time quota set for use of 
Twitter. Trust was starting to 
use for corporate 
communications but 
individual use not 
encouraged  
Restrictions not mentioned 
on general blogs 
 
Twitter, Facebook: users 
and would-be bloggers 
should seek advice from 
Communications before 
using professionally  
WordPress blogs formerly 
(maybe still) blocked  
 
 
Issuing of Twitter handles 
required permission from 
divisional director 
 
Twitter blocked by default 
Collaborative 
projects e.g. 
wikis 
Restrictions not mentioned Restrictions not mentioned Restrictions not mentioned 
Social 
networking 
services 
Facebook: time quota set for 
use 
 
Originally blocked entirely 
following breach of 
confidentiality by clinical staff 
member and misuse by 
nurses 
 
 
LinkedIn and other 
‘professional’ sites accessible 
Facebook blocked 
 
 
 
 
LinkedIn and other 
‘professional’ sites 
accessible 
Access to Facebook etc. 
blocked on PCs but not on 
users’ mobile devices – 
Trust has a BYOD network 
and policy.  
 
Some staff approved to use 
social media for work 
purposes.  
 
LinkedIn and other 
‘professional’ sites 
accessible 
Content 
communities 
Time quota set for use of 
SlideShare – ‘personal 
storage’ category 
Prezi formerly blocked as 
presenting possible 
confidentiality risks – now has 
time quota set 
Time quota set for use of 
YouTube  
SlideShare not mentioned  
Prezi - restrictions not 
mentioned – IT manager 
unsure of policy – 
Communications provides 
training on use of Prezi 
Specific permission 
required to access YouTube 
on main Trust network - NB 
bandwidth limitation 
statement in place – 10s 
pauses 
 
Trust had own YouTube 
channel; YouTube not 
available at some outlying 
sites 
Status of SlideShare unclear  
 
Prezi blocked 
 
 
YouTube reported as 
blocked (T4-04, T4-05) but 
this denied by IT manager – 
had formerly allowed access 
to content tagged as 
‘educational’ but now 
allowed all 
 
LIS has Pinterest site – 
infographics collection  
Table 5.2 Access to social media applications  
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Considerable variation was apparent across the three Trusts in respect of access to Web 2.0 and 
social media applications commonly considered important as resources for information seeking and 
sharing. The findings indicated that Web 2.0 applications other than Skype were accessible for the 
most part. However, certain types of social media content were effectively blocked in two out of the 
three Trusts: blogs and microblogs (T1, T4) and content communities (T3, T4). Trends in the 
gradually increasing use of podcasts, and in increasing acceptance of the educational value of 
YouTube, were observable. However, the restrictions on use of SlideShare and Prezi obviously 
created problems for sharing content, and are difficult to account for. Further aspects of some of 
these issues are discussed in subsequent chapters. 
 
Regarding mobile devices, the overall picture was thus one of use predominantly of personal, rather 
than Trust-issued, mobile devices, with varying levels both of usage and of support. Mobile devices 
were not being used for information purposes or for e-learning to any great extent. 
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Chapter 6. Findings: education and training 
arrangements 
6.1 Introduction 
Following on from the previous chapter on barriers to information seeking and use in generally, this 
chapter gives an account of barriers to information seeking and use which related specifically to 
formal and informal education and training activities undertaken by Trust staff and students on 
placement, in particular to e-learning, and to their effects. It is in fact largely concerned with issues 
relating to e-learning and to IT infrastructure, as set out in Figure 6.1. 
6.2 IT infrastructure 
As reported in Section 1.4.6, a considerable strategic and operational commitment had been made 
centrally and locally to e-learning within the NHS in England. However, adoption of e-learning by 
NHS organisations as a means to deliver education and training, and the widespread requirement 
that e-portfolios be used to record learning activities of whatever kind (T1-04) was perceived by 
clinical and training staff as tending to increase pressure on already-scarce IT facilities. Inability to 
access desktop computers on the wards was widely reported. A variety of other problems with 
computer hardware and networks, which impacted upon the effective delivery of e-learning, were 
mentioned by participants across all the Trusts. These included lack of webcams and hence inability 
to support teleconferencing (T1-04); near-obsolete PCs that had a hardware specification that was 
inadequate to run particular e-learning modules (T1-10); available screen resolutions too low to view 
the totality of content on screen (T4-22, T2-02); other issues with hardware or peripherals, such as 
lack of sound cards (T1-06), lack of speakers or headphones; other indeterminate problems with 
sound (T3-20); and lack of network bandwidth hindering or precluding the download of podcasts 
(T3-21) or the viewing of video clips (T3-19).  
Underlying the “ageing PCs” issue often appeared to be a decentralised approach to the 
procurement of PCs and peripherals, coupled with local funding pressures; this is discussed further 
in Section 7.2.2. (The issue, as well as the blocking of websites needed for clinical information 
seeking, was discussed in a Guardian newspaper article by May (2014), who observed that new 
clinical software was widely expected to run on ageing computer infrastructure that could not 
adequately support it.) It is pertinent that the T1 IT manager (T1-11) expressed the view that the 
Trust’s use of Microsoft’s Virtualization Desktop Infrastructure (VDI) (see Section 5.2.2.2 above) 
permitted older PCs to continue in use; the Trust no longer had an agreed life cycle for PCs. 
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According to a FoI request response, full implementation of VDI was not expected to be completed 
until November 2015. T1-11 did not appear to be aware of the problems experienced with 
inadequate hardware specification, as described by training staff. 
In T1, the training officer T1-10 reported that while it had been possible to access the NLMS system 
from home to undertake e-learning, completing a module did not always register on the system, 
thus effectively rendering the remote access facility useless. The same problem was reported also by 
T1-08 in relation to the mandatory learning for nurses. A problem with completed training 
registering on the NLMS was also reported at T3, requiring the system to be manually overridden. 
This suggests the possibility that the remote access functionality within the NLMS may have been 
inherently unstable. 
New doctors at T3 were required to undertake a web-based induction programme produced by the 
local deanery, but hosted externally by a private e-learning provider. During the previous year this 
had malfunctioned: either some content was not visible when it should have been, or completion of 
the module did not register (T3-21). It was anticipated that the programme would be abandoned 
following a merger with another deanery, and that just the Core Skills Framework would be used.  
 
In those Trusts which used the NLMS, new starters who were not yet registered as Trust staff on the 
Electronic Staff Record (ESR) could not access e-learning which could be required pre-induction. T1-
10 was hoping to arrange trial access to an e-learning portal as a possible alternative, and to obviate 
the non-registration problem described above with remote access. 
 
The “new starters” problem was addressed in T3 by providing a two-day face-to-face induction 
session conducted by subject matter experts. If a new member of staff missed this for whatever 
reason, it was difficult to arrange for them to repeat it or to undertake the equivalent e-learning. 
With Foundation doctors and GP trainees undertaking four-month rotations, this meant that their e-
learning could not be undertaken in a timely fashion, potentially affecting the quality of their work; 
by the time they had caught up with their e-learning requirements for their current rotation, they 
were often due to undertake their next one (T3-21).  
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Figure 6.1: Education and training arrangements 
T3-10 reported on a specific problem that had arisen two years previously with access to e-learning 
by community health staff on the outsourced S3 network. They had found that they were unable to 
run the statutory and mandatory training modules on the NLMS. Support calls had been logged with 
the S3 helpdesk but not acted upon. They were also finding that their learning activity was not being 
accurately recorded on the NLMS, and that in addition there were issues associated with the 
smartcards they were using to log on to the application. These persistent problems had led to a 
breakdown of trust with S3 and disengagement from e-learning on the part of these staff. The 
training department at T3 had then launched an investigation: a small working party consisting of a 
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representative from HR (on account of the smartcards issue), a training officer (T3-10 herself) and 
the senior analyst from the IT department (T3-17) visited each of the members of staff who had 
reported the problems. It was found that the main problem related to incorrect versions of Java on 
their PCs. Staff at S3 had apparently lacked understanding of their role as to the technical 
requirements of supporting e-learning, and were not acting on the calls they had received; they had 
instead disclaimed responsibility entirely, assuming that the issue lay with McKesson, the NLMS 
vendor.75 McKesson for its part had insisted on there being only two nominated contacts from each 
Trust, an arrangement which was deemed unsatisfactory by T3-17. The lack of response from S3 had 
led to issues “festering” (T3-10); staff in T3-WPH had not been reporting to the training department 
the problems they were experiencing. Another technical problem was that the online system 
checker provided by McKesson to check the specification of users’ PCs, including the Java version 
they were currently running, was not working correctly under Windows 7; in particular, it was not 
correctly detecting the Java installation. 76 T3-17 was subsequently able to liaise with S3 to ensure 
that the Java version on these PCs was updated. To avoid the need for individual ad hoc updates, T3-
17 was hoping to manage Java updates centrally on the main T3 network via Configuration Manager. 
According to the e-learning officer T3-05, any changes to system requirements would normally have 
been notified by McKesson to their contact in the Trust, who would then have passed the 
information on to the IT department for the changes to be rolled out remotely on Trust PCs. This at 
least was the process for the main network at T3. However T3-10 reported that sometimes this 
information was not sent in time by McKesson, and training and IT staff were alerted to the required 
changes only by users reporting the inability to run a particular e-learning module. In December 
2014 a new contract for the Electronic Staff Record and OLMS was awarded not to McKesson but to 
IBM, to take effect from November 2015 (Meek, 2015c).  
An issue relating specifically to e-learning development was reported by T4-22 at interview and in 
subsequent correspondence. Microsoft Windows operating systems (Windows XP, Windows 7, and 
Windows 8) were generally used within the NHS for PCs and laptops. NHS IT departments, therefore, 
did not support Apple Macintosh computers, which constituted a severe limitation for e-learning 
development, for which the Macintosh platform was widely used.  
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Specific issues encountered by T4-22 included the following: 
 
 Many e-learning developers were setting up Macintosh-based systems covertly, but then 
could not register equipment or update software  
 One manikin that T4-22’s own centre had used was solely Macintosh-compatible until 
recently 
 A considerable number of centres had invested in a specific software video performance 
analysis product that required an entire Macintosh system (multiple computers, servers, 
local area network (LAN) with Wi-Fi interconnection) 
 
More generally, T4-22 had encountered the following problems with supporting Mac OS or iOS-
based devices: 
 Difficulty in accessing sites such as iTunes and the App Store via NHS IT; access was required 
regularly for software upgrades 
 Inability to download and install programs or applications without extensive discussion or 
negotiations with IT 
 Difficulty in arranging access to systems for users external to the Trust 
 General lack of knowledge about or interest in Macintosh-based systems 
 
This lack of support for the Macintosh platform has evident implications for e-learning development 
in NHS contexts; it was likely to be acting as a severe constraint, resulting probably in a need for 
outsourcing arrangements and their attendant costs. 
 
Unusually, given the standard restrictions on end-users’ downloading and installing software 
themselves, T4-22 had been able to download and install Dropbox77 on to a laptop supplied to him 
by the IT department, on which he had found he had administrator rights. He was convinced that 
this was due to an oversight, but was not intending to advertise the fact!  
 
The issues discussed in 5.2.2 with regard to generic logins also bore upon professional education. 
Where students were unable to obtain appropriate logins to Trust systems during their placements, 
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their learning could be hindered. In T1, medical students on placement, who were issued by their 
university (U3) with iPads, connected not to the Trust network but to the postgraduate centre’s own 
Wi-Fi network (T1-01). Wi-Fi connectivity within the students’ residences was relatively poor, so 
many of them were coming into the library and using the computer suite there, which was otherwise 
little used (T1-06). According to T1-06, medical students’ use of network facilities from within the 
students’ residences for educational purposes had occasioned disputes with the IT department, 
which had claimed that they were downloading films. 
A confusing situation appeared to prevail regarding the availability of Trust network logins to nursing 
students at T1. AHP students were reported as being able to obtain logins to the Trust network on 
the same basis as AHP staff (T2-01). Integrated governance had previously stated that nursing 
students were “temporary” staff and should not be given logins. This policy had now been reviewed; 
it had been agreed that nursing students should, after all, be given logins, but this decision did not 
seem to have been implemented. 
T2-01 perceived the IT department’s concerns as relating to “security of information and what you 
can access”, rather than to training. Nursing staff were unwilling, in view of information governance 
prohibitions on sharing passwords, to share logins with students. In consequence, nursing students 
on placement in T1 were able to access the Trust intranet only within the library (where staff could 
log them on to the Trust network), not on the wards (T1-08).  
The IT manager (T1-11) for his part indicated that he was not aware of specific training requirements 
for these students, although he stated that “they ought to have training before they are given 
access.” In T4, generic logins could be issued by most of the wards, although the library service did 
not do this (T4-20). AHP students at T4 were able to use Trust PCs, but were driven to undertake 
much of their information seeking at home owing to the lack of available machines at work (T4-10). 
Students on placement within T4 were not able to log in to clinical systems; their tutors logged in for 
them to enable them to access specific content under supervision (T4-08). T4-08 spoke of the 
importance of students on placement at T4 having access to the EPR system once it had been 
implemented in order for them to learn to document care correctly. Medical students at T3 were 
reported to have read-only access to the Trust’s EPR system (T3-21). Rather than their connecting to 
the Trust network, T3-06 would have liked to be able to provide access for students and teachers to 
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the academic wireless network, eduroam, but at the time of the study it had only been deployed 
within large single-site teaching hospital Trusts.78  
On account of T3’s physical health services being outsourced and on a different network from the 
rest of the Trust, a portal had had to be set up enable staff within these services to access T3’s e-
learning (T3-09). However, T3 training staff were expecting e-learning to be available to staff much 
more readily than was then possible through the new Hadron intranet being implemented within 
the Trust (see Section 4.2.3). 
T1 was hoping to be able to find the funding to set up a virtual learning environment using 
SharePoint through which to access e-learning; this was to replace the NLMS, the search facilities of 
which were perceived as decidedly lacking (T1-05, T1-10). 
6.3 Published information resources 
As with the other Trust library services, T3-LIS provided individual information literacy support to 
staff for their studies, as reported by the non-clinical teacher T3-04. 
Within all three Trusts there were close links between education and training functions and library 
and information services. The library at T1 had been involved in supporting junior doctors’ e-learning 
for some time before it had been decided to introduce e-learning widely across the Trust. It had 
facilitated online examinations in orthopaedics via its university computer suite, made its NHS 
computer suite available for trainer-led e-learning sessions for groups of staff with information 
literacy difficulties, and provided access to an e-learning authoring software package for trainers to 
use in creating their own e-learning material. Formerly, members of library staff had themselves 
facilitated e-learning sessions, but they had not needed to do so recently; they preferred subject 
experts to facilitate (T1-01). The library’s computer facilities were also regularly used by medical 
students to access e-learning (T1-06). Library staff had a close working relationship with the 
postgraduate centre, with which it was co-located; each service was represented at the other’s 
business meetings, and the library worked with the centre manager to produce lists of e-learning 
resources pertaining to the topics of educational sessions held at the centre (T1-06). Similarly the 
library at T4 provided computer facilities for students when none was available within the clinical 
area, and assisted students with accessing e-resources, ran training sessions on literature searching, 
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and provided staff and students with one-to-one information literacy training and support, which 
staff undertaking post-registration courses at universities found particularly helpful (T4-08). 
T3-LIS appeared to work more closely with the Trust’s training department than was the case 
elsewhere. The library frequently shared a stall with training at internal events, jointly promoting 
education and learning opportunities (T3-07). Sometimes the library manager was able to give a 
brief presentation to remind staff of the role of the library in supporting not only professional 
learning within the context of formal study, but also patient care. Promotional material about T3-
LIS’s resources and facilities was available in the Trust’s computer centres.  
6.4 E-learning 
6.4.1 Drivers for the growth of e-learning 
Local drivers for the growth of e-learning were observable mostly in T1, as the Trust’s Learning and 
Development Department was about to roll out e-learning there. They included poor take-up of day 
release for training (T1), a need for more flexibility in the provision of training, coupled with the 
perceived poor quality of face-to-face training (T4), and lack of motivation on the part of staff to 
undertake training (T1) (T1-10; T4-01). As against this, T1-04 had felt that updating of mandatory and 
statutory e-learning in line with frequently-changing Trust policies was perceived as involving a 
heavy burden for the training department, and that this had led its introduction to be delayed. T1-10 
and T1-05 reported that time was indeed an issue, and moreover that the introduction of e-learning 
had required a re-negotiation of the subject matter experts’ role: 
“Initially when we first proposed this a few years ago … I think there was quite a lot of hostility 
from the subject matter experts, although … they are nearly all on board with it now, because 
they can see that actually it will release their time, whereas I think before it was perceived as 
taking [over their role], and that’s been a big step change.” (T1-10) 
6.4.2 Timeline and development of e-learning within each Trust 
In T3 and T4, the use of e-learning for the delivery of training was reported to be well-established, 
and was referred to within T3’s mandatory training policy. E-learning in T4 had started in 2009 (T4-
01). T3 was described as having a “really strong culture of e-learning” (T3-09). (Nationally, mental 
health Trusts had frequently been early adopters of e-learning; with their typically wide geographical 
spread and large numbers of sites, it offered obvious advantages.) E-learning was only just starting in 
T1, beginning with statutory and mandatory training (T1-10).  
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The issue was raised by participants of “bought-in” versus “home-made”. T3-07 had been involved in 
an e-learning authoring project, and felt as a result that producing e-learning within the Trust was 
too time-consuming; purchasing it externally was a better alternative. The e-learning team at T4 
reported that they did not have the capacity to work with clinicians to develop clinical e-learning 
packages. As a result, clinical e-learning in T4 was generally produced by external developers (e.g. 
T4-10, T4-05; cf. T4-22’s observations in 6.2 above about lack of technical support for e-learning 
development). 
All the Trusts employed an in-house developer using e-learning authoring software to produce 
customised e-learning content to meet some mandatory and statutory training requirements in 
consultation with subject matter experts. Many professional bodies had produced extensive e-
learning content available to their members; it was possible for Trusts to use this for mandatory 
clinical training. Other e-learning content was produced by universities (e.g. U3-Pharm for 
pharmacists). Otherwise, clinical e-learning could be commissioned from external providers for 
particular purposes (e.g. T4-05). 
The sharing of e-learning between NHS organisations was viewed as being very desirable in avoiding 
duplication of effort (T4-12). Some degree of customisation was thought to be required, however, 
for each Trust, to reflect particular localities and Trust policies. However, T4-08 also felt that Trusts 
needed to have e-learning branded as “theirs”: 
6.4.3 Scope and utilisation of e-learning  
E-learning was being used extensively within two of the Trusts in the study (T3 and T4) for clinical 
and non-clinical mandatory and statutory training, particularly at induction. T4-19 indeed 
complained of “e-learning overwhelm” for doctors. T1 was just about to roll out the use of e-learning 
for this purpose. E-learning was also used within all the Trusts to support other professional 
learning, although this varied in extent by profession. Nursing (T4-05, T3-07, T3-20), and pharmacy 
(T4-04) participants reported past or expected involvement as subject matter experts in the creation 
of e-learning packages. Blended learning was preferred in T4 for physiotherapy training, as providing 
better coverage of practical issues and the benefits of face-to-face discussion (T4-08), and was 
reported as being used successfully for radiography training (T4-12). Dieticians in T2 were making 
very little use of e-learning (T2-02). The Chartered Society of Physiotherapy had not produced any e-
learning, but had created an online portfolio for members to log their auditable professional 
development activities (T2-03).  
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6.4.4 Learning management systems  
T3 made use of the National Learning Management System (NLMS) which was part of the Electronic 
Staff Record (ESR) system.79 Mention has already been made of the T1 trial of a possible alternative 
hosting platform and LMS (6.2). For reasons likely to be related to the known usability problems of 
the NLMS interface (Clarke, 2006), a decision had been taken at T4 at the time e-learning was 
introduced there to implement a Moodle-based LMS instead. (Moodle is an extensively customisable 
open-source learning management system widely used across the world to support e-learning.) 80 
The training department retained the services of a Moodle developer and system administrator. This 
offered a significant advantage in managing induction training, in that it allowed e-learning modules 
required as part of induction to be undertaken by new starters, in particular junior doctors, before 
their official start date; in Trusts where the NLMS was used, a new starter could not have an 
account, because, on the ESR system, they still had “applicant” status until they officially began 
work. At T3, this meant that junior doctors’ induction training still needed to be delivered face-to-
face for two days rather than online (T3-21).  
6.4.5 Non-technical problems with e-learning 
E-learning “overwhelm” has already been mentioned (6.4.3), as has the difficulty of updating e-
learning in a timely fashion to reflect changes in Trust policies (6.4.1). Other organisational (as 
distinct from technical) problems with e-learning were reported by participants.  
T1-04 mentored students taking e-learning courses provided by three different universities, two of 
whom used the Blackboard LMS. One university gave her access to their Blackboard, but the other 
did not, meaning that she could not see what her students were supposed to be studying. 
T4-22 mentioned the poor computer literacy levels that he had repeatedly encountered within the 
NHS in the course of his career. He suggested that this, and associated negative attitudes and low 
expectations, were part of an overall picture, which affected e-learning, of under-resourcing and 
under-development of information technology infrastructure and service provision within the NHS 
relative to other sectors. This issue is discussed further in Section 11.3. 
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6.5 Web 2.0 and social media 
Use of Web 2.0 and social media applications and resources for education and training purposes was 
seldom discussed by any of the participants. The e-learning specialist T4-22 reported using Twitter as 
a main communication tool with other e-learning and simulation specialists. Educationalists were 
not aware of social media use by students for educational purposes, such as Facebook study groups. 
The only possible exception to this was the Facebook group referred to by the clinical teacher T1-08, 
who mentioned the use of one by a group of her students to disseminate information about changes 
to the teaching timetable. This was not, of course, something to which she as a lecturer had access, 
so she was not placed to comment on its content or about how the group was being used by the 
students concerned. Podcasts were available in principle to download at T3, but low bandwidth 
limited this in practice (T3-12). Use of podcasts for medical education, to be accessible via the new 
Trust intranet, was planned at T3 (T3-21). 
 
Mandatory and statutory e-learning provided by Trusts did not make any use of social media, or of 
Web 2.0 platforms such as wikis. Also, in addition, participants had not encountered them in any 
other e-learning contexts. The only exception was that of accessing and using YouTube videos (e.g. 
the clinical teacher T3-19). This participant encountered jerkiness and buffering delays in viewing 
YouTube, suggestive of insufficient bandwidth. The researcher discovered subsequently that, in 
some instances, this could actually have resulted from explicit network management policies: the 
Trust IT manager (T3-06) spoke of a bandwidth limitation statement in place on the main Trust 
network, which introduced ten-second pauses into the viewing of video clips. (It is possible, 
however, that T3-19 was referring in some instances to availability of YouTube on the outsourced 
network supported by S3.) T3-19 had also encountered problems obtaining permissions to access 
YouTube content when presenting at training sites, and felt frustrated and demeaned by the need to 
do so: 
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“Yes. If you are doing a presentation or something within … L&D you actually have to get 
special permissions to, say you wanted to use a … YouTube clip ... or whatever, and some of 
them are very good, or even something simple like NHS -- … like the other day I was doing 
something on immunisations and there is some quite good very simple little animated films … 
so it’s not easy; it is putting another barrier and a step that … increases your frustration really 
… So what sometimes you do is -- you do it at home, so you put presentations, you put the links 
on and then when you come into like the L&D department you get, you will be OK to … use that 
and then they have to do it, they have to ring up and get the access and whatever and you are 
allowed to, but again, let’s face it, we are professionals, you know, we are not going to be, you 
know, doing any illicit sort of, well …” (Clinical teacher, T3, 19) 
The library and the education department at T4 maintained Twitter feeds; however, some of the 
education department content consisted of re-tweets of material from other Trust services. T4-22 
reported using Twitter in addition to email as a primary means of communication with e-learning 
specialists within the region and with his wider professional network. 
Several indications were expressed of a need for advice and guidance on the professional use of 
social media. These all came from AHP clinical leads: T4-10’s suggestion of partnering with the Trust 
library regarding social media use; T2-02’s reporting that junior dietetics staff had expressed an 
interest in receiving training on professional use of social media; and T4-08’s uncertainty about how 
to use professional and personal Twitter accounts simultaneously.  
6.6 Mobile devices 
All Trusts in the study had U3-Med students on placement. U3-Med at the time was one of several 
medical schools in England where students were given iPads and expected to use them as fully as 
possible to support their clinical learning throughout their studies, requiring that Wi-Fi networks be 
available at the sites where they were based. The academic lead for e-learning at U3-Med (U3-Med-
1) had reported no particular technical problems with students’ network access on any teaching 
sites, including T1, where they connected to the postgraduate centre’s wireless network. The project 
manager had apparently worked closely with Trust IT managers to ensure that Wi-Fi was in place at 
the relevant hospital sites and was accessible to students. T1-01 and T1-06 were, however, aware of 
problems with Wi-Fi connectivity in the residences at T1-LH (see also T1-06’s comment on this, 
reported in Section 6.2). The eduroam installation at T4 was referred to above (Section 4.4.3). 
According to T4-11, Wi-Fi was only then in the process of being installed in the education centre; he 
258 
was unclear, however, which network this was, i.e., the main Trust Wi-Fi, the BYOD Wi-Fi or 
eduroam. 
To support mandatory and statutory e-learning in T1, the training department had successfully 
submitted a bid to a Local Education and Training Board (LETB) learning infrastructure fund, and had 
procured six “rugged” Android tablets. Once e-learning had properly started, these were planned to 
be taken on the wards to allow staff to access e-learning within clinical areas via the Trust Wi-Fi 
network. These were supplied by the company Motion81 and were designed to minimise infection 
control risks; they had a completely flat-topped surface that could be readily disinfected. The 
intention of staff in the department was to use them as part of a mobile classroom that could be 
conducted within a day room on a ward. T1’s content used Adobe Flash, hence could not be 
accessed via Apple devices (Bristol, 2013; Brusco, 2011; Shankland, 2010). In addition to these 
devices, T1-07 indicated that some educational use was expected in the future of tablets provided 
for purposes of clinical record keeping; the Trust had submitted a bid in the second round of the 
Nursing Technology Fund82 for tablets on which to record clinical observations. A similar bid had 
been submitted by T2, for the use of 7” rugged iPads (T2-01). 
In pre-registration nursing and midwifery education at T1, T1-08 reported that tablets were used by 
some the faculty members at U2 who were involved in supporting students working in private sector 
(i.e. non-NHS) academic placement areas, although none had yet been seen at T1-LH. In 
postgraduate medical education, T1-06 reported that many doctors were accessing learning 
resources via their own tablets. The difficulty they were having, she said, was not in getting access to 
e-resources as such, but in finding time to use them. The issue of insufficient time was raised also by 
T1-07 in respect of nurses. T1-04 reported that mobile devices were not routinely used in post-
registration pharmacy education, although one student had needed to participate in a 
videoconference while sitting in her car using her iPhone on account of the lack of suitable PC 
facilities, including lack of webcams, within the department. Webinars were apparently being more 
commonly used by their education provider U3-2, where the staff conducting them were aware of 
the problems that students were likely to encounter with NHS IT, and were accordingly scheduling 
them in the evenings for students to access from home.  
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T3-06 aspired to roll out eduroam (the national academic wireless network) across the Trust to 
support student placements of all kinds. However, he had found that no precedents existed for 
multi-site Trusts; existing NHS implementations of eduroam were on acute hospital sites.83 T3-05 
was aware of a project conducted by an e-learning specialist in another Trust (E15) to identify which 
tablets could be used to access content via the NLMS. Apparently in T3 very few staff had tablets; 
mostly they accessed e-learning via a Trust laptop or via a personal laptop using the trust virtual 
private network (VPN) connection and a remote access authentication token; such tokens were 
readily available to staff (T3-10, T3-06). 
T4-01 reported that staff were accessing Trust e-learning content via their personal Android devices. 
However, the resources were not accessible on iPads or iPhones on account of the Adobe Flash issue 
with Apple devices (mentioned above, this section). The training department was investigating the 
possibility of a move to using HTML5 in future as the platform for their own e-learning content to 
obviate this problem. Use of mobile devices seemed to be well-embedded in pharmacy teaching; T4-
04 taught medical students and other students who had their own mobile devices, using the 
NearPod 84 system to synchronise her own device with the students’ devices rather than presenting 
on a screen. Students were able to interact with the content, e.g. type things on screen and submit 
them to the lecturer. In the context of physiotherapy education, however, T4-08 was not aware of 
any educational use of mobile devices. 
Accessibility of e-learning content via mobile devices and platforms, including full learning 
management system functionality, had been identified as an essential system enhancement to the 
NLMS to be provided under the new ESR contract planned to take effect in November 2015 (NHS 
Electronic Staff Record Programme, 2014). 
 
6.7 Summary 
This chapter relates how e-learning was firmly established at T3 and T4, but only just starting at T1, 
affording the opportunity to investigate the early stages of implementation. T3 and T4 had adopted 
different approaches to circumventing the technical limitations of the then-current version of the 
National Learning Management System (NLMS). The account of technical problems with access to e-
learning within T3’s community health services illustrates the difficulties of supporting NHS e-
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learning within an outsourced environment. Across all three Trusts, e-learning software 
compatibility issues with “legacy” PC hardware presented problems, despite extensive virtualisation 
across network environments (cf. Section 6.2 above). Lack of support for the Macintosh platform, as 
well as lack of staff capacity within training departments, served to inhibit the in-house development 
of e-learning; much of the more specialist work was being outsourced, with evident cost 
implications. Little evidence emerged of specific organisational factors underlying these problems. 
Much e-learning content available to NHS staff, and all of the mandatory and statutory training 
material, was accessible via the National Learning Management System (NLMS) within each Trust, 
and was well supported. However, a number of issues were identified with the functionality of the 
NLMS, in particular the inability to provide access to it for new starters, thereby preventing e-
learning being delivered to them in a timely fashion, i.e. before starting in post. A slowly increasing 
trend towards usage of podcasting and YouTube videos for educational purposes was apparent, 
despite technical and policy barriers. Other e-learning material of potential professional relevance 
was little mentioned by interview participants. 
A steady growth in usage of mobile devices for educational purposes was apparent across all three 
Trusts, secondary in some instances to their use within clinical systems. In T1, tablet computers had 
been purchased specifically for e-learning purposes. However, lack of adequate Wi-Fi network 
coverage could present an obstacle to this. The general issue of Wi-Fi provision on NHS sites is 
discussed further in Sections 1.4.3 and 12.8. 
 
The following chapter (Chapter 7) goes on to look at issues for information access presented by 
organisational dynamics and aspects of professional culture.  
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Chapter 7. Findings: organisational dynamics and 
professional cultures 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Following on from Chapter 5, which focused on the specifics of barriers to information seeking and 
use in general, and Chapter 6, which focused on barriers to education and training,  this chapter 
focuses on national policy priorities and their implementation, and on regulatory concerns, as a 
means of identifying organisational dynamics within each individual Trust and the influences of 
professional cultures. References to some of these issues were made by participants, but were not 
described in detail. It also discusses the inter-relationships and mutual perceptions of the various 
services, including patterns of communication and collaborative working. In particular it highlights 
instances of apparent misinformation or misunderstanding, and long-standing unresolved issues. In 
addition it identifies staff attitudes, professional norms and wider cultural issues relating to the 
overall focus of the inquiry. It is concerned principally with IT infrastructure and how it managed, 
and with cultures, behaviours and attitudes relating to information technology use in general and to 
e-learning in particular. The content coverage is illustrated in Figure 7.1. 
  
7.2 IT infrastructure 
7.2.1 IT strategiesInterview participants within IT, library and information services and training and 
development were asked about inputs to information technology strategy within their respective 
Trusts. T1-01 informed the researcher that the Director of Nursing had successfully lobbied “at the 
last minute” for her to be represented on the intranet planning group; this was the only input of 
which she was aware. The IT manager at T3 received input into IT strategic planning via the locality 
management teams; he or a colleague would represent the IT department at their periodic 
meetings. For the Trust’s two clinical systems there were user groups which were a key channel of 
communication with the IT department. For training and development the IT trainer, who was based 
within the IT department, provided feedback on IT issues arising with training (T3-06), although 
there was no explicit training and development or library input into the IT agenda. T3-06 was not 
apparently aware that the training department employed an in-house e-learning developer. T3’s 
implementation of a new Hadron intranet has been discussed previously (4.3.2). According to T3-19, 
a “Dragon’s Den” process existed within T3 for vetting, approving and funding proposed e-resources 
projects relating to patient information. 
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At T4, Department Information Groups had been established for each of the major hospital sites and 
for community services. A business analyst from the IT department was attached to each of these 
groups. At the group meetings, the business analysts had an opportunity to meet clinicians and to 
discuss new projects, issues with existing projects, issues with existing clinical systems, etc. (T4-20). 
No mention was made, however, of library or education input. 
 
Figure 7.1 Organisational dynamics and professional cultures 
7.2.2 Procurement of hardware 
Participants in all three Trusts complained of the age of the computer hardware they were expected 
to use. T2-01, who was based on a T1 site, reported a recent conversation with a colleague as 
follows:  
“… We … have IT systems that we expect to last for … ever and a day, you know; I was talking 
yesterday and someone was saying, ‘Oh, all the computers that we have got are at least 10 
years old, you would think someone must be winding them up at the back nearly’”. (AHP 
clinical lead, T2, 1) 
 
A medical education administrator (T3-21) described the PCs in her department as “ancient”. In 
2013, the IT department at T3 had engaged a contractor to carry out an audit of PC specifications,  
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reporting back on which machines needed upgrading and which could not be upgraded and needed 
to be replaced (T3-10); what the upshot of this exercise had been, she was not sure.  
 
Within all three Trusts, there was no ring-fenced funding for procurement of IT hardware and 
peripherals; central funding for upgrading or replacing PCs was associated only with specific 
projects, such as migration from Windows XP (T4); otherwise, local budget holders were responsible 
for meeting these costs in line with IT service standards and recommendations (T1-11). At T1, T1-04 
reported difficulty in procuring and installing a new PC, particularly in relation to identifying funding. 
T4-10 reported a similar experience at T4, which had required her to continue using a “condemned” 
(i.e. officially obsolete) PC for some months. The IT manager in T3 reported that he could only 
recommend, not insist, that a service replaced an obsolete machine (T3-06). In T2, PC upgrades and 
replacements were provided by the outsourced provider S3 as part of their contract with the Trust, 
and were not controlled by the individual services: PCs were replaced when deemed irreparable or 
obsolete (T2-02). T4-10 reported an acute shortage of PCs in her department following a move; only 
two were available, whereas, in her opinion, five were needed, requiring her and her colleagues to 
share access to PCs and to hot-desk. The most recent CQC inspection at T4, published while the 
study was being written up, had identified a number of problems with the EPR and human resources 
systems and with patient records in some services.  
 
In these situations the importance of providing staff with sufficient PCs of adequate specification 
and performance appeared to be insufficiently recognised by budget holders among other service 
priorities. Elsewhere within therapy services, the situation appeared to be better: another AHP 
clinical lead had concurred with the researcher’s suggestion that desktop hardware was “reasonably 
current” (T4-08). A radiographer in T4 reported that, within her service, the business manager 
readily agreed to the upgrading or replacement of PCs when necessary, to support the requirements 
of the PACS and CRIS systems (Picture Archiving and Communications System; Computer Radiology 
Information System) which were central to its clinical work. 
 
7.2.3 Organisational interface with IT services 
7.2.3.1 Introduction 
It is intuitively evident that good IT support is required to facilitate online information seeking and 
use of all types. This section discusses how IT services related to and were perceived by end-users 
and to other departments within their respective Trusts. The focus here was on seven related but 
distinct aspects of their perceived quality and character that could affect access to information 
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services and resources: technical adequacy and scope of the service, accessibility and usability; 
promptness of response to support calls, character of communications, adequacy of resourcing, 
alignment with business needs and priorities, and general attitudes towards end-users, both of 
managers and staff. 
 
7.2.3.2 Perceived technical adequacy and scope 
The IT helpdesk at T4 had failed to resolve a persistent problem with the installation of an updated 
version of Adobe Flash Player, which IT had failed to resolve, resulting in considerable frustration. 
T1-01 reported that the T1 IT department was good with “quick fixes”. T4-22’s account of the T4 IT 
department’s unwillingness or inability to support a Macintosh e-learning development environment 
was noted above (6.2).  
 
7.2.3.3 Perceived accessibility and usability 
All the IT services were able to access user PCs remotely from the helpdesk, which was much 
appreciated by users. Incidentally, within T3 the library service was also able to use the same remote 
access facility DameWare (SolarWinds),85 as the T3 IT department, as a means to provide user 
support. T3 IT staff were also able to use an online chat facility for resolving support issues (T3-20). 
None of the helpdesks had a web interface, i.e. for users to enter and monitor the progress of 
support calls; contact with helpdesks was via telephone or email in all cases. 
 
T1-04 complained that communications with the IT helpdesk at T1 were cumbersome, i.e. that it was 
difficult to get to speak to anyone and an excessive number of emails were generated in relation to 
individual support calls. T2-03 complained of the slowness and impracticality of the process in 
logging support calls with S3, which involved a telephone queueing system, compared with the ease 
of contacting T1’s IT service. 
 
These problems and other negative experiences of the interface with IT support would have 
contributed to time pressures and stresses in the working environment, and were likely to have 
engendered a reluctance to initiate support calls. In terms of the job demands–resources model of 
Demerouti et al. (2.5.5.3) they could be categorised as a “hindrance demand”. They are similar in 
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nature to the “overhead” created by website blocking, as discussed in Section 11.3.2 and 
represented in Figure 11.2. 
 
7.2.3.4 Timeliness of response 
No explicit references were made by participants to IT department standards for responding to 
support calls. T4’s IT department was reported as being very prompt at remote updating of software 
(T4-08). Other than this, the only comments made by participants relating to timeliness of response 
related to clinical systems. T3-19 herself had found S3, the outsourced IT service provider for T3’s 
community health division, “really helpful” in her contacts with them. However, she mentioned that 
some of her colleagues felt that S3 had been tardy in resolving problems with the C2 clinical system, 
even minor issues related to user logins, thereby creating delays in data input and hence a clinical 
risk. A group of C2 “champions” had been established as a channel through which to resolve support 
issues. Another potential clinical risk relating to perceived slow response on the part of the same 
outsourced IT service to a problem with supporting supplies for tube feeding was described by T2-
02. That such delays were occurring even with clinical system support, which was perceived to be a 
higher priority (see Section 7.2.3.5 below), seemed to indicate the existence of serious resource 
constraints, which would have been likely also to affect support for information seeking and use. 
 
7.2.3.5 IT department resources 
T1-08 expressed the view that, although the IT service at T1 was good, and indeed had improved 
over the last few years, it was under-resourced and struggling with inadequate infrastructure:  
“Yes, I think they are dealing within restricted … resources in terms of staff, in terms of … the 
quality of the technological equipment they are using and perhaps the systems that they are 
working with. The software that they are working with as well – sometimes … I think they do 
their best with what they have got to manage with.” (Clinical teacher, T1, 8)
 
T1-02 expressed a similar view, noting the lack of resources available for IT outside clinical 
departments. Similarly, the IT department at T4 was felt to be significantly under-resourced in 
relation to demand: 
“And again, you know, it’s- it is not a department that is awash with staff …  We are a huge 
institute, [number of staff] people, goodness knows how many PCs and how many miles of 
cabling … I think … it is probably too much for them.” (Consultant surgeon, T4, 19)  
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7.2.3.6 Perceived quality of communications  
Good communications and working relationships are an essential aspect of effective IT support. 
However, perceived communication inadequacies on the part of IT services featured strongly as a 
theme within T1 and T4. The librarian at T1 (T1-01) reported that the Head of IT Services in T1 
habitually failed to respond to communications, although other members of IT staff were felt to be 
more positive towards the library and its service objectives . T1-02 also indicated that the Head of IT 
Services could be unresponsive. T1-11 was seemingly unaware that the library had computers that 
were on the Trust network. T4-22 stated that his only available contact with the IT department had 
been via a call handler at the helpdesk; he had never succeeded in speaking to an IT manager about 
the specific needs of his service. T4-09 reported that contact with the IT department regarding 
information governance-related matters was minimal, despite their physical contiguity.  
 
7.2.3.7 Perceived alignment with service business needs and priorities  
To provide an effective service, an IT department needs to be well aligned with the business needs 
and priorities of its internal customers; to support access to published information, the alignment 
needs to be with LIS and with education and training services (Beagle, 1999). T1-01 spoke of a 
situation where a perceived lack of alignment of priorities had thwarted the provision of a long-
desired and much-needed service, namely the provision of printing facilities out of hours. The 
administration of printing and photocopying in the Trust was centralised, and IT had refused the 
library permission to make use of a possible sub-control option afforded by the software. T1-01 had 
subsequently identified another possible option, which had been approved by IT; unfortunately she 
was then threatened with loss of the funding from U2 which was required for this, and was unable 
to go ahead with placing an order for the system. The issue of out of hours printing within the library 
had apparently remained unresolved for 10 years, restricting use of library facilities for staff working 
shifts. 
 
7.2.3.8 Perceived cultures and attitudes  
The formation of effective working relationships has a strong attitudinal component; it is hindered 
by prejudices and negative attitudes, whether on the part of service providers or of customers.  
 
T4-22 was of the opinion that clinical services generally were a much higher priority for T4’s IT 
department than education services, a view in which T4-11 strongly concurred. In T3, in contrast, the 
main education and training services were thought to be well supported. In particular, according to 
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T3-04, IT staff had been willing to come out to provide training and support for the upgrade to 
Microsoft Office 2010.  
 
A clinical tutor at T1 hinted that, in her experience, IT management culture within the NHS was liable 
to engender restrictive or negative attitudes to end-users as compared with other sectors: 
“It very much depends on who happens to be [pause] in charge and … also where they have 
come from ((laughs)). Sometimes it is … where they have come from … Ones that have been 
in the NHS the whole way up can be quite... ((laughs))” (Clinical tutor, T1, 6) 
 
T4-10 had encountered an intractable problem with three iPads which had been paid for by a charity 
to use within a clinical service: 
“Do you know, it has taken probably 18 months to even get them remotely functioning. To 
actually … it’s been, I felt like giving them back; the challenge IT wise to get anything 
functional with those iPads … has been most horrendous … just … actually getting them [set 
up] on ... any service … We don’t have a relationship with Apple, we had -- people had given 
us vouchers to download apps but we couldn’t use them, we can’t access … the Internet, we 
can’t go on-line and … we couldn’t get them set up, and then using them has been a 
tremendous hurdle, an obstacle to -- I think we are finally there, but it has taken…”  
(AHP clinical lead, T4, 10) 
 
T4-22 reported also that the IT department could be inflexible (as reported in 7.2.3.6 above). 
T1-4 perceived a cultural divide with T1’s IT department: 
“But I think culturally, I suppose as an organisational basis, I think there is, I think -- quite 
right, you know, there is a big divide between the IT department and the rest of us.” 
(Pharmacist, T1, 4) 
 
The following further illustrates the apparent ambivalence of the IT department overall towards the 
T1 library service: 
“That’s been … one of the – the complications that – that we’ve got … Originally we weren’t 
really recognised as part of the Trust, for example when we get CDs which are licensed, we’ll 
make them available in the IT suite. I’ve now got – I can call, and someone from IT will come 
down and actually install the CDs for me.”  
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“ … They’ve – they’ve given me all the suggestions, so uncertain relations in the past were 
kind of forgotten about, I think … We’re not really considered -- we’re slowly coming on the 
radar -- they haven’t quite worked out what we can do. I think at first we were seen as a bit 
of a threat, and – it’s – it’s beginning to change – where they can see that we might be able 
to work together, but that’s with a lot of the IT staff, but not the senior manager.”  
(Librarian, T1, 1) 
 
T1-06 described the T1 IT department’s attitude and level of alignment to business needs in the 
following terms: 
“ … They are not completely amenable, we do sometimes have to, you know, rattle cages and 
get the big guns in the Trust to sort it out, but generally we have managed to get what we 
need.” (Clinical tutor, T1, 6) 
 
According to T1-04, some IT staff were patronising in their attitudes: 
“They are patronising sometimes, it depends who you get to speak to ... some of them are 
very nice, very willing to help. You get the odd one that is very patronising.” 
 (Pharmacist, T1, 4) 
 
Issues of ownership of processes and professional jurisdiction, as well as of attitude, were apparent 
in T1-01’s account of her “unofficial” involvement in implementation of the new Trust intranet: 
“They haven’t rolled it out across the Trust, and we’re currently trying to – to support the IT 
department when they do it, that we’ll actually help add content to it and manage it on 
behalf of the departments, and … I’ve done some work on metadata for leaflets before, as 
well. We’re not exactly embedded in the process, but we’re not off the radar, either …” 
(Librarian, T1, 1) 
 
Similar issues were apparent in the way in which T4-09 spoke of the way in which he experienced 
the information governance function being excluded from major informatics projects: 
“I think that is an endemic reflection of the older organisation and the culture that is here, 
there [are] clearly new people who have come into various departments. We have got a 
person who is responsible for project management now; he is from outside and he is more 
focussed on doing things in structured, PRINCE2 methodology using PID and all that, and we 
have had meetings with him and incorporated IG into that process, so it is more embedded 
for very smaller projects. He gets in touch with us frequently about smaller things, and we 
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will be involved in those projects and on the groups, but [for] the bigger ones there seems to 
be still this bureaucratic -- they want to control it at the top of the organisation, we don’t 
want everyone else really involved in it … Our message to them is that we need to be 
engaged because we want to be helping, pointing out issues from the outset; we don’t want 
you to come along when it’s done, want us to … see it and then[us to] say, ‘This is a 
fundamental flaw’” (Records and governance manager, T4, 9). 
 
Evidence was presented within the literature review of negative attitudes to end-users as a common 
aspect of IT staff subcultures (2.5.2). The failures of cooperation and communication on the part of 
T4’s IT services described above by T4-09 had the potential for serious adverse impacts not just upon 
information services, but upon the Trust’s planned EPR implementation, a major strategic initiative 
(4.4.1, 4.5.1). Issues of professional jurisdiction are discussed in 11.5 below. 
 
7.2.3.9 Overall perceived quality of service 
Many users within T1 (e.g. T1-08, T2-02) were generally positive about the quality of service 
provided by the Trust’s IT service helpdesk, finding the staff helpful, polite and prompt to respond to 
support requests. Users in T2 were generally dissatisfied with the outsourced IT service provided by 
S3, and stated their preference for an in-house IT support service. However one of the nurses in T3-
WPH (T3-20) had contact with both the Trust IT services and with S3, and commented that, “They 
are all brilliant; they are both really, really good”. T3-01 reported a steady improvement in T3’s in-
house IT services during her time in post.  
T4-10 felt that IT services in T4 had improved considerably during her time at the Trust:  
“They are significantly improved to how things were historically in terms of their action and 
resolving IT issues. I have to say, they have got their act together, but it has been a 
challenge.” (AHP clinical lead, T4, 10) 
 
T4-06 also gave positive reports of T4’s IT services (cf. above, Section 7.2.3.4).  
 
Overall, a variety of problems in the interface of users with IT services were described by 
participants, which had affecteded or could potentially affect access to information sources. These 
included understaffing and general lack of resources, a tendency to prioritise clinical systems at the 
expense of information and other services, poor communications, cumbersome and bureaucratic 
reporting procedures and processes, a lack of alignment with LIS and other business priorities, and 
negative or patronising attitudes on the part of IT support staff. A marked trend towards 
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improvement in overall quality of IT services was also noted, however, by participants in all three 
Trusts. 
 
7.3 Published information resources  
Some collaborative activities relating to published information resources have been noted 
previously: T3 library’s work with the Trust’s training department (6.3), and T4 library’s effective 
working with the IT department on IP address checking and troubleshooting problems with e-
resources (5.2). A notable failure of communication has been highlighted as well: the T1 Head of IT’s 
habitual non-response to communications reported by the librarian T1-01 and others (7.2.3.6 
above). 
 
All of the Trusts’ library and information services were well regarded by clinicians; all spoke highly of 
their library’s help with searches and document supply, although T3-19 and T1-07 both felt that 
better domain knowledge would have improved the quality of some of the searches carried out. 
T3-02 regretted the T3 library’s lack of a physical presence within the Trust: 
“[The] library service is generally very, very good … but I … I think you do lose something 
when a library service loses a physical base, and it is just as if it disappears out of your 
consciousness really and, so I mean there have been places when I have had an hour or so, 
when I worked in [name of hospital], it would be nice just to walk over to the library just to 
flick through the journals and flick through the books and see if there is any new additions 
there that might be interesting, whether it’s mental health or whether it was anything else. 
They just become more invisible, I think.” (Clinical tutor, T3, 2) 
 
T1-06 reported that the T1 library was always highly rated by the Deanery following their visits and 
by junior doctors in General Medical Council (GMC) training surveys. She mentioned also that, 
following an intervention by medical educators, the Trust management had resolved to make up a 
shortfall in library funding threatened by the proposed move of the U2 school of nursing from the 
T1-LH site. 
 
T4-08 described the electronic resources available via the T4 library as very good. T4-10 was fulsome 
in her praise: 
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“I can’t rave about our librarians enough, so they have been my godsend ((laughs)) and I just ring 
them and I will go down, I know them, I have a relationship with them and they have helped me 
through and accessed things … that I need and are brilliant … they are clearly way ahead of the 
game” (AHP clinical lead, T4, 10) 
 
T3-01 was described as an “excellent librarian” by T3-18. 
 
T2-01 mentioned T1 library’s support for students: 
“… They are very helpful in terms of supporting students and using that facility. It is the same 
with if they are out here and they want to come and use it … it is not a problem.  
(AHP clinical lead, T2, 1) 
 
Library services were involved in specific service initiatives in support of evidence-based practice. 
T1’s library was involved in the provision of a specialised current awareness service focused on areas 
of board-level concern in relation to quality of patient care and patient safety, namely pressure 
sores, safer medicines and falls, which were reported as being effective (T1-07). T3-01 also provided 
a customised current awareness service to senior nursing staff in T3-WPH. 
Another clinical teacher within the same service made some important observations about 
evidence-based practice in relation to the general culture of T3: 
“I feel like the overall culture within our Trust really does … value and prioritise … evidence 
based practice and accessing resources.”  
“That is like our mantra, the 6 Cs, and as part of that it is about … evidence based practice, 
developing the individual, valuing them, culturing and whatever, and I do think that … we are 
really supportive in that, supportive in accessing [resources] … (Clinical teacher, T3, 19) 
 
In May 2013 T3 had adopted the 6 Cs (care, compassion, commitment, courage, communication and 
competence) as its core values. The 6 Cs had originally been put forward as a statement of nursing 
values in the document Compassion in practice (Department of Health, 2012a).86 At T3, the 
operational meanings of the 6 Cs for individual staff members by way of behaviours were elaborated 
within what was termed a “collective responsibility agreement”. Under “competence”, the  
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document referred to a general duty for all staff members of acquiring knowledge and skills to 
support one’s role, addressing any identified gaps. 
 
T3-19 also reported encouragement from the Trust’s management to become involved in guideline 
development. She felt that one reason why this might be being encouraged is that it could be 
directly advantageous to the reputation and prestige of the Trust. 
 
According to T3-01, the emphasis on evidence-based practice was starting to be extended to 
business planning and service redesign: 
“People are starting to realise that their business cases and their arguments they need to 
make --actually they are being asked for evidence, so me going to these meetings and 
standing up and saying, ‘That’s why we are here’, a light bulb comes on for them and they 
think, ‘I know who to ask now’. So you know it is an opportunity for making sure that things 
are evidence based, and we are needing to make more business cases, aren’t we? … It is one 
of the major things, and redesign being … underpinned by evidence and best practice really, 
so it is not a bad time … for being able to demonstrate why it is important to be around …” 
(Librarian, T3, 1) 
 
T1-02, by contrast, felt that within management practice at T1 there was insufficient reference to 
published sources of evidence: 
“… I think that spreads right across some NHS staff groups … including … middle managers in 
… accounts, HR, some of the corporate functions. It’s – there’s a culture in some 
organisations, and I’d say it about here, that you should be busy, busy, busy, because that’s 
the perception of efficiency and effectiveness, rather than OK, let’s take in some information, 
let’s digest it, let’s talk about it, let’s plan.” (Human resources manager, T1, 2) 
 
This quotation invites comparison with Thompson et al.’s (2008) concept of the “culture of 
busyness” in nursing (Section 2.4.5 above). T1’s values statement, while referring to “high quality 
care” and “learning and leading”, did not specifically mention acquisition of knowledge and skills; 
T4’s also made only a passing mention of sharing knowledge and promoting best practice. 
 
NICE-01, whose background was in commissioning of clinical services, felt that commissioning in 
general within the NHS made insufficient reference to published evidence, leading her to wonder to 
what extent evidence sources were used (see Section 1.4.1, above). he also felt that there was 
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insufficient training given to commissioners, and insufficient capacity within NHS library and 
information services to support commissioning effectively: 
“… Often library services are quite small in their capacity and then if you have got a 
commissioning organisation which holds 40 commissioners in there and each of them require 
support for evidence based resources …” (Senior manager, NICE, 1) 
 
In terms of individual professional cultures, there were two important observations. First, T4-12 
outlined the way in which the use of published evidence was embedded within one of the main 
regulations governing the work of radiographers, the Ionising Radiation (Medical Exposure) 
Regulations 2000:87  
 
“We have to, and this is part of our IRMER regulations, and IRMER is [the] Ionising Radiation 
(Medical Exposure) Regulations 2000 … and as part of these what we have to do is justify 
each and every single request.”  
 
Web searches formed a major part of the process of justification: 
“… If it is something that you don’t know, you want to look it up, so you will go on the 
Internet, you will put it in and then you will call up a site and it says ‘access denied’ ((laughs)) 
and then you will go and find another one, … there is usually something that you can find 
that isn’t ‘access denied’, but … know sometimes you are looking up because you want to 
know what it … because it’s like when you are doing an X-ray … you have got the clinical 
information about that patient, you know what they are potentially looking for, we know 
what that looks like if they have it, so we need to know that information when we are looking 
at our images, to say, ‘Do we need extra projections, or is this enough for that examination?’ 
You know, is there anything else, or do I need to take it urgently because we have spotted 
something that perhaps is … potentially a life-threatening thing? …” (Radiographer, T4, 12)  
 
The short time frame available for conducting searches implied that online information needed to be 
instantly available. Sources consulted, according to T4-12, could include Google, Google Scholar, the 
Society of Radiographers’ e-journals, or one of the standard bibliographic databases, such as CINAHL 
or Medline. 
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Second, as regards use of published information by nurses to support their practice and the 
modelling of professional behaviour by preceptors and mentors, the researcher had raised with T1-
07, the matter of Bertulis’ findings from a literature review (2008b) of non-use of published 
information resources by nurses: that nurses tended to base the selection of information resources 
on convenience and accessibility, rather than quality, and preferred informal sources (usually 
colleagues) to printed or online ones. T1-07 expressed her conviction that the modelling of 
professional information-seeking activity by mentors as an aspect of the enculturation of students 
and newly qualified nurses would improve in quality as more nurses became academically qualified; 
indeed, that the whole culture of nursing would change. 
 
Bertulis, in her earlier report (Bertulis & Cheeseborough, 2008) of the Royal College of Nursing 
survey of nursing professions’ information behaviour, had reported that nursing staff whose 
employers had positive attitudes to evidence to change their practice appeared to have better 
access to a whole range of resources, including the Internet and the local health library. Availability 
of published information resources, and organisational support of LIS, has been shown by other 
authors also to correlate positively with attitudes to evidence-based practice and information 
seeking (literature review, Section 2.4.5). Evidence was presented by participants in all three Trusts 
of positive perceptions of LIS. Within T3 there was clear evidence also of a well-developed culture of 
evidence-based practice across the Trust. While this was less obvious within T1, the library service 
was closely involved in support for particular patient safety initiatives. All the Trust LIS were highly 
regarded by clinical and training staff at “grassroots” level. 
 
7.4 E-learning 
The impact of regulatory drivers on e-learning in dementia care in T1 has been noted already 
(Section 4.3.1). Other relevant issues relating to organisational dynamics and professional cultures in 
e-learning, in particular drivers for the growth of e-learning, and scope and utilisation of e-learning 
in different professions, were discussed in Section 6.3.  
 
7.4.1 Culture, behaviour and attitudes relating to use of IT 
Aspects of culture, behaviour and attitudes relating to information technology use obviously have 
bearings on a number of areas, including clinical systems implementation, communications and 
information behaviour (Ward et al., 2008). They have a bearing particularly on e-learning, however, 
and, for that reason, are discussed here. According to T1-01, paper-based communication still 
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predominated within the Trust, while T1-04 indicated that a significant proportion of clinical staff 
were markedly averse to using computers: 
“I don't like to use the word technophobic, but certainly on an individual basis I think there 
are still ... a number of clinical staff that don't like to use the computers or use them as little 
as possible. There are an awful lot of people that don't have their own e-mail address, even 
though everyone is issued with a Trust e-mail account; they use it so infrequently that their 
passwords expired …” (Pharmacist, T1, 4) 
 
According to T1-02, nurses and junior doctors in T1 were very difficult to reach via email. Problems 
with communicating via email in T1 were mentioned also by T1-04. 
 
In a similar vein, T3-19 indicated that, while IT training and support were readily available within the 
Trust, there were nursing staff within T3’s community services who tended to avoid using 
computers, and who also did not avail themselves of the IT training opportunities that were offered 
them. She had even known staff whose decision to take early retirement had been partly 
precipitated by “technostress”. 
 
T3-19’s comments here may be compared with those of T4-22 regarding poor computer literacy 
(6.4). As discussed in Section 2.8.5 above, habitual non-use of computers or aversion to computer 
use within the NHS is thought to be a relevant factor in the persistence of poorly-developed 
infrastructures and in low levels of information technology investment and innovation. Poor-quality 
IT infrastructure and negative experiences of IT support services may themselves be contributory 
factors in aversion to computer use, so that a vicious cycle may exist. As we have seen, many of the 
technical problems affecting access to published information resources related to inadequacies in 
infrastructure (5.2). It is also self-evident that, in an environment in which much, if not all, 
professional information in the health sciences is published, and expected to be accessed, online, 
aversion to computer use is likely to be associated with or result in poor levels of access to and use 
of information to support evidence-based health care. 
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7.4.2 Staff attitudes to e-learning 
Observations of “e-learning overwhelm” for doctors at T4 have already been mentioned. The risk of 
“overwhelm” caused by inappropriate expectations of e-learning was highlighted by T1-01: 
“… People think that e-learning is something quick and easy, and they forget to add up the 
time that it takes; it’s getting difficult for people to do it in their own time at home, 
particularly if they want work-life balance.” (Librarian, T1, 1) 
 
Participants reported a range of attitudes to e-learning among the groups of learners of which they 
were aware: 
“I think you will always find people who like it and people who dislike it – [it] is a bit like 
Marmite, isn’t it? You either love it or you hate it …” (Non-clinical teacher, T3, 4) 
 
Reasons given for disliking e-learning included the lack of interaction with other students and the 
opportunity to ask questions to check understanding (T2-01). When undertaking anatomy and 
physiology e-learning they did not learn how to pronounce the Greek and Latin words, leading to 
feelings of insecurity with the subject matter. Discussion boards related to e-learning modules could 
be intimidating or pretentious, and usability could be a problem; the authors too readily assumed 
that the content was readily navigable without signposting or guidance (T1-08).  
 
T1-08 observed that it was vital for students’ understanding that feedback was provided with marks 
for test questions, so that reasons for incorrect marks could be understood and pinpointed; also that 
usability problems or system errors with e-learning could have a very aversive effect on learners, 
undermining their confidence in undertaking it.  
In the view of one clinical teacher at T3, usability in e-learning was of paramount importance: 
“… I think things have got to be made to a point where it’s like shopping on-line, it is easy [to] 
do … it’s intuitive, it is simple … that is what we have got to get to.”  (Clinical teacher, T3, 7) 
  
In recognition of the importance of usability, the e-learning developer at T3 was reported as 
spending a large amount of time on improving the user-friendliness and usability of the Trust’s e-
learning content: 
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“… Over the last year, our e-learning developer has spent a huge amount of time working 
with the subject matter experts for the mandatory e-learning packages we have got that 
they are much more user friendly now, you can go back and to through them, we have got 
pre-course assessments so that if you do the assessment and pass you don’t need to go 
through the whole thing, and … there is lots of things being put in place to make the package 
much more user friendly and it has got … it is more, before it was very grey, it is very 
coloured, there is lots of hints and tips …” (Clinical teacher, T3, 4) 
 
The training administrators at T1, T1-05 and T1-10, also spoke of the critical importance of usability 
and “debugging” from a change management point of view when e-learning was introduced within 
T1. T1-10 stated that she had learned this from unsuccessful initiatives she had seen elsewhere to 
introduce e-learning. 
 
It is intuitively apparent that usability of information resources can affect access to and use of 
published information. The findings reported above suggest 1) that this may be particularly true of e-
learning, and that 2) usability issues may be more likely to affect novice users of e-learning than 
those who are experienced. T1-05’s comments suggested that poor initial experiences of e-learning 
could have enduring aversive effects. The findings here may be compared with the report of usability 
issues affecting HDAS, the NHS common interface to online bibliographic databases in the health 
sciences, which are discussed in Section 5.3 above. 
 
7.5 Web 2.0 and social media 
Several participants spoke of ways in which explicit professional norms relating to social media were 
transmitted or enforced. T4-08 mentioned a university lecturer’s being “friends” with her students 
on Facebook as means of communication with them that she had found to be more effective than 
telephone or email, but then also monitoring the content of their posts and reproving them if they 
posted any content that she deemed unprofessional. 
 
The clinical teacher T1-08 spoke of the peer monitoring of social media content among student 
nurses: 
“… We have had students … screenshot other students’… comments and bring them in and 
say, ‘We think this is inappropriate’, and … raise their concerns with the university staff about 
other students behaving inappropriately, because they are worried as … being friends with 
them; they think ‘Well, I don’t want to ...’ and I think, ‘Well, I am this person’s friend on here’, 
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and … they … tend to try and monitor each other and … keep each other in line in terms of 
what is appropriate and not.” (Clinical teacher, T1, 8) 
 
Participants mentioned specific teaching that students and junior doctors received about 
professionalism in the use of social media:  
“… We warn all our students when they come to be careful about what they do or don’t post 
in terms of -- obviously they need to think about what they are saying, if they are saying 
anything that links to the Trust as to whether it’s … libellous or not.”  
(AHP clinical lead, T2, 2)
 
T1-06 highlighted the importance of maintaining appropriate privacy settings:
“We do talk to all the trainee doctors that start, about social media sites, but it is more to 
warn them to be careful about the sort of information... and … warn them that … if they 
allow open access then people looking to employ them can look at them, so it's about really, 
how to use, how to maintain your privacy settings, it’s more that sort of thing.” (Clinical 
tutor, T1, 6) 
 
Participants tended to perceive the level of risk of using social media in professional contexts as 
unacceptably high: 
“I think generally, your more senior practitioners will tend not to use Facebook and social 
media, … because of the potential risks inherent with that … I know a lot of our staff do, but I 
think a lot of, I think perhaps if you speak to a few of the more senior staff they might say, 
‘No, I just don’t do that’”. (Clinical teacher, T1, 8) 
 
The clinical teacher T1-08 felt that social networking could potential involve her in potentially 
complex problems relating to her professional role and identity, in particular the need to establish 
proper boundaries with students and patients: 
“I think … for me there is a fear within my role and my connection with students and the 
practice that … I am not on any social networking site, because I just think it opens the door 
to potential problems that I don’t want to get involved with … if I am not on it at all, that is 
not ever going to happen.” (Clinical teacher, T1, 8) 
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The AHP clinical lead T4-10 felt that NHS culture acted as a powerful disincentive to the use of 
Twitter in particular. Her primary concern appeared to be the possible risk to the reputation of the 
Trust: 
“I would even have this niggle, now maybe it’s just because of what you get instilled into you 
when you are in the NHS a long time, is to -- what am I allowed to Tweet, and what am I not? 
You know in terms of… all that breach of … reputation and that wider aspect, and I feel 
actually the reality is, we need to probably have some very open discussions about this, and a 
little bit of -- … to be given authority to say you can, you can Tweet.”  
(AHP clinical lead, T4, 10) 
 
The clinical teacher T3-19 would have liked to use social media in connection with patient 
engagement with community health services; however, she felt that this was potentially a high-risk 
undertaking, in which support and training within the Trust would be required: 
“Yes, but I also understand that sometimes within our groups there is a bit of a risk there, 
that would maybe … you feel like you want to pull the reins back a little bit because, if I think 
of something like perinatal mental health or whatever, there is just a risk that you would 
want support to manage that risk really.” (Clinical teacher, T3, 19) 
 
The issue of using social media for patient engagement had also come up as a possible service 
development within pharmacy services, but the pharmacist T3-18 felt that the existing lack of access 
to social media applications precluded him and his colleagues from doing so. Here it appears that the 
Trust’s restrictions on social media use had dissuaded him from pursuing a social media initiative. 
(Neither of these participants appeared to be aware of the help and support with social media 
initiatives available from T3’s communications department, as outlined by the communications 
officer T3-12 : see above, Table 5.2). 
 
The findings here are comparable with those of Scragg, Shaikh, Shires, et al. (2017) in respect of staff 
concerns. General attitudes of staff to social media and social media policies are discussed in section 
9.2.3 below. 
 
7.6 Mobile devices 
Professional norms and culture in relation to information technology of any sort are affected by, and 
are necessarily closely related to, current usage, policy and practice. Policy aspects were discussed in 
Sections 1.4.4 and 4.5.3, and earlier allusions have been made to existing usage, although not all 
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work-related usage of mobile devices was explored with participants, particularly when it related to 
clinical systems. 
 
In T4, Trust mobile phones had formerly only been given to senior clinicians and managers, but were 
now available to anyone (according to T4-19). This participant, a consultant surgeon, reported using 
his own iPad for work via the Trust BYOD network, and his own iPhone for work-related calls, an 
apparently common practice. 
 
There was a strong sense expressed within T1 and T3, and within some professional groups in T4 
that, as T3-18 succinctly expressed it, “Personal smartphones and tablets aren’t really acceptable for 
use in a patient environment”. This, he said, reflected Trust policy, which precluded the use of 
personal smartphones in clinical areas. He explained that he was unclear on the full thinking behind 
the prohibition, but referred to possible breaches of confidentiality via the built-in camera and 
access to Facebook, or via loss of the device.  
 
T1-08 spoke of expectations of student nurses regarding the use of mobile devices: 
“In terms of using [their mobile devices] in practice I think there are issues around the 
opportunity that they might get to do that because of the work that they are doing … so 
there are time constraints there. I think also, my gut feeling is that the … nursing staff, their 
mentors, their ward managers probably wouldn’t reflect very positively on the students being 
on their mobile phones whilst actually on the ward … [even for work-related or study 
purposes] … they would probably ask them to do that in their break or … sometimes they will 
facilitate them to go to the library if they need to do some research, and they probably would 
prefer them not to use mobile phones whilst actually within the ward area.”  
“… There is perhaps the idea that maybe it is not appropriate … being on your mobile phone 
in front of patients or in the clinical area … because I think there is always the concern that … 
they are not using it for research and education purposes, they might be … texting their 
friends …” (Clinical teacher, T1, 8) 
 
According to T1-04:  
“… There is an internal rumour within pharmacy that you cannot take smartphones on to the 
wards, and certainly you can't use them on the wards, they are supposed to be left within the 
department.” (Pharmacist, T1, 4)  
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This seems at first sight to be an odd way of referring to a departmental policy. It was one of a 
number of instances in which restrictions on mobile phone use were cited as being official policy, 
but could not be found in Trust policy documents; see T4-04’s comments, below. 
 
T4-08 reported that AHPs in T4 were discouraged from carrying mobile devices with them when they 
were on the wards: 
“Loads of them have bleeps or a pager, so if they need to be contacted for a professional 
reason then they are accessible … it is linked to infection control and professionalism and 
things, so if they needed to access any educational things I would … support them in 
accessing the Trust’s … equipment rather than having to use their own.”  
(AHP clinical lead, T4, 8) 
 
“Quite a lot of our staff are still working in areas where there is a lot of equipment, and yes, 
it is never, for me as a professional it is never a great look to see a therapist walking down 
the hospital corridor taking a personal call on a mobile.” (AHP clinical lead, T4, 8) 
 
The radiographer T4-12 reported that, while there were no official restrictions within the Trust on 
the use of mobile phones in particular areas, it was a matter of “professionalism” that mobile 
phones were not used in patient areas. T4-04, however, reported that she used her own mobile 
regularly on the wards: 
 
“Yes, a lot of people within the Trust have apps on their phone for various, various bits and 
bobs, so I have a BNF app, I have … a NICE app, I have -- what else do I use? Oh, dose 
calculating apps, body surface area calculating apps, so kind of the things that I would do 
every day on a ward, I have an app for, and whereas five years ago I would never even have 
… dreamed of taking my mobile phone down to the ward, I now have my mobile phone on 
me pretty much all the time.”  
 
When asked about possible restrictions on using mobile phones on the wards, her response was: 
“Oh gosh, don’t open this can of worms! I don’t know. Certainly the medics have their phones 
on them, we have our phones on us and we use them quite freely and openly.”  
(Pharmacist, T4, 4) 
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Her response here may have indicated awareness of a common practice that was at variance with 
official policy. It should be noted, however, that at T4, tablets were used clinically in a variety of 
contexts, such as the major trauma team, where the so-called “rehabilitation prescription” was 
completed using a tablet. The stroke team members were also using tablets in a similar fashion. Both 
of these examples of clinical tablet usage were aspects of national programmes (T4-08). The 
community health services of T3 were also piloting the use of rugged tablets by nurses undertaking 
domiciliary visits (T3-19). Medical students from U3-Med using university-issued iPads to support 
their clinical learning were present in all three Trusts, although to a limited extent in T3 (psychiatry 
rotations only). The planned use of tablets at T1 has already been described (Section 6.5). T4’s BYOD 
policy and wireless network may have contributed to a wider acceptance of the use of personal 
smartphones in work contexts. 
 
As described above (Section 5.2.6), board members in all three Trusts were issued with iPads. T4 had 
approximately 200 iPads altogether, which, according to T4-20, were used mainly for document 
management and for accessing email. Considerable numbers of staff also used their own iPads for 
work via the Trust’s BYOD network. At T3, laptops and Windows 8 tablets were the preferred mobile 
devices; only limited numbers of iPads (20-25) were in use.  
 
Under existing university guidelines, medical students were strongly discouraged from taking their 
iPads on to the wards. However T1-07, a senior nurse manager, foresaw a time when policies and 
attitudes might change, particularly if iPads were able to connect to the Trust planned EPR system: 
“If you are looking after patients you can’t be carrying an iPad with you … and if you need to 
look anything up all the wards have got computers, so you can look things up. I can’t see the 
need for that at the moment … but as we get more … progressive, then I think we will have a 
stance on that that will … yes, all have iPads which aren’t linked up to one system and they 
need to be. This electronic patient record has got to link through to every piece of kit, and 
currently it doesn’t.” (Senior nurse manager, T1, 7)  
 
The clinical tutor T3-02 stated his view that, away from clinical areas, staff were using their personal 
mobile phones far too much for non-work purposes while at work. He complained in particular of 
staff using their mobile phones during morning handover meetings: 
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“… When we discuss every case, this is the home treatment team, so it is quite an ill group of patients 
that we are talking about you will see people not listening and …” (Clinical tutor, T3, 2) 
 
A gradual overall shift was apparent towards greater acceptance of the use of mobile devices in the 
context of professional work. In general it appeared probable, however, that professional culture 
regarding the use of mobile devices was lagging somewhat behind trends in mobile learning and use 
of point of care information (Lumsden, Byrne-Davis, Mooney, & Sandars, 2015). 
 
7.7 Summary 
This chapter has focused on the interface of clinical services, training and LIS with IT services, on the 
use of information resources and perceptions of LIS, and on culture, behaviour and attitudes relating 
to the use of IT and to e-learning in particular. Participants in all three Trusts reported that 
procurement of PC hardware was the responsibility to individual services (IT departments had 
limited control over hardware procurement) and was not accorded a high priority by service 
managers unless directly required for clinical systems. In consequence they were obliged to use old, 
sometimes obsolete, PCs. No central or ring-fenced funding was available to cover the cost of 
replacements. IT services in all three Trusts were reported as being accessible via telephone and 
email, and (in the case of T3) via online chat. Participants described the communication processes 
with T1’s IT helpdesk and with the outsourced service for T3’s community services, S3, as 
cumbersome and time-consuming. While responses to IT support calls were generally described as 
timely, the quality of communications in general with IT departments, and their responsiveness to 
business needs, were stated to be unsatisfactory both in T1 and in T4, where negative attitudes 
towards end-users (and in the case of T4, to the information governance managers) on the part of IT 
staff were also described. End-users also reported that the IT departments of T1 and T4 tended to 
focus on clinical systems as their main priority, at the expense of other problems; at T3, however, 
education and training were felt to be well supported. Although all the Trusts’ IT services were 
reported as having improved steadily over the previous few years, those at T1 and T4 were 
described as significantly under-resourced in relation to demand.  
 
All the library and information services appeared to be highly regarded, and their activities well 
aligned with the business processes of their respective Trusts. The importance of evidence-based 
practice (EBP) as an aspect of the overall culture of each of the Trusts appeared to vary. At T3, it 
appeared prominent; at T1, an emphasis on EBP was described by participants in relation to 
particular quality and patient safety initiatives, but as insufficiently emphasised in overall 
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management culture; in T4, it was not referred to at all. It is possible that, being a research 
institution, EBP at T4 was taken for granted. Some indications were given of the importance of EBP 
within individual professional cultures: a detailed account of its application within the practice of 
radiographers (T4), and an opinion about trends in recently qualified nurses’ enculturation into 
habits of information use at T1.  
 
Participants spoke of a cultural aversion among clinical staff to the use of computers, and 
widespread lack of use of electronic communications in particular. Information literacy problems 
were cited as one possible barrier to e-learning implementation; others included usability issues 
(particularly important for less experienced users), e-learning “overwhelm” in terms of the time 
required, and the lack of opportunity to interact with other learners. 
 
Means of transmission of professional norms regarding social media use could include a presence on 
and monitoring of particular social media platforms, as well as formal face-to-face teaching on e-
professionalism. Concern was expressed by clinicians about the perceived risks of professional use of 
popular social media platforms: these were perceived as presenting risks to reputation of the Trust, 
confidentiality, and the maintenance of appropriate professional boundaries. Interest was expressed 
by clinicians within T3 in the possible use of social media for patient and public engagement, but the 
participants concerned felt that existing restrictions within the Trust on social media use acted as a 
strong disincentive to pursuing any practical initiatives.  
 
Professional norms relating to the use of mobile devices, as reported by participants, stressed the 
unacceptability of using these in general, and mobile phones in particular, within clinical areas. 
However, there appeared to be an increasing acceptance of the use of mobile devices in non-clinical 
contexts. The use of tablet computers for recording patient observations, for record keeping and for 
e-learning, as well as T4’s BYOD arrangements, may have been a contributory factor. 
 
The following chapter (Chapter 8) discusses more formal policy aspects of the regulation of IT 
services’ use. 
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Chapter 8. Findings: information governance and 
security 
 
8.1 Introduction 
General aspects of information governance and security within the three Trusts, including the use of 
secure web gateways, have been discussed extensively in the “background” chapter (4.2). This 
chapter covers a number of specific issues: acceptable use policies, monitoring of staff web use, 
mobile device security, general endpoint security issues, and the effects  of these on access to 
published information resources and on education. Under the heading of access to published 
information resources, the chapter looks in detail at the frequency and extent of website blocking, 
the nature of content that was blocked, responses to encountering blocked sites, the effects of 
website blocking, and awareness of national whitelist and browser requirements. The content 
coverage is illustrated in Figure 8.1. 
 
8.2 Acceptable use policies 
T1 and T3 had incorporated all aspects of IT use, including the Internet, into single policies. T4 had 
separate policies governing Internet and email use and computer and network security. The policies 
varied somewhat in scope and content, however, as outlined below. 
 
All the policies included the key constituent items of an acceptable use policy (AUP) as identified by 
Gallagher, McMenemy, and Poulter (2015). In AU1 a substantial section was devoted to acceptable 
us of the Internet, social media and instant messaging. It was notable in the positive attitude it 
expressed towards the Internet at the beginning of the document: 
“Use of the Internet is a key information resource for [T1]. Our ability to exploit and gain 
advantage from information will enable us to maintain and improve our reputation and 
ensure that we meet our strategic business and professional goals.” 
 
It sought to encourage the following activities: communicating with fellow employees, business 
partners of the Trust and suppliers within the context of employees’ specific job roles; acquiring or 
sharing information necessary or related to employees’ job roles; and personal educational, research 
and recreational use of Internet services in accordance with the policy which did not interfere with 
the employee’s own or other work duties. It stated, however, that personal or recreational use of 
email and the Internet was “a privilege, not a right” and could be withdrawn, also that non-work 
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activities resulting in heavy network traffic were not acceptable. Individuals were asked to limit their 
personal use of the Internet; according to the policy, the Trust allowed “limited personal use, for 
communication with family and friends, independent learning, and public service”. It offered lists of 
examples of acceptable and unacceptable use of Trust IT facilities; the latter included the standard 
range of illegal activities as proscribed in computer misuse legislation (see Section 2.7.3, and 
Appendix G). In addition to these, online shopping, whether for Trust-related or personal purposes, 
without prior approval was specifically banned, as was the sending of “unreasonably large electronic 
mail attachments or video files not needed for business purposes”, this latter in the interests of 
maintaining network performance. Pornography was treated at some length: the deliberate viewing 
and/or printing of pornographic images were banned. An exception was made, however, for 
“legitimate study and research into pornography and associated issues” as the “only reason for 
deliberately accessing such material”. 
 
Within AU3, personal use of the web and email was allowed on a similar basis to AU1, although staff 
were required to put “PERSONAL” in the subject line of personal email messages, and not to store 
them for more than two weeks. The specified categories of unacceptable IT system use in AU3 were 
similar to AU1’s, and included gambling and pornography (T3-06). Personal use of the web during 
breaks was subject to the approval of a member of staff’s line manager. Unintentional access to sites 
of an offensive nature was to be logged as an incident. 
 
AU4Int specified the use of Microsoft Explorer and Microsoft Outlook as the standard web browser 
and email client; however, version numbers were not given. Installation of additional software or 
plug-ins required the permission of the IT department. Personal usage of email and the Internet was 
normally allowed during break times, subject to line management approval. In contrast to AU1’s’s 
“legitimate study and research” exception for accessing pornography, AU4Int stated that “ALL forms 
of pornography transmitted or received via any medium will ALWAYS be deemed as offensive.” A 
long list of categories of unacceptable material was provided, which appeared to derive in its 
entirety from the SWG4 documentation. In similar fashion to AU3, unintentional access to offensive 
or proscribed material was to be reported to line management.  
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A specific warning was issued about downloadable files: 
 
“Access to downloadable files, the downloading of files and transmission of files may be 
restricted by [the secure web gateway] and / or NHS and Trust network settings. These 
restrictions may [apply to] files of [certain types] (e.g. .zip files) and / or files that exceed 
specific size thresholds, and may change in line with security advice”. 
 
The tone of AU4Int was notably minatory: the threat of disciplinary sanctions for internet misuse 
appeared twice, within a text box and highlighted in bold. The use of peer-to-peer (P2P) applications 
was specifically banned in AU1 and AU4Int, as constituting a risk to the security of the Trust network. 
Generally, file downloads were required to accord with legislation such as the Copyright Designs and 
Patents Act 1988.
 
Figure 8.1 Information governance and security 
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Other than T1’s exception for pornography already mentioned, no qualification was made in any of 
the Trusts’ AUPs regarding intention or purpose of access to categories of material generally 
considered as unacceptable. This contrasts markedly with the provisions of the “model” AUP 
published by HSCIC (literature review, Section 2.7.3.2). No instances of requests to access such 
material for research or clinical purposes were discussed by participants.  
 
The originator of AU4Int was given as the director of informatics. Approval of the policy had been 
given by “Trust information governance” in lieu of the IM&T steering group, which at that time was 
in abeyance and due to be re-launched. The policy had apparently been ratified by staff side 
representatives of the Trust’s consultative committee, presumably on account of its messages 
regarding disciplinary measures; however, no other consultations with staff groups were mentioned. 
The date of issue of the version publicly available via the Trust website was given as March 2011, 
with a review scheduled for March 2012, which was thus overdue. AU4Sec listed a manager 
responsible for IT infrastructure and business continuity as it originator. It had been issued in March 
2014, with a scheduled review date of October 2016. No details of consultations with or ratifications 
by other staff groups were given. 
 
AU3 gave the director of operations as the lead executive, with the head of IT as the author. The 
approving body was the Trust records and clinical systems group. A link was provided to a copy of 
the equality impact assessment, also to a list of the staff consulted during the document’s 
preparation. The implementation date was given as March 2014, with a scheduled review date of 
March 2019. 
 
AU1 gave the head of ICT as the author of the policy, with the medical director as the lead director. 
The approving body was the information governance committee. An equality impact statement was 
provided, also a list of the managers and staff group consulted during the policy’s preparation. The 
implementation date was given as March 2013, with a review scheduled for March 2016. 
 
Review arrangements were noted very briefly in each document. No mention was made in any of 
the policies of any arrangements for monitoring of the impact or effectiveness of the AUP and of its 
enforcement. 
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8.3 Monitoring 
AU1 described in detail the monitoring of web use that was undertaken in relation to the provisions 
of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). According to the policy wording: 
“The [IT Department] keeps records in order to monitor traffic flow and system usage. These 
indicate the dates, times and sites accessed. The [IT Department] staff do not inspect any of 
this information to check on personal use, nor do they routinely inspect the contents of any 
internet log file.” 
 
Circumstances cited as warranting monitoring included a threat to the Trust’s systems or data 
resulting from malware, suspicion on the part of the Head of IT that IT facilities were being misused, 
or a request from the police in furtherance of a criminal investigation. The T1 secure web gateway 
did, however, send automatic notifications to IT managers of attempts to reach blocked websites 
(T1-12). Managers were also notified by IT of excessive non-work-related usage by members of their 
staff. As reported in 4.5.4, T1-02 reported, however, that while penalties for misuse were stated in 
policies, in practice not a great deal of monitoring took place of compliance with information 
security policies, e.g. regarding the proper use of smartcards. The pharmacist T1-04, however, 
expressed concern about the consequences of attempting to access blocked websites in the course 
of her work, and was keen to avoid doing so: 
“You won't use search terms that you want, or you just think, ‘I can't do this at work’, 
because you know it is going to throw up blocked content, or there will be questions asked.” 
(Pharmacist, T1, 4)  
 
However, the automatic notifications of attempts to reach blocked websites did not appear to be 
acted upon.  
AU3 did not mention the requirements of RIPA. It stated simply that: 
“Should a line manager have a concern about an individual’s use of the internet, [the IT 
Department] can provide a log file which will contain details of the site accessed by the user, 
the time of day the sites were accessed and for how long.”  
 
“If a member of staff has been accessing or trying to access an inappropriate website, it is 
the responsibility of the [IT Department] staff to notify the [IT helpdesk] manager or deputy, 
who in turn will contact the user’s line manager and ask them to take appropriate 
disciplinary action.” 
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T3-06 reported receiving requests from managers for records of the web use of individual members 
of staff approximately every two months. He would have liked to put in place some system of 
automatic reporting to line managers at regular intervals of websites visited by staff across the Trust; 
however, he said he did not have the resources to do so, and that he had other priorities to address 
within his limited budget. He did, however, generate a report for each meeting of the records and 
clinical systems group of the “top ten” websites visited. Log files covering up to three months’ worth 
of data were potentially available to be scrutinised. A contract IT staff member had been dismissed 
within the relatively recent past for excessive Internet use during working time (T3-06, T3-03). T3-06 
reported receiving requests periodically from managers to block certain sites that were deemed 
inappropriate, but which were not blocked by SWG3, indicating that some degree of under-blocking 
was occurring. He did not give further details of these, nor did he state whether or not he actually 
added them to a blacklist. No routine monitoring was undertaken of content filtering accuracy.  
 
According to AU4Int, reports of email and Internet use were generated by the IT department for 
monitoring purposes and could be made available for managers “where cause for concern may 
indicate this is appropriate”, i.e., in accordance with the provisions of the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). The need to “investigate alleged or suspected non-permissible use” was the 
only justification referred to for accessing these reports. It also stated that alert messages identifying 
the user were sent to IT managers when attempts were made to access websites in “certain blocked 
categories”; these were monitored and “appropriate action … taken, if necessary”. The user was also 
alerted to the fact that their attempt to visit a blocked site had been recorded. Two participants (T4-
10 and T4-05) reported being concerned, after seeing these, about the possible repercussions, and a 
speech and language therapist, T4-08, mentioned general concern about this: “What staff wouldn’t 
want either would be for IT to think that people were trying to access [inappropriate material] …”. In 
practice, however, IT managers at T4 did not scrutinise log files of blocked websites to assess 
filtering accuracy; T4-20 reported that he had no time to do so.  
 
Use of Skype was specifically banned in the policy under the category of peer-to-peer (P2P) 
networking applications, these presenting a recognised security risk (2.6.3).  
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8.4 Endpoint security 
T4-09 commented on what he perceived as laxity about basic information security measures in T4: 
“… The basic stuff that went on in terms of… tighter and greater awareness around security 
measures, printing e-mails, port control for memory sticks, things like that, that are 
enforceable through organisations, aren’t always enforced here, and it is a big cultural shock 
for them. People have said to us, ‘This place is five or six years behind other Trusts’ … Just 
because it’s a big Trust … doesn’t mean it’s at the top of its game in everything, I don’t 
think.” (Records and governance manager, T4, 9) 
 
Indeed, the Trusts in the study did not follow basic security best practices in several respects: the 
use of older versions of web browsers, which presented a security risk in itself (P1), occurred in all of 
them (2.6); all the Trusts had at least some PCs still running the obsolete Windows XP; screen locking 
of PCs was not implemented in T1, thereby increasing the risk of unauthorised access to confidential 
data; and USB port blocking was not implemented in T4 (T4-09, confirmed by T4-20), thereby 
potentially allowing data breaches via the use of unauthorised unencrypted USB memory sticks. Of 
these, the lack of port blocking at T4 was potentially far the most serious. The confusion regarding 
the use of encrypted memory sticks in T4 has already been noted (5.2.1). It seems paradoxical and 
inconsistent that, although levels of website blocking were relatively high in T4, other areas of IT 
security, as just outlined, were lax. 
 
8.5 Access to published resources  
This section is concerned with the blocking of websites and responses thereto. 
 
8.5.1. Frequency / extent of website blocking experienced 
The senior manager at NICE, NICE-01, stated that “[Blocking of websites] is what we hear from our 
library community, they do tell us this quite a lot”. Reports of the frequency of encountering blocked 
websites varied across the three Trusts and by professional group. Most of the participants in T1 (T1-
01, T2-02, T1-06) reported encountering blocked sites and content very infrequently; the comment 
from  the clinical tutor T1-06 was typical: 
“As a post grad clinical tutor, no-one is coming to me and saying ‘I cannot get access …’”  
(Clinical tutor, T1, 6) 
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T1-04, however, reported that she encountered them more often: 
“… Sometimes you just think, ‘I will go and do it at home’; it is an awful lot easier. Even if you 
know it is not social media or anything -- it is just, because obviously we do get queries about 
things …” (Pharmacist, T1, 4) 
 
The IT manager T1-11 reported that only five requests to unblock websites had been received by the 
helpdesk within the last 18 months. T1-05 and T1-10 reported encountering blocked websites in the 
course of their work, but did not provide details, or any indication of frequency. T2-03, who worked 
across both T1’s and T2’s systems, reported that more blocking of websites occurred within T2 than 
within T1. 
 
The reported incidence of blocked sites, as reported by the librarian T3-01 and clinical teacher T3-07, 
was similarly low in T3’s main network. The pharmacist T3-18 had experienced only four instances in 
five years. T3-19, a clinical teacher working within T3’s community health services, reported, 
however, that she was encountering blocked sites when carrying out Google searches. This was 
presumably occurring on the outsourced network (see above, Section 4.5.3). 
 
Levels of reported blocking of websites were generally much higher in T4, however. In relation to the 
support of teaching activity within medical education, T4-11 reported having encountered a blocked 
website only once in the previous four years. The librarian T4-06, who was new in post within the 
last six months, cited a figure of one a month, which he said had been quickly unblocked by the IT 
department once reported. T4-03 suggested that, dependent on the type of work she was 
undertaking, she might encounter a blocked site every two months. T4-12 reported encountering 
blocked sites “sometimes, not often”. T4-04 and T4-10 both reported frequently encountering 
blocked sites: “daily, probably” (T4-04); “it might occur every week” (T4-10). T4-05, a clinical teacher, 
while not giving an estimate of frequency, was evidently encountering blocked sites regularly, as also 
was T4-22, who reported the frequency as “fairly often”. T4-10 commented “I am just constantly hit 
with denials, blocks and …” T4-05 was under the impression that there were fewer restrictions on 
web searches within the library: “certainly in the library you can access things more readily.” T4-03 
observed that blocking of websites “does happen a lot”. 
 
The number of blocked websites encountered by library staff would have depended on the type of 
searches they were undertaking for readers and the resources they were using, It is unclear in this 
situation, however, why the number of blocked websites should have been lower for the library staff 
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than for clinicians within the Trust, or why T4-05 should have formed the view that there were fewer 
restrictions on web access within the library compared to other parts of the Trust; this was 
subsequently denied by the IT manager T4-20. 
 
8.5.2 What was blocked? 88 
The retired IT manager, P1, recounted an amusing episode in which the implementation of a skin 
tone detection feature within the web filter at his former Trust had aroused the ire of the 
dermatologists, who had thereby been blocked from accessing online dermatology resources 
containing images of skin conditions. The feature had therefore been disabled forthwith; compare 
the attempts by pornography seekers to access an online dermatology atlas: Section 2.7.3.4.2 above. 
Apart from individual site restrictions, he reported that the only thing that had been blocked “as a 
matter of course” was streaming radio, on account of its high bandwidth usage. P2 mentioned 
iTunesU,89 specifically, as being an educational resource that was blocked within his Trust. Much of 
the provision of IT infrastructure in his organisation was outsourced, and he did not himself have 
direct control of the secure web gateway, although he suggested that the rationale for the site being 
blocked might relate to potential bandwidth consumption and impact on network performance, 
rather than to malware concerns. He indicated that these were likely to be deciding factors for other 
Trusts in their blocking of access to resources of an apparently legitimate character. 
 
The very few specific instances of individual work- or study-related websites, as distinct from web 
applications, reported as having been blocked at T1 included the British Medical Association90 
website (T1-01) and a BBC adult literacy website (T1-10). As reported in 5.5 above, the AHP clinical 
lead T2-02 reported that an  online professional forum was not accessible from computers at T1. 
(Professional forums can be classified as web applications managing user-generated content, 
although their technology predates that of Web 2.0 technologies and social media.) 
 
At T3, T3-18 reported being blocked from accessing sites that he had needed to refer to in relation 
to the medication management of a patient who was self-harming: 
 
                                                          
 
88
 Blocking of Web 2.0 and social media applications is discussed in Section 8.5.3 below. 
89
 ITunesU: http://www.itunesu.co.uk/  
90
 British Medical Association: http://www.bma.org.uk  
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“… So of course when you put in queries about self-harm the question then is ‘Why is 
somebody looking at self-harm?’ Another one in relation to anorexia for example, or bulimia, 
because of course you get your ‘pro-ana’ sites which are … there. Good reason they are being 
blocked, but the reason you are trying to, you are looking for particular searches underneath 
that title --not a ‘pro-ana’ site but because that title, that name in itself raises issues you 
have to, I tend to narrow down my searches and then go to IT and ask, ‘I want a particular 
paper relating to this search’.”  
 
Other instances of blocking that he had encountered appeared to relate to “objectionable” terms: 
“Unfortunately some of the queries you do get have words that the computer system or the 
IT system recognises as being out of the ordinary ((laughs)) and so therefore can block.”  
(Pharmacist, T3, 18) 
 
He reported in particular that results of a search engine query “hyper-sexuality” had been blocked. 
Another instance of blocked content at T3 was described in Section 5.5 above, which appeared to 
relate to an intellectual property issue with podcast teaching material. 
 
The relatively small extent of T3’s forensic services was noted above (4.1.1), the relevance of this 
being that information needs in forensic services frequently concerned subject matter (relating, e.g., 
to sexual offences, violence or arson) that is commonly blocked by web filters. 
 
Within T4, as reported by the AHP leads T4-08 and T4-10, the consultant surgeon T4-19 and the 
medical education administrator T4-11, there was a consensus among clinical participants that the 
Trust web filter tended to block material containing images or advertisements. This could as much 
affect information intended to be provided to patients as professional-level information for 
clinicians: 
“Yesterday on the neonatal unit I needed to show a parent at the bedside what … disposable 
teat … to purchase in a chemist and I wanted to show her a picture of just what it looked like 
… But went on every -- by every cot side there is a computer, ideally so you can bring 
anything up, went on and I just wanted to show a picture on the Boots website: denied, 
blocked … just typed in the product, [trade name] teats and … it was denied … it’s basic stuff 
like that even, that never mind trying to actually look at articles.” (AHP clinical lead, T4, 10) 
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T4-08 reported a similar experience in attempting to access patient information containing images.  
 
The blocking of advertisements was subsequently confirmed by T4-20: 
“That is correct, well advertising certainly, because there are malicious adverts out there that 
get … that pop-up all the time, so adverts as a category is blocked.” (IT manager, T4, 20) 
 
He maintained that, with advertising-supported legitimate websites, this was not a problem, 
because the main content was still available to be viewed: 
“Yes, what we do find is because they are in frames, … and iFrames, then the main site gets 
through, but then sometimes adverts on each site get blocked.”  
 
He denied, however, that images in general were currently being blocked; however, he seemed 
uncertain of the exact situation: 
“Image sites aren’t blocked; there are, they used to block image sites, and I need to check 
that actually because … as far as I know image sites aren’t blocked, but they were some 
image sites that did contain pornography so we did block image sites. Image sites are not 
currently blocked.” (IT manager, T4, 20) 
 
In subsequent email correspondence, he suggested that some of the sites which users had been 
attempting to access were from Google Ad Services, which invariably appeared at the top of search 
results lists. Being advertisements, these were, of course, blocked. This accorded with T4-12’s 
observation that, in particular, sponsored Google listings appearing at the top of search results were 
blocked, whereas the same site appearing further down in the “free” search results might not be.  
 
T4-08’s and T4-10’s experiences with patient information sites suggested that the configuration of 
SWG4 to block images may not have been working as intended. T4-20 did not initially offer any 
explanation as to why the entire content of the sites, rather than just the advertisements, were 
blocked in these cases. He was evidently not aware of the problem; indeed, as indicated in the 
quotation above, he seemed to be somewhat uncertain as to what the current configuration of the 
device was regarding images. Subsequent contact with the SWG4 helpdesk confirmed that, using the 
then current version of the SWG4 software, legitimate websites should normally have been available 
with advertising suppressed. However, it was stated that occasionally (owing to problems with how 
that site had been written), if the advertisement failed to load, it prevented the site as a whole from 
loading. However, this was not common. It was possible that sites identified by clinicians as carrying 
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advertising were being blocked for other reasons. The situation appeared to be complex and 
somewhat confusing. 
 
Other than the blocking of advertising, T4-12 felt that what was blocked was “quite arbitrary”. The 
communications officer T4-03 observed also that the web filter blocked “objectionable” words out 
of context. The pharmacist T4-04 had encountered blocking of access to an article in the British 
Journal of Psychiatry; she thought this had happened for the same reason, “something in relation to 
drugs and alcohol”. 
 
8.5.3 Responses to encountering blocked websites  
Responses that were referred to by participants included doing without the blocked material and 
looking for alternative sites, reporting the site to IT, circumventing restrictions using a mobile device 
on a different network, and carrying out the search at home. 
 
T4-03 reported regarding her response to encountering blocked websites that “It depends how 
essential it is; for me to actually -- if I can find information that will do elsewhere, I make do, but if it 
is something that I think I am going to use frequently I just e-mail IT.” T4-04 hardly ever bothered to 
report them; her comment was, “I just shrug”. She had contacted IT only “on a handful of occasions 
where I have needed access to something, and I have had to ring them and say, ‘I need access to this 
website because of x, y, z’.”  
 
T4-09 commented, “Personally I don’t try because I have given in trying to get the other things fixed” 
(this is in keeping with his report in 4.2.1.4 of poor service from the IT helpdesk). He contrasted this 
situation with how matters had been managed in his former Trust: 
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“So, if I needed, a classic one we got is when I was there we got a lot of FoI requests from 
journalists, we used to copy all our FoI requests to the communications department and they 
would have access to this website journalistlisted.com91 or something, they had access to 
that, being Comms., but we didn’t in FoI, and they used to say to me, ‘Oh, they are on this 
website, they are a journalist’, and I could never check it, and then I would speak to IT one 
day and they set me up straight away, they wouldn’t have a problem, they would see that 
there is a business need for it, and they would grant that … but I don’t know here whether 
the process would work.” (Records and governance manager, T4, 9) 
 
T4-12 was fairly sure that students used their mobile phones to circumvent blocked websites as far 
as signal strength, custom and policy allowed. However, she did not make clear whether the 
students were using 3G or 4G networks to do this, or one of the Trust’s networks (i.e., BYOD or 
eduroam). 
 
Several participants (T1-04, T4-05) reported postponing their searches and conducting them at 
home. T3-06 was sure that users did this in T3, rather than contacting the IT helpdesk, and did not 
give up their search attempts:  
“I think a lot of staff just … maybe don’t raise it as an issue; if they can’t get on to it they wait 
until they get home … They will do it when they get home, I am sure.” (IT manager, T3, 6) 
 
All the Trust IT departments reported that they had established procedures for handling requests to 
unblock websites and web applications, which might involve consulting information governance: 
“Yes, they go to the helpdesk in IT, and then it can be looked at, and usually they come then 
to IG if … if they are not sure about the website … and they will ask if we are happy with it.”  
(Records and governance manager, T1, 9)
                                                          
 
91
 Journalisted: http://www.journalisted.com.  
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Similar processes were reported to be in place at T3 (T3-03) and T4 (T4-20). 
 
T3-01 described her experiences with her occasional requests to unblock websites: 
“When I have experienced blocking I have just been able to flag it with the IT department and 
because it’s been up, because it’s never been an iffy site they will unblock it. Obviously they 
will ask you what site it is, … but largely they will be things like charities or large 
organisations, that they can tell when you tell them what it is, and it’s fine to unblock it and 
the words that you are typing in … you know they could be quite sensitive words from the 
fact of what we do as a Trust, so -- but like I say the response has always been quick when it 
has happened, and it’s been occasional.” (Librarian, T3, 1) 
 
According to T3-06, the librarian T3-01 had never, to his knowledge, raised a request to unblock a 
website. He observed however that her requests may not have come to his attention because her 
judgement as an information professional was most likely to have been trusted by the IT staff 
member responsible for the secure web gateway, so that the normal requirement for line 
management authorisation of unblocking requests had been waived in her case: 
“… There is always a chance that if [T3-01] has raised it as an issue then the chap who 
manages that element of the infrastructure would have just taken it on board that [T3-01] 
has asked for it so she is doing it in a… this is a bona fide site and it shouldn’t be blocked, so 
he may have just actioned it.” (IT manager, T3, 6)  
 
T3-18 also reported that his requests to unblock websites were also trusted by IT staff: “people are 
aware that I … do medicines information queries for the Trust”. 
 
T3-06 described in more detail the process within T3 for getting a site unblocked: 
“… The process [for getting a site unblocked] is to log a request with the service desk, and 
then … the chap who manages that would then, would then come to me and say what shall 
we do in relation to this [site] … there is having that justification from an audit perspective to 
say the reasons why … so then it would be a question of doing that level of investigation to 
find out why it was blocked in the first place, … and to determine what those risks were, and 
if I felt there was some risk involved I would probably run that past our information 
governance …” (IT manager, T3, 6) 
 
T3-06 did not explicitly admit the possibility of false positives. 
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In parallel fashion, T3-03 described how T3-06 would consult with her if they were in doubt as to 
whether or not access to a particular website or web application was allowable: 
“… If they are not sure they will ring me and say, ‘What do you think?’ but quite often it will 
be [that]they will have a look at it, and … if you say …’This is [x]’, it is usually quite obvious 
what you want access to and why.”  
 
Decisions on business need in web access were made, she said, according to “… Who is asking, what 
the reason is, and what they want access to.” T1-06 reported that blocked websites at T1 were 
unblocked promptly by IT: 
“… Occasionally, I mean occasionally I find when I have tried to go on to -- things were 
blocked, but if we e-mail IT [and] … say why we need access to the resources they usually ...”  
(Clinical tutor, T1, 6) 
 
T3-12 reported that she had needed to make the case to IT for the unblocking of some social media 
applications; the “default” security posture had been to block them: 
“… We do have to make the case for why we think something should work in the way it does 
… but I guess in terms of social media … our IT department … will set up blocks to certain 
types of social media and then we need to make the case as to why something is unblocked 
((laughs)). So that is the way it tends to happen.” (Communications officer, T3, 12) 
 
In T4, T4-20 claimed that a second-line support engineer could “allow the site within minutes” once 
the job was in the queue. T4-12 had found that the IT helpdesk staff were prompt in responding to 
emailed requests to unblock sites: “I just usually send an e-mail to the IT helpdesk and say, ‘This is 
blocked; please unblock’.” However, T4-04 had found that: 
“… On the handful of occasions I have asked, I think on two occasions they said they would 
unblock the website, and I think that took about 48 hours, a couple of days, 2 or 3 days 
maybe to get that sorted. And on the other occasions they said that the website was still not 
permitted.” (Pharmacist, T4, 4) 
 
Unfortunately, she was unable to recall what sites they were and what reasons had been given for 
the refusals. 
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The librarian T4-06 reported that unblocking of websites was “fairly quick”. The clinical teacher T4-
05 had successfully placed requests with IT to unblock websites. She reported, however, that the site 
in question (which she could not recall) had been unblocked for her only, not across the Trust. This 
limited unblocking for an individual user was flatly denied, however, by T4-20, who informed the 
researcher that previously blocked websites, when unblocked, were made available to all users on 
the network.  
 
T4-05 reported having encountering blocked websites so often that she had given up searching from 
her office computer and was regularly taking work home: 
“Well, to be honest I’ve actually stopped accessing – trying to access now because I tend to 
know that it will be blocked. I did go on the library website yesterday to have a look, and … I 
didn’t have a problem going via the library through to the resources – and that helped me to 
get through … I think I’ve just got used to taking it home now and doing it at home, to be 
honest.” (Clinical teacher, T4, 05) 
 
Promptness of IT helpdesk response in unblocking websites was not discussed by users in T3. 
In all three Trusts, as we have seen (8.2 above), the IT managers did not scrutinise log files of 
blocked websites, and appeared to depend upon user reports as their main approach to addressing 
over-blocking or false positives. In T4 it is likely that a great many blocked sites were going 
unreported. 
 
8.5.4 Effects of website blocking 
For T4-12, encountering blocked websites had not had a great impact, since she had in each instance 
been able to find alternative sources of information: “I have not had the occasion where I have not 
been able to find what I want.” However, several participants described feelings of frustration and 
annoyance: 
“It is quite frustrating because I think … you are, you know, I understand why it happens, you 
know that you are doing it with the best of intentions because you need that information, the 
system is not supple enough …” (Pharmacist, T4, 4) 
“I would say blocked websites are incredibly infuriating.” (Pharmacist, T4, 4) 
“… It’s quite frustrating, it’s quite annoying …” (Clinical teacher, T4, 5) 
 
T4-04 felt that it was difficult, when working with colleagues in other Trusts, not knowing what other 
Trusts had access to; consistency would have been desirable: 
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“I think a standard approach would make such a difference; I think if you know your 
colleagues working at other Trusts know that you have the same access that they do and you 
know you can all, you know where you stand, whereas at the moment I think nobody really 
knows where, what sort of situation anybody else is in.” (Pharmacist, T4, 4) 
 
The “workaround” of conducting searches at home, or working at home, has already been noted: cf. 
the discussion of “avoidance” strategies in Section 11.3.2. The negative effects on staff members’ 
work-life balance through needing to work at home were readily evident, as were the effects on 
productivity and on personal and organisational effectiveness caused by delays in unblocking 
websites and resulting from needing to take time to report blocked sites.92 These are clearly 
illustrated in T4-05’s comments below: 
“… As I’ve said, it did … impinge on my personal time [indistinct] at home where I can access 
the sites quite easily at home … just generally frustrated, and it – certainly if you - with me I 
do quite a lot of teaching, and obviously teaching’s got to be research-based, and you’ve got 
to be able to access the latest information to keep everything up to date ... it just causes a 
delay … you put it to one side and take that home, but then when you’re doing it regularly 
you’re taking it all home, and if you’ve got three or four curriculums, or … you’ve got to 
update your … teaching packages …” (Clinical teacher, T4, 5) 
 
The shortage of time for information-seeking reported by clinicians of all disciplines across a wide 
range of studies (see 2.4.4, 2.4.5 above) would have served to magnify these negative effects: if an 
information need at a particular time could not be met on account of a blocked website, it was 
unlikely to be revisited, and was likely to remain unmet unless a suitable alternative source of 
information could be found in a timely fashion. The effect of blocking of websites is discussed 
further in Section 11.3.2 below.  
 
The researcher asked T4-20 about the possible extent to which he believed that false positives (sites 
incorrectly blacklisted, as described by other participants) might create problems for users. His 
response was as follows: 
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“Yes it does, yes. There is no doubt about it, with the amount of websites that are out there, 
you do get false positives, there are… I mean I have some particularly … the e-mails, I can 
understand the frustration from users sometimes when they -- because the e-mails … yes, 
‘Why is this blocked?’ and it’s blocked because if the site isn’t categorised then [SWG4’s 
categorisation engine] unblocks, scans the website looking for any particular words, 
keywords whatever, images and then categorises based on what it can scan on the page, and 
if for any reason that is blocked as pornography, then that is when the users get particularly 
irate when they see that a site has been blocked.” (IT manager, T4, 20) 
 
He mentioned pornography here specifically; however, there are numerous other reasons that he 
could have cited why websites could be blocked as inappropriate (Section 2.7.3.1). It is clear that T4-
04 and T4-05, who in their roles as clinical educators undertook a great deal of web searching in the 
course of preparing educational material, were experiencing continuous negative effectss on their 
working lives from blocked websites. Other participants, such as T4-10 and T4-21, frequently 
experienced negative effects on clinically-related information seeking from blocking of websites. 
Although T4-20 here acknowledged briefly that false positives occurred, and had previously 
mentioned processes for getting websites unblocked (see above), he conspicuously failed to give any 
indication that the negative effects of false positives on users’ working lives might in any way be 
considered a possible issue of concern within IT services. Both he and his counterpart T3-06 in T3 
appeared to be focused far more on suspected or actual computer misuse by members of staff and 
the security risks that might thereby be presented to their Trusts. As already discussed (in the 
literature review, 2.6) the findings of research relating to the subject distribution of malicious 
websites suggest that this focus may be misplaced other than in relation to “adult” content. 
 
8.5.5 Awareness of national measures  
One of the agreed follow-up actions from the TDAG survey (described above in Sections 1.4.5 and 
2.7.3.4.2) (TDAG, 2009b), was the setting-up of a national whitelist of “domains not to be blocked” 
within the NHS. It will be recalled that library managers were intended to send the updated versions 
of the whitelist to their Trust IT departments as soon as they received them from their local TDAG 
representative, for the necessary configuration changes to be made to the Trust SWG.  
However, none of the IT managers in any of the Trusts appeared to be aware of the list. Among the 
librarians, T3-01 and T1-01 were both aware of the list, but said that it was not implemented within 
their respective Trust IT departments. T3-01 indicated that this was because in T3 there was so little 
trouble with the blocking of content. Neither librarian had been asked by end-users to intervene in 
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instances where web content was blocked. The records and governance manager T3-09 was 
unaware of the list, as were the library staff at T4 (T4-06, T4-07). It was evident that within the 
Trusts in the study the processes for maintaining, publicising and implementing the national 
whitelist were not working as originally intended. 
 
T3-06 reported that he had not seen the letter from NICE regarding browser requirements for the 
administration of OpenAthens and the link resolver (see below, Appendix J). T1-12 did not indicate 
whether or not he had seen it; he did indicate, however, that T1 was no longer tied into any NPfIT 
contracts for systems requiring the use of older browsers. Owing to shortage of time in the 
interview, the researcher was unable to ask T4-20 whether he was aware of the letter. The letter 
had not been addressed to named individuals; it is possible therefore in T1 and T4 that it had been 
received by the Head of IT (T1) and the Director of Informatics (T4) but not forwarded to other staff. 
 
8.6 Information governance and education 
Issues relating to information governance and education were very little discussed by participants. 
They arose in only two contexts: making available conference presentations, and making audio-
visual recordings for teaching purposes. 
 
T4-11 advised the researcher that, when presentations were sent out to the participants of 
paediatric conferences, particularly paediatric nephrology conferences, images of children were 
removed from the presentations. He was unclear, however, as to whether this was a matter of 
formal policy, either within Trust information governance or from the university medical school, or 
what the precise rationale might have been.  
 
The other issue arose in connection with a project to video record clinical scenarios for teaching 
purposes proposed by T4-22: 
“… The idea was we were going to put some cameras in an A&E department and we were 
going to have almost a button on the wall which … you hit to video what was going on. And 
the idea was that it was a way of … actually analysing … a variety of different things, but 
getting some feedback about real clinical events … We had huge equipment issues because 
we found a really nice piece of equipment that would do all that, we could put it in a secure 
cabinet above the false ceiling and do all the rest of it, but and it would record to a memory 
stick or a hard drive incorporated but it wouldn’t … do any of that on an encrypted memory 
stick …” (E-learning specialist, T4, 22) 
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One of the restrictions that had been imposed was that the memory stick needed to be encrypted in 
case a video showing real patients was inadvertently lost, thereby resulting in an information 
governance incident. He had therefore been unable to proceed with the project.  
 
8.7 Use of mobile devices 
National and local policies significantly shaped  the Trusts’ information governance and security 
policy and practice in respect of mobile devices. National policies were discussed in Section 1.4.4 
above. Reference has been made above to Trust policies and requirements relating to mobile 
devices: T1 pharmacy department’s prohibition of the use of mobile phones on the wards (7.6), T3’s  
prohibition of the use of smartphones in clinical areas (5.6, 7.6), T4’s BYOD policies (4.5.3), and 
perceived departures from policies (5.6, 7.6).  
 
8.8 Summary 
In summary, this chapter provided an account of the implementation of specific security systems 
and policies in terms of their effects upon information seeking and use. These included acceptable 
use policies, monitoring of staff web use, the use of secure web gateways, use of mobile devices, 
and endpoint security.  
 
Acceptable use policies, while they varied in tone (with that of T4 being notably minatory) were 
broadly similar in content in relation to allowable personal web and email use and to categories of 
unacceptable web use. Although review dates were specified, no mention was made in any of the 
documents of processes for monitoring the effects of the policy. All the Trusts had processes in place 
for individual monitoring of web use in cases of concern, i.e. in accordance with the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) and its associated code of practice, whether the Act was 
actually referred to or not. Although attempts to access websites that were blocked were not 
followed up in any of the Trusts, several clinical staff reported concerns about the possible 
repercussions of these, and one (T1-04) reported that it inhibited her search activities. The T3 IT 
manager was concerned about overall levels of recreational web use, on which he reported regularly 
to an information governance committee. None of the Trust IT departments scrutinised log files of 
blocked websites to assess filtering accuracy, citing lack of time to do so; they appeared to depend 
solely upon user reports as their approach to addressing over-blocking or false positives. However, 
users frequently did not report blocked websites, preferring to look for alternative material to meet 
their information needs, or to carry out searches at home. 
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Promotional material for the three SWGs appeared to reflect different corporate attitudes on the 
part of the vendors to the possible over-blocking of legitimate websites. That for SWG3 
acknowledged the possibility of over-blocking of legitimate websites as a likely issue for NHS 
services; those for SWG1 and SWG4, however, focused solely on prevention of inappropriate web 
use. SWG1 and SWG3 offered fully granular control of Web 2.0 and social media websites, whereas 
SWG4 did not, with potential implications for social media management at T4. IT departments had 
implemented default configurations for web filtering, and, other than “rationing” access to Web 2.0 
and social media sites at T1, had not made use of other configuration options. 
The reported deficiencies in endpoint security, i.e., the ongoing use of Windows XP and older 
browsers, lack of screen locking (T1) and lack of USB port blocking (T4), represented potentially 
serious information security risk factors for their respective Trusts. 
 
Perhaps surprisingly for a teaching and research institution, evidence of frequent blocking of 
websites, affecting the work of clinical educators in particular, was found at T4, but not at T1 or T3. 
In general, sites appeared to be blocked either arbitrarily, on account of their containing content 
relating to sexual behaviour, drugs, or self-harm (T3), or of their inclusion of images, particularly 
advertising images (T4). Users frequently did not report blocked websites, preferring to look for 
alternative material to meet their information needs, or to carry out searches at home. While all the 
Trusts had procedures in place for getting legitimate websites unblocked, times taken for this could 
vary within a Trust, the longest reported being 48 hours at T4. Delays in unblocking sites, and the 
need to work at home, were reported by one clinical educator as adversely affecting her productivity 
and work-life balance (T4-06).  
 
Neither IT managers nor librarians appeared to be aware of the national whitelist of “domains not to 
be blocked” within the NHS, suggesting that its management and dissemination needed to be 
reviewed. Similarly, IT managers did not appear to be aware of the letter issued by NICE relating to 
libraries’ browser requirements for link resolver and OpenAthens administration, indicating again 
possibly that the dissemination strategy had not been fully effective, although in practice the 
required browsers were available to library staff in all Trusts under the terms of general policies. The 
lack of awareness of these initiatives may have reflected the general “bureaucratic and 
administrative fatigue” characterised in relation to NHS IT by Solomon, Beale and Lennox-Chhugani  
(2016). 
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The following chapter goes on to consider policy issues that relate particularly to corporate and 
individual staff communications, mainly as they relate to social media. 
 
  
307 
Chapter 9. Findings: communications policies and 
practices 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This final results chapter sets out the findings relating to the remaining main theme, 
communications policies and practices, as these relate both to Trust and to individual professionals. 
The only relevant ‘column themes’ under this heading are social media and mobile devices; the 
chapter therefore begins with a consideration of social media. The content coverage is illustrated in 
Figure 9.1. 
 
9.2. Web 2.0 and social media 
9.2.1. Web 2.0 and social media policy in relation to media strategies 
Policy and guidance for all Trusts were intended to cover both work-related and personal uses of 
social media from wherever they were accessed. 
 
T1 had produced a specific policy regarding social media (SoMe1) and had treated the use of social 
media also in its IT acceptable use policy (AU1). SoMe1 had been published only within the last few 
months (T1-09). T4 briefly mentioned social media in AU4Int, and had produced a separate social 
media guide (SoMe4) for staff. T3 briefly referred to social media within AU3, and had incorporated 
brief coverage of social media within its overall media relations policy (SoMe3). The research 
directorate of T4 had produced its own social media guide for staff (SoMe4-Res), incorporating 
information about ethics requirements relating to the use of social media for purposes such as 
recruitment of research participants (T4-03).  
 
The departmental responsibilities within each Trust for social media policy and guidance were 
varied. In T1, SoMe1 was the responsibility of the information governance manager. In T3, SoMe3 
was held by the communications department. Within T4, AU4Int was held by the informatics 
department, and SoMe4 was held by the communications department in association with human 
resources and union representatives. Responsibility for departmental social media guides lay with 
the individual departments. 
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SoMe1 and SoMe4 both incorporated general positive statements about the advantages of health 
professionals’ using social media. SoMe4 referred to the benefits of sharing knowledge and skills 
outside the organisation, acknowledging the existing uses of social media by staff members, and the 
Trust’s wish to encourage and support these. SoMe1 cited opportunities for research, raising 
awareness of topical health issues, public engagement and the chance to establish a wider and more 
diverse professional network. However, it also indicated that blocking access to social media for 
most staff within the Trust was a matter of policy, while acknowledging that many staff were 
accessing social media via personal mobile devices. 
 
All policies referred to the need to ensure the operational effectiveness of the Trust and to avoid 
bringing the Trust (in T1, also the NHS) into disrepute. Also they all referred to the need for 
professionalism in the use of social media, and incorporated standard warnings not to breach 
confidentiality directly or indirectly through the posting of PII or photographs online, or through 
sharing information about the Trust that was otherwise sensitive or, as in T1, subject to non-
disclosure agreements. SoMe1 provided some brief scenarios to illustrate the confidentiality issue 
with respect to PII. The policies also specifically prohibited the posting of material likely to 
contravene diversity or bullying and harassment policies, or that was in any other way illegal. All 
stressed that disciplinary action could be taken for inappropriate use of social media, including 
possible dismissal, and that civil proceedings or criminal prosecution could also result.  
 
SoMe1’s instructions were the most detailed and prescriptive. They stressed the need for factual 
accuracy on social media and for inaccuracies to be corrected in a transparent way. Staff were 
enjoined not to post any photos on personal social media sites of themselves or colleagues in 
uniform, or in an identifiable work setting, and to work on the basis that anything they wrote or 
posted could be shared more widely without their knowledge or permission. They were enjoined to 
use their real names if they were associating themselves in any way with the Trust. They were also 
warned that posts under a pseudonym could become admissible in a disciplinary investigation or 
hearing if, at a later stage, these posts became associated with the staff member’s real name. 
Procedures were established for what actions a staff member should take should he or she feel 
harassed, bullied or victimised as a result of another member of staff’s post via a social media site. 
 
SoMe3 was brief in nature. It prohibited posting of PII and of illegal content. It stated that SoMe 
content should represent T3 and not offer personal opinions or views. Staff were strongly advised to 
consider the implications of any material published online. Staff wishing to utilise SoMe tools 
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extensively for the purpose of sharing information in a professional capacity were enjoined to seek 
advice from the communications team. 
 
Figure 9.1 Communications policies and practices 
 
SoMe4 included recommendations regarding privacy settings and general safe behaviour online. It 
stated that the posting of photographs on sites such as Facebook required specific permission from 
the subjects. It stressed that staff were responsible not only for content that they posted themselves 
on social media sites, but also for the content of comments that they permitted to be displayed. 
Staff were enjoined to refrain from identifying Trust colleagues by name, as well as patients, and to 
refer to social media guidance produced by their own professional body or regulator, as applicable. 
 
SoMe4’s position on access to social media within the Trust network was not stated formally; 
however, essentially, staff who could not demonstrate a specific business need for access to popular 
social media applications such as Twitter and Facebook were blocked from accessing them. Requests 
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for access required to be authorised by a line manager (T4-06). However, staff members who were 
unable to access social media from their desktop computers frequently did so from their own mobile 
devices via the BYOD network, on which the security settings were intended to be less restrictive. 
According to T4-22, however, in some instances, the settings on the BYOD network were more 
restrictive than those of the Trust network. Similarly in T3, access to “professional” sites, such as 
LinkedIn and Academia.edu, was routinely allowed, but not access to Facebook, Twitter etc. Not all 
participants were aware of their Trust’s policies or guidance on social media; for example, T4-08 and 
T3-07 stated that they were not. 
 
The implementation of Web 2.0 and social media policy in T1 appeared to be the subject of 
considerable confusion. Contradictory accounts of T1’s policy were given by different participants, as 
can readily been seen in the accounts below of policy and practice regarding the availability of 
specific applications. It was seen earlier (in Section 4.4.4) how the practice of setting quotas for the 
usage of particular web applications had not been publicised.  
 
Policy, experiences of misuse, and attitudes appeared to be closely inter-related. The senior nurse 
manager T1-07 commented on the orientation of SoMe1 regarding social media, suggesting that 
incidents involving their misuse, and in particular a breach of confidentiality, had given rise to the 
Trust’s initial negative stance, which was now softening to some extent: 
“So I think we have taken a very, very firm stance around social media, and actually I have to 
say I think, I think at the time it was right because it has really raised the profile of the 
importance of … confidentiality in the organisation, so I think it has got-- a very strong 
message went out to all staff that Facebook, … social media, can have, cause some real 
problems if we are not careful with it. People have got that message, so now -- that is great 
and we can start to backtrack a little bit, relent, and so we have got a social media policy.” 
(Senior nurse manager, T1, 7) 
 
The breach of confidentiality on Facebook had been the act of a clinical staff member, leading to her 
dismissal (T1-02, T1-09). T1-12 reported similarly that there had been serious incidents at T1 
involving social media, which had led to the policy decision to impose a complete block on access to 
popular social media applications within the Trust network: 
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“Social media sites are blocked on Trust PCs, so you can’t access Facebook, I couldn’t access 
Facebook or Twitter from … my PC … and the Trust very much took that view … because … 
there were a number of incidents related to staff … inappropriately using those sites during 
work time. So, that was the view … because it was misuse …” 
“… In a previous role I held in the organisation as a lead nurse … I had to discipline two senior 
members of my nursing team where it was reported to me that they weren’t doing their jobs 
on nights, where they were not responding … (Senior nurse manager, T1, 12) 
 
T1-12 had asked IT to investigate. The report indicated that they had not moved from the computer 
for 3½ hours and had been accessing Facebook and a variety of other non-work-related websites: 
“Well, they are not employed to be on Facebook for 3½ hours, so … there were decisions 
made then at an organisational level, that actually we can’t have … staff, the decision was 
we can’t … trust staff to use it sensibly, we can’t … trust staff to … use it sensibly in their 
break, … so … the decision was to block it from all Trust PCs.”  
(Senior governance and risk manager, T1, 12)  
 
This represents a restrictive response to what was reported to have been a single (albeit flagrant and 
extremely serious) instance of misuse. However, according to the clinical tutor T1-06, there was not 
in fact a complete ban at all: access to social media websites was allowed during breaks. T1-06 
reported that she was able to access professional Twitter feeds and blogs from her desktop 
computer, suggesting that these were not blocked. 
 
T1-12 outlined how SWG1’s settings were configured in relation to social media websites: 
“So we used to block Facebook, MySpace, BeBo, Twitter. Websense now allows you to take a 
granular approach to it, so we can now allow access to Facebook, but we don’t allow access 
to Facebook chat, we don’t allow access to …. ‘add new friends’ and ‘accept friends’ and that 
sort of thing, so if somebody has got a … work reason, professional reason to access 
Facebook they can do, … same with Twitter; … we have got granular … security through 
[SWG1] that is set up on that.” (IT manager, T1, 12) 
 
When asked whether access to social media websites was allowed only to particular categories of 
staff, he responded as follows:  
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“No … we don’t block websites based on the staff member, we base it on the website and the 
category of website. So [SWG1] has … snap-ins built in for Facebook and Twitter and all the 
popular sites, so you can say, ‘Yes, I will allow access to that, yes I will allow access to that’. 
The same thing, what we generally do is we will add a quota on each and say, ‘Right … in 
your day you will have 30 minutes of quota for sites that we don’t just allow wholeheartedly’, 
so … like games websites, social media. I think YouTube is on that, without looking I am not 
100% sure, but we … “ (IT manager, T1, 12) 
 
As described in 8.3 above, the quota system was flexible in that a user could ask to have a usage 
quota for a web application increased for specified business purposes, with subsequent usage being 
audited. This facility had particular application to the use of personal cloud storage applications and 
also online presentation applications such as Prezi, both of which were categorised by SWG1 as 
“personal online storage”. 
 
T1’s practice accorded with current industry trends:  
 
“Granular controls for social media are becoming one of the most requested features in Web 
security solutions as businesses and organizations are increasingly realizing the benefits of 
granting employee access to social media. In the past, social media controls were often 
binary and businesses would either completely block access or allow totally unregulated use. 
Many Web security vendors now offer granular controls that allow businesses to provide a 
safe and controlled social media experience for users based on different needs and policy 
criteria.” (Radicati Group, 2012, p. 6) 
 
As we have seen, however (Section 8.3 above) similar granular controls do not seem to have been 
implemented at T3 and T4, despite the fact that the respective SWGs offered this facility. 
By contrast with the serious incidents of misuse at T1, the HR manager T3-09 reported that no 
serious breaches of confidentiality via Facebook or other social media site had occurred at T3, only 
instances where some “inappropriate” content had been posted, details of which were not given. No 
information governance incidents specifically involving social media were reported either at T4. 
Details of other types of incident currently under investigation at T4 (there were reportedly several) 
were not disclosed. 
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9.2.2 Blocking of Web 2.0 and social media applications  
The availability and status of individual social media applications was described above in Tables 5.1 
and 5.2. The restrictions in T1 and T4 on access to blogging and microblogging applications 
(WordPress, Twitter) and in T3 and T4 to content communities (SlideShare, YouTube, Prezi) were 
noteworthy in particular, since anecdotal evidence indicated considerable usage of these 
applications by health professionals in relation to information behaviour. 
 
9.2.3 Staff experiences and perceptions of Web 2.0 / social media use 
and related policies 
 
Aspects of usage of social media in relation to information seeking and sharing are described also in 
section 5.5. Social media and professional norms are discussed in 7.5. 
 
Several participants provided indications of a pronounced generational divide in attitudes to, and 
use of, social media, with senior staff avoiding using them entirely, or using them only in non-work 
contexts: 
“I think most of, I can happily say that most of the more senior staff in the department don’t use 
social media in either their personal or work life … the younger ones do use it. I know the ones who 
are sort of in the middle band have used it and then have realised that it wastes half their life and 
have stopped using a lot of them. I am only saying what they are saying to me; I don’t use them.” 
(AHP clinical lead, T2, 2) 
 
Several other clinical staff (T4-19, T3-20) similarly expressed views of social media in general which 
were negative or indifferent. 
 
T1-01 suggested that attitudes to social media would change markedly over time as the younger 
generation of staff were appointed to management roles: 
“…The higher up you are in the organisation, the older you are likely to be and the less 
technically aware you are … 5 years, 10 years, the people who will be in charge of the 
organisation will be the ones who have grown up with all this stuff and are comfortable and 
familiar with it, so I think it is a changeover, it is this X and Y Generation thing, isn’t it? I think 
we are on the cusp of the power shift …” (Librarian, T1, 1) 
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In discussing social media policy, the senior nurse manager T1-07 emphasised the serious 
consequences of breaches of confidentiality, both for patients and their families and for the 
organisation as a whole: 
“We need to get the balance right between recognising the benefits of social media and the 
risks of using social media; … if we … breach patient confidentiality, then the implications of 
that for us as an organisation [are] absolutely huge. So that does tend to make us a wee bit 
… risk-averse, … just because we will have -- it damages the reputation of the Trust, it puts 
patients in fear of sharing information with us, because then they wonder where is it going to 
go, who is going to have access to it, and so we … have to get that balance right … to think 
that there is the opportunity that that could actually be out in the public arena is just … 
devastating for all the patients and families.” (Senior nurse manager, T1, 7) 
 
It was striking here that she used the term “risk-averse” in relation to the Trust’s policies, and 
offered a justification for this approach; compare here T1-02’s comments in Section 4.5.4 above, the 
account of NHS organisational culture in Section 2.5.5 of the literature review, and the general 
discussion in 11.4.1.  
 
T1-02 characterised the Trust’s policy as follows: 
“Here we have an IT … led approach to computer misuse, so things are very tightly 
controlled, often blocked, and – and that’s the approach that this trust takes, which in terms 
of … cultural progress down those sorts of like … thinking about social media and the uses of 
social media … it’s really restrictive … we … can’t access any social media here …”  
 
T1-02 candidly expressed her personal disagreement with it: 
“I don’t necessarily agree with that, because I think it lies in both camps, really, there’s a 
responsibility on both sides for … control of misuse, but … I tend to feel, or think, that … 
people are adults at work, and as such … these are resources, and it feels a bit archaic, really, 
to block usage completely … where it could be really useful.”  
 
In her view, use of social media by NHS Trusts was a very important tool for public and staff 
engagement, and T1 through its current policy was missing a major opportunity: 
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“In my … profession, which is … resourcing, really, you see huge benefits where companies 
have embraced social media and are putting – they’ve got a presence … and they use it – and 
you see it in the NHS, you see other trusts doing it. [H13] down in … London – absolutely 
fabulous – using their Twitter feed, and things like that, and … it has a huge effect on the 
staff who work there, because they feel like [H13] people, that … ‘Look how fantastic your 
trust is – isn’t this a great place to work?’ And … we miss out on that, and part of it is 
because of the massively restrictive and quite old-fashioned, I think, approach to IT security, 
which is just to block it and not to discuss it, and that’s it.” (HR manager, T1, 2) 
 
The records and governance manager T1-09, by contrast, was personally in favour of a total ban on 
access to social media websites: 
“Yes. I mean to be honest I would rather them all blocked, Facebook included.”  
 
She mentioned a report she had recently read in which the top ten websites accessed by public 
sector staff had been listed: 
“The majority were … personal e-mails, Facebook, things like that, not for work purposes, 
and I just wonder if that is going on here.” 93  
 
Here it is evident that she was concerned about the possible adverse effect that access to social 
media websites could have on productivity: 
“… it kind of blurs the boundaries of what is acceptable and what not.”  
(Records and governance manager, T1, 9) 
 
The librarian T1-01 and her colleagues had found recently that the online presentation application 
Prezi 94 and cloud storage applications had suddenly been blocked without warning. This had had a 
particular impact upon the library, because her induction presentation was in Prezi and could not  
 
                                                          
 
93
 The researcher was unable subsequently to locate the report concerned. It is possible that T1-09 was 
referring to the report of the TaxPayers Alliance publicising the extent of personal web use at the Department 
of Work and Pensions (TaxPayers Alliance, 2010) or an article in the Daily Telegraph on social media and 
personal web use at the Department of Communities and Local Government (Hope, 2012). 
 
94
 Prezi: http://prezi.com  
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readily be migrated to another platform. SlideShare,95 an application for hosting and sharing 
presentations, was also apparently blocked.  
 
When asked about the status of Prezi within T1, the senior risk and governance manager T1-12 
responded as follows: 
“I honestly don’t know, and I wasn’t aware that it was blocked. In fact it was … the postgrad 
medical centre who told me, because it was … I can’t think, it came to light at a meeting I 
was at, that said that Prezi, someone had wanted to use Prezi and they couldn’t, and I said, 
'Well, I can’t see why we couldn’t use it’, so I am actually raising it with IT to say, ‘Why can’t 
we?’” (Senior risk and governance manager, T1, 12) 
 
According to T1-09, IT had referred an unblocking request for Prezi to her: 
“ … We weren’t sure, it was questioned basically -- it wasn’t necessarily that we saw that it 
was Prezi and thought right, absolutely not … it, the way that it was on the web was 
questioned by IT and that just to see if IG was happy with it, and because it is cloud-based … 
you have to be … careful because if they are presenting patient information on [the] cloud 
then it can be open for all on the intranet, Internet, sorry … so it was just basically … to look 
at exactly what they wanted and see if it was acceptable or not; it wasn’t blocked in the 
end.” (Records and governance manager, T1, 9) 
 
It is unclear from this account what the nature of T1-09’s concerns were about the application being 
“cloud-based”: whether about possible non-compliance with the Data Protection Act requirement 
not to transfer personal information outside the European Economic Area without specific consent 
or entitlement to do so, or about possibly inadequate security within the application itself, or both. 
Her account suggested that Prezi was still normally blocked and had been unblocked for one user 
only, whereas that of the IT manager T1-11 indicated that it was available to all staff, with a quota 
set for usage. The most obvious explanation could have been that a new quota-based system of 
social media controls had been implemented by IT department, perhaps on an experimental basis, 
without prior consultation with the information governance managers; however, this seems at first 
sight unlikely. 
                                                          
 
95
 SlideShare: http://www.slideshare.net  
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T1-01 stated that she “had been campaigning about social media for some time”, attempting 
unsuccessfully to implement a number of services based on social media applications. She felt that 
the blocking of web applications was essentially a matter of lack of understanding, and related to 
attitudes which were generationally-based. She felt that this applied to Prezi in particular: 
“ … What you do in Prezi you can also do in PowerPoint or Word – you know, click of one 
button and it’s uploaded to the Internet … (Librarian, T1, 1) 
 
T1-01 had also, in the past, been blocked from creating a library film club blog, despite receiving 
advice from the Trust’s legal services that this would be permissible, and suggestions from them as 
to the drafting of an appropriate policy. She had been told officially that no Trust-related social 
media activity would be allowed until the social media policy had been developed, which, in the 
event, had taken several years, and at the time the interview was conducted had apparently still not 
been officially launched.96 
 
According to T1-01, restrictions on access to blogs and blogging platforms were affecting the 
library’s distribution of the current awareness bulletins produced by local libraries, entailing extra 
work in producing PDF or Word documents: 
 
She remarked on the transient nature of some social media applications: “sometimes you’re just 
getting up and running and the resource has gone”, “a lot of these things … are fairly faddy”. She 
also noted the difficulty of evaluating the impact of a library presence on Facebook and Twitter. Her 
preference would have been to use blogs and wikis: blogs “basically as a tool to sit behind whatever I 
do” and wikis – “it’s an internal communication thing between the Trusts”. She appeared to think 
that internal, NHS-specific systems held more promise for professional networking than public 
platforms such as Twitter and Facebook. While she was well aware of CILIP’s exhortations to 
librarians to use social media within their services, she felt that staffing issues made it difficult, in 
practice, for NHS libraries to maintain an effective social media presence. 
 
Regarding information governance incidents relating to social media, T1-01, although not referring 
to specific past incidents, took a pessimistic view of the likely future response: “I think if something 
should happen, that it would be a very reactive culture.” She felt that changes in the Trust’s culture 
                                                          
 
96
 By the time the researcher interviewed T1-07, it had just recently been published. 
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and policy relating to social media would come about in the near future through external pressures, 
notably moves by bodies such as the medical royal colleges to integrate social media within their 
ways of working.  
 
The perception of the training staff at T1 was that the Trust’s restrictive social media policy, and its 
web filtering practices in general, represented a desire on the part of the senior management to 
exercise organisational control for its own sake. T2-01 expressed the view that the corporate 
attitude to social media in T1 was generally negative. Her own Trust, T2, she thought, was “slightly 
more forward-thinking in terms of using social media”. 
 
9.2.4 Corporate uses of Web 2.0 and social media 
9.2.4.1 Drivers 
The decision to use social media corporately in T3 was described by T3-09 as driven fundamentally 
by the need for patient engagement, particularly in child and adolescent mental health services: 
“… There was resistance for quite some time for things like Twitter accounts and … but we 
have gone very much now, I think -- it’s once you have breached the Rubicon [sic] … you are 
in the social media, you make the decision that we are going to engage and we are going to 
use it, and I think because we have … service users we are trying to engage in who are … 
child and adolescent mental health, and if that is the most relevant way to engage with them 
we … had to do it, we had to understand and provide for that …”  
 
She said that the use of social media platforms by the Trust’s partners and providers of outsourced 
services had been a factor in the way that use of social media was gradually spreading: 
“It is … just in a … non-anxious way, if that sounds right, because there has been a lot of 
anxiety, and I don’t know if that’s just me and where I sit in the organisation, because for 
years we talked about Twitter and forums and … the pitfalls of both, and now it just seems to 
be gently washing in, and we have got this policy and everything seems much more enabled, 
so obviously the first test will be when there is something inappropriate.”  
(Human resources manager, T3, 9) 
 
T3-09 felt also that the work on social media published by NHS Employers (NHS Employers, 2013a, 
2013b, 2014), and its then chief executive’s role in this, had been decisive in influencing her own 
view: “He was the one that turned around social media.” She was not herself active on Twitter, but  
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followed his and several other Twitter feeds as a professional resource: “I like to see and hear what 
is going on.”  
 
For T3-12, the rationale for using social media was about going to where people are: 
“If you think of the use of social media from a communications point of view, it is being 
where people are at … you go to there to have a conversation with them rather than 
expecting them to visit you on your corporate Trust website or in your corporate Trust 
magazine, and so … it is just another media channel.” 
 
She felt that there was a necessary balance of risk and reward in using social media: 
“And I think that is probably where you have come across the term risk, because I think it is a 
balance of risk versus reward, and obviously there is a huge potential reward for engaging 
with communities via social media, but you do have to have the safeguards in place, so that 
has always been the sort of approach that this Trust has taken, is that if we are going to 
extend access to channels like this, there is some responsibility that individual staff members 
take on, around their responsible use of that media … and we have evaluated the risks and 
deemed them to be acceptable.” (Communications officer, T3, 12)  
 
In T1, use of social media corporately by the Trust was only just beginning to be discussed: 
“We are only at the stage where it is currently being discussed - I’ve written up a proposal 
which has been approved by my exec. … and it’s going to go here, there and everywhere for 
approval.” (Communications officer, T1, 3) 
 
In T1, the local drivers for social media use were perceived to be its possibilities for recruitment of 
staff (T1-03), provider and partner organisations’ adoption of social media (T1-01), and perceived 
benefits for staff engagement and the health of organisational culture (T1-02). The T4 
communications strategy contained no specific references to social media use. 
 
T1-03 reported that he had personally been resisting the idea of venturing into use of social media 
for some time, on account of lack of resources. Unlike T3 and T4, which had well-staffed media and 
communications departments, T1 employed one communications officer, supported by a part-time 
assistant, to carry out a wide range of duties which included editing of staff newsletters and 
moderating the trust website and intranet. His time was therefore already very limited: he reported 
that he had “been fire-fighting for years”. T1-02 felt that, apart from the information governance 
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concerns about social media identified in 9.2 above, other organisational factors had contributed to 
a resistance to the use of social media: 
“The culture in – in many Trusts, which is, like you said, not to engage in … professional social 
we- networking at work, because it’s perceived to be perhaps ‘slacking off’ or people 
potentially not … having the time, and … not having the right environment or mind-set to do 
it … So, and then you … lose lots …” (Human resources manager, T1, 2)  
 
9.2.4.2 Patterns of Web 2.0 and social media use 
The only presence that T1 had on social media was via some videos on YouTube promoting its 
newly-refurbished maternity unit. T1-03 had reserved a number of Twitter handles for future use. 
 
The Trust charity had a Facebook page, but not T1 itself, other than an “unofficial” page on which 
some quite negative feedback had been left about the trust’s services. (This may have been 
something that T1-03 was alluding to in a comment he had made, “There are conversations going on 
out there about us that we can’t easily respond to”.) Apart from the additional workload, T1-03 was 
concerned about how to handle negative comments on social media: 
“And what also was worrying me is if … former patients … what can I say - hijack – though 
that’s not the word I mean – if they … if they bombard us using that … it’s obviously very 
public … and it is … a case of – OK, well we would have to work out how will we respond to 
these … professionally to try and nip it in the bud and … – so as well as responding to them it 
is also - once – once you have a social media presence you can’t leave it. You have to have a 
cycle of things going on …” (Communications officer, T1, 3) 
 
T1-03’s expectations regarding feedback from patients were notably negative; he evidently 
perceived patient feedback on social media as needing to be “managed” or “controlled”, rather than 
presenting any kind of opportunity to improve service delivery. In T3 and T4, Twitter and Facebook 
were used extensively for patient and public engagement, for research dissemination, and for 
sharing innovation in professional practice. In each case, social media activities were closely 
regulated, mainly by the communications department of the Trust.  
 
In T3, there was no corporate Facebook page as such, but use of Facebook had been successfully 
piloted within locality health promotion services. The T3 Twitter feed was active in retweeting 
general items about mental health which were thought to be of interest to followers. In T4 there 
existed an umbrella corporate presence on Facebook and many separate Twitter feeds for individual 
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departments and services. The Facebook page, however, appeared to feature mostly news items 
from the “media centre” of the main Trust website. According to T3-12, T3’s various forms of social 
media presence were clearly intended to form part of an overall media strategy:  
“We approach our use of social media channels strategically, so if we are going to do 
something, we do it with an objective in mind”. (T3-12) 
 
The creation by the library at T4 of a current awareness portal and Pinterest site has already been 
noted (Section 5.5).  
 
9.3 Mobile devices 
The general NHS policy requirements relating to portable media and devices, including mobile 
phones and tablet computers, were set out in Section 1.4.4.  
 
T1 did not have a discrete mobile devices policy as such. However, a number of policy restrictions on 
the use of mobile devices appeared to be in operation, including a general prohibition on the use of 
smartphones in clinical areas. The rationale for this appeared to relate primarily to risk of breaches 
of confidentiality or privacy. T1-07 observed how such breaches could be entirely inadvertent. She 
noted how easy it was inadvertently to include a patient in a photograph when the focus of the 
photographer’s attention was elsewhere; this could result in problems of informed consent and 
breach of privacy, if the photograph were subsequently to be posted to a social media website. An 
incident of this type had occurred in the recent past. As discussed in 7.6, the pharmacy department 
prohibited the use of mobile phones in clinical areas by its staff (T1-04). According to T1-01, BYOD 
was specifically prohibited within T1. 
 
T3 was the only one of the Trusts to have a specific mobile devices policy. According to T3-18, it 
expressly prohibited the use of mobile phones in clinical areas. However, such a prohibition was not 
found explicitly within the text of the policy, which enjoined users only to “be aware of, and respect, 
local policies regarding the use of mobile communications devices”. Users were warned that all calls 
made on Trust-provided mobile phones were logged by the network provider, and that “there 
should be no expectation of privacy in anything created, stored, sent or received” on one. 
 
T4 incorporated its mobile devices policy within AU4Sec. All Trust-owned mobile devices were 
required to have MDM enabled on them, allowing monitoring of application deployment, location 
tracking and remote wiping of the device. Mobile apps that were installed on Trust-owned devices 
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were required to be licensed and purchased through authorised sources. As far as possible, users 
were enjoined to avoid storing Trust data on mobile devices. 
 
9.4 Summary 
Individual use of popular social media platforms and Web 2.0 resources was restricted in all of the 
Trusts to varying extents. In practice, T3 was the most restrictive. A distinction was commonly made 
between “professional” and “recreational” resources, with Twitter, despite its increasing 
professional use, generally perceived as “recreational” in nature. Social media were sometimes felt 
by research participants to be suitable only for personal or recreational use (cf. Ward et al., 2009). 
They were often perceived as high-risk, especially by nurses and AHPs, based on concerns about 
privacy and confidentiality and of maintaining appropriate professional boundaries with patients and 
with students. Professional online forums hosted by professional association websites (e.g. iCSP) 
were favoured by AHPs as a means of communication and networking, but were not always 
accessible within NHS network environments, with evident implications for this group of clinicians. 
Noticeable generational differences were observed in use and expectations of social media, with 
students and younger colleagues being perceived as heavy users, but colleagues within the same age 
group far less so, with implications for enculturation and informal guidance in e-professionalism. 
Corporate use of social media for external relations was well established at T3 and T4, but only just 
starting at T1. Individual services at T4 also used Twitter for internal communications. While the 
three Trusts were at different stages of implementation, a gradual process of acceptance was 
evident across all the Trusts in respect of corporate use of social media. External drivers of this 
that were mentioned by participants included NHS Employers and professional bodies. There 
was also an apparent increasing awareness of the possibilities afforded by social media as tools 
for patient, public and staff engagement.  
Regarding personal use of social media, organisational and system policies facilitated this to some 
degree (the quota system in T1 and the BYOD network in T4), but also reflected a continuing 
organisational ambivalence. Policies and guidance produced by regulators (e.g. the Nursing and 
Midwifery Council (NMC), the General Medical Council (GMC), and the Health and Care Professions 
Council (HCPC), were increasingly known to be available, on which training in e-professionalism for 
students and trainees could be based. The educational usefulness of YouTube content appeared to 
have been recognised to some extent relatively recently by IT departments, although restrictions 
were still in place; compare the findings of Elcock (2016), which are presented in full in Appendix P. 
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A discussion of the adoption of social media for corporate communications in terms of models of 
diffusion of innovations will be presented in Chapter 11. 
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Chapter 10. Findings: synthesis of results by Trust 
A synoptic overview of key findings for the three Trusts is set out in Table 10.1 for comparative 
purposes, drawn mainly from Chapters 5 to 9 but incorporating some material from elsewhere, 
notably Section 4.4.4. The main findings are considered below in terms of various aspects of the 
Trusts’ organisational performance and dynamics as discussed in Sections 4.1 and following above: 
financial management, innovativeness, digital maturity, information governance, and working 
relationships with IT services. (Digital maturity is considered here in general terms rather than with 
reference to a specific framework.) 
 
10.1 T1 
T1’s organisational performance overall as indicated by most key metrics (Table 4.2) appeared to be 
relatively good. However anecdotal reports indicated that it suffered from ongoing medical staffing 
shortages, and the annual reports indicated that it was in financial deficit, reported as >£1m in 2014-
15, reduced from >£12m the previous year. Some of the non-clinical services with which the 
researcher had contact (information governance, research, communications, IT, training and 
development) appeared understaffed. This appeared to raise questions concerning T1’s capacity to 
respond to environmental challenges, and to deliver improved effectiveness and financial savings, 
through innovation in its operations and services. Its strategic objective of reducing management 
costs, as indicated in its 2013-14 annual report, is likely to have related to deficit reduction measures 
and to these low staffing levels. In comparison with other NHS organisations, T1 could be considered 
a ‘laggard’ in terms of organisational innovations such as e-learning and use of Web 2.0 and social 
media applications.  
 
In some respects, T1 did not appear to have a high level of digital maturity. The fact that 
development of its IT strategy had been outsourced, as reported by the IT manager T1-11, suggested 
a lack of in-house capacity for strategic planning in terms of IT. It was reported as not yet having a 
full EPR system, though one was planned. Its IT services were, according to participants’ reports, not 
particularly “user-friendly”: there were shortages of PCs in clinical areas, remote access to Trust 
systems did not always work well, and its current intranet (scheduled for replacement) was out of 
date and ‘clunky’ in terms of functionality. The high level of HDAS crashes cited by the librarian T1-
01 is likely to have indicated inadequate network bandwidth. Participants’ comments indicated that 
remote access to Trust email was generally available, but remote logins to the Trust network were 
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enabled only for senior staff. Encrypted USB memory sticks were reported as being difficult to 
obtain, and their use restricted off site. Enterprise-level cloud storage was reported to be available 
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 T1 T3 T4 
Chapter 5. Findings: barriers to information seeking, use and sharing 
5.2.1 Encrypted portable 
media and devices 
Encrypted USB sticks difficult to obtain – 
bureaucratic hurdles / expense? Specific 
permission required for use off-site 
Encrypted USB sticks easy to obtain Encrypted USB sticks expensive - no longer 
issued in practice – though still required in 
policy – confused situation 
5.2.2.2 Remote access Remote access restricted to senior staff Remote access easy to obtain Remote access available – not discussed by 
participants 
 
4.2.3, 
7.2.1, 
7.2.3.8 
Intranets Existing intranet ‘clunky’ and out of date; 
new intranet in development –  
New Hadron intranet planned 
Knowledge manager part of library team 
Adequate intranet, readily accessible without 
login on Trust sites – but T4-LIS reported 
errors in administration 
5.2.3 “Legacy” software 50% PCs upgraded from Windows XP to 
Windows 7 – aiming to complete by April 
2015 
 
Incompatibility of applications with 
Windows XP a hindrance to accessing e-
resources 
 
Process of upgrading to Windows 7 in hand 
– but would not be completed before end 
April 2015 
PC upgrading to Windows 7 from XP – aiming 
to complete by April 2015 – but no funding 
identified – had not publicised plans to end-
users 
5.2.4 System policies and 
permissions 
System policies: unable to install ActiveX 
controls or enable cookies 
 
Effects of system policies not mentioned System locking / encryption on laptops 
affected presentations 
5.3 Browsers Standard browser: IE7, but LIS staff had 
access to Google Chrome 
Standard browser: IE8 Standard browser: IE7, but alternatives 
available as required 
5.2.5, 
5.3, 5.6 
Numbers of PCs in 
clinical areas 
Shortages of PCs on the wards, leading to 
inability to access BNF 
 
 
 
 
Lack of access to BNF an issue  
BNF could not be accessed via the Trust’s 
BlackBerry devices. Some users 
downloaded BNF application for own 
iPhones 
 
 
 
 
 
Shortages of PCs in clinicians’ offices (AHPs) 
BNF not mentioned specifically 
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 T1 T3 T4 
5.2.6 Access to approved 
storage 
Board members and divisional general 
managers provided with Content Locker for 
iPads – a secure collaboration and 
document management application 
 
No cloud storage solution available to other 
staff 
 
Use of Dropbox, OneDrive etc. ‘rationed’ by 
SWG 
No cloud storage solution mentioned  Board members and other senior managers 
provided with BoardPad for iPads – secure 
collaboration and document management 
application 
 
No cloud storage solution available to other 
staff 
 
Staff able to use Google Drive for storage – 
but disliked by IT as possible security risk 
 
Access to Dropbox blocked 
 
1.4.3 Webmail Trusts (other than T2) used domain-based email rather than NHSmail 
5.2.7.1 Webmail Remote access to T1 email via MS Outlook 
Web App was available to all staff via a 
login on the intranet  
 
Allowed other webmail, but not for T1 
business 
 
Attachments in webmail not to be opened, 
on account of malware risk 
Remote access to T3 email available to all 
staff 
 
 
Allowed webmail applications, but not for 
T3 business; only to be used with line 
manager’s permission 
 
 
Remote access to T4 email via MS Outlook 
Web App was available to all staff 
 
Access to Google Mail allowed within T4, 
though IT manager would have preferred to 
block it on security grounds 
 
Hotmail previously blocked, but access 
restored quickly after doctors complained 
(was typically used by junior doctors for 
work-related purposes as alternative to 
frequently changing Trust email) 
 
5.2.7.2 Email attachments Email attachment size limit was 22MB – no 
problems reported 
No problems reported Users encountered problems sending email 
attachments owing to size limit (10MB) 
 
Formerly not been possible to download and 
read attachments in Hotmail messages 
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5.2.7.3 Spam filter and DLP 
false positives 
Spam filter and DLP had sometimes blocked 
receipt and sending of email 
communications from key external 
organisations 
 
No problems reported DLP system blocked only sending of PII 
5.3 
 
 
Use of information 
services by 
clinicians 
Clinicians used e-resources from NHS Evidence and Trust LIS, accessed via OpenAthens 
Also e-resources provided by professional bodies, Google Scholar – as alternative or in addition to NHS Evidence / Trust LIS 
 
 
5.3 Problems with e-
resources 
 Librarians reported problems accessing some major publishers’ content via OpenAthens – 
publishers had not properly implemented it 
Librarian reported HDAS very prone to 
crashing 
 Had implemented alternative to HDAS  
 
LIS conducted regular IP checks on 
availability of e-journals – worked closely 
with IT department 
 
5.5  
See also 
Tables 
5.2, 5.3 
Podcasts Planned to use internally-produced 
podcasts for information dissemination 
Availability of external podcasts unknown 
Planned to use internally-produced 
podcasts for information dissemination – 
but external podcasts unavailable due to 
bandwidth problems 
 
External podcasts available to download 
5.5, 
9.2.2 
 
LIS use of Web 2.0 
and SoMe 
Library active in attempting to develop 
SoMe / Web 2.0-based services – felt that 
obstacles related to lack of understanding 
of cloud services and generational attitudes 
 
No SoMe / Web 2.0 services mentioned by 
librarian 
Library developed SoMe platforms (Pinterest 
for infographics, WordPress for library CAS) – 
accessible to staff via trust network (if 
approved) or BYOD network on personal 
mobile devices 
 
5.5 Online forums Online forums important to AHPs for 
professional discussion and information 
sharing – but blocked within T1 – use not 
encouraged at work 
 
 
 
Online forums not mentioned by 
participants 
Online forums not mentioned by participants 
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 Other Web 2.0 
applications 
 
Web 2.0 applications other than Skype (generally blocked as P2P) generally accessible 
Blogs and 
microblogs 
 
SoMe: blogs, microblogs blocked SoMe: content communities blocked SoMe: blogs, microblogs blocked 
 
 
5.6 LIS support for 
mobile devices 
LIS supporting iOS and Android personal 
mobile devices  
 
LIS maintained national list of clinical 
mobile applications 
 
LIS supporting iOS and Android personal 
mobile devices 
Support for mobile devices not mentioned as 
such by library staff 
Chapter 6. Findings: education and training 
6.1, 6.2, 
6.4.4 
IT infrastructure Delivery of educational content frequently hindered by IT infrastructure issues: network bandwidth, inadequate specification of PCs, lack 
of sound cards and peripherals (e.g. webcams); monitor resolutions too low 
 
New starters unable to access induction e-learning before starting in post – NLMS did not 
allow access to people who were not already registered as staff 
 
New starters problems circumvented at T4 
via use of Moodle 
 
T1 hoped to circumvent via use of new e-
learning portal – not yet tested 
T3 had portal set up for community staff to 
enable them to access e-learning. T3 junior 
doctors’ induction needed to be delivered 
face-to-face for two days 
6.1 
 
NLMS system checker did not work correctly to verify Java versions – national issue 
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  T1 T3 T4 
6.1 IT infrastructure Problems reported related to other PC 
infrastructure issues: lack of webcams and 
hence inability to support teleconferencing; 
near-obsolete PCs whose hardware 
specification that was inadequate to run 
particular e-learning modules (despite 
virtualisation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Major problem with access to e-learning 
had been caused by outsourced T3 provider 
ignoring need to update Java version on 
users’ PCs. Other problems reported with 
with sound and lack of network bandwidth 
hindering or precluding the download of 
podcasts or the viewing of video clips (T3-
19).  
 
 
Java version issue not applicable – used 
Moodle as alternative to NLMS 
 
Problem reported with low screen resolution 
rendering content difficult to view 
 
 
6.2 
 
Network logins for 
students 
AHP students able to obtain network logins 
on same basis as staff 
 
Issue of student logins to Trust network not 
specifically referred to by participants 
 
IT manager wished to implement eduroam 
for students, but no multi-site NHS 
precedents for this; students therefore 
needed to connect to Trust Wi-Fi 
Wards able to be issued by wards – students 
could use these to access Trust network  
 
Library did not issue generic logins  
 
Students unable to log in to clinical systems 
Earlier ban by integrated governance on 
nursing students being given Trust network 
logins had been reviewed – but new policy 
not implemented – student nurses able to 
access Trust intranet only in library, where 
staff could log them on. (Medical students 
had access to PGMC Wi-Fi for iPads) 
 
 
6.3 LIS support for e-
learning 
Library heavily involved in supporting e-
learning:  
-- encouraged use of computer suite for e-
learning and online examinations 
-- provided access to an e-learning 
authoring package for trainers to use 
-- worked closely with postgraduate 
medical centre 
 
Library and training worked closely together 
to promote education and learning 
opportunities: 
-- promotional material about LIS available 
in T3 computer centres 
-- librarian invited to give presentations at 
training events on role of LIS 
 
 
 
Library: 
-- provided computer facilities for students 
-- assisted them with accessing e-resources  
-- ran information literacy training sessions 
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6.3 Scope and 
utilisation of e-
learning 
T1 was just about to roll out the use of e-
learning for clinical and non-clinical 
mandatory and statutory training 
 
E-learning was being used extensively for clinical and non-clinical mandatory and statutory 
training, particularly at induction 
E-learning used within all Trusts to support other professional learning, varied in extent by profession 
 
6.4 Perceived 
disadvantages of e-
learning 
Perceived disadvantages of e-learning: 
-- heavy workload involved in constantly 
updating mandatory and statutory e-
learning in line with Trust policies 
-- diminution / devaluation of subject 
matter experts’ role 
-- easy to underestimate time required / 
overall burden of e-learning requirements 
 
 
 
No disadvantages mentioned by 
participants 
Overall burden of e-learning requirements 
for junior doctors created “overwhelm” 
 
6.4.1 Drivers for adoption 
of e-learning 
Drivers for adoption of e-learning: 
-- poor take-up of day release for face-to 
face training 
-- lack of motivation to attend training 
Specific drivers not mentioned – though  
anecdotal evidence suggested that mental 
health Trusts were early adopters of e-
learning – geographical spread, large 
number of sites an obvious driver – able to 
take study leave to attend IT suites or 
access at home 
 
Drivers for adoption of e-learning: 
-- need for more flexibility in training 
provision 
-- perceived poor quality of face-to-face 
training 
-- lack of motivation to attend training 
 
6.4.2 Timeline and 
development of e-
learning 
E-learning about to be rolled out E-learning well established – “really strong 
culture of e-learning” – advantages evident 
for mental health Trusts – geographical 
spread and large numbers of sites 
 
E-learning well established – started 2009 
6.4.2 Sources of e-
learning content 
 
Professional e-learning content produced by professional bodies and universities – Trusts could use for mandatory training Use of e-
learning, and involvement of professional bodies in producing e-learning, varied widely by profession 
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  Not discussed by participants Producing home-made e-learning too time-
consuming – buying in a better alternative 
E-learning team did not have time to work 
with clinical staff to produce e-learning – 
clinical e-learning therefore produced by 
external developers 
 
6.5 Web 2.0 and SoMe 
use for learning 
Nursing students used Facebook groups – 
but not known how – participant had no 
access 
 
 
Use of podcasts for postgraduate medical 
education planned 
Twitter used to communicate among e-
learning and simulation specialists  
 
Education department maintained active 
Twitter feed 
 
YouTube widely used for teaching – but technical obstacles encountered (e.g. bandwidth limitation) and specific permissions sometimes 
required 
6.6 Use of mobile 
devices for learning 
U3 medical students using iPads to support their learning while on clinical rotations 
 
NLMS used Adobe Flash, therefore could not be accessed on Apple devices (iPads etc.). Could be accessed on some Android and Windows 
devices 
 
Medical students connected to PGMC  
Wi-Fi 
Medical students able to connect to T3 Wi-
Fi 
eduroam retro-fitted across much of site to 
support this – but not available everywhere 
 
‘Rugged’ Android tablets purchased to 
enhance access to e-learning via mobile 
classrooms on wards 
 
Expecting in future to use tablets purchased 
for clinical purposes also for e-learning 
Most staff accessed Trust e-learning via a 
personal or Trust laptop using a VPN and 
remote authentication token 
Staff accessing Trust e-learning content via 
personal Android devices 
 
Use of mobile devices well embedded within 
pharmacy teaching – tutor used NearPod for 
interaction with students via their tablet 
computers 
Otherwise no uses of mobile devices 
reported for educational purposes 
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Chapter 7. Findings: organisational dynamics and professional cultures 
7.2.1 IT strategies No library or training input into IT strategy 
 
Librarian on planning group for new trust 
intranet – but did not feel fully embedded 
in process 
IT manager received strategic input via 
locality management teams – IT 
department represented on these.  
-- Clinical systems user groups for T3’s two 
clinical systems provided important channel 
of communication with IT 
-- IT trainer provided feedback with IT 
issues related to training 
-- No explicit library or training input into IT 
strategic agenda 
-- ‘Dragon’s Den’ process for vetting, 
approving and funding new patient e-
information projects 
 
 
Departmental information groups 
established for each major hospital site and 
for community services; business analyst 
from IT attached to each of these 
 
No library or education input 
7.2.2 Hardware 
procurement 
In all areas except T3 community services, no ring-fenced funding for replacement of IT hardware and peripherals; central funding 
associated only with specific projects; local budget holders responsible for meeting costs 
Reported difficulties in getting new PCs and 
peripherals installed – administrative 
obstacles, lack of funding 
IT department had engaged contractor to 
audit PC specifications, with a view to 
upgrading or replacement 
CQC had identified needed improvements in 
hardware and infrastructure, especially in 
community services  
 
 
Some services reported inadequate or old PC 
hardware, also shortage of PCs. Other 
services well provided for, especially where 
clinical need readily apparent, e.g. radiology 
 
7.2.3.2, 
7.2.3.4 
Experiences of IT 
support 
IT department good with ‘quick fixes’  IT department had failed to resolve a 
problem with Adobe Flash over several 
months – but updated software promptly 
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  Provided email and telephone contact, remote logins to users’ PCs – no web interface to helpdesk 
7.2.3.3, 
7.2.3.6 
  Provided online chat facility  
Difficult to get to speak to anyone in IT 
support, and email communication 
cumbersome – excessive numbers of emails 
generated 
 
Process of logging calls with outsourced IT 
support service S3 slow and impractical – 
telephone queuing system 
 
7.2.3.4  S3 slow to respond to calls relating to clinical systems  
7.2.3.5, 
5.2 
Experiences of IT 
support 
 
IT department perceived as good but as 
under-resourced and struggling with 
outdated infrastructure – tended to focus 
purely on support of clinical systems 
 
 
 
 
 
IT perceived as supporting education, 
training and LIS functions well 
IT department perceived as under-resourced 
in relation to demand – helpdesk tending to 
prioritise clinical systems over educational 
issues 
 
IT worked closely with LIS to keep firewall 
settings up to date for e-journals 
7.2.3.7  Out of hours printing issue in library 
unresolved for 10 years – perceived lack of 
alignment of IT business priorities – 
restricted library use for staff working shifts 
IT manager seemingly unaware that LIS had 
computers on the Trust network as well as 
the university network 
No specific alignment issues mentioned by 
participants 
No specific alignment issues mentioned by 
participants – but problem getting donated 
iPads configured to provide patient 
information 
7.2.3.6  Head of IT Services habitually failed to 
respond to communications, but other staff 
better 
 
 
 
 
No communications issues with in-house IT 
reported 
T4-22 unable to speak to a senior member of 
staff to resolve specialist support issues 
 
Information governance contact with 
informatics was minimal despite physical 
proximity of offices – information 
governance function was excluded from 
major projects 
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7.2.3.8  IT management culture in NHS perceived as 
engendering negative attitudes to end-
users compared with other sectors – staff 
who came from a private sector 
environment thought to be more amenable 
Cultural divide perceived between IT and 
other staff  
 
T1 IT department perceived by librarian as 
highly ambivalent towards LIS 
Some IT staff perceived as patronising 
towards end-users 
 
IT staff attitudes not raised as an issue by 
participants 
Negative / exclusive IT staff attitudes 
reported by records and governance 
manager 
7.2.3.9 Experiences of IT 
support 
Users generally positive about quality of IT 
support: staff helpful, polite and prompt to 
respond to support requests 
In-house IT perceived as very good – 
steadily improved over librarian’s 9 years in 
post 
Contrasting reports received of outsourced 
IT (S3): some good, some very poor  
 
Quality of IT support perceived as having 
improved over last few years 
7.3 
 
Perceptions of LIS Library well regarded by clinicians 
 
Reported that better domain knowledge 
would improve quality of mediated 
literature searches 
Library well regarded by clinicians – though 
clinical tutor regretted the lack of a physical 
library presence – librarian described as 
“excellent” 
 
Reported that better domain knowledge 
would improve quality of mediated 
literature searches 
 
Library well regarded by clinicians – for 
quality of support to users and scope of e-
resources 
LIS provided current awareness service 
focused on specific patient safety areas: 
safer medicines administration, falls, 
pressure sores 
 
 
 
 
LIS provided customised current awareness 
service to nurses in community services 
LIS maintained current awareness portal 
No other current awareness services 
mentioned 
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7.3 Evidence-based 
practice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EPB initiatives focused on specific patient 
safety areas 
 
Management practice perceived as 
referring insufficiently to published sources 
of evidence 
 
AU1 expressed strongly positive view of the 
use of the Internet for information seeking 
 
Strong culture of EPB – reflected in 6 C’s 
adopted as T3 values statement 
EBP initiatives not mentioned by participants 
 
Clinical teacher T4-05 mentioned need to 
keep teaching material fully up-to-date with 
results of most recent research 
 
Use of published evidence by radiographers 
embedded in the IRMER regulations 
governing requests for radiographic images 
7.4.1 Cultural attitudes 
to IT 
Significant proportion of staff averse to 
using computers 
 
Some community staff tended to avoid 
using computers and would not avail 
themselves of training opportunities that 
were presented to them 
 
Techno-stress cited as a reason given for 
community nursing staff taking early 
retirement 
Computer aversion / non-use cited in general 
by T4-22 as an aspect of wider problems with 
NHS IT, but no specific instances offered 
Paper-based communication still 
predominated within Trust – use of email to 
communicate with staff was problematic – 
not everyone used the Trust email - allowed 
their accounts to expire 
7.4.2 
 
Attitudes to e-
learning 
Nursing students’ reasons for disliking e-
learning: lack of interaction with other 
students; insecurity with subject matter 
(pronunciations of terms etc.); disliked 
discussion boards; poor usability 
 Junior doctors suffering from e-learning 
overwhelm 
 
E-learning staff emphasised importance of 
improving usability and debugging when e-
learning introduced 
T3 e-learning developer spent a great deal 
of effort on improving usability 
Usability not referred to by e-learning staff 
7.5 Attitudes to Web 
2.0  
and SoMe 
Peer monitoring of social media content by 
student nurses 
E-professionalism training provided: what 
and what not to post, privacy settings 
Level of risk of using social media in 
professional contexts generally perceived as 
unacceptably high 
 
 
 
Clinician participants keen to use social 
media to improve patient engagement with 
community health services – but perceived 
as high risk undertaking – unaware of 
guidance available from communications 
department 
Saw NHS culture as a powerful disincentive 
to use of Twitter 
 
Concerned with reputation of the Trust 
 
Need expressed for further training and 
guidance 
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 T1 T3 T4 
7.6, 5.6 
 
Mobile devices Strong sense among clinicians (T1, T3, some professional groups in T4) that “personal smartphones and tablets aren’t really acceptable for 
use in a patient environment” 
 
Medical students strongly discouraged from taking iPads into clinical areas – written policy 
 
Clinicians’ stated views about content of policies restricting use of mobile devices sometimes at variance with actual policies 
 
Student nurses discouraged from using 
mobile phones in clinical areas 
Pharmacist cited departmental and Trust 
policies prohibiting use of mobile phones in 
clinical areas 
Pharmacist cited Trust policy as precluding 
the use of personal smartphones in clinical 
areas  
Laptops and Windows 8 tablets the 
preferred mobile devices – only 20-25 iPads 
in use 
Trust BlackBerry mobile phones unable to 
access the web 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctors and pharmacists at T4 commonly 
used own smartphones for work purposes – 
may have been facilitated by BYOD. No 
actual restrictions in T4 on use of mobile 
phones in particular areas – but perceived as 
a matter of “professionalism” that mobile 
phones should not be used in clinical areas 
 
Trust mobile phones available to all staff who 
needed them – but some very out of date 
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97
 Material from Section 4.4.4, Secure web gateways, is also included in detail here on account of its close relationship with the content of Chapter 8. 
 T1 T3 T4 
Chapter 8. Findings: information governance and security97 
8 
passim 
Cybersecurity No cybersecurity incidents reported at any of the Trusts within previous few years 
8.2 
 
Acceptable use 
policies 
All AUPs included key constituents as identified by Gallagher, McMenemy and Poulter (2015) 
All banned illegal activities as described in computer misuse legislation 
  AU1 sought to encourage both work-related 
and recreational information seeking in 
accordance with the policy which did not 
interfere with work 
Internet use at work “a privilege not a right” 
Allowed limited personal use 
Specifically banned were:  
-- online shopping without prior approval 
-- sending of unreasonably large email 
attachments not required for business 
purposes 
-- deliberate viewing of pornography other 
than for legitimate study and research 
-- use of P2P applications (e.g. Skype)  
 
AU3: allowed personal use of email and 
web on similar terms to AU1 
 
-- Included gambling among prohibited 
activities 
-- Personal email to be identified as such 
with ‘PERSONAL’ in the subject line and 
deleted after two weeks 
-- Unintentional access to ‘offensive’ sites to 
be logged as an incident 
AU4Int: Personal use of the web and email 
during breaks required permission of line 
manager 
Installation of additional software or plugins 
required permission of IT department 
No viewing of pornography allowed for ANY 
reason 
Long lists of categories of unacceptable 
material –  apparently derived verbatim from 
SWG4 documentation 
Specific warning about downloadable files 
Threats of disciplinary sanctions for Internet 
misuse 
General minatory tone 
Use of P2P applications (e.g. Skype) banned 
Downloads required to conform with 
copyright legislation  
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  T1 T3 T4 
  AU1 authored by Head of ICT 
Lead director – Medical Director 
Approved by information governance 
committee 
Equality impact statement provided 
List provided of staff groups consulted 
Implemented March 2013 
Review date March 2016 
 
 
 
AU3 authored by Head of IT 
Lead director: Director of Operations 
Approved by records and clinical systems 
group 
Equality impact statement provided 
List provided of staff groups consulted 
Implemented March 2017 
Review date March 2016 
 
 
 
AU4Int authored by Head of Informatics 
 
Approved by “Trust information governance” 
in lieu of IM&T steering group, at that time in 
abeyance 
Ratified by staff side representatives of Trust 
Negotiating and Staff Side Committee – no 
other staff groups consulted 
No equality impact statement provided 
Implemented March 2011 
Review date March 2012 – past review date 
8.3 
 
 
Monitoring of staff 
web use 
In accordance with RIPA 2000, records were kept of web use, but individual usage was monitored only at the request of a line manager in 
cases of concern 
Frequency of monitoring requests not 
referred to by IT manager 
IT manager received monitoring requests 
about every two months 
Frequency of monitoring requests not 
referred to by IT manager 
8.3 
 
Monitoring of staff 
web use 
SWG1 sent automatic notification to IT 
department of attempts to access blocked 
websites  
One participant expressed concern at 
consequences of this – inhibited her 
searching - but were not acted upon by IT 
IT department also notified managers of 
excessive non-work-related web use 
 
Little monitoring of compliance with 
information security policies in practice, 
though penalties for misuse stated in 
policies 
According to AU3, line managers could in 
principle be contacted regarding attempts 
to access a blocked site – but actual 
occurrences not described by participants 
 
IT manager reported regularly to records 
and clinical systems group on “top ten 
websites visited” 
 
SWG4 sent automatic notification to IT 
department of attempts to access blocked 
websites 
One participant expressed concern at 
consequences of this – but not acted upon 
by IT 
No routine monitoring undertaken by any of the Trusts of content filtering accuracy 
4.4.4 
 
 
 
Secure web 
gateways 
No under-blocking reported  IT manager received requests from 
managers periodically to block sites 
deemed inappropriate that were not 
blocked by SWG3 – unclear what nature of 
sites was or whether added manually to 
blacklist – suggestive of under-blocking 
No under-blocking reported 
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  T1 T3 T4 
  Focus of SWG1 promotional material solely 
on preventing inappropriate web use 
 
 
 
 
Case studies of SWG3 implementation in 
NHS referred to problems presented for 
clinicians by over-blocking 
“Over-blocking a huge problem for the 
NHS” 
P2 (IT manager whose Trust used SWG3) 
unaware of any problems of website 
blocking 
 
 
 
Focus of SWG4 promotional material solely 
on preventing inappropriate web use 
4.4.4 
 
Secure web 
gateways 
Quotas implemented for usage of many 
Web 2.0 applications – though apparently 
not publicised 
 
Offered facility to set up different access 
levels according to job role – again not 
implemented 
 
Offered a facility for analysing security 
threats posed by particular URLs or IP 
addresses and reporting incorrectly 
categorised websites; unlikely, however, 
that end-users within the Trust would have 
accessed it 
Offered facility to set quotas for usage of 
many Web 2.0 applications – but not 
implemented 
 
Also offered: 
-- facility for delegated temporary 
unblocking of blocked content to select 
users and managers – not implemented 
-- facility to set up different access levels 
according to job role – not implemented 
 
Offered facility to set up different access 
levels according to job role – not 
implemented 
4.4.4 Secure web 
gateways 
Offered ‘granular’ controls on functionality 
of social networking applications 
 
Offered ‘granular’ controls on functionality 
of social networking applications 
Did not offer fully granular social media 
controls 
Default categories of restricted web 
content implemented 
Implementation of web access controls not 
discussed by IT manager 
Default categories of restricted web content 
implemented – extensive 
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  T1 T3 T4 
8.4 
 
 
Endpoint security Did not implement locking of PC screens No endpoint security issues mentioned by 
participants 
Endpoint security perceived as lax: printing 
emails, port control for USB memory sticks 
non-existent; situation confused re: 
availability of encrypted USB sticks 
 
All Trusts still using older versions of browsers – compatibility with legacy applications – potential security risk 
All Trusts still using Windows XP – potential security risk 
8.5.1 Blocking of 
websites 
Blocking of websites reported to NICE manager by librarians as a frequently-occurring problem 
8.5.1 Frequency / extent 
of blocking 
Very little blocking of web content 
mentioned – though pharmacist reported 
carrying out searches at home on account 
of it 
 
Very little blocking of web content on 
internal network – more occurring on 
outsourced network  
Some clinical staff experienced very high 
levels of website blocking – “constant” or 
“daily” or “weekly” – but library encountered 
relatively few – one a month 
 
 
 
 
8.5.2 What was blocked? No specific content types mentioned by 
participants 
 
 
 
Sites relating to eating disorders and sexual 
behaviour blocked 
Web filter tended to block material 
containing images or advertisements, 
including sponsored Google listings 
Configuration to block advertising was a 
matter of policy, but sometimes the entire 
site was unintentionally blocked 
8.5.3 
 
Responses to 
encountering 
blocked websites 
 
Low levels of reporting - IT manager 
reported that only five requests to unblock 
websites had been received by helpdesk 
within last 18 months 
 
IT manager did not discuss reporting levels 
– but likely to have been low in line with 
low incidence of blocked websites 
Despite high levels of blocking, participants 
described making very few reports to IT of 
blocked content: “I just shrug”, “I have given 
in trying”, “I’ve actually stopped trying to 
access now” 
Likely that many blocked sites unreported 
Participants in all three Trusts reported that staff postponed web searches and carried them out at home on account of website blocking 
 
All Trusts had processes for getting websites unblocked – sometimes IT consulted information governance if in doubt 
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  T1 T3 T4 
  Blocked websites unblocked promptly by IT Library and pharmacy staff reported that 
their unblocking requests were trusted 
without further checking 
Blocked websites unblocked promptly by IT 
Time taken to unblock websites varied 
widely – required second-line support 
engineer to action – could be “fairly quick” 
but sometimes took several days 
 
8.5.4 Effects of website 
blocking 
Effects not described by participants Effects not described by participants Effects or impacts of website blocking: 
frustration, annoyance, ‘infuriating’ 
 
Work-life balance, productivity, personal and 
organisational effectiveness affected through 
continually encountering blocked sites and 
needing to work at home 
 
IT manager acknowledged issue but was not 
considered a matter of concern for IT 
services 
 
  IT manager essentially pragmatic in overall 
approach: “my main … role is making sure 
that things keep on working here … people 
can come in, log on to the computer, and 
do their job” 
IT managers seemed far more focused on suspected or actual computer misuse and the 
possible attendant security risks (insider threats) than on problems caused by lack of 
accuracy of web filtering 
8.5.5 Awareness of 
national measures 
All IT managers unaware of national whitelist 
Librarian aware of list but said it was not 
implemented within T1 
 
Librarian aware of list but said it was not 
implemented within T3 
Records and governance manager, librarian 
unaware of list 
IT manager did not indicate whether he had 
seen the letter from NICE, but stated that 
there were no NPfIT legacy applications in 
T1 requiring the use of older browsers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IT manager not seen letter re: browsers 
from NICE 
Unable to ascertain whether IT manager had 
seen letter – could have gone to Head of 
Informatics 
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  T1 T3 T4 
8.6 Information 
governance and 
education 
Issues relating to information governance 
and education not mentioned by 
participants 
 
 
Unable to record real-life clinical scenarios 
for teaching purposes on account of a 
recording issue: information governance 
insistent that the removable media within 
the recording device be encrypted, but the 
device could not write to encrypted media 
 
Images of children removed from paediatric 
nephrology presentations sent out to 
delegates following conference – unsure of 
precise rationale for this practice or whether 
it related to a formal policy 
Chapter 9. Findings: communications policies and practices 
9.2.1 Corporate use of 
SoMe 
T1 just starting to experiment with SoMe 
for external communications  
 
New SoMe policy recently launched 
 
Apparent discrepancy between policy and 
SWG configuration 
Use of SoMe for external communications 
with other organisations well established – 
piloting SoMe communications with 
patients and public 
 
Restrictive policies on internal use 
Use of SoMe for external communications 
well established – delegated to individual 
departments 
Restrictive policies on internal use – but 
mitigated in practice by BYOD – network 
settings less restrictive 
Policies intended to cover both work-related and personal uses of social media from wherever they were accessed 
 
 Web 2.0 and SoMe 
policy in relation to 
media strategies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Information governance responsible for 
SoMe policy 
Communications department responsible 
for SoMe policy 
AUP for Internet and email use held by 
informatics department 
 
SoMe4 policy held by communications 
department in association with human 
resources and union representatives 
 
Departmental social media guides the 
responsibility of individual departments 
concerned 
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  T1 T3 T4 
9.2.1 
 
Web 2.0 and SoMe 
policy in relation to 
media strategies 
SoMe1 cited opportunities for research, 
raising awareness of topical health issues, 
public engagement and the chance to 
establish a wider and more diverse 
professional network 
 
Blocking access to social media for most 
staff within the Trust was a matter of policy 
 
Acknowledging that many staff were 
accessing social media via personal mobile 
devices 
SoMe3 did not discuss possible advantages 
of SoMe use 
SoMe4 referred to the benefits of sharing 
knowledge and skills outside the 
organisation 
 
Acknowledged existing uses of social media 
by staff members 
 
Expressed Trust’s wish to encourage and 
support these 
9.2.1 
 
Web 2.0 and SoMe 
policy policy in 
relation to media 
strategies 
 
SoMe1 referred to the need to ensure the 
operational effectiveness of the Trust and 
to avoid bringing T1 and the NHS generally 
into disrepute 
SoMe3 and SoMe4 referred to the need to ensure the operational effectiveness of the Trust 
and to avoid bringing the Trust into disrepute 
  SoMe1 referred to the need for 
professionalism in the use of social media 
Incorporated standard warnings not to 
breach confidentiality directly or indirectly  
-- through the posting of PII or photographs 
online 
-- through sharing information about the 
Trust that was otherwise sensitive or 
subject to non-disclosure agreements 
 
SoMe3 and SoMe4 referred to the need for professionalism in the use of social media 
 
Incorporated standard warnings not to breach confidentiality directly or indirectly  
-- through the posting of PII or photographs online 
-- through sharing information about the Trusts that was otherwise sensitive 
  All policies also specifically prohibited the posting of:  
-- material likely to contravene diversity or bullying and harassment policies 
-- that was in any other way illegal 
All stressed that:  
-- disciplinary action could be taken for inappropriate use of social media 
-- civil proceedings or criminal prosecution could also result 
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  SoMe1: 
-- Very detailed and prescriptive 
-- Precluded posting of photos on SoMe 
personal sites of staff in uniform on in an 
identifiable work setting 
-- Enjoined staff to use real names if 
associating themselves in any way with T1 
-- Included procedures for dealing alleged 
bullying and harassment via social media 
-- Urged staff to be aware of possibility of 
information being shared without their 
permission or knowledge 
-- Stressed need for factual accuracy 
 
 
SoMe3: 
-- Brief in nature 
-- Prohibited posting of PII and illegal 
content 
-- SoMe content should represent T3 and 
not offer personal opinions or views 
-- Staff strongly advised to consider the 
implications of any material published 
online 
-- Staff wishing to utilise SoMe tools 
extensively for the purpose of sharing 
information in a professional capacity 
enjoined to seek advice from 
communications team  
 
SoMe4:  
Included recommendations regarding privacy 
settings and general safe behaviour online 
-- Stated that posting of photographs on sites 
such as Facebook required specific 
permission from the subjects 
-- Stressed that staff were responsible not 
only for content that they posted themselves 
on social media sites, but also for the 
content of comments that they permitted to 
be displayed 
-- Staff enjoined to refrain from identifying 
T4 colleagues by name, as well as patients 
-- Staff referred to social media guidance 
produced by their own professional body or 
regulator 
 
9.2.1 
 
Web 2.0 and SoMe 
policy  
 
Policy, experiences of misuse, and attitudes 
appeared closely inter-related  
 
Implementation of policy in T1 appeared 
confused 
 
Popular SoMe applications were ‘supposed’ 
to be blocked, but in fact were only subject 
to a quota system, although functionality 
was restricted 
Access to “professional” sites, such as 
LinkedIn and Academia.edu, routinely 
allowed in T3, but not access to Facebook 
 
SWG3 allowed ‘granular’ controls on 
popular SoMe sites – but not implemented 
Facebook, Twitter and other popular social 
media platforms blocked by default in T4 
Requests for access required:  
-- demonstration of specific business need 
-- authorisation by a line manager 
 
SWG4 allowed read-only access to popular 
SoMe sites - but not implemented 
 
Staff frequently accessed SoMe from own 
mobile devices via BYOD network 
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9.2.3 
 
Staff experiences 
and perceptions of 
Web 2.0 / SoMe 
and related policies 
 
Indifference or negative attitudes towards SoMe widespread 
 
Suggested by participants that a marked generational divide existed in attitudes to SoMe: younger staff comfortable and familiar, older 
staff negative 
 
T1’s policy and practices described as ‘risk-
averse’, as ‘reactive’, and as seeking to 
exercise control for its own sake 
 
One participant (HR) described them as ‘IT-
led’ and expressing tight control – missing a 
major opportunity for public and staff 
engagement 
 
But records and governance manager in 
favour of a total ban on SoMe access – 
concerned about adverse effect on staff 
productivity 
 
T3-19 said she felt frustrated and 
demeaned by the need to secure 
unblocking and permission from IT for use 
of YouTube for training 
SoMe policies and practices not commented 
on as such by participants 
T1 library had experienced problems getting 
use of Prezi approved – situation appeared 
confused 
 
Librarian had been told that ‘no Trust-
related SoMe activity would be allowed 
until the social media policy was developed’ 
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9.2.4.1 Drivers of corporate 
use of SoMe 
Local drivers for SoMe use perceived to be: 
 
-- possibilities for recruitment of staff (T1-
03) 
 
-- provider and partner organisations’ 
adoption of SoMe (T1-01) 
 
-- perceived benefits for staff engagement 
and health of organisational culture (T1-02). 
 
Corporate use of SoMe only just beginning 
to be discussed 
 
Culture of Trust another negative factor; 
professional social networking at work 
perceived as ‘slacking’ 
Decision to use SoMe corporately in T3 
described by communications officer as 
driven fundamentally by the need for 
patient engagement, particularly in CAMHS 
 
Rationale for using SoMe: going to where 
people are 
 
A necessary balance of risk and reward in 
using SoMe 
 
Use of SoMe platforms by T3’s partners and 
providers of outsourced services another 
factor in spread of SoMe use: now “gently 
washing in” (T3-09) 
 
Publications of NHS Employers cited as an 
important general influence on SoMe use 
by Trusts 
 
 
 
 
No specific drivers for SoMe use discussed by 
participants 
9.2.4.2 Patterns of SoMe 
use 
Communications officer had resisted 
adoption of SoMe it on account of workload  
 
Was concerned about possible negative 
feedback from patients and how to manage 
or control it 
 
 
 
 
SoMe used extensively for: 
-- research dissemination 
-- patient and public engagement 
-- sharing innovation in professional practice 
 
SoMe activities closely regulated by communications department 
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        Table 10.1 Summary and comparison of findings by Trust
 T1 T3 T4 
9.2.4.2 Patterns of SoMe 
use 
Trust charity – but not T1 itself – had a 
Facebook page 
No corporate T3 Facebook page 
 
Use of Facebook successfully piloted by 
locality health promotion services 
 
T3 Twitter feed retweeted items of general 
interest about mental health 
Umbrella corporate T4 Facebook presence 
 
Facebook page seemed to feature mostly 
news items from “media centre” of T4 
website 
 
Many individual Twitter feeds for T4’s 
individual departments and services 
T4 LIS had current awareness portal and 
Pinterest site for infographics 
 
9.3 Mobile devices and 
SoMe 
No discrete mobile devices policy as such 
 
General prohibition in force on use of 
smartphones in clinical areas – related to 
concern about breaches of confidentiality 
or privacy 
 
BYOD specifically prohibited 
 
 
Had specific mobile devices policy 
 
No ban on using mobile phones in clinical 
areas – but users enjoined to ‘be aware of, 
and respect, local policies regarding the use 
of mobile communications devices’ 
 
Users warned that on T3 mobile phones: 
-- all calls logged by network provider 
 
-- ‘there should be no expectation of 
privacy in anything created, sent, stored or 
received’  
All T4-owned mobile devices were to have 
MDM enabled 
 
Mobile apps that were installed on such 
devices required to be licensed and 
purchased through authorised sources 
 
As far as possible, users were enjoined to 
avoid storing T4 data on mobile devices 
 
Personal mobile devices on BYOD network 
required PIN protection via Trust-approved 
security application 
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only to senior managers in conjunction with the use of iPads for document management, and use of 
personal cloud storage solutions was reported to be restricted. The service provided by the IT 
department was perceived by participants as good in terms of technical capability, but as struggling 
with inadequate staffing levels and outdated infrastructure, and hence focused on maintaining 
clinical systems as its main operational priority. It is likely that the task of EPR implementation was 
placing a particular strain on its resources. There were also indications from participants’ comments 
of poor communication on the part of IT managers and staff, and of insufficient alignment to 
business needs. Some aspects of IT services appeared to be good: Wi-Fi coverage was adequate 
across most of the main hospital site, plans for upgrading from Windows XP were well in hand, and it 
had implemented a market-leading secure web gateway; also, no legacy NPfIT applications remained 
in use. Very little blocking of legitimate websites was reported. Participants indicated that 
alternatives to the standard web browser (IE7) were available to staff according to business need. 
 
While working relationships between information governance and IT management seemed to be 
harmonious and collaborative, marked differences of attitude and approach were apparent between 
the two groups in relation to policy development. The IT manager T1-11 described his overall 
approach to information security management as “pragmatic”; his focus was on “making sure that 
things keep on working here”. He contrasted this with the tendencies of T1’s information 
governance, which he perceived as “always [wanting] to tighten things down”. For their part, 
information governance managers, as indicated by their comments, were apparently concerned 
about computer misuse, particularly in relation to social media, and tended to see IT staff as 
concerning themselves exclusively with technical matters at the expense of risk governance issues.  
 
T1’s approach to Web 2.0 and social media, as represented in its policies and in the attitudes of 
nursing, information governance and communication managers as apparent from their comments, 
seemed cautious to the point of negativity. Past occurrences of flagrant misuse, leading to 
heightened concern about breaches of confidentiality and privacy, as well as under-resourcing of the 
communications function, appeared to underlie this. This marked tendency was offset to some 
extent, however, by the approach of T1-11, who had implemented via the secure web gateway a 
flexible “rationing” approach to many social media and Web 2.0 applications. As indicated by 
apparently conflicting accounts from participants, confusion seemed to exist about the 
implementation of policy. Support from the university on site (U2) appeared to have assisted the 
library in maintaining a high-profile, innovative service to Trust staff and students, including the 
facilitation of e-learning initiatives and use of personal mobile devices for information purposes. 
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The relatively low level of research activity at T1, as indicated by national and Trust reports, may 
have been a factor in the researcher’s difficulty in recruiting respondents at this site. It has a possible 
relationship also with the reported lack of emphasis on evidence-based practice other than in 
relation to specific patient safety initiatives. 
 
10.2 T3 
T3 gave the appearance of being a stable, cohesive, high-performing, and innovative organisation 
within the limits of its resources. It organisational performance overall, as indicated by key metrics 
(Table 4.2) was good. It reported a small financial surplus. Its library service was described by the 
librarian T3-01 as largely electronic, and the librarian fulfilled a clinical librarian role (itself innovative 
within mental health) as well as a management one. E-learning was reported by participants as being 
well-established within the culture of the Trust, being delivered in close partnership with library 
services, and well-supported by the IT department. Other comments indicated that there was also a 
strong culture of evidence-based practice, reflected in the adoption of the ‘6 C’s’ as T3’s statement 
of values, and likely to be related to its relatively high level of research activity.  
 
T3 appeared to have a moderate level of digital maturity. Mental health and community services had 
both successfully implemented EPR systems some time previously. The provision of IT services was 
split between the community services, where it was outsourced, and the mental health services, 
where it was provided in-house. The in-house service was well-regarded by participants; however, 
evaluations of the outsourced service (S3) were mixed. It was planned to take the outsourced service 
in-house, as being more cost-effective. S3 had conspicuously failed to address a support issue 
related to the NLMS, leading to major problems of staff disengagement from e-learning within 
community services before it was eventually resolved. In-house IT services were reported by 
participants to be user-friendly in respect of contact and communication with the helpdesk, 
availability of remote access to the Trust network and email system, and availability of encrypted 
portable media. Wi-Fi coverage was available across the Trust estate, although its quality was 
described as variable; a process existed to report poor signals. According to the IT department 
strategy, laptops were the preferred mobile device; little use was made of tablets or smartphones. 
Trust mobile phones were reported to be of a dated type, and unable to access the web. Plans for 
upgrading PCs from Windows XP were reported to be not on schedule to meet the deadline for the 
end of Microsoft support. The IT manager reported difficulty in persuading service managers to 
upgrade or replace obsolete PC hardware. 
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Participants reported that, after a lengthy process of deliberation and discussion, T3 had adopted a 
social media strategy in respect of its external communications. Judging from reports of the 
availability or otherwise of particular applications, individual staff access to and use of social media 
and Web 2.0 applications appeared to be limited; in practice, T3 was the most restrictive of the 
three Trusts in this respect.  
 
Information governance functions were delegated to a considerable extent across individual 
departments and services, with the records and governance manager T3-03 exercising a 
coordinating role, and also being responsible for the annual IGT returns. Working relationships 
between information governance and IT were reportedly collaborative in character. In respect of 
attitudes to computer misuse, T3-03 expressed a considerably higher level of trust in the good 
intentions of staff that those of the IT manager T3-06, who appeared from his comments to be very 
focused on measures to report and reduce personal web use (PWU), which he perceived as 
presenting a malware risk. T3-06 stated that under-blocking of inappropriate web content was 
sometimes reported to him. Other than monitoring of individual web use at the request of managers 
who had particular concerns about possible individual misuse (as with the other Trusts), actual policy 
and practice in respect of PWU did not extend to measures other than the regular reporting to the 
records and clinical systems group of the “top ten” websites visited by Trust staff as a whole. Also it 
did not appear to be reflected in a restrictive configuration of the SWG, since very little blocking of 
legitimate websites occurred within the in-house network. T3-06 stated, however, that he would 
have liked, had resources allowed, to undertake more extensive analysis and reporting of PWU. Two 
factors in particular may have influenced T3-03’s sanguine attitude to information security: the 
limited extent of T3’s forensic service provision (4.1.1), and the very small number of recent 
information governance incidents (4.1.2.2). 
 
10.3 T4 
T4 was a very large teaching hospital Trust, which was in financial surplus and planning for new 
capital projects and growth of its specialist services and research activities. It was also planning 
developments of its IT infrastsructure. Its organisational performance overall as indicated by most 
key metrics (Table 4.2) was good. Trust documents indicated that the reconfiguration of services 
following the takeover of a neighbouring Trust was not complete at the time of the study. 
 
T4’s library service was evidently well resourced in terms of premises, holdings and staff, and was 
reported by clinicians to provide an excellent service to Trust staff and students. To obviate the 
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deficiencies of HDAS, it had implemented an alternative interface to bibliographic databases, EBSCO 
Discovery Service. In many respects T4, as indicated in Trust documents and the comments of 
interview participants, demonstrated a high level of digital maturity: it was highly innovative with 
respect to its use both of clinical and of non-clinical IT, and further major investment in its 
infrastructure and systems was planned. The innovativeness of T4 in general as an organisation is 
likely to have related to its position as a major teaching and research centre. It had been successful 
in its NTF bid for mobile devices to support community staff; it had implemented an automated 
tracking system for clinical observations, and had developed a successful business intelligence 
system. It had introduced BYOD, and was working on developing a “home-grown” EPR system. 
Enterprise-level cloud storage was available to senior managers in conjunction with the use of iPads 
for document management; otherwise, staff were able to use Google Drive for cloud storage, though 
its use was deplored as potentially insecure (T4-20).  
 
However, judging from participants’ comments, IT staff were very stretched to deliver good quality 
technical support. It is likely that EPR development and implementation, in particular, was placing a 
considerable burden on IT services. Failure of service managers to fund the replacement or 
upgrading of obsolete PC hardware and peripherals, as reported by some participants, would have 
added to this. The latter issue was reported in some instances to be hampering clinicians’ work. 
Information governance as a function appeared to be subordinated to IT, while communication 
between information governance managers and IT services was reported to be minimal. Information 
governance was reported as a low organisational priority in practice, and poor in respect of the 
implementation of basic security measures such as issue and use of encrypted USB memory sticks 
and USB port blocking (T4-09). Despite this, no serious information governance incidents (SIRI Level 
2 or above) had occurred in the recent past. Compared with the other Trusts, it was evident from the 
texts that there had been little consultation between IT and other staff groups in developing IT 
security and acceptable use policies. For the latter, the scheduled review was well overdue. The IT 
department was not required to support e-learning, for which the training department retained the 
services of its own Moodle developer and system administrator. E-learning was reported to be well 
established. The use of Moodle as the host for T4’s e-learning meant that some of the logistical and 
technical difficulties presented for e-learning by the NLMS as reported by training staff in the other 
Trusts, in particular the “new starters” issue, were obviated. 
 
A high level of blocking of websites was reported as occurring, which was likely to have related to 
several specific technical issues which are discussed in detail in Section 11.3.2 below. The adverse 
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effects on online information seeking appeared from participants’ comments to be considerable, 
particularly for clinical educators and other clinical staff who needed to make extensive use of web 
search engines in the course of their work. Like his counterpart at T3, the IT manager responsible for 
SWG4 believed that PWU presented a malware risk in se. He acknowledged that, although he was 
aware of users’ complaints about blocked websites, he was faced with numerous competing 
operational pressures, and chose not to act on them. The failure of IT services to engage with the 
information governance function could have excluded a possible organisational avenue through end-
users could address the problem of over-blocking. He did not generate any form of report for 
managers on the extent of PWU. 
 
While many Web 2.0 and social media applications were reported as blocked on the T4 network, the 
effects of this were apparently mitigated to a considerable extent by BYOD: a separate wireless 
network had been set up to support BYOD, on which the settings were in most cases less stringent, 
allowing staff to circumvent the restrictions. Responsibilities for corporate communications using 
social media were delegated to individual departments and services. 
 
The following chapter builds upon the results chapters and draws together the findings to develop a 
possible model of the effects of deficiencies in IT infrastructure and of the blocking of legitimate 
websites. It provides a discussion of the adoption of social media for corporate and individual 
professional communications in terms of diffusion of innovation theory and Maslow’s hierarchy of 
needs.  
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Chapter 11. Discussion and interpretation 
11.1 Introduction 
This chapter starts by proposing a possible unifying theoretical model across the different topic 
areas as presented in Chapters 4 to 10, drawing on a variety of frameworks to identify the main 
factors which have been found to determine levels of access to published information, and to 
represent the ways in which they interact. It goes on to set some of the main findings within a wider 
context.  
  
Wilson’s updated model of information behaviour (Wilson, 1997, 1999; 2.4.2) suggests that 
information seeking behaviour is influenced by what he termed intervening variables. These are 
contextual factors, the impact of which may be “supportive of information use as well as preventive” 
(1999, p. 256); they may be psychological, demographic, role-related or interpersonal, and 
environmental in nature. In terms of this model, the present study has focused on environmental 
variables of a technical and organisational nature with NHS Trusts. The data analyses, taken in 
conjunction with the literature review, suggested that the environmental factors in operation could 
be categorised under the following major headings:  
 
 Power, culture, trust and risk in information security (11.3). 11.3 is subdivided into six 
discrete areas, each of which is discussed in turn: blocking of websites (11.3.2) and 
mandatory use of encrypted portable media (11.3.3); empowerment, engagement and 
access to information (11.3.4), information security / governance risk (11.3.5), and impact of 
information governance / security incidents (11.3.6). Blocking of websites and mandatory 
use of encrypted portable media (11.3.2, 11.3.3) are discussed in terms of the “satisficing” 
and information source horizon concepts (Sonnenwald, 1999; Fourie and Claasen-Veldsman, 
2011) (2.4.2) and of Inglesant and Sasse’s (2011a, 2001b) application of Clegg’s (1989) 
circuits of power theory to information security (2.5.6.2). Staff empowerment, engagement 
and access to information (11.3.4) are discussed in relation to Kanter’s (1993) theory of 
structural empowerment (2.5.6.1). The discussion of information security / governance risk 
(11.3.5) makes reference to sociological theories of risk (2.7.1). 
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Figure 11.1 Factors determining access to published information within the NHS  
 
Legend 
Solid black arrows: lines of organisational influence 
Dashed blue arrows: lines of departmental responsibility 
Dotted black arrow: pertinent infrastructure issue  
Solid blue arrow: line of influence of level of resources 
Coloured boxes for stakeholder groups: colours are those of the thematic maps (Chapters 4-9) 
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 Professional relationships (11.5).  The consideration of professional relationships (11.5) 
draws extensively on Abbott’s theory of the system of professions (1988)(2.5.4). 
 Approaches to innovation (11.4). These are considered in terms of theories of diffusion of 
innovations, principally that of Rogers (1966/2003)(2.8). Discussion of Web 2.0 and social 
media use in particular refers to the theory of IT-culture conflict (Koch, Gonzalez, & Leidner, 
2011; Leidner & Kayworth, 2006)(2.8.4) and to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs concept, as 
adapted by Chretien and Kind (2014) in relation to social media adoption within health 
services (2.8.5). 
 
11.2 Proposed theoretical model 
This chapter discusses three main theoretical areas of relevance and interest: interactions of power, 
culture, trust and risk in information security; approaches to innovation; and the effects of inter-
professional conflicts and competition. This section proposes at the outset a theoretical model which 
unifies and generalises these. 
 
The study as a whole was expected and intended to be of an exploratory nature (3.3), hence the 
conclusions are are presented as a model to stimulate further exploration and testing. Figure 11.1 
proposes an explanatory model of the majority of factors found to be operative in determining 
access to online published information within NHS organisations. Not all the findings could be 
represented, e.g. those related to the relative priority of professional education. 
 
The role of Trust leadership in establishing appropriate attitudes to risk fostered by a culture of 
trust, and the relationship of these to a Trust’s culture of innovation, was discussed in the literature 
review, Section 2.8.2. Information security posture is defined by Young (2008, p. 4) as “the current 
state [of information security] in terms of the role of information security in the organization, degree 
of integration of information security in business planning, and employee/management attitudes 
towards information security”. It thus includes a substantial attitudinal component. Organisational 
responses to technical information security threats may depend upon the organisation’s attitude to 
risk and preferred balance of risk and reward, as discussed in Section 2.7.1. 
It is proposed that six main factors are involved, which may be grouped into two main categories:  
 
1) Declining public trust in and 2) increased regulation of public services , e.g. via data protection 
provisions as implemented within the Information Governance Toolkit, interact with each other, as 
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shown at the top of Figure 11.1, and constitute important external influences on a Trust’s leadership 
style and approach, as discussed in Section 2.5.5.2. They may also affect organisational policies more 
directly. Leadership style and approach in turn directly influence two key aspects of organisational 
culture, these being the Trust’s information security posture, of which two of the key determinants, 
as shown in Figure 11.1, are organisational trust (in this context, managers’ and IT professionals’ 
trust of staff) and attitude to risk (in this context, tolerance of failures in the interest of 
organisational learning), and its culture of innovation, of which its level of implementation of e-
learning and its policies and practices relating to use of Web 2.0, social media and mobile devices 
form a part. These are represented by the two boxes in the centre. Information security posture as a 
whole and its contributory components, organisational trust and attitude to risk, have further direct 
influences on culture of innovation; indeed, attitude to risk may be considered as a component 
aspect of culture of innovation (Mulgan & Albury, 2003); compare the discussion of risk and 
innovation in Section 2.8.2. Information security posture is also directly influenced by past 
information governance or security incidents, cf. Section 11.3.6; these tend to raise the priority given 
to security (compare the discussion in Section 2.7.2.4.1). Leadership style and approach has an 
additional direct effect upon the Trust’s overall strategic priorities. Strategic priorities in turn are 
likely to affect the position and status of IT services, and thereby to determine the level of resource 
available for IT staffing and infrastructure, and hence the quality and level of development of IT 
services provided within the Trust, including PC and network infrastructure, and the adequacy of IT 
department funding levels.  These are represented at the foot of Figure 11.1. They may also 
determine specific IT priorities. Within T1 and T4, for example, EPR implementation was a major 
strategic priority, which would have placed considerable strain on budgets and staffing levels in 
respect of other areas of their IT departments’ work (4.4.1). They are also likely to determine the 
levels of resource available for other corporate functions such as information governance and 
communications. As we have seen, overall cultural attitudes to IT are also likely to inform strategic 
priorities relating to IT (2.8.5, 6.4.5), although this is not represented within the model.  Level of 
resource in turn influences culture of innovation, both directly and via absorptive capacity, as shown 
by the solid blue arrows on the right.  
2) Contested jurisdiction between library and information services, communications, training and 
development, information governance, and IT departments, as represented by inter-professional 
conflicts. This is discussed in relation the study findings in Section 11.5 below. This contested 
jurisdiction (8) also impinges upon 4) information security posture, which in turn influences 5) the 
Trust’s culture of innovation, and hence its use of mobile devices and of Web 2.0 and social media 
applications, by services and by individuals. Both information security posture and culture of 
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innovation thus directly affect access to published information online. It also has an influence upon 
the quality of IT services, as shown by the blue dashed arrow to the bottom left.  
 
Mobile device implementation is an aspect of innovation in its own right, but bears also on social 
media adoption, especially where Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) policies have been implemented, 
as indicated by the black dotted arrow on the right. The specific responsibilities of IT departments 
for IT infrastructure and of communications departments for Web 2.0 and social media strategy are 
indicated by the blue dashed arrows. The effects of level of resource (7) on culture of innovation (5), 
both directly and via absorptive capacity (cf. the discussions in Section 2.8.1 and 11.3 above), are 
represented by the solid blue arrows on the right. Among the Trusts in the study, only the very large 
teaching hospital T4 currently had the resources available within its IT department to be able to 
implement BYOD, which carries a considerable overhead (2.8.3). BYOD allowed staff a better level of 
access to Web 2.0 and social media than was available via the T4 network (9.2.1). 
 
Other possible influences on culture of innovation are not shown.The deficiencies of IT infrastructure 
and staffing identified in the results chapters (4-10) relate to the relatively low percentage annual 
expenditure on IT by health services in the United Kingdom as a whole compared with other sectors. 
Owing to the fragmented nature of the NHS in England following the “Lansley” reforms (Health and 
Social Care Act 2012), it was not possible to derive a national figure for expenditure on information 
technology by NHS organisations. Contributory factors to the relative lack of investment in IT within 
the NHS are cited above (Section 2.8.5). As stated above, level of resource, being a factor in culture 
of innovation (Apekey et al., 2011; Section 2.8.1 above) is likely to affect culture of innovation both 
directly and via its effects on absorptive capacity; such an influence could be said to have been 
apparent particularly in T1, in which staffing levels across corporate departments, particularly 
communications, were relatively low. 
11.3 Power, culture, trust and risk in information security
11.3.1 Introduction  
General aspects of NHS information technology were described in Section 1.4.3. The literature 
review presented an overview of the general characteristics of the NHS as an organisation (2.5.5), 
and outlined some of the problems perceived with information technology innovation with the NHS 
(2.8.5). The results chapters (4 to 10) described in further detail some characteristic features of the 
manner in which IT infrastructure and security are managed within the NHS in England, as 
exemplified within the three Trusts in the study. The study findings can be set within a context of 
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declining public and organisational trust relating both to the quality of health services provision and 
to data protection, as discussed above (1.4.4, 2.5.5.2), and also of increasing regulation of health 
services and social care, as described by Hillman and others (Hillman et al., 2013). Also, both the 
study findings and the literature review indicate a further contextual factor of low levels of 
organisational resource devoted to information technology (2.8.5, 4.4, 7.2.3). It is suggested that, 
being focused on technological rather than behavioural solutions to security issues, and offering 
users limited information, discretion, scope for decision-making or involvement in policy-making, the 
approach to information security and cybersecurity within the case study NHS Trusts was of a 
functionalist, authoritarian type (cf. 2.7.2.4.1). It accords culturally with this overall picture, in being 
low in trust of end-users and highly risk-averse in character. In relation to information behaviour, 
two areas of activity appeared to be perceived in particular as presenting potentially unacceptable 
levels of risk: PWU (T4, T3 to some extent) and any form of use of popular social media platforms 
(particularly T1). This is in keeping with overall organisational characteristics (2.5.5). This argument is 
elaborated further within the following sections, and related to the proposed theoretical model . 
11.3.2 Blocking of websites 
False positives have been termed the “friendly fire of information security” (Johnson, Goetz, & 
Pfleeger, 2009, p. 14). The level of blocking of work-related web content (over-blocking), also 
termed false positives, in T4 was relatively high, while that in the other Trusts was reportedly low (as 
discussed in 8.5.1). As stated in 10.3 above, this is likely due to three specific technical factors: 1) the 
high number of categories of web content that were blocked by SWG4 by default, i.e. its restrictive 
configuration, 2) (related to 1) a possible inherent lack of accuracy of SWG4 in identifying and 
blocking inappropriate content, malware, or both, leading to a great many false positives, and 3) the 
practice in T4, in marked contrast to the other Trusts, of blocking advertising as a possible malware 
risk on account of “malvertising”. The discussion of ROC curves in Appendix L is relevant here: for a 
given “real-world” content classifier, in general terms, specificity decreases, and the proportion of 
false positives increases, as sensitivity is increased. However, the greater the area under the curve, 
the greater is the specificity of the device for a given level of sensitivity. It may be recalled that 1) in 
T4 blocking of image content seemed in some instances to block the site entirely, and 2) that levels 
of over-blocking were also reported as low by P2 in another Trust where another secure web 
gateway SWG3 was in use (8.3). The high levels of over-blocking at T4 were reported as giving rise to 
complaints which the IT manager responsible for the device acknowledged were not being acted 
upon. The recorded negative observations about SWG4 reported in Section 8.3 raise the further 
technical question of what proportion of “malvertising” content would have been blocked as 
malware by SWG4 had it not already been blocked as advertising.  
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As well as technical factors, organisational and cultural factors were apparently involved, including 
lack of communication. As stated above in Section 10.4, there had been very little involvement of 
end-users at T4 in the development of AU4Int, as evidenced by the lack of formal consultation with 
stakeholders (8.2). In addition, it may be recalled that the IT department at T4 was reported by the 
records and governance manager T4-09 as prone to making decisions regarding systems design and 
security measures in isolation without appropriate consultation with information governance 
managers or other stakeholders (4.5.1, 4.5.2). Information governance managers not only had little 
effective communication with IT, they lacked a direct reporting channel to appropriate senior 
managers through which they could raise any concerns (4.4.1). A possible channel via which 
representations could have been made to the IT department about high rates of website over-
blocking was thus not available, and it was possible for T4-20 to ignore individual user complaints. 
Adams and Sasse (1999) suggest that unwillingness or failure of IT departments to communicate 
with users about security practices may be underlain by the “need to know”, principle, based upon 
the idea that disclosing information about security processes makes them easier to subvert; it is held 
that restricting access to this information, therefore, is likely to increase security. Users may 
therefore have incomplete and insufficient knowledge of security issues that concern them. 
However, since end-user involvement in the formulation of information security policies is often 
cited as a motivating factor in ongoing compliance (e.g. Adams & Sasse, 1999; Albrechtsen, 2007) 
this overall situation within T4 may not represent good information security practice.  
 
The information source horizon concept (Section 2.4.2 above) suggests that perceived non-
availability of resources affects clinicians’ established habits of information seeking. The effects are 
likely to be accentuated under time pressure. The findings from other information behaviour 
research relating to time pressures and time available for answering clinical questions have also 
been discussed (Section 2.4.4 above): Brennan et al. (2014) reported the doctors interviewed for 
their study as saying that such were the pressures of their work that even login requirements were 
an obstacle to information-seeking for them. A fortiori it must be inferred that blocked websites 
present an even greater obstacle. “Satisficing” behaviour (see above, Section 2.4.2) is a factor here 
also; staff may set “stop rules” for their searching in relation to material that is unavailable, looking 
for alternative sources (cf. T4-03, Section 8.5.3), or just managing without it. 
 
Sasse's (2015, p. 82) observations about the need for security to be usable are applicable to the 
blocking of websites as well as to authentication requirements for information systems and 
electronic resources: “In real-world environments, authentication fatigue isn’t hard to detect: users 
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reorganize their primary tasks to minimise exposure to secondary security tasks, stop using devices 
and services with onerous security, and don’t pursue innovative ideas because they can’t face any 
more ‘battles with security’ that they anticipate on the way to realising those ideas.” Another of her 
observations (2015, p. 83) is also pertinent: that users’ experiencing false positives reduces the 
overall credibility of information security, thereby tending to undermine its effectiveness. Sasse’s 
concerns here relate also to the concept of security fatigue, as described in Section 2.7.2; reluctance 
to report blocked websites can be perceived as an aspect of this.  
 
The decision-making process of users faced with blocked websites can be represented 
diagrammatically in Figure 11.2. The diagram lists the key questions, in a suggested order, which 
may contribute to a user’s decision whether or not to report a blocked website. Affirmative answers 
contribute to the likelihood of a decision to report, while negative ones reduce it. From the 
participants’ comments cited in Section 8.5.3 it was apparent that the willingness of end-users to 
report blocked sites depended to a degree upon: 
1) the importance of the information to the user in the particular instance 
2) the availability of the information elsewhere (on the web, or via a university or home 
computer) 
3) the likely future usefulness of the information – will reporting the site pay dividends later in 
ensuring its future availability, for myself or for colleagues? 
4) the relative urgency of the information need – can it wait for a few days? 
If so … 
5) the overall frequency of encountering blocked websites: high frequencies acted as a de-
motivator and strong disincentive on account of the negative feelings, time and effort 
involved (cf. 2.5.5.3; 11.2.4) 
6) the outcomes of earlier requests, including the time taken, or reasons given for refusal to 
unblock a site 
7) (partly consequent upon 3 and 6) the degree to which the user felt trusted by IT department 
staff in placing the request. This factor would have applied in principle across all the Trusts, 
although in practice far more sites were being blocked within T4 than there were either in T1 
or in T3. 
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Figure 11.2 Likelihood of users to report blocked websites 
 
The primary purpose of web content filtering within an organisation’s secure web gateway is to 
represent its Internet acceptable use policy and ensure, as far as possible, that it is followed. The 
configuration of content filtering settings can therefore be considered part of the policy process. As 
an aspect of good governance, NHS Trusts are generally keen to monitor the effectiveness of their 
policies and to minimise unintended negative consequences by evaluating and monitoring their 
impacts, via measures such as impact assessment, consultations with stakeholders and scheduled 
reviews. 
 
We have seen, however, that even in a Trust (T4) where complaints to the IT department about false 
positives were being made regularly (the IT manager T4-20 reported receiving emails from 
dissatisfied end-users: 8.3), the content of blocked websites notified via automatic alerts or cited in 
calls to the helpdesk, and hence the accuracy of blocking, was according to T4-20, not being 
monitored, evaluated or reported (8.3). Other security devices implemented on corporate networks, 
notably intrusion detection systems, are known to generate large numbers of false positives, which 
can overwhelm system administrators (Lemos, 2015); from the security management point of view, 
it is conceivable that alerts generated by the secure web gateway had been perceived as similar to 
these in character, and the effects of the many false positives on end-users not heeded. All the Trust 
IT departments were reported, either by end-users (T1, T4) or by one of their own managers (T3) to 
be under-resourced and under-staffed, and accordingly focused their attention primarily on the 
support of clinical systems, sometimes at the expense of other IT services ( 7.2.3.5, 8.2). It is likely 
that, faced with such pressures, IT security efforts were focused primarily on “housekeeping” (cf. T1-
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11’s comment in Section 4.5.4 above) and on demonstrating compliance with national standards, i.e. 
fulfilling the Section 300 requirements of the Information Governance Toolkit (Department of 
Health, s.d.). It is possible that lack of resources rather than cultural factors (risk aversion, low trust 
of end-users) may have been the primary operative factor in the lack of prioritisation of over-
blocking in T4, although its effect is likely to have been compounded by poor communication (see 
Section 11.4 below). 
 
The censorship aspect of web filtering (Sections 2.7.3.4.1, 2.7.3.4.2) obviously raised major issues for 
NHS library services, since librarians generally held as part of their professional value set a strong 
commitment to freedom of enquiry (Trushina, 2004). CILIP’s ethical framework stated that access to 
information should be blocked on legal grounds alone (CILIP Code of Professional Practice, cited by 
Brown and McMenemy, 2013). The IFLA/UNESCO Internet Manifesto Guidelines (IFLA & UNESCO, 
2006, p. 14) stated that “libraries providing access to information on the Internet should do so in 
accordance with the principles of Article 19 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which 
states that everyone has a right to … seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any 
media …”. The American Library Association, unlike its British counterpart CILIP, had campaigned 
strongly against web content filtering. 98 
 
Resnick et al. (2004, p. 11) raised the question, “how much over-blocking or under-blocking is too 
much?” Their view is that people differ in their assessments of the benefits of blocking bad sites and 
the costs of blocking legitimate sites; the debate hence needs be redirected to organisational and 
professional values. Here, organisational culture is relevant (2.5). Prince et al. (2010) raised a similar 
fundamental issue, relating to values, of the balance of risk and reward, that is, the possibly negative 
security risks of less restricted access versus the negative consequences and risks of over-blocking, 
which, as we have seen, can be considerable. The comparison with higher education is perhaps 
instructive. Within health services, confidentiality of patient information is of paramount 
importance, whereas within higher education, networks are highly segmented (S. Pinfield, personal 
communication),  and discussions regarding information security are strongly informed by the need 
to safeguard academic freedom as a fundamental organisational value. This may be perceived as an  
                                                          
 
98
 See, for instance, material on the ALA Filters and Filtering resource page: 
http://www.ala.org/offices/oif/ifissues/filtersfiltering [accessed 12/01/16] 
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organisational challenge for information security management (e.g., O’Connell, 2005); compare the 
comments of Werlinger et al. (2009) cited above in Section 2.7.2.4.1. 
 
The comments of the SWG vendor’s product manager SWG3-01 regarding the impossibility and 
undesirability of blocking all illegal or potentially illegal content were noted above (Section 4.4.4). 
Many of the subject areas defined as illegal may not appear to present a problem for legitimate 
information access and use; however, breach of copyright appears to present a particular issue  
(cf. the comment cited in Section 3.9). It raises the question of the extent to which an organisation 
can, or should, endeavour to prevent its staff from breaching copyright, or accessing illegally copied 
or reproduced material, via technical means rather than through information governance training.  
 
As stated in the literature review (Section 2.5.6.2), the application of Clegg’s (1989) circuits of power 
theory to issues of information security policy and compliance by Inglesant and Sasse (Inglesant & 
Sasse, 2011a, 2011b), is highly relevant to the present study. An outline of the theory, including a 
general diagrammatic representation, was provided in the literature review. These authors (2011b) 
used it in conjunction with actor network theory (ANT) to represent two information security 
scenarios, both very similar to circumstances encountered within the NHS Trusts in the current 
study, and it is possible to adapt their approach to model the study findings (as shown in Figures 
11.3 and 11.4 below). In Scenario 1 within their paper, compliance with restrictive system and 
acceptable use policies was actively enforced by technological means: restricted use of software on 
the organisation’s personal computers and laptops was enforced through a “closed build” which 
required approval by a manager and action by IT support staff to install or configure software. A 
similar policy restricted acceptable use of the Internet through a web filtering device. In Figure 11.2 
the three levels represent the three circuits of Clegg’s circuits of power theory: agency, social 
integration and system integration, which correspond to three types of power, causal (expressed 
within information infrastructure controls), dispositional (a capacity to wield power) and facilitative 
(methods of enforcement) (cf. Figure 2.5). 
 
Comparing the current study findings with Inglesant and Sasse’s Scenario 1, one can identify in 
Figures 11.3 and 11.4 the same three categories of user response: acceptance, resistance and 
avoidance. The “acceptance” response is illustrated by the finding that, while library staff discussed 
their need to obtain the IT department’s support for the use of alternative browsers (5.3), only one 
participant (T4-22) mentioned the lack of a facility to install software as an obstacle to his work (6.3). 
Inglesant and Sasse (2011b, p. 4) suggested that the individuals offering such “acceptance” 
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responses are, while complying with the policy, in fact affected by it, “not by what they are ‘got to 
do’, nor even by what they are prevented from doing, but in what they do not even consider doing”. 
In situations such as these it can be said that the [organisation] has successfully stabilised the 
meaning of “acceptable use” to the extent that staff members comply without even considering 
alternatives. In terms of actor network theory (2.5.6.2) they suggested that the various (human and 
non-human) actors are “enrolled” in a “problematisation” that asserts locked-down access as an 
obligatory passage point (represented by the hexagon on the left of the diagram (Figure 11.3 below) 
through which access to software must pass. This form of exercise of power may be compared with 
Lukes’ (1974) characterisation of symbolic power as insidiously shaping people’s perceptions, 
preferences and values.  
 
Trust IT departments, while sometimes allowing the use of non-standard software where indicated 
by business need, tried to keep it to a minimum for reasons of ease of maintenance and cost; the 
process of negotiating its use took time and effort on the part of end-users, as illustrated by the 
comments of participants in response to the browser survey quoted in Appendix J. 
 
There are two other possible responses of end-users to Scenario 1, those of “resistance” and 
“avoidance”. Requests for websites to be made accessible, or for non-standard software to be 
installed on one’s PC or laptop for reasons of business need, or (as T4-22 had done, 6.2) installing 
software on an apparently unrestricted laptop with the semi-connivance of an IT support staff 
member, would have constituted “resistance” in these terms. So also would requests for sites to be 
unblocked, or complaints to IT management (as occurred within T4) or line management about 
levels of website blocking. Using one’s home computer to access blocked websites (as T4-05 
habitually did, Section 8.5.3) or use of an application on one’s personal mobile device to access 
work-related e-learning material that was not available within the Trust (as a student of T1-04’s had 
done, Section 6.6), would have constituted “avoidance”. 
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Figure 11.3 Locked-down access to “closed build” PCs and external Internet 
Adapted from Inglesant and Sasse, 2011b, p. 4, with permission 
 
Avoidance, as Inglesant and Sasse (2011b) noted, allows users to get the job done. They feel forced 
to avoid the rules, and are inconvenienced (and lose productivity) in circumventing the operation of 
the policy by negotiations regarding the installation of the software or unblocking of the website, or 
in accessing the blocked website(s) at home. Resistance can also involve lost productivity on account 
of the time involved. Both avoidance and resistance represent total or partial breakdowns of the 
actor network. 
 
As the authors remarked, the closed build, while simplifying the provision of technical support and 
reducing risks from software incompatibilities, breach of licence terms or malware, carries a cost in 
terms of employee time and hence productivity, and also of organisation within the IT department. 
In effect, the power exercised by the IT department within the organisation is maintained by 
disempowering staff members. In terms of ANT, the secure web gateway, group policies etc. 
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constitute obligatory passage points (OPPs) through which access to software and to information 
must pass (see Section 2.5.6.2 above). However the policy and its means of enforcement are 
bypassed relatively easily by staff using their home computers instead. Using a home computer 
avoids the resistance, but may be subject in its turn to information governance policy restrictions on 
account of the risk potential data loss which it presents. There is contested meaning here, in that the 
security policy constructs points through which all access must pass, whereas staff members 
ascribed meaning to their own resistance or avoidance behaviour in alternative terms, as relating to 
business need. The authors suggest, as an alternative to the OPPs, that an attempt should be made 
instead to stabilise meaning around business needs, so that these become the main “actor”, as in 
Figure 11.3 below. In this scenario, a less restrictive configuration of the secure web gateway, 
together with wider options to install and use software which is needed, meets business needs, as 
shown in the middle pathway, without any need for the resistance which is shown in the right and 
left hand pathways .  
 
The definition of “black box” in a software development or other IT context is “any device whose 
workings are not understood by or accessible to its user”. Correspondingly, black box testing is “a … 
method in which the tester has no knowledge of the inner workings of the program being tested. 
The tester might know what is input and what the expected outcome is, but not how the results are 
achieved” (WhatIs.com, 2008). Commercially available SWGs may be described as black boxes (e.g. 
Ayre, 2004) in that the details of their workings are kept commercially confidential and are not 
understood in detail by those who implement them. 
 
This definition may be contrasted with the way in which actor network theory uses the term “black 
box”. For ANT, a black box is “a technical artifact that appears self-evident and obvious to the user” 
(Cressman, 2009, p. 6) or “A frozen network element, often with properties of irreversibility” 
(Walsham, 1997, p. 468). “Black-boxing”, so-called, is a process of closing questions and debates 
(Levy, 2003). The term “punctualisation” is used to refer to the process by which complex actor 
networks are black-boxed and linked with other networks to create larger actor networks. An actor 
network may be considered a “black box”, when its identity has become established, its role, 
function and presence are no longer questioned, and it has acquired a commonly agreed set of 
meanings (Goff, 2014). SWGs are seen as technical, but their implementation actually requires 
management decisions to be made (e.g. regarding the types of content to be blocked, “rationing” of 
access to web applications, establishing different levels of access for different user groups, etc.). It is 
suggested that it is particularly easy for systems implemented as black boxes in the IT sense to 
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become black boxes in the ANT sense, and thus for IT staff to “hide behind” a supposedly given 
system, failing to accept responsibility for implementing configuration options that meet local needs 
and preferences and accord with organisational values.  
 
There appeared to be no clinical counterpart to the value of “academic freedom” in higher 
education in claiming the right of unrestricted access to published information; the notion of 
“clinical freedom” or “clinical autonomy”, sometimes cited in criticism of evidence-based medicine, 
refers purely to clinical practice (Hampton, 1983; Parker, 2005). This initially unexpected finding may 
possibly be accounted for as follows. Regulatory and clinical governance requirements generally 
exist for clinical practice to be evidence-based or for an evidence base to be demonstrable and 
documented within the patient record (2.4.4). Such requirements, and hence evidence searching, 
may be associated by clinicians with the curtailment, rather than the exercise, of clinical autonomy 
(Brown, 2008). In practice this may, in many instances, involve explicit adherence to NICE and other 
guidelines, affording relatively little scope for professional judgment; also, specialist advice on 
medicines is frequently sought from a medicines information pharmacist within a Trust, again 
documented within the patient record, thereby reducing the need for other clinicians to seek 
medicines-related information (Kerr, 2009). Website blocking may thus be perceived by clinical staff 
rather as a (tedious, but tolerable or negotiable) aspect of a defensive NHS bureaucracy than as an 
infringement of professional rights and prerogatives.  
 
11.3.3 Mandatory use of encrypted portable media 
In Scenario 2 of Inglesant and Sasse’s (2011b) paper, the policy requirement described was to use a 
particular type of encrypted portable media device for transferring files, namely a company-issued, 
256-bit encrypted drive of a specified brand. This is very similar to the policy in T1 and T3, although, 
as it happened, not within T4; while the use of encrypted media for transporting sensitive 
information was still required within local policies, the Trust IT department there had ceased to issue 
encrypted USB memory sticks, and port blocking had not been implemented (8.4). Within the terms 
of Clegg’s (1989) circuits of power theory, implementation within T1 and T3 can be said to have 
relied strongly upon episodic power; the emphasis was on micro-techniques of enforcement, with 
very little leeway allowed for alternative interpretations of policy requirements. Concurrent with the 
encrypted portable media requirement were the restrictions (T1) or blocks on the use of common 
cloud storage applications, which further enforced the policy by effectively denying users an 
alternative means of storing and transmitting files. 
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Figure 11.4 Re-thinking circuits of power in acceptable use enforcement 
Adapted from Inglesant and Sasse, 2011b, p. 7, with permission 
 
Within T4, the power circuits of social and system integration were more important. However, 
within both the episodic and the social/system integration circuits, there were factors operating 
within T4 that discouraged compliance with the policy. Before the IT department in T4 had ceased to 
issue them, approved encrypted memory sticks had been expensive and relatively difficult to obtain, 
and were also hard to obtain in T1. The devices were also perceived as having inherent limitations, 
mostly relating to slow loading of content, causing some inconvenience when making presentations 
at events (5.2.1). In the absence of port blocking at T4, their use had effectively become dependent 
upon user compliance and user effort, thereby involving what has been identified (Beautement & 
Sasse, 2009; Beautement et al., 2008) as the compliance budget (2.7.2.4.2). Hence it can be seen 
that there are considerable tensions between system and social integration within the Trusts’ 
security systems and processes, in respect of the prohibition on software installation (for T4-22), the 
blocking of websites (T4 generally), and the requirement to use only approved encrypted portable 
media provided by the IT department (T1, T4 generally). It will be recalled that system integration 
refers primarily to technological means of control, whereas social integration involves the meaning 
attached to entities, whether social or technological, through which controls are exercised; it also 
involves rules of practice and membership categories (2.5.6.2). The actors here were not able to 
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enact the rules which they had accepted and wished to enact, because security processes did not 
offer the conditions which would allow them to do so (Oliveira, 2010). Inglesant and Sasse (2011b) 
suggest that attention should be given to the meanings attached by users to information security 
practices: they ask: “How can meaning be most successfully stabilized around the needs of the 
business?” (p. 7). They also suggest that the concept of “business need” is primary in establishing 
information security practices that are acceptable to end-users, usable and stable.  
 
11.3.4 Empowerment, engagement and access to information 
According to Kanter’s theory of structural empowerment, access to information, that is both 
published information relating to professional expertise and information about one’s organisation, is 
one of the structural conditions of staff empowerment (Laschinger et al., 2010; see literature review, 
2.5.6.1). It should therefore follow that lack of access to professionally-relevant information is ipso 
facto disempowering. It is disempowering for another reason: barriers to accessing and using online 
published information that result from organisationally-imposed access controls represent a 
limitation of staff autonomy, and could be construed as an expression of lack of trust of staff by IT 
and other managers (see literature review, Section 2.5.5.3; also above, 11.1.3). Greco et al.’s (2006) 
model  of the antecedents and consequences of empowerment and engagement (Section 2.5.5.3) 
suggests that these forms of disempowerment can directly contribute to staff disengagement. In 
terms of antecedents and consequences, it  proposes a possible causal route through which levels of 
access to information and to job resources such as adequate computer infrastructure could affect 
levels of staff engagement, and thereby organisational effectiveness and performance, including 
clinical outcomes (Figure 11.1). Level of organisational trust is represented within the overall 
theoretical model (Section 11.1, Figure 11.1) as constitutive of information security posture. 
 
It is suggested, therefore, that barriers to information seeking and use can have both direct and 
indirect negative effects upon both clinical and organisational effectiveness. The direct effects have 
been described in detail within the results chapters (5 to 10) above. The links to clinical and 
organisational effectiveness may readily be identified within the “infrastructure” and “quality 
methods” areas of the clinical governance process (shown in Figure 1.2): directly in the elements of 
“access to evidence”, “information technology infrastructure supports practice”, and “well trained 
staff”, and less directly in “clinical policies evidence-based” and “good practice spread”. The indirect 
effects occur via the mechanism proposed below in Figure 11.5, i.e. structural empowerment and 
staff engagement.
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Figure 11.5 Proposed mechanism of effect of access to information on organisational effectiveness 
Adapted from Leiter & Maslach, 2003 
 
11.3.5 Information security / governance risk 
Very few explicit references were made by any of the IT managers to management of information 
security or cybersecurity risks. The implicit nature of risk minimisation, as well as coverage of 
information security risk management in official documents, may go some way to explaining this. For 
instance ITIL v3, formerly referred to as the IT Infrastructure Library, makes explicit reference to 
identifying and managing risks as part of the service design phase (Faber & Faber, 2010; Sheikhpour 
& Modiri, 2012). ITIL provides internationally recognised best practice guidance for all aspects of IT 
service management (Cabinet Office, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d, 2011e). It can be used to provide 
comprehensive information on how to implement the information security standards mandated via 
ISO/IEC 27001 or the NHS IG Toolkit (Clinch, 2009). Although the use of ITIL was not mandatory, it 
was supported by the former NHS Connecting for Health and was widely used within the NHS (Haw, 
Derry, & Gowing, 2006). Another contributory factor may have been the tacit nature of much 
decision-making in information security management, as described by Werlinger and associates 
(Botta et al., 2010; Werlinger, Hawkey, Botta, et al., 2009)(2.7.2).  
 
The work of Werlinger’s team has implications for the nature of risk analysis and risk management in 
information security and cybersecurity. In the literature review (2.4.7) it was noted that tacit 
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decision-making had also been observed in clinical contexts, regarding the applicability of forms of 
encoded knowledge to particular cases. On these grounds Alaszewski, Alaszewski and Potter (2006) 
expressed criticism of what they term the “expert” approach as represented within formal methods 
of clinical risk management: it fails to recognise the ways in which social context influences the ways 
in which risks are identified and managed, and in particular the agency of individuals in structuring 
risks. Analogous criticisms were expressed by Baskerville (1991) and others (see Section 2.7.2) of 
conventional methods and techniques of information security risk assessment and management; for 
Baskerville, they represented not a fully “scientific” approach, but a valid means of generating 
contextually-situated professional knowledge using intuitive judgements. 
 
Lafferty (2013, 2015) had suggested that the understanding of social media in general within the 
NHS was poor, and failed to balance risks and benefits (2.7.3.4.2). One of the few extended 
discussions of risk took place with T1-07 (senior nurse manager) regarding the catastrophic impacts 
of breaching confidentiality and therefore patients’ trust via social media. In her view, the enormity 
of the negative consequences of breaching patient confidentiality via social media justified a total 
ban on accessing social media via the Trust’s network (9.2.1). Social media risks were also mentioned 
by the communications officer T3-12, who spoke of a necessary balance of risk and reward, and of 
the need to have safeguards in place (9.2.4.1). In her view, these risks had been evaluated within her 
Trust and deemed to be acceptable. 
 
The sociological theories of risk reviewed briefly in Section 2.7.1 above indicate that different groups 
have different perceptions and understandings of risk (Vaast, 2007), and that risk management in 
general is a highly political process, in which values play an important role (Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982; Douglas, 1992; Jasanoff, 1998; cf. Section 2.5.5.2 above). Use and regulation of Web 2.0 and 
social media applications was evidently a contentious area, as evidenced by the wide range of 
opinions and attitudes to them among study participants, ranging from considerable enthusiasm to 
strong dislike and disapproval (7.5). One aspect of the cultural theory of risk (Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982a), the propensity of subjects to evaluate activities of which they disapprove as high risk, may 
therefore be particularly applicable to social media policy. Social media issues are discussed further 
in 11.3 below. Attitude to risk is represented in the proposed theoretical model (Section 11.5, Figure 
11.1) as a key constituent of information security posture. 
 
11.3.6. Impact of information governance / security incidents  
The literature review suggested in Section 2.7.2 that serious incidents involving actual or potential 
breaches of confidentiality of patient or staff personal data occurring within the past few years 
would have had an adverse impact managers’ trust of staff, leading to more restrictive attitudes and 
practices in information governance, relating particularly to storage devices and services, Internet 
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acceptable use policies and social media (cf. Ezingeard, Bowen-Schrire, & Birchall, 2007; Volpentesta, 
Ammirator, & Palmieri, 2011). This indeed proved to be the case in respect of social media, with a 
highly restrictive policy having been introduced at T1 following a single breach of confidentiality 
incident (as described in Section 9.2.1). Conversely, in the opinion of one participant (the records 
and governance manager T4-09), the relative laxity at T4 regarding technical enforcement of 
information security measures (encryption, port blocking etc.) was attributable to the fact that none 
of the Trust board members had had experience of data breaches and their consequences. He felt 
that a serious data breach would need to occur in order to highlight to them the importance of such 
measures (Section 4.4.3; cf. Sections 1.4.4, 2.7.2). The effects of information governance incidents 
on organisational trust, attitude to risk and hence on overall information security posture are 
represented in the overall theoretical model, Figure 11.1. 
 
11.4 Approaches to innovation 
Rogers’ (1966/2003) theory of diffusion of innovations (2.8.1) may usefully be applied to aspects of 
the study findings relating to Web 2.0 and social media policies and use of mobile devices, which 
exemplify the Trust’s approaches to innovation. There are two aspects of the Trusts’ social media 
policies which need to be considered: corporate use of Web 2.0 and social media applications, and 
regulation of the individual use of them within Trust networks. Within the proposed theoretical 
model (Figure 5.11), these are said to constitute key components of an organisation’s overall culture 
of innovation. One part of the DoI theory concerns the manner in which characteristics of 
innovations influence the rate of their adoption. It suggests that there are five pertinent ones: 
relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability, and observability. 
 
Relative advantage: the relative advantages of using Web 2.0 and social media for professional 
purposes did not seem readily apparent to participants who were accustomed to more conventional 
methods of professional networking; indeed they were often perceived negatively as wasting time. 
Existing work-related uses of Twitter were sometimes deprecated as being trivial (T4-10, 5.5). Some 
participants expressed awareness of the potential uses of social media for patient and public  
engagement (9.2.4.1). It is likely that Facebook in particular was perceived by some participants as 
essentially a platform for the exchange of social trivia (e.g. T1-09, 9.2.3), and this perception was 
generalised to other social media as a “technology cluster” (Archibald & Clark, 2014; Rogers, 2003, p. 
249), leading to the non-recognition of their potential benefits. 
 
Compatibility: social media were perceived as incompatible with participants’ existing values in that 
they were perceived as a risk to confidentiality and the maintenance of appropriate professional 
boundaries. Participants were explicitly aware of the risks of misuse and of previous instances of 
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misuse (e.g., 7.5). T1-02 spoke of professional social media use being perceived negatively as 
“slacking”, and of a perception that work environments were not conducive to it (9.2.4.1). 
 
Complexity: while not necessarily perceiving social media as technologically complex, participants 
felt very much in need of training and guidance from their Trusts on what was permissible in the 
professional use of social media (7.5). They did not feel comfortable in the online environment, or 
that professional usage of social media would be “natural” to them, unlike their younger colleagues, 
students or children (9.2.3). 
 
Trialability: perception of the trialability of social media for corporate use varied between 
organisations and participants. A decision had been made in T1 to experiment with small-scale 
corporate use of Facebook and Twitter in limited contexts for specific purposes, reflecting a 
perception that it was trialable, and that usage could be extended if results were favourable. 
However, in T3 one participant (T3-09, 9.2.4.1) spoke of “breaching [sic] the Rubicon”, reflecting a 
sense that venturing on to social media was a commitment that was essentially irreversible. 
 
Observability: participants in T3 had become aware of the increasing levels of social media use by 
other organisations within the Trust’s environment, such as suppliers, regulators and professional 
bodies (9.2.4.1). Observability was not raised as an issue by participants, for either individual or 
corporate use of social media. In T1, methods of evaluating the visibility and impact of the Trust’s 
experimental social media presence were not mentioned. Communications staff in T3 and T4 did not 
discuss any forms of monitoring of their Trusts’ social media presences.  
 
Another part of Rogers’ theory (2.8.1) concerns the processes of individual and group decision-
making relating to innovations. Four main stages are involved: knowledge, persuasion, 
implementation, and confirmation. Prior conditions such as previous practices, individual needs, 
propensity towards innovation and social system norms influence the process. Regarding social 
system norms, it was suggested in the literature review (Section 2.8.4) that restrictions on access to 
social media applications within the workplace could reflect an IT-culture conflict (Koch et al., 2011; 
Leidner & Kayworth, 2006); these authors expressed the view that a perceived inherent conflict with 
organisational or professional culture and values could act to restrict access and to inhibit staff from 
exploring possible uses of different Web 2.0 and social media applications (e.g. discussion forums, 
blogs and wikis) within the workplace to support professional activities. The overall culture of the 
NHS has been described as risk-averse, bureaucratic, highly regulated, and compliance-focused 
(Alaszewski & Horlick-Jones, 2002; Maddock, 2002; Matthews, 2009). It is suggested that an IT-
culture conflict of this nature was operating within all three Trusts to varying degrees: most strongly 
within T1 and least strongly within T3 in relation to corporate use, and strongly in both Trusts in 
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relation to individual use. Within T4 a mixed picture was apparent: corporate use was well 
established within some services, but for individual use this was far less so. 
 
Some of the factors identified by Rogers (2003) and others (Section 2.7 above) as being relevant to 
organisational readiness appear to be salient within the study and for the NHS as a whole. NHS 
Trusts are comparable in their degrees of centralisation, formalisation, and complexity, all of which 
are high. According to Rogers (2003), centralisation and formalisation inhibit innovativeness; 
complexity encourages organisation members to grasp the value of innovations, but may make them 
difficult to implement on account of the difficulties experienced in reaching consensus. We have also 
seen that, while a certain appetite for risk is required for successful innovation, external pressures 
on NHS organisations tend to drive them toward risk aversion (2.5.5.2 above). It may be concluded, 
then, that the NHS organisational environment is generally not conducive to innovation, even 
though innovation has been cited as a major strategic priority for the NHS (Department of Health, 
2011b; Royal College of Nursing, 2012a; Young Foundation, 2011).  
 
T1, T3 and T4 varied in their levels of interconnectedness. T1 had one main site and two subsidiary 
sites, possibly facilitating greater interconnectedness among staff based at the main site; T3, 
typically of mental health and community services, was a multi-site organisation, reducing 
possibilities for interconnectedness among some staff groups. T4 incorporated a number of 
specialist hospitals, which (as discussed in 4.1.2.2 above) tended to function as discrete 
communities. The Trusts varied also in size (T4 was much larger than the other two) and degree of 
organisational “slack”; it was evident to the researcher at an early stage that T1’s level of 
organisational “slack”, as indicated by the low staffing levels of corporate functions such as 
communications, information governance, training, research support and human resources, was 
relatively very low. Correspondingly, the Trust had outsourced the drawing-up of its IT strategy, and 
was a late adopter of several innovations including e-learning, the corporate use of social media and 
of electronic patient records (EPR); it may be inferred that its absorptive capacity was also low.T4 
also had not yet implemented EPR, but was devoting considerable resources within its informatics 
department to developing its own system rather than implementing a commercially available one 
(4.4.1). It was also planning a number of other IT innovations. 
 
End user policies are a primary governance vehicle employed by organisations to respond to 
employees’ use of social media (Cain, 2011; Cox, 2014). The work of Vaast and Kaganer on 
organisational social media policies (Kaganer & Vaast, 2010; Vaast & Kaganer, 2013) is directly 
relevant to the study’s findings on social media policy and access within the three Trusts. It will be 
recalled (Section 2.8.5) that these authors analysed corporate responses to user-driven technologies 
in terms of a shifting of the comprehension or shared understanding element of decision making 
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about possible adoption into the time frame of implementation and assimilation. Decision makers 
are thus faced with a pressing need to devise policies just as they are starting to make sense of the 
innovation themselves. This corresponds closely with the blocking observed within T1 of all social 
media activity until the Trust’s policy had been developed (9.2.3). Social media policies, and those 
relating to mobile devices, are represented within the proposed theoretical model (Section 11.1, 
Figure 11.1) as a major component of culture of innovation. 
 
In both T1 and T3, participants reported that shifts had occurred recently in corporate thinking 
about social media, regarding its use for corporate communications as well as by individual 
professionals. It is suggested that a version of the processes described in Figure 2.15 (Chretien and 
Kind, p. 1139) may have been taking place within the case study Trusts in relation to social media at 
a number of levels: organisation-wide, among professional groups, and at the level of the individual 
clinician; this application of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs to social media therefore has some 
explanatory potential. T1-07 (reported in Section 9.2.1) spoke of addressing security concerns via 
disciplinary action imposed on staff who misused social media as a precursor to introducing a Trust 
social media policy. As to the reflection and discovery phase, the Trust, as stated earlier, was starting 
to experiment with the use of Facebook and Twitter for patient and public engagement, and had 
implemented more granular controls in line with current industry trends. The librarian T1-01, 
through her innovative efforts to make use of applications such as blogs and Prezi to provide new 
library services, had gone some way towards educating information governance managers about 
their workings and character, thereby facilitating the processes of reflection. One participant in T3 
(T3-09) spoke of changes in practice regarding social media as “gently washing in” following very 
extensive (but inconclusive) discussions across the organisation of possible corporate risk. The 
library service at T4 was also leading the processes of discovery via its use of social media 
applications to provide a current awareness portal and a Pinterest infographics site (5.5). NHS 
Employers had persuasively championed via its publications the use of social media within the NHS 
(NHS Employers, 2013a, 2013c, 2013d, 2014). The increased availability of policy guidance on the 
use of social media produced by professional regulators (General Medical Council, 2013; Health and 
Care Professions Council, s.d.; Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2015) and other professional bodies 
(British Medical Association, 2011; Royal College of General Practitioners, 2013; Royal College of 
Nursing, 2009; Royal Pharmaceutical Society, s.d.), as well as the increasingly-common inclusion of 
“e-professionalism” as a topic within health professions’ pre-registration and post-registration 
training curricula, may have served to address security concerns, enabling policymakers to consider 
the issues of how best to use social media, both corporately and individually, in support of the 
Trust’s business objectives. 
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Several participants (9.2.3) spoke of marked generational differences in attitudes to social media 
use. Similarly Sandars and Schroter (2007)(among UK doctors and medical students), and Taylor, 
McMinn, Bufford, and Chang (2010)(among USA-based psychologists) identified age-related 
differences, likely due to a cohort effect, in understanding the workings of social media and in 
perception of what constituted appropriate social media use. Students and younger professionals 
were far more likely to be familiar with social networking technologies and to use social networking 
websites than older ones. According to Jones and Hayter (2013, p. 1496), older professionals’ lack of 
involvement with social media presents a risk: “More experienced and more cautious practitioners 
may be less likely to use these technologies and potentially are more likely to encourage others to 
avoid their use, increasing the likelihood of students failing to engage in helpful discussions about 
privacy and professionalism … It is … important that clinicians involved in mentoring students are 
engaged with the issues associated with social media and can reinforce good practice from the 
clinical perspective”. The applicability of their comments to teaching and training taking place within 
NHS settings is readily apparent.  The indications presented of a generational divide in attitudes to 
social media have potential implications for the delivery of LIS (Lacey Bryant, 2016). 
 
11.5 Professional jurisdictions, professional projects 
The general point which can be made about IT support, which may be applicable to the T4 findings in 
particular, is that, despite the widespread use within the NHS of ITIL (Cabinet Office, 2011), which 
should inculcate a service orientation, IT departments in general can display a tendency to be 
technology-focused rather than customer focused, and do not always appreciate the impact of their 
activities on the business of the organisation (Bruton, 2002; Cater-Steel, 2009, 2010). 
 
Indications of disputes over areas of jurisdiction, or of potential or actual professional projects 
(Abbott, 1988; Kirkpatrick, Ackroyd, & Walker, 2007; Larson, 1977) were provided by several 
participants. Reference was made in Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.3.8 to apparent disputes over areas of 
jurisdiction between the T1 library manager and IT staff regarding the Trust’s new intranet, and at T4 
between the records and governance manager T4-09 and the IT department regarding EHR 
developments; generally T4-09 felt that the information governance function within T4 was treated 
as an “afterthought” and was not able to operate effectively (4.5.1, 4.5.2). There were also 
indications of considerable variability in jurisdiction relating to information governance and 
information security (P2, T4-09, T3-03; 4.5.2). (Lomas (2010) attributed the assumption of 
responsibility for information security on the part of records managers to the aftermath of the 
October 2007 HMRC data loss; see Section 2.5.5.2 above.) The library manager at T1’s proposed 
service initiatives, based upon Web 2.0 or social media platforms, during the previous few years had 
been consistently blocked by integrated governance while the social media policy was being 
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developed (9.2.3). The senior risk and governance manager T1-12 felt that the IT department tended 
to abdicate what she felt were its information governance responsibilities in favour of a purely 
technical role (4.5.2). The records and governance manager T1-09 felt that the records management 
aspects of information governance were under-developed and not well understood within the NHS, 
compared with the government department in which she had previously worked (4.5.3). The IT 
manager T3-06 was surprised to discover that the training department retained the services of a full-
time e-learning developer (6.2). Overt conflicts involving communications staff were not mentioned 
by participants; however, it should be borne in mind that adoption of social media for corporate and 
departmental communications would have involved a loss of monopoly control of output and also 
the need to respond in a timely fashion to comments made via social media by patients, carers and 
members of the public, thereby entailing significant changes to the roles of communications staff, 
with the addition of training and supervisory responsibilities (T3-12). Within the overall model 
(Figure 11.5), the overall outcomes of disputes over jurisdiction constitute a key determinant of 
information security posture, and hence of culture of innovation. 
 
As well as disputes over jurisdiction, and hence an element of power struggle (discussed in Section 
2.5.4), it is likely that fundamental differences in professional cultures, identities and values were 
involved here between groups of staff and managers responsible for information governance, 
information security, library and information services, and communications. Conflicts between and 
within professional groups in the NHS over information security and access to information are 
described by Adams, Blandford and Lunt (2005) and by Adams and Blandford (2005). Such 
differences could potentially include differences in information security culture and approaches to 
information security (Kolkowska, 2011) (see Section 2.7.2.4.1 above). Habits of information 
technology use in general (Boudreau, Serrano, & Larson, 2014; Stein, Galliers, & Markus, 2012), and 
information behaviour in particular, are strongly influenced by professional group affiliations 
(Edwards et al., 2013) and are fundamental to, or even constitutive of, professional identity (Brown 
& Duguid, 2001; Lloyd, 2009; Sundin & Hedman, 1996). It is unsurprising therefore that information 
systems and services become a primary arena for inter-professional conflicts. One would expect the 
values and opinions of NHS library and information professionals strongly to emphasise freedom of 
information, as outlined in the IFLA and CILIP codes (CILIP, 2004; IFLA & UNESCO, 2006). These 
would include upholding the view that restrictions on access should be the minimum required by 
law, and prioritising the support of information seeking and use, including the development of new 
information services (Dole, Hurych, & Koehler, 2000; Koehler, 2003). Within IT occupational values, 
the need for following formal, structured control processes was identified by Jacks and Palvia (2011) 
as a major theme. Similarly one would expect clinicians to emphasise the confidentiality of patient 
information (e.g. Adams & Blandford, 2005; Fernando, Choudrie, Lycett, & De Cesare, 2012) and 
records and governance professionals to focus on the task of information governance in general. 
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According to the HSCIC (Health and Social Care Information Centre, 2015b), information governance 
provides a framework to bring together all the legal rules, ethical guidance and best practice that 
apply to the handling of information, allowing implementation of central advice and directives, 
compliance with the law, and year-on-year improvement plans. Its fundamental task, according to 
Lomas (2010, p. 184) is that of “putting in place information management programmes to ensure 
that information is controlled to ensure it is ‘appropriately’ available but that its security is not 
compromised.” This was clearly expressed by T4-09 in his comment about the role of information 
governance in electronic patient record implementation (4.5.2).  
 
The literature review (2.5.4, 2.5.5.1) made reference to the ways in which professional cadres within 
a professional bureaucracy are able to exercise power to resist service developments they do not 
like via their monopolies of specialist operating knowledge. Not only do IT systems themselves 
function as key instruments of organisational control (Silva, 2007), but the overall high level of 
dependence that organisations have on IT means that IT professionals generally constitute a 
powerful and influential group within organisational politics (Markus & Bjørn-Andersen, 1987; 
Setterstrom & Pearson, 2013). In particular, they may exert a strong influence on both the 
formulation and the implementation of information security policies (Lapke & Dhillon, 2008). 
Notwithstanding the general lack of representation of IT management at Trust board level 
(Hoeksma, 2015), it is suggested that IT managers within the NHS, as well as clinicians, may function 
as an expert group with strong powers of veto. In particular, their judgments relating to information 
system practices, information security or cybersecurity are unlikely to be questioned by senior 
management, who may not appreciate the limitations of information security risk management 
knowledge and practice (2.7.2, 11.3.5). This type of process is described by Hickson, Hinings, Lee, 
Schneck, and Pennings (1971, p. 217), according to whom “the division of labor becomes the 
ultimate source of intra-organizational power”. Power in their definition is strongly linked to the 
ability to cope with uncertainty on behalf of other parts of the organisation. It is also linked to 
centrality within the workflow. The power of IT managers may also relate to the “revered” form of IT 
organisational culture identified and described by Kaarst-Brown and Robey (2006). Such an exercise 
of power is not linked specifically to a professionalisation strategy as such; as we have seen (2.5.4), 
information technology practitioners as a group within the UK are marked by “weak 
professionalisation”. It seems that information security experts are content for current and 
prospective employers to judge them purely on the quality of their work; they do not appear to 
perceive any need to pursue a conventional professionalisation strategy (Reece & Stahl, 2015).  
 
Several features of the typical functionalist information security management scenario 
conceptualised by Rastogi and von Solms (2012) (see 2.7.2.4.1 above) are identifiable within the 
information security management arrangements of the Trusts: the somewhat negative tone of  
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AU4Int (8.2); the lack of monitoring of the impact of the AUP and of its enforcement (all three 
Trusts) (8.2); the expression sometimes of patronising attitudes towards users on the part of IT 
support staff at T4 (7.2.3.6; cf. Guzman et al., 2004; Guzman, Stam, & Stanton, 2008; Rao & 
Ramachandran, 2011); IT managers’ focussing their attention more on misuse of the Web, i.e.on 
insider threats, rather than on facilitating professional information seeking and use (T3, T4) (8.5.4); 
and apparent lack of consultation with staff in formulation of AU4Int and AUPSec (8.2). As far as 
wider organisational values are concerned, there is the general issue here of the appropriateness, as 
well as effectiveness and consequences, of enforcing acceptable use policies solely via technical 
measures rather than primarily as a disciplinary matter; of treating NHS staff, in fact, as responsible 
adults who are able to make informed decisions about information resources and manage their use 
of time at work appropriately (B. O’Leary, personal communication, October 2011); the findings 
suggest that this was not consistently being done. The possibility arises that negative attitudes to 
information seeking (2.4.5) may have wider effects, “legitimised” by information governance and 
security concerns, on organisational decisions regarding computer facilities for staff and strategic 
priorities for IT infrastructure within NHS Trusts. Levels of organisational trust / distrust may play a 
part here, as may also conflict between and within professional groups over information security 
and access to information (Adams & Blandford, 2005).  
 
The IT department at T4 was reported by T4-09 to manage projects in an exclusive, non-consultative 
fashion (4.5.1, 4.5.2) and, in particular, as failing to involve representatives from information 
governance in a major electronic patient record implementation project. Greenhalgh et al.'s (2010) 
case study of a Summary Care Record implementation within primary care services suggested that 
exclusion of information governance could have potentially serious consequences regarding the 
incorporation of measures to ensure legitimate access to records, etc.; so also do the work of 
Baskaran, Davis, Bali, Naguib, and Wickramasinghe (2013); Linsley, Kane, and Owen, (2011); and 
Singleton, Pagliari, and Detmer (2008). In contrast with prevailing practice within the other Trusts, 
information governance staff also were not involved in the management of web filtering practice, or 
in other aspects of information security policy. The IT department at T4 had purchased an email 
encryption solution, but had not publicised it or produced any operating procedures for it; the 
records and governance managers had done so once they became aware of the situation. 
Communication between the two departments appeared to be minimal, and cooperation between 
them to be confined to technical investigation by IT of reported information governance incidents 
(4.5.2).  
 
There are issues relating to national structures that are of relevance here. The view of a senior 
manager at NICE, NICE-01, that the history of problems with HDAS raised major questions about 
strategic responsibility within the NHS for the overall quality of IT provision within Trusts, was 
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reported earlier (5.3). It  was noted in particular that responsibility for providing access to evidence 
sources, which was located within the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), was 
split off both from areas of other health informatics responsibility, which sat with the National 
Information Board within NHS England (strategy), with the Health and Social Care Information 
Centre (provision of information, data and IT systems) and from NHS Library and Knowledge 
Services, which were the responsibility of Health Education England. The series of transfers between 
different organisations of the National electronic Library for Health / National Library for Health / 
NHS Evidence were described above (Section 1.4.5). Apart from indicating volatility within the 
organisational and political climate, this history of instability suggested a possible cultural 
unwillingness on the part of the NHS informatics community to assume responsibility for the support 
of access to published information, or perhaps even to recognise the significance of the 
management of information and knowledge services as a legitimate aspect of health informatics 
activity (cf. Sections 1.4.5, 1.4.7, 2.5.4). The organisational separation, complained of by NICE-01, 
also considerably reduced the leverage for possible improvements in IT infrastructure to support 
knowledge and learning services.  
 
The design of the NHS information governance system, encompassing as it does concepts of  
management, information security, public accountability and legal compliance, clearly implied that 
information governance and records managers should hold a level of management responsibility for 
information security (1.4.4; Lomas, 2010). However, despite the existence of the information 
governance group on which they were represented, the records and governance managers in T4 
were apparently not able to exercise one (4.5.1).  
 
11.6 Summary 
This chapter has discussed three main theoretical areas of relevance and interest: interactions of 
power, culture, trust and risk in information security; approaches to innovation; and the effects of 
inter-professional conflicts and competition. It has also proposed an explanatory theoretical model 
unifying these different perspectives to represent the major factors influencing access to online 
published information within the NHS in England. It has been made evident that the roots of 
problems with access to, and use of, such information lie deep within the culture and organisational 
characteristics of the NHS and its use of IT. The following chapter goes on to present overall 
conclusions from the study and recommendations for further research and for policy. 
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Chapter 12. Conclusion and recommendations 
12.1 Introduction 
As explained in Chapter 1, the study set out to explore organisational and technical barriers to online 
information seeking, sharing and use by health professionals and managers within the NHS in 
England, in support of professional development and of clinical and management decision making. 
Such barriers were perceived as potentially affecting adversely both  the quality of clinical care 
provided and organisational effectiveness. In doing so the research focused in particular on 
investigating an apparent contradiction in the implementation and effects of regulatory policies and 
practices.  These at once supported staff training and development, and required that clinical and 
management decisions be made according to the most current best practice evidence, but also 
appeared to result in restrictions on access to, use and sharing of published information, as attested 
to by clinical educators and information professionals.  
 
This chapter revisits the background to the study (12.1) and summarises its overall conclusions 
(12.2). It goes on to discuss the extent to which the research objectives have been met (12.3), and its 
methodological limitations (12.5), with an outline of its contribution to new knowledge (12.6). This is 
followed by recommendations for further research (12.7) and recommendations for practice within 
the NHS (12.8), including information security and governance practice and social media training, 
with a final concluding section (12.9). 
 
12.2 Overall conclusions 
On the basis of the foregoing discussion (Chapter 11), it is suggested that barriers to accessing 
published information resulted from a variety of factors; they: 
1) arose from the relative inadequacies of IT infrastructures and from historical constraints on 
infrastructure (e.g. from NPfIT legacy systems) – themselves reflecting low levels of expenditure on 
IT in relation to turnover and historically negative cultural attitudes to IT on the part of health 
professionals and managers (6.4.5; cf. the roles of level of corporate resource, and of quality of IT 
infrastructure and its management in Figure 11.1);  
2) reflected a support priority given to clinical and corporate systems (4.5.4, 5.2, 7.2.3.5, 7.2.3.9), 
and adoption of cybersecurity “coping strategies” (e.g. implementing default configuration of secure 
web gateways, and not fully implementing their available functionality or monitoring their 
performance) by under-staffed NHS Trust IT departments (4.5.4);  
383 
3) represented a “side-effect” of measures implemented to address information security concerns 
related to PII, e.g. mandatory encryption of portable media (5.2.1). This, in turn, reflected a high 
priority given to data protection and privacy, and possibly also a high level of fear in relation to it, 
both organisationally and individually, on account of the possible disciplinary and financial sanctions 
that could be imposed for data breaches (4.5; cf. 1.4.4); 
4) related to this, reflected an apparent lack of awareness, or prioritisation, of the importance of the 
NHS as an environment for pre-registration and post-registration professional educational and 
training, and of the information needs of students on placement and of trainees, as reflected 
particularly in problems with providing access to Trust networks and networked applications (4.2.2, 
5.2.2.1, 6.2); 
5) reflected a relatively authoritarian, centralist service culture within some NHS IT departments, 
and insufficient business alignment or customer focus (cf. 11.3.1);  
6) reflected a lack of organisational readiness for user-driven innovation, in particular regarding 
mobile devices and the use of social media (11.4). This latter may have been linked with an 
expectation, based on recent history but disavowed in current NHS IT strategy (McBeth, 2016b), that 
significant IT innovation in the NHS should be centrally driven and funded, that is, “top down” rather 
than user- or clinically-driven (cf. the role of “culture of innovation” in Figure 11.1); 
7) reflected degrees of IT-culture conflict (Leidner & Kayworth, 2006) between particular 
information technology applications bearing upon information behaviour (secure web gateways, 
Web 2.0 applications, popular social media platforms) and the organisational culture of the NHS 
(11.4). 
8) reflected a fragmentation in responsibilities for NHS IT services, in particular the separation of 
responsibility for NHS Evidence, which lay within the remit of NICE, from the rest of NHS IT 
(governed by the Department of Health, NHS England, and HSCIC) and from NHS library services 
(governed by Health Education England)(1.4.5 ). 
 
With such a strong cultural focus on the secure management of personal information, including 
patient records and confidential business information, including activity and performance data 
(4.5.4), sight was apparently being lost at corporate levels, and within IT departments within the 
NHS, of the need to facilitate access to, use and sharing of published information to support 
professional development and decision making. IT and IG staff, and senior clinicians and managers, 
in keeping with the generally risk-averse culture of the NHS, could also be exclusively focused on 
insider threats, such as risks or possibilities of misuse of access to the Web and Web applications, 
rather than on the benefits of their proper use, which may have been insufficiently encouraged or 
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supported.  It is also possible that policy “silos” at national and at Trust level (cf. the findings of 
Smith and Katikireddi (2013) relating to policy making in public health) may have been involved, 
reflecting an organisational tendency to perceive information security and cybersecurity solely as a 
technical matter, unrelated to other areas of policy and practice. Since the theoretical model of 11.1 
is partial in its representation of relevant organisational factors, and some of the proposed 
constructs are abstract in nature, only points 1) and 6) of these conclusions readily map to it. 
 
12.3 Extent to which overall research aim has been met 
The stated overall aim of the research was as follows: 
 
To investigate barriers to online professional information seeking, use and sharing occurring 
within the NHS in England, their possible effects (upon working practices, working lives, 
education and clinical and organisational effectiveness), and possible explanatory or causative 
factors. 
 
Since there had been little previous work in this area, the research was intended and planned as an 
exploratory and explanatory case study. The scope of possible issues to be addressed proved to be 
wide-ranging and complex. In some respects, the study was of insufficient scope, in terms of the 
methods it was able to adopt, to address the research aim as originally conceived.  
 
The study aimed to investigate the nature and extent of barrriers to online information seeking.  A 
range of different barriers occurring within the Trusts of the study were identified and described in 
detail. However, it was not possible to include within it any national survey or log file analysis 
element, hence the overall prevalence and frequency of occurrence of different types of barriers to 
accessing information could not be estimated, and the “extent” aspect of the research aim could not 
be met.  
 
The study also aimed to investigate the effects of barriers to online information seeking. It was 
successful in doing so to a certain degree, as described in 12.3 above under Objective 2 / RQ2. 
 
The study aimed to identify “possible causal factors”. It was able to delineate technical factors in 
considerable detail, but its investigation of organisational factors was much less complete. In 
particular, the literature had indicated that issues of risk, risk management and attitudes to risk were 
likely to be of central importance. The study provisionally identified a wide range of possible 
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organisational factors relating to barriers to information seeking (12.2); an explanatory theoretical 
framework for some of these was proposed which involved the construct “attitude to risk” (11.1). 
However, risk as such was little discussed by participants, other than in relation to Web 2.0 and 
social media (11.3.5). It would have been desirable to explore further participants’ understandings of 
the relevant aspects of risk in relation to information seeking, use and sharing. However, it would 
have been impossible to access tacit or implicit understandings of risk without spending considerably 
more time in the field and undertaking an ethnographic study; implicit understandings are not 
readily accessible via texts, speech or discursive materials (Tracy, 2010) 
 
12.4 Extent to which specific research objectives have been 
met 
 
The following section discusses the extent to which the research objectives have been met and the 
corresponding research questions answered. 
 
Objective 1: to establish in detail the nature and extent of barriers to accessing to published 
information online within the NHS in England, related to the functionality of information 
technology infrastructure or from aspects of policy and practice relating to the use of 
information technologies. 
 
RQ1: What limitations currently exist on access to online published information to support 
professional development, clinical and management decision making, and research within 
NHS organisations arising from organisational strategies, policies and practices as they are 
implemented in relation to IT infrastructures and information technology use? 
 
To address RQ1, a wide variety of types of barriers to accessing, storing and using published 
information were identified and described, as detailed within Chapters 5 to 9. The accounts varied in 
specificity and detail according to the backgrounds of the participants. The barriers included a 
variety of problems with PC hardware and software, problems with email content or attachments, 
problems with system policies and permissions, insufficient bandwidth on Trust networks, poor or 
non-existent wireless network coverage, inability to connect to 3G or 4G networks from 
smartphones being used within NHS premises, difficulty in obtaining the encrypted USB memory 
sticks mandated by NHS portable media policies, lack of continuity of funding for access to 
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mandatory e-learning, restrictive policies on the use of mobile devices, and blocking of websites and 
web applications, including Web 2.0 and social media applications.  
 
Objective 2: to determine the effects that these barriers might have on professional information-
seeking, learning and decision-making in the contexts of clinical and management practice, 
education and research, and the possible consequences for working practices, for working lives 
and for clinical and organisational effectiveness. 
 
RQ2: What effects do these limitations (as cited in RQ1 above) have on professional information 
seeking, use and sharing, on the working practices and working lives of health professionals, on 
the education of students, and on clinical and organisational effectiveness? 
 
For RQ2, general indications were provided by the participants who described them of the 
consequences and effects  of technically-related restrictions on accessing, using and sharing 
published information for a variety of clinical, managerial and educational purposes (answering 
clinical questions, providing patient information, creating educational material, professional 
learning, and external relations). In some instances, particularly with the clinical educators, it was 
clear from the participants’ accounts that these restrictions were encountered frequently and 
presented a considerable obstacle to their work. In one instance, the participant’s work-life balance 
was being seriously affected through her resulting frequent need to undertake work at home (8.5.3). 
However, in many cases the main research method (semi-structured interviewing) did not prove to 
be as suitable as the researcher had hoped in generating detailed accounts of particular instances of 
such restrictions in their contexts, since participants were generally not able to recall events with the 
required degree of accuracy, and hence were unable also to provide precise accounts of their 
effects. The account of the problems in T3’s community services with accessing e-learning, described 
in Section 6.2, was an exception; a detailed internal report had been written concerning these. While 
this was not made available to the researcher, she was provided with a succinct account of its 
contents via telephone by the senior IT analyst T3-17 who had participated in the preceding 
investigation. Identifying and analysing negative effects is notably difficult. In many cases, barriers to 
information seeking as described by participants are likely to have constituted a general “drag 
factor” on the work of the professionals involved, the effects of which are difficult to categorise or 
evaluate. A distinction should be made between contributory and direct effects;  as Brettle, Maden, 
and Payne (2016) indicated, many factors may contribute to information behaviour, working 
practices, etc. 
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Objective 3: to investigate the norms, practices, attitudes, values, interests and presuppositions 
of the relevant staff groups regarding information seeking, business need and risk management 
which might be involved, and the influences they might be exerting on the phenomena identified 
in relation to Objective 1). 
 
RQ3: What are the organisational issues within NHS Trusts (policy drivers, legal and regulatory 
requirements, organisational values, cultural attitudes and presuppositions, professional norms, 
and practices) which bear on a) how IT infrastructure enabling access to online published 
professional information, including e-learning content, is managed, and b) how acceptable use 
policies, social media policies and web content filtering are implemented? How do these issues 
interact? 
 
For RQ3, three main theoretical areas were identified as being of relevance: interactions of power, 
culture, trust and risk in information security; diffusion of innovation in the use and regulation of 
Web 2.0 and social media; and the effects of inter-professional conflicts and competition. IT 
infrastructure relating to information provision and its management, relevant policy drivers, legal 
and regulatory requirements, and professional norms, with some of their interactions, were 
identified and described in detail. Under-resourcing of IT infrastructure and staffing, and security 
decisions consequent upon these, were also pinpointed as major contributory factors. Here the 
interview content yielded rich data relating to the context and background of health professionals’ 
information behaviour. However it was not generally possible, using the adopted research methods, 
to elicit the basic assumptions identified by Schein (1996) as a constituent of organisational culture, 
which are generally tacit in nature and accessible via only via observations of processes and 
behaviour (cf. Section 2.7.2.4.1). 
 
12.5 Limitations of the study 
The three organisations included as nested sites of data collection within the study, although 
selected to represent the greatest possible variety of organisational forms, did not exemplify the full 
possible range of different types of NHS organisation; this would have prolonged the data collection 
excessively. Although all the Trusts included some community services, NHS community trusts as 
such, and specialist NHS acute trusts (covering services such as oncology, orthopaedics or thoracic 
medicine) were not included.  
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Recruitment of participants was dependent not only upon the identification of suitable potential 
participants by other parties (librarian, research office assistant) in some cases, but also upon the 
willingness of those contacted to participate in the study, hence the participants represented a 
group of willing volunteers. It is likely that the participants had had some prior interest in the subject 
of the study; hence bias may have been introduced into the participant sample, leading to a possible 
overstatement of the effects of barriers to accessing and using information. This may have been true 
particularly within T1, where the researcher experienced considerable difficulties in recruiting 
participants. 
 
The participant sampling strategy had aimed to achieve as good a level of data saturation as possible 
in each Trust within the constraints of the limited time available for data collection (3.4). While the 
researcher felt that she had obtained a reasonably clear and consistent picture from her interviews 
at T1 and T3, the huge size of T4, and the organisational complexity of its specialist clinical services 
and research activities, made this far less achievable, and created a much greater degree of 
uncertainty regarding the generalisability of the findings across the organisation as a whole. In 
particular it would have been desirable to investigate further the apparent dysfunction identified in 
the relationship between T4’s informatics and information governance services, and its apparently 
decentralised approach to social media policy, but there was no opportunity to do this. 
The researcher’s aim had been to recruit participants in similar roles across the three Trusts in 
accordance with her purposive sampling strategy. However, it did not prove possible to recruit 
across all participant staff categories for all the Trusts. As previously noted, the researcher was 
unable to recruit an interview participant within the outsourced IT provider S3. In T1 it proved 
impossible to recruit a radiography educator, in T3 the clinical psychologist whose name was put 
forward by the research manager was unwilling to participate, and in T4 no human resources 
manager was contactable. At T3 the education pharmacist did not respond to the researcher’s email 
requesting an interview, so the drug information pharmacist was interviewed instead. In addition, in 
T4 an education facilities manager (as he proved to be), rather than a postgraduate medical 
educator or medical education manager, was put forward by the research office as the preferred 
participant. The possible full range of experiences may therefore not have been presented by 
participants within these categories. It was thereby also less possible to capture common patterns of 
data across the specialist areas they represented (Neergaard, 2006). 
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It was difficult in interviews with the IT managers to cover risk and security issues adequately in the 
time available as well as to gather from them the large amount of background information that was 
required about their Trust’s IT infrastructure and services.  
 
Participants’ perceptions of the quality of their Trust’s IT services were set out within a “home-
grown” framework (Section 7.2.3). Transferability of the findings could perhaps have been improved 
through the use of a standard framework such as ServQual (Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry, 1988, 
cited by van Velsen, Steehouder, & De Jong, 2007), which has been widely used in IT service quality 
research. 
 
It should be noted that the researcher had no prior “intelligence” about barriers to information 
seeking and use in any of the Trusts, hence the findings that high levels of website blocking were 
occurring in T4, and that T3’s community services had experienced a major problem with technical 
support of e-learning, were entirely fortuitous. The fact that blocking of websites was found to be 
common in only one Trust out of the four represented within the study indicates its sporadic nature; 
it also limits to some extent the transferability of the findings regarding website blocking. 
 
It could be argued that the researcher’s previous experience of working in the NHS as a library 
manager prevented her from taking a fully objective view of its structures and practices. However, 
her “insider” position provided in her view a highly advantageous background knowledge of the NHS 
as an organisation, of its information systems and services, and of the information needs of its 
health professionals, greatly enhancing her ability to establish effective rapport with interview 
subjects and to ask appropriate questions (cf. Silva & Backhouse, 2003). As her research progressed, 
she was able to reflect on her previous negative experiences, and to set them in the context of a 
deepening theoretical understanding of the relevant information behaviour, information security 
and organisational issues (cf. Section 3.9). 
 
12.6 Contribution to new knowledge 
Problems of access to and use of published information within the NHS for health professionals and 
managers, and the effects these could possibly have on the quality of care, had previously been 
highlighted informally by library and e-learning practitioners, but hitherto little studied (as discussed 
above in Sections 1.1, 1.2.1 and 2.7.3.4). The thesis presents the first detailed qualitative study of 
technical and organisational obstacles to professional information seeking, use and sharing to have 
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been undertaken within any part of the UK National Health Service. Previous investigations, while 
providing detailed accounts in some instances of problems caused by blocked websites, blocked web 
applications, including e-learning and social media resources, and other barriers to storing, using and 
sharing information, had been based either on survey data or on informal reports by information or 
e-learning professionals, and had focused largely on describing phenomena and their effects without 
studying the organisational background and context in which they were occurring or attempting to 
offer any analysis of possible causative factors. The explanatory model presented in Chapter 11, 
although it omits some aspects of the findings (Figure 11.1), is wide-ranging in scope, bringing 
together perspectives drawn from the fields of information behaviour, information security and 
cybersecurity, health service management studies, social theories of risk, diffusion of innovation 
theory, and the sociology of professions. 
 
More specifically, the study has: 
 Provided a detailed account of commonly occurring problems with PC hardware, PC 
software, system policies and permissions, and network infrastructures;  
 Created a diagrammatic representation of the decision-making process of users faced with 
blocking of legitimate websites by web filters (11.3.2; Figure 11.3); 
 Discussed this and the overall findings relating to blocking of websites in relation to the 
information horizon and satisficing concepts; 
 Adapted in relation to these findings Inglesant and Sasse’s analysis (2011a, 2011b), which 
was based upon Clegg’s circuits of power theory and actor network theory, of the effects 
upon end-users of information security measures ; 
 Offered a detailed account of operational difficulties encountered by training staff and users 
with the then-existing National Learning Management System for managing e-learning, 
including inherent deficiencies in its functionality and problems with its implementation in 
the contexts of the Trusts of the study; 
 Identified the direct negative effects of barriers to information seeking and use upon both 
clinical and organisational effectiveness within the NHS via a process of mapping to the 
different facets of the clinical governance process (Figure 2.4); 
 Adapted Greco et al.’s (2006) model (2.4.9, Figure 2.5) of the antecedents and consequences 
of empowerment and engagement to indicate a possible causal route through which levels 
of access to information, and to job resources, such as adequate computer infrastructure, 
could indirectly affect levels of staff engagement, and thereby organisational effectiveness 
391 
and performance, including clinical outcomes. This indirect effect is additional to the direct 
effect described above; 
 Explored aspects of culture, behaviour and attitudes relating to the use of IT, in particular 
the mutually reinforcing effects of poor digital literacy and poor IT infrastructure provision 
(7.4.1); 
 Applied Chretien and Kind’s (2014) “hierarchy of needs” model of changing perceptions of 
risks and benefits of social media use among health professionals to explain the study 
findings relating to use and non-use of social media by clinicians and their perceptions of 
social media-related risk; 
 Demonstrated the applicability to the study findings regarding levels and processes of social 
media adoption within the three Trusts of Kaganer and Vaast’s analysis (Kaganer & Vaast, 
2010; Vaast & Kaganer, 2013) of the process social media adoption by organisations based 
on social representations theory; 
 Adapted Abbott’s theory of professions (1988) and its application to the construction of 
professional identity in nursing in relation to information behaviour by Sundin and 
associates (Johannisson & Sundin, 2007; Sundin & Hedman, 1996) in putting forward an 
explanation of the study findings of contested jurisdiction between different health 
informatics professions within the NHS (1.4.7, 2.5.4, 11.5). 
 Provided a detailed account of professional norms relating to the use of social media and 
mobile devices within the three Trusts; 
 Investigated perceived IT department service quality in respect of  IT support needs relating 
to information behaviour. 
 
This section has set out the contribution to new knowledge made by the study. Areas for further 
research are discussed in the following section. 
 
12.7 Recommendations for further research 
The study has indicated a great many possibilities for further research, as follows. 
 
The original TDAG survey (Technical Design Authority Group, 2009a, 2009b) was pivotal in 
establishing a warrant for the present research. It would be valuable as part of the Knowledge for 
Healthcare LIS strategy agenda (Health Education England, 2014) to conduct an updated version of 
the TDAG survey among NHS library managers in England to see what changes in barriers to 
information access, use and sharing have occurred since 2008, when it was first conducted. E-
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learning, mobile devices and social media in particular are all rapidly changing areas, in terms both 
of resources and of policy; it is likely that significant changes in infrastructure, policy and practice 
would be shown to have taken place. It could also be valuable to conduct surveys of individual 
professional groups; this could be done via their associations with the appropriate permissions, and 
would not need NHS research governance approval. Design of the survey could be informed by the  
findings of the present study (Bunton, 2016). 
 
In principle, the diary interview method (Bartlett, 2012; Zimmerman & Wieder, 1977) could be an 
effective way of obtaining from health professionals detailed accounts of the nature and context of 
obstacles they encounter to information seeking, use and sharing, and to elucidate their impact. It is, 
however, inherently difficult to evaluate negative impacts; cf. the work of Farnan et al. (2008) in 
attempting to assess the impact on patient care of clinical questions going unanswered. Also time 
pressure could militate against effective and comprehensive diary keeping. Since barriers to 
information access, use and sharing may be encountered only relatively infrequently by many NHS 
staff, the diary keeping would also need to take place over a relatively long period to capture enough 
material of interest, bringing possible attendant problems of continuity and participant motivation. 
Success with the data collection would be more likely with a brief, structured format for the 
recording of access problems. Prompts for participants’ record keeping could be adapted from those 
commonly used in library impact studies, such as the NHS Library and Knowledge Services impact 
toolkit (Weightman & Urquhart, 2008). Alternatively, a “critical incident” (Flanagan, 1954; Urquhart 
et al., 2003; cf. Payne, Maden-Jenkins, & Brettle, 2011)  for assessing the impact of blocked websites 
could be used. However this would depend on recall rather than contemporaneous recording of 
data, and would hence be subject to the same problems as semi-structured interviews (12.2).  
 
It was originally envisaged that the present study would include a log file analysis element; however, 
this was dropped for lack of time. Log file analysis, given the required anonymisation (so that web 
traffic monitoring and Internet activity could not be tracked to individual users), would provide 
insight into the accuracy of secure web gateway categorisations of websites and into staff web use, 
both work-related and non-work-related, in a manner which would not depend on user or system 
administrator reporting. Obtaining such log files would obviously be a sensitive matter, requiring the 
researcher to establish a high level of trust with the host organisation. Log file analysis been 
successfully used, however, by a number of researchers to investigate  PWU at work, e.g. in 
conjunction with subject categorisation tools by Valli, (2004), Johnson and Ugray (2007) and 
Shepherd, Mejias and Klein (2014). It should be noted that both these groups of researchers 
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encountered the problem of whether to categorise particular instances of web use by an individual 
employee as legitimate or otherwise without knowing in any detail about the nature and context of 
the employee’s work. It would be a much simpler matter, however, to establish whether or not a 
particular blocked website were potentially legitimate for information purposes. In particular, it 
would also be desirable to investigate the effects of accuracy of web filtering of configuration 
decisions to block advertising. It might be possible to use some form of case-control approach for 
this, using matched pairs of Trusts with the same SWG, where one Trust blocked advertising, the 
other did not. 
 
Procurement and implementation processes for secure web gateways could be worth investigating 
via documentary analysis of tender documents and system documentation, and non-participant 
observation at relevant meetings, etc. The interest here would be in the process of drawing up the 
documents and in how different selection criteria are weighted within the selection process, also in 
how SWGs are implemented and decision made about their configuration. 
 
The relative paucity of UK-based studies of Web 2.0 and social media use in health professions 
practice and education, including social media policies, was noted above (2.4.1). Aspects of social 
media use within NHS services, including types of use in relation to information behaviour / 
professional learning, provision of training, staff attitudes and individual social media usage, as well 
as NHS social media strategies and policies, would all be fruitful areas of study.  
 
IT service quality and responsiveness to business need is an important determinant of organisational 
effectiveness in general; it also impinges upon culture of innovation and upon information 
behaviour. While digital maturity has been evaluated within NHS organisations (1.4.3), to the 
researcher’s knowledge, there have been no studies conducted of IT services management, service 
quality, or service climate within health services (2.8.5). An investigation along these lines, possibly 
using the evaluation instrument devised by Jia and associates (Jia & Reich, 2011, 2013; Jia, Reich, & 
Pearson, 2008) would be of considerable interest. 
 
It was noted above (2.7.3.2.2) that there is very limited evidence concerning the effectiveness of 
security education, training and awareness (SETA) in reducing unintentional information security / 
cybersecurity incidents. The publication of a revised version of the Information Governance Toolkit, 
planned for April 2018 (“IG Toolkit update from NHS Digital,” 2017), and its attendant mandatory e-
learning, could provide an ideal opportunity to undertake evaluations of pilot e-learning 
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programmes in terms of security awareness and reductions in numbers of incidents. Something 
similar could possibly be undertaken with digital literacy initiatives, such as the joint HEE/RCN 
programme Every nurse an e-nurse (Cumming & Davies, 2017); however, security is only one of the 
domains of digital literacy which it identifies, so the security-related content may be limited. 
 
While it illustrated considerable variations in information governance structures and modus 
operandi in relation both to information security and other risk governance areas, the research was 
not able to establish any correlation between such arrangements and problems of access to 
published information, other than to suggest a possible association between high rates of blocking 
of websites and poor communication between IT and other services. This again could be an 
interesting area of study, particularly in relation to outsourced services. 
 
12.8 Recommendations for practice 
It is evident from the study findings (Chapter 5, passim) that improvements in all aspects of PC and 
network hardware and infrastructure within the NHS are needed to support information seeking and 
use. In particular it was clear that Wi-Fi coverage, which is required to support the use of mobile 
devices, was variable within all three Trusts in the study. General network bandwidth issues were 
identified in T1 and T3. Following Marcus Baw’s surveys (Baw, 2013; Sachdeva, 2014), and a 
recommendation from Tim Kelsey, formerly the National Director for Patients and Information 
(Meek, 2015b), the need for improved Wi-Fi connectivity has been addressed at DH policy level 
(“Free wi-fi to be provided in all NHS buildings - Jeremy Hunt,” 2015), and implementation has begun 
(Whitfield, 2016a)(cf. Section 1.4.3, above). It is to be hoped that other infrastructure issues can be 
addressed as part of the modernisation, paperless agenda (Moore-Colyer, 2016). It would also be 
highly desirable for the planned Health and Social Care Network (formerly named the Public Services 
Network for Health) (McBeth, 2016a; Meek, 2015a) to be able to provide higher bandwidth and  
better web connectivity and facilities than the existing N3 network, for which the national contract 
was due to expire in 2017.99  
 
A clear requirement emerged for access to approved secure individual cloud storage to facilitate 
information sharing (5.2.6). This would, in many cases, obviate the need to use encrypted portable 
media, with the attendant problems of obtaining them. A cloud storage facility is available within the 
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 N3/HSCN: http://psnc.org.uk/contract-it/pharmacy-it/new-national-network-n3/  
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new NHS secure email system, NHSmail 2, although only as an add-on service using Microsoft 
OneDrive for Business and Microsoft SharePoint 2013 rather than as part of the core suite of 
applications (Accenture & Health and Social Care Information Centre, 2015). It is unclear  
whether or to what extent this service permits sharing of files across organisational boundaries, the 
need for which emerged clearly (5.2.6).100 
 
The deficiencies identified in the NLMS provided by McKesson in 2008, which was in use at the time 
of the study (6.2, 6.3.4) were set to be addressed within the new Oracle Learning Management 
(OLM) being developed by IBM, which was also planned to provide much-needed new functionality: 
compatibility with mobile operating systems, support for web conferencing, integration with Web 
2.0 and social media applications, and a range of local configuration options including links to local 
intranets (Bussey, 2015). The problems with HDAS were similarly intended to be addressed by the 
redevelopment initiated in 2015 and launched in October 2016 (Section 5.3). 
 
It was apparent from the findings (8.5.5) that the NHS Library and Knowledge Services whitelist of 
essential websites was not being publicised effectively, either to librarians or to IT managers. It is 
clear that, for the whitelist to be an effective tool with which librarians can maximise access to 
published information for their end-users, efforts must be made to engage librarians with its 
maintenance and updating. It must be publicised more effectively to IT managers, and robust local 
systems put in place for IT departments to be notified of updates. This work could be co-ordinated 
with the assistance of local library service leads and electronic services officers, where these exist; 
NICE could also have a role in this. It would be desirable also for updating purposes to collect 
information about website unblocking requests received and implemented by Trust IT departments, 
though this might not be readily available. 
 
Existing IT training within NHS Trusts may be limited in coverage and not always available when 
needed. To address digital literacy deficits, Trust IT departments should conduct digital literacy and 
cybersecurity training needs analyses among Trust staff and develop appropriate digital literacy 
training programmes, in line with Baroness Martha Lane Fox’s recommendations of December 2015 
(NHS England, 2015). This work could be informed by Health Education England’s work on digital 
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literacy.101  Digital literacy issues can most appropriately addressed within information literacy 
training relating to web use, so there is a strong argument for combined training provision covering 
both information and digital literacy, devised and offered in conjunction with library and information 
services (cf. Willard, 2010, Ofsted, 2010). 
 
The HSCIC practice guide on social media stated that problems are best addressed via user education 
rather than via technical controls (Health and Social Care Information Centre, 2012). NHS Trusts 
should provide training and guidance for all staff on the professional uses of common social media 
platforms such as Twitter, LinkedIn, YouTube and Facebook, and publish clear guidelines and 
recommendations for different types of corporate and professional use (health promotion, research 
dissemination, publicising events etc.) Library and information services could provide part of this this 
training, either face-to-face or via e-learning, as part of user education in effective web searching. 
Training should inform staff about the major security and privacy issues specific to social media 
(described in Section 2.6 above). 
 
Verma, Kavita, and Budhiraja (2012, p. 212) suggested as a general principle that the Hippocratic 
injunction primum non nocere (“First, do no harm”), should become the watchwords of information 
security staff; in other words, they should be at pains to avoid blocking the good when attempting to 
prevent the bad. Rather, they should, as far as possible, adopt context-aware security practices 
(Covington, 2015; Dimensional Research, 2015) which do not hinder employee productivity, focusing 
on providing the security protection that enables information to flow through the organisation 
(Harkins, 2013). Trust acceptable use policies should give clear examples of uses of information 
systems that are acceptable and which the Trust wishes to encourage (Gallagher, McMenemy, & 
Poulter, 2015).  
 
In addition, to avoid possible negative impacts on organisational trust, it is important that responses 
to information security incidents, including disciplinary sanctions for misuse of Trust IT systems, are 
proportionate (Lippert, 2004). Trust IT and information governance departments should consult 
more widely than was commonly occurring at the time of the study with stakeholders in the 
development and revision of Internet acceptable use policies. They should communicate with 
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stakeholders concerning web filtering practices and policies, and they should monitor and evaluate 
their impacts, encourage the reporting of false positives as applicable, and institute processes for 
responding promptly (within hours if possible) to requests to unblock legitimate sites. Greater use 
could be made of the facilities available within SWGs to establish different policy levels for clinical 
and clinical support staff groups, if this were thought desirable (see above, Section 2.7.3.4.2). For 
maximum effectiveness, information security training and awareness (SETA) interventions should 
aim at aligning the information security / cybersecurity frames of reference of different staff groups 
(Sedlack & Tejay, 2011; cf. Vaast, 2007). 
 
Library, education and training functions need to be more closely involved than at the time of this 
study in information technology business planning and strategy via appropriate consultative 
structures; this could help to raise the priority of IT service requirements in these areas. In particular, 
local policies need to be established by NHS Trusts for access by students on placement to 
networked resources and systems in line with their educational needs, and clear workflows and 
processes need to be established for this to be provided in a timely fashion.  
 
Lack of IT support for the Macintosh platform by Trust IT services emerged as presenting a hindrance 
to development of e-learning in-house, and thereby possibly leading to additional cost being 
incurred through outsourcing (Section 6.2). Consideration should be given to establishing such 
support services, possibly at regional level, via outsourcing arrangements if necessary. 
 
12.9 Conclusion 
Professional information seeking, use and sharing online within the networks of NHS Trusts in 
England has been shown to be adversely affected in some organisations by restrictions relating to a 
wide variety of technical and organisational factors. These include aspects of leadership and culture, 
in particular organisational trust, attitude to risk, and culture of innovation; professional attitudes to 
IT and norms of behaviour; variations in cybersecurity practices; inter-professional conflicts; external 
policy drivers; and poor levels of resourcing for IT infrastructure and staffing. It is important that the 
problems underlying difficulties in accessing, using and sharing published information be addressed, 
both for the organisational effectiveness of NHS organisations in the future and for the quality of 
their clinical care. 
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Appendix A. 
Main search statements  
 
The following represent the main search statements used in literature searching for this thesis. 
 
In the statements below, “ “ represents a search string, * a stem truncation, ? a wildcard truncation. 
AND, OR are Boolean operators; brackets enclose alternative search terms linked by OR. Statements 
in italics had document type limitations applied to them, where available within the individual 
databases. 
 
Information behaviour 
 
((“information (need*” OR use” OR behavio?r” OR seeking)” OR “evidence seeking”) AND (clinician* 
OR doctor* OR nurs* OR midwi* OR “allied health” OR “health* professional*” OR therapist* OR 
dentist* OR psychologist* OR “social work*) AND (online OR Internet OR web-* or database*) 
 
(“information need*” OR “information use” OR “information behavio?r” OR evidence*) AND 
manager AND health 
 
(theor* OR model*) AND (“information need*” OR “information use” OR “information behavio?r”) 
AND health 
 
(“information (need*” OR use” OR behavio?r” OR seeking)” OR “evidence seeking”) AND (barrier* 
OR obstacle* OR hindrance*) 
 
“professional identit*” AND (health OR NHS) AND “information (need*” OR use” OR behavio?r” OR 
seeking)” 
 
(“clinical autonomy” OR “freedom of enquiry”) AND “information (need*” OR use” OR behavio?r” 
OR seeking)” 
 
“clinical autonomy” AND (“freedom of enquiry” OR “academic freedom”) 
 
 
e-learning 
 
(e-learning AND (NHS OR “National Health Service”) 
 
(e-learning AND (NHS OR “National Health Service”) AND “mobile devices” 
 
(e-learning AND (NHS OR “National Health Service”) AND (strategy* OR history OR development) 
 
(NHS OR “National Health Service”) and m-learning 
 
IT services 
 
“IT service climate” AND (“IT service quality” OR “client satisfaction” OR “customer satisfaction” OR 
orientation) 
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“(IT OR “information technology”) service* management” 
 
“IT service* management” AND “best practice framework*” 
 
 (“IT service framework*” OR “IT service management framework*”) AND (NHS OR “National Health 
Service”) 
 
(NHS OR “National Health Service”) AND (COBIT OR ITIL) 
 
Organisational characteristics of the NHS 
 
“organi?ational culture” AND (review or overview) - document type limitation used here where 
available 
 
“organi?ational culture*” AND health – limit to UK 
 
organi?ation* WITH (sub-culture* OR subculture) 
 
Staff engagement, organisational values and organisational trust 
 
(“staff engagement” OR “work engagement” OR “employee engagement”) AND (review OR overview 
OR introduction)  
 
(“staff engagement” OR “work engagement” OR “employee engagement”) AND (“conceptual 
analysis” OR theor*) 
 
(“staff engagement” OR “work engagement” OR “employee engagement”) AND (NHS OR “National 
Health Service”) 
 
(“job resources” OR “job demands”) AND (“staff engagement” OR “work engagement” OR 
“employee engagement”)  
 
(staff OR employee OR work) AND burnout AND (“conceptual analysis” OR theor*) 
 
“organisational trust” AND (“conceptual analysis” OR theor*) 
 
“organi?ational trust” AND (NHS OR “National Health Service”) 
 
(“values statement* OR “statement* of values”) AND (NHS OR “National Health Service”) 
 
“NHS Constitution” AND values 
 
“competing values framework” AND (review OR overview OR introduction)  
 
“competing values framework” AND (NHS OR “National Health Service”) 
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Professionals within the NHS  
 
“system of professions” AND (review OR overview OR introduction)  
 
(“professional jurisdiction” OR “professional project”) AND (review OR overview OR introduction) -  
(“system of professions” OR “professional jurisdiction” OR “professional project*)”) AND (health OR 
NHS OR “National Health Service”) 
 
professionalism AND (“NHS OR “National Health Service”) 
 
“professional identit*” AND (“NHS OR “National Health Service”) 
 
 (professional OR inter-professional) AND (conflict* OR tension* OR rivalr* OR dispute* OR relations) 
AND (NHS OR (“National Health Service”) 
 
“health professional* OR doctor* OR clinician*) AND manage* AND (conflict* OR tension* OR rivalr* 
OR dispute*OR relations) AND (NHS OR (“National Health Service”) 
 
(“professionalism OR professionali?ation) AND (IT OR ICT OR “information technology”) 
 
“professional bureaucracy” AND (NHS OR (“National Health Service”) 
 
“New Public Management” AND (NHS OR (“National Health Service”) 
 
Information security / cybersecurity management 
 
(“information technology” OR “information and communications technology” OR IT OR ICT) AND 
(sub-culture* or subculture*) 
 
(“information security” OR cybersecurity OR cyber-security OR “cyber security”) AND (culture OR 
climate) AND “service management” 
 
“information security polic*” AND (development OR implementation OR “decision making” OR 
decision-making) 
 
(“information security” OR cybersecurity OR cyber-security OR “cyber security”) AND power AND 
organi?ation* 
 
power AND organi?ation* AND (review OR overview OR introduction)  
 
power AND organi?ation* AND “information (systems OR security)” 
 
(“information security” OR cyber-security OR cybersecurity OR “cyber security”) AND “risk (assess* 
OR manag* OR analysis)” 
 
(“information security” OR cyber-security OR cybersecurity OR “cyber security”) AND end-users OR 
“end users” OR users) 
 
(“information security” OR cyber-security OR cybersecurity OR “cyber security”) AND culture 
 
“Web application security” 
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“web-borne malware” AND (vulnerabilit* OR threat*) 
 
“drive-by download*” 
 
malvertising 
 
malware AND browser* AND (vulnerabilit* OR threat*) 
 
malware AND (ActiveX OR Java) AND (vulnerabilit* OR threat*) 
 
malware AND browser* AND (plug-in* OR plugin* OR add-on* OR BHO or “browser helper object*” 
AND (vulnerabilit* OR threat*) 
 
(“user* OR end-user*) AND (education OR training OR awareness OR SETA) (effectiveness OR 
evaluation) 
 
(“Internet misuse” OR “Internet abuse” OR “cyber?loafing” or “cyber?slacking”) OR “personal web 
use” OR PWU) AND (review OR overview OR introduction)  
 
(“Internet misuse” OR “Internet abuse” OR “cyber?loafing” or “cyber?slacking”) OR “personal web 
use” OR PWU) AND (health OR NHS) 
 
(“Internet misuse” OR “Internet abuse” OR “cyber?loafing” or “cyber?slacking”) OR “personal web 
use” OR PWU) AND (health OR NHS) AND (prevent* OR deter* OR detect*) 
 
(“Internet misuse” OR “Internet abuse” OR “cyber?loafing” or “cyber?slacking”) OR “personal web 
use” OR PWU) AND (health OR NHS) AND “organi?ational trust” 
 
“acceptable use (policy OR policies)” AND (NHS OR “National Health Service”) 
 
(“Internet misuse” OR “Internet abuse” OR “cyber?loafing” or “cyber?slacking”) AND monitoring 
AND “United Kingdom” 
 
Web filtering / blocking 
 
(web OR website) AND (filtering OR blocking OR “access control”) AND (review OR overview OR 
introduction)  
 
(web OR website) AND (filtering OR blocking OR “access control”) AND “acceptable use polic*” 
 
(web OR website) AND (filtering OR blocking OR “access control”) AND (health OR NHS) 
 
(web OR website*) AND (filtering OR blocking OR “access control”) AND (over-blocking OR 
overblocking OR “false positive*) 
 
(web OR website*) AND (filtering OR blocking OR “access control”) AND ((ROC OR “receiver 
operating characteristic”) OR (specificity OR sensitivity)) 
 
(web OR website*) AND (filtering OR blocking OR “access control”) AND (over-blocking OR 
overblocking OR “false positive*) AND (effect* OR impact* OR consequence*) 
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(web OR website) AND (filtering OR blocking OR “access control”) 
 
 
 
Risk 
 
risk AND “conceptual analysis” 
 
(“theory of risk” OR “risk theory”) AND (review OR overview OR introduction) 
  
(“cultural theory” OR Douglas OR Wildavsky) AND risk 
 
“risk thermostat” OR “risk homeostasis” 
 
“risk society” AND (review OR overview OR introduction) 
 
(NHS OR “National Health Service”) AND (attitude* to risk” OR “risk appetite* OR risk-averse OR 
“risk averse” OR “aversion to risk”) 
 
“risk perception” AND (“cyber security” OR cybersecurity OR cyber-security) OR “information 
security)  
 
“risk perception” AND (“cyber security” OR cybersecurity OR cyber-security OR “information 
security) AND (“health service” OR NHS or healthcare) 
 
“empathy gap” AND “IT services” AND (“health service” OR NHS or healthcare) 
 
 
Diffusion of innovations 
 
“diffusion of innovation*” AND theor* AND (review OR overview OR introduction)  
 
“diffusion of innovation*” AND (IT OR ICT OR “information technology”) 
 
“diffusion of innovation*” AND (IT OR ICT OR “information technology”) AND (NHS OR “National 
Health Service”) 
 
(“organi?ational culture*” OR organi?ational values”) AND (“social media” OR Web 2.0”) AND 
conflict* 
 
“IT-culture conflict” AND (NHS OR “National Health Service”) 
 
“diffusion of innovation*” AND (“organi?ational readiness”) AND (NHS OR “National Health Service”) 
 
(barrier* OR obstacle* OR hindrance*) AND “diffusion of innovation*” AND (NHS OR “National 
Health Service”) 
 
“IT consumeri?ation” OR “consumer IT” OR “shadow IT” OR “user-led innovation”) AND “diffusion of 
innovation*” 
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“IT consumeri?ation” OR “consumer IT” OR “shadow IT” OR “user-led innovation”) AND (IT 
department* OR “IT services”) 
 
“IT consumeri?ation” OR “consumer IT” OR “shadow IT” OR “user-led innovation”) 
 
“IT consumeri?ation” OR “consumer IT” OR “shadow IT” OR “user-led innovation”) AND (“IT 
governance” OR security) 
 
(“social media” OR “Web 2.0”) AND (policy OR policies OR guideline*) 
 
(“social media” OR “Web 2.0”) AND (NHS OR “National Health Service”) 
 
(“social media” OR “Web 2.0”) AND (clinician* or “health professional* OR nurs* OR therap*) 
 
(“diffusion of innovation*” OR adoption) AND (“social media” OR “Web 2.0”) 
 
(“Bring Your Own Device” OR BYOD) AND “diffusion of innovation*” 
 
(“Bring Your Own Device” OR BYOD) AND (security OR risk) 
 
(“mobile device*” AND “diffusion of innovation*” 
 
(“mobile device*) AND (security OR risk OR governance) 
 
(“mobile device*) AND (NHS OR “National Health Service”) 
 
("National Health Service" OR NHS) AND ("technology acceptance" OR “information technology”) 
AND attitude* 
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Appendix B. Information behaviour of multi-professional groups of health care staff  
Table B.1 Information behaviour of health care staff: primary research 
Authors Date 
published 
Country Researchers’ 
discipline/ 
background  
Subjects Methods Research focus 
Andrews, Pearce, 
Ireson, & Love 
2005 USA LIS/medical 
research 
practitioner members of a 
primary care practice-based 
research network: medical, 
nursing, physician assistants 
survey information-seeking behaviour to 
improve LIS support; excluded clinical 
questions related to drug dosages or 
interactions 
Doney, Barlow, & 
West 
2005 UK LIS / medical 
education 
primary care staff in 
Nottingham and Rotherham 
survey usage of LIS, internet and biomedical 
databases; information literacy training 
needs 
Thain & Wales 2005 UK LIS staff of colorectal cancer 
managed clinical network 
survey 
semi-structured 
interviews 
access to and use of library and 
knowledge services; informing design of 
cancer portal 
Podichetty, 
Booher, Whitfield, 
& Biscup 
2006 USA medical 
research and 
education 
health professionals attending 
CME programmes: medical; 
physical therapists, physician 
assistants 
survey (IUAHP 
questionnaire) 
internet use and its effects among 
health professionals, including patients’ 
perceptions of Internet information 
Hider, Griffin, 
Walker, & 
Coughlan 
2009 NZ medical 
education / LIS 
clinical staff in a single health 
board: medical, nursing, AHP, 
dental 
survey information-seeking behaviour using 
online resources provided by LIS 
Rutland & Smith  2010 UK LIS  representatives of occupational 
groups providing public health 
services 
semi-structured 
interviews 
Information needs of ‘frontline’ public 
health workforce, whether needs are 
being met, barriers to meeting needs 
Sedghi, Sanderson, 
& Clough 
2012 UK LIS/computer 
science 
health professionals in Sheffield 
teaching hospitals 
think-aloud protocols in 
structured searching 
tasks; 
semi-structured 
interviews 
resources used for medical image 
searching; relevance criteria applied to 
medical image searching 
Kostagiolas, 
Ziavrou, Alexias, & 
Niakas 
2012 Greece LIS all clinical staff (not auxiliaries) 
of Metaxa Cancer Hospital 
survey Information needs, resources 
preferences, obstacles to information 
seeking 
Jackson et al.  2007 UK various health and social care 
professionals involved in 
providing care to children with 
health-care needs in Barnsley 
survey information-seeking behaviours, sources 
of information currently received, 
information requirements and 
preferences for future provision 
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Appendix C. 
Studies of other groups of health service staff  
Many of the themes that have featured in the accounts in Chapter 2 of the information behaviour of 
doctors, nurses and health service managers occur again in these studies. Social workers are an 
important group of professionals working within health services, most particularly in mental health 
and learning disabilities settings, where they frequently work in multidisciplinary teams within 
integrated services (Allen, 2014; Lilo & Vose, 2016). A number of research findings relating to social 
workers’ information behaviour were thus of potential interest and importance. These related to 
lack of Internet access in the workplace, poor IT and information literacy skills, technophobia, poor 
understanding of library services, dependence upon verbal information sharing, lack of a research 
culture within the profession, and lack of management support for information-seeking in the 
workplace (Beddoe, 2010; Gannon-Leary, 2006; Gosling & Westbrook, 2004; Harrison, Hepworth, & 
de Chazal, 2004).  
 
Particular phenomena have been noted in relation to the information behaviour of other groups of 
health professionals: the high levels of use of journals and websites by AHPs (Fell, Burnham, & 
Dockery, 2013; Haigh, 2006; Kloda & Bartlett, 2009; Nail-Chiwetalu & Ratner, 2007); the degree of 
variation in the use of bibliographic databases by AHPs according to professional group 
(physiotherapists very high, speech and language therapists low) (Fell et al., 2013; Nail-Chiwetalu & 
Ratner, 2007); the persistence of workplace cultures which discourage information seeking and 
restrict access to the Internet (Duffy, 2000; Gilmour et al., 2008; Shanahan, 2009, 2012; Shanahan, 
Herrington, & Herrington, 2009; Westerman & Hurt, 2007); the low levels of library use by AHPs and 
social workers (Haigh, 2006; Harrison et al., 2004); the perceptions of poor information literacy as a 
barrier to information-seeking among AHPs as well as among nurses (Fell et al., 2013; Kloda & 
Bartlett, 2009; Nail-Chiwetalu & Ratner, 2007); the relatively low level of use of the Internet by 
dentists (Funkhouser et al., 2012; Landry, 2006); and clinical psychologists’ high level of knowledge 
of research methods and designs, coupled with low awareness of online information resources 
(Berke, Rozell, Hogan, Norcross, & Karpiak, 2011) and use of books for educational purposes 
(Wehmeyer & Wehmeyer, 1999). 
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Appendix D. Web-based cybersecurity threats 
 
Phishing is defined as the act of sending an email or social media message to a user falsely claiming 
to be an established legitimate enterprise or trusted individual, in an attempt to lure the user into 
surrendering private information that will be used for identity theft (Webopedia, s.d.). Spear-
phishing is a variant in which the messages are customised to a particular individual (Brozycki, 2009; 
Kassner, 2013). Spear-phishing is a variant in which the messages are customised to a particular 
individual (Brozycki, 2009; Kassner, 2013). Pharming employs a variety of techniques to direct users 
to malicious websites. One form of pharming, DNS cache poisoning, also known as search engine 
poisoning or DNS spoofing, exploits vulnerabilities in the domain name system (DNS) to divert 
Internet traffic away from legitimate servers and towards malicious ones (How-To Geek, 2015). DNS 
cache poisoning can occur without the user’s knowledge or involvement. Malicious websites may 
install malware; they may also use attack techniques such as cross-site scripting, cross-site request 
forgery, SQL injection or so-called  clickjacking to steal important credentials (such as logins and 
passwords) or other personal information from the victim in order to facilitate identity theft, or to 
gain unauthorised access to an application (Egele, Kirda, & Kruegel, 2009; Eshete, Villafiorita, 
Weldemariam, & Kessler, 2011; Grossman, 2012). 
 
Pharming employs a variety of techniques to direct users to malicious websites. One form of 
pharming, DNS cache poisoning, also known as search engine poisoning or DNS spoofing, exploits 
vulnerabilities in the domain name system (DNS) to divert Internet traffic away from legitimate 
servers and towards malicious ones (How-To Geek, 2015). DNS cache poisoning can occur without 
the user’s knowledge or involvement. Malicious websites may install malware; they may also use 
attack techniques such as cross-site scripting, cross-site request forgery, SQL injection or so-called  
clickjacking to steal important credentials (such as logins and passwords) or other personal 
information from the victim in order to facilitate identity theft, or to gain unauthorised access to an 
application (Egele, Kirda, & Kruegel, 2009; Eshete, Villafiorita, Weldemariam, & Kessler, 2011; 
Grossman, 2012).  
 
In a drive-by download (2.6.2), cyber-attackers may gain access to and compromise a legitimate 
website to serve malicious pages via four prevalent mechanisms: the exploitation of vulnerabilities in 
web server security and server-side scripting applications, code injection attacks via user-
contributed content, advertising, and third-party widgets. Such malicious pages typically contain 
JavaScript code, which may be obfuscated (thereby effectively unreadable) or polymorphic (the code 
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changes with each view), rendering it impossible to detect using signature-based antivirus solutions. 
There are five stages in a drive-by download: 1) the entry point (visiting the compromised website); 
2) distribution (the compromised page redirects the browser to another website containing a so-
called exploit kit); 3) exploit (the exploit kit probes the browser, operating system and other 
potentially vulnerable software (e.g. PDF reader, media player or browser extensions) looking for a 
vulnerability which it can attack); 4) infection (if the exploit kit discovers such a vulnerability in a 
browser component or extension, it can download the attack payload, i.e. the malware itself); 5) 
execution (the malware, of whatever type, runs on the infected computer) (Zorabedian, 2014). 
 
So-called “black hat” search optimisation techniques are often used to lure unsuspecting end-users 
to malicious websites, which are thereby led to rank highly in search engine results for popular 
search terms (Julisch, 2013). The term “search engine optimisation” (SEO) in general refers to the 
methods and techniques, both technical and creative, that can be employed to improve a website’s 
rankings in web search engine results and drive traffic to its pages. “Black hat” techniques are those 
that are considered unethical, and which are banned by common search engines. They include so-
called keyword stuffing (filling a web page with keywords), cloaking (showing to search engine 
crawlers different content from that shown to users), artificially increasing the number of links to a 
site through link farming or use of paid links, posting spam comments on other sites which 
incorporate back links, and plagiarising other sites to create duplicate content (Cahill & Chalut, 2009; 
Kent, 2006; Killoran, 2013; Malaga, 2008, 2010).  
 
Phishing is defined as the act of sending an email or social media message to a user falsely claiming 
to be an established legitimate enterprise or trusted individual, in an attempt to lure the user into 
surrendering private information that will be used for identity theft (Webopedia, s.d.). Spear-
phishing is a variant in which the messages are customised to a particular individual (Brozycki, 2009; 
Kassner, 2013). Spear-phishing is a variant in which the messages are customised to a particular 
individual (Brozycki, 2009; Kassner, 2013). Pharming employs a variety of techniques to direct users 
to malicious websites. One form of pharming, DNS cache poisoning, also known as search engine 
poisoning or DNS spoofing, exploits vulnerabilities in the domain name system (DNS) to divert 
Internet traffic away from legitimate servers and towards malicious ones (How-To Geek, 2015). DNS 
cache poisoning can occur without the user’s knowledge or involvement. Malicious websites may 
install malware; they may also use attack techniques such as cross-site scripting, cross-site request 
forgery, SQL injection or so-called  clickjacking to steal important credentials (such as logins and 
passwords) or other personal information from the victim in order to facilitate identity theft, or to 
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gain unauthorised access to an application (Egele, Kirda, & Kruegel, 2009; Eshete, Villafiorita, 
Weldemariam, & Kessler, 2011; Grossman, 2012). 
 
Pharming employs a variety of techniques to direct users to malicious websites. One form of 
pharming, DNS cache poisoning, also known as search engine poisoning or DNS spoofing, exploits 
vulnerabilities in the domain name system (DNS) to divert Internet traffic away from legitimate 
servers and towards malicious ones (How-To Geek, 2015). DNS cache poisoning can occur without 
the user’s knowledge or involvement. Malicious websites may install malware; they may also use 
attack techniques such as cross-site scripting, cross-site request forgery, SQL injection or so-called  
clickjacking to steal important credentials (such as logins and passwords) or other personal 
information from the victim in order to facilitate identity theft, or to gain unauthorised access to an 
application (Egele, Kirda, & Kruegel, 2009; Eshete, Villafiorita, Weldemariam, & Kessler, 2011; 
Grossman, 2012).  
 
In a drive-by download (2.6.2), cyber-attackers may gain access to and compromise a legitimate 
website to serve malicious pages via four prevalent mechanisms: the exploitation of vulnerabilities in 
web server security and server-side scripting applications, code injection attacks via user-
contributed content, advertising, and third-party widgets. Such malicious pages typically contain 
JavaScript code, which may be obfuscated (thereby effectively unreadable) or polymorphic (the code 
changes with each view), rendering it impossible to detect using signature-based antivirus solutions. 
There are five stages in a drive-by download: 1) the entry point (visiting the compromised website); 
2) distribution (the compromised page redirects the browser to another website containing a so-
called exploit kit); 3) exploit (the exploit kit probes the browser, operating system and other 
potentially vulnerable software (e.g. PDF reader, media player or browser extensions) looking for a 
vulnerability which it can attack); 4) infection (if the exploit kit discovers such a vulnerability in a 
browser component or extension, it can download the attack payload, i.e. the malware itself); 5) 
execution (the malware, of whatever type, runs on the infected computer) (Zorabedian, 2014). 
 
So-called “black hat” search optimisation techniques are often used to lure unsuspecting end-users 
to malicious websites, which are thereby led to rank highly in search engine results for popular 
search terms (Julisch, 2013). The term “search engine optimisation” (SEO) in general refers to the 
methods and techniques, both technical and creative, that can be employed to improve a website’s 
rankings in web search engine results and drive traffic to its pages. “Black hat” techniques are those 
that are considered unethical, and which are banned by common search engines. They include so-
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called keyword stuffing (filling a web page with keywords), cloaking (showing to search engine 
crawlers different content from that shown to users), artificially increasing the number of links to a 
site through link farming or use of paid links, posting spam comments on other sites which 
incorporate back links, and plagiarising other sites to create duplicate content (Cahill & Chalut, 2009; 
Kent, 2006; Killoran, 2013; Malaga, 2008, 2010).  
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Appendix E. 
Ethics documents 
 
E.1. Proposal for research ethics review 
Information School 
The University of Sheffield 
 
 
Proposal for  
Research Ethics Review 
 
Students  Staff 
This proposal submitted by:  This proposal is for:  
 Undergraduate x Specific research project  
 Postgraduate (Taught) – PGT  Generic research project 
x Postgraduate (Research) – PGR  This project is funded by: 
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Project Title:  
Access to e-resources within the English NHS: the role and impact of organisational  
cultures, information governance, and IT strategy  
 
Start Date: 01/10/2012 End Date: 30/09/2015 
 
Principal Investigator (PI):  
(student for supervised 
UG/PGT/PGR research) 
Catherine Ebenezer 
 
Email: lip12cme@sheffield.ac.uk 
 
Supervisor:  
(if PI is a student) 
Professor Peter Bath 
 
Email: p.a.bath@sheffield.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indicate if the research:       (put an X in front of all that apply) 
 Involves adults with mental incapacity or mental illness, or those unable to make a personal 
decision 
 Involves prisoners or others in custodial care (e.g. young offenders) 
 Involves children or young people aged under 18 years of age 
 Involves highly sensitive topics such as ‘race’ or ethnicity; political opinion; religious, spiritual 
or other beliefs; physical or mental health conditions; sexuality; abuse (child, adult); nudity and 
the body; criminal activities; political asylum; conflict situations; and personal violence. 
 
Please indicate by inserting an “X” in the left hand box that you are conversant with the University’s 
policy on the handling of human participants and their data. 
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x 
We confirm that we have read the current version of the University of Sheffield Ethics Policy 
Governing Research Involving Human Participants, Personal Data and Human Tissue, as 
shown on the University’s research ethics website at: www.sheffield.ac.uk/ris/other/gov-
ethics/ethicspolicy 
 
 
 
 
Part B. Summary of the Research 
 
B1. Briefly summarise the project’s aims and objectives: 
(This must be in language comprehensible to a layperson and should take no more than one-half page. Provide 
enough information so that the reviewer can understand the intent of the research) 
Summary: 
 
The overall aim of the research is to investigate the possible relationship between stated policy 
regarding evidence-based practice and professional learning, particularly e-learning, and the actual 
provision of computing facilities and IT security practice at NHS trust level, both from a technical and 
an organisational perspective.  
 
More specifically, the objectives of the research are to investigate: 
1) the impacts of inadequate functionality and restrictions on access to information resources and 
applications on professional information seeking within the NHS; 
2) the attitudes, presuppositions and practices of information governance, communications, human 
resources and technical staff which bear on how the security of networks and devices (PCs, laptops, 
and smartphones) is implemented within NHS trusts, in relation to overall organisational priorities 
and strategies. 
 
B2. Methodology: 
Provide a broad overview of the methodology in no more than one-half page. 
 Overview of Methods: 
 
It is proposed to carry out an exploratory case study using mixed methods, involving one or more 
geographically accessible NHS trusts, which may be of the same type or of different types. It could 
also, if indicated, involve publishers of e-resources and the current cohort of MSc Health Informatics 
students within the Information School; members of both groups are likely to have interesting 
experiences to investigate. It would follow an embedded, single-case design, treating the English 
NHS as the actual case, with the trust(s) and the groups of students and publishers’ representatives. 
As a first stage, the nature and extent of e-access problems will be described, quantified and 
analysed, and an initial exploration undertaken of attitudes and values, probably via: 
 1) Semi-structured interviews with library and workforce development staff (3-5 per trust) 
2) Semi-structured interviews with key informants (around 10 per trust) of staff within information 
governance, network security, human resources and communications departments, selected via 
purposive sampling 
3) Obtaining from the trust IT departments technical information about information security 
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measures in place within the trust 
4) The findings will be set in the context of documentary analysis, for each trust, of relevant strategy 
and risk assessment documents, policies, and information system documentation 
5) Q-methodology could be used to investigate further the attitudes of information security and 
information governance staff to web-based information-seeking. The Q-sort could, if indicated, 
include statements about the nature of the “core business of the NHS”, and the core purposes of 
information technology within the NHS. as the embedded units of analysis (Yin, 2009). 
6) If possible within the time available, telephone interviews will be conducted with representatives 
(5-8) of information providers (publishers, aggregators) for them to provide information about the 
technical aspects of problems they have encountered in setting up access to e-resources for NHS 
customers, and with members of the current cohort of MSc Health Informatics students within the 
Information School to report on technical problems they have encountered in relation to 
information-seeking. 
 
If more than one method, e.g., survey, interview, etc. is used, please respond to the questions in Section C for 
each method. That is, if you are using both a survey and interviews, duplicate the page and answer the questions 
for each method; you need not duplicate the information, and may simply indicate, “see previous section.” 
 
 
C1. Briefly describe how each method will be applied 
 
Description – how will you apply each method? 
Method (e.g., survey, interview, observation, experiment): 
 
1) Interviews 
1) Semi-structured face-to-face and telephone interviews with members of relevant NHS staff 
groups and other relevant parties(see above under B2) 
a) Semi-structured interviews with library and workforce development staff, including 
professional heads, to gain their perspectives on access to e-resources within the 
organisation and upon organisational readiness, in terms of technical infrastructure and 
support, for e-learning; 
b) Semi-structured interviews with key informants (around 10 per trust) within information 
governance, network security, human resources and communications, to explore their 
assumptions about information-seeking, their understanding of their role and of 
organisational priorities in managing information risk and access to e-resources for 
teaching and learning; 
c) Telephone interviews with representatives (5-8) of information providers (publishers, 
aggregators) for them to provide information about the technical aspects of problems 
they have encountered in setting up access to e-resources for NHS customers; 
d) Telephone interviews with members of the current cohort of MSc Health Informatics 
students within the Information School, to identify problems they may have experienced 
in accessing information from with NHS networks. 
 
2) Q methodology (if time allows) 
Q methodology is said to be useful in profiling attitudes about a phenomenon, and seeks 
to measure the relative importance of personal beliefs on issues or debates of social or 
economic consequence. It is best suited to the task of unravelling the subjective 
structures, attitudes and perceptions of the person or issue that is being observed, and 
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is particularly appropriate for sensitive topics (Anandarajan et al., 2006). Its purpose in 
the present context would be to investigate further the attitudes of information security 
and information governance staff to web-based information-seeking. The method 
involves two stages. The first is the creation of a collection of around 40 statements, 
known as the Q-sample, representing themes or belief categories, in this case derived 
from the literature search and from the interviews as previously coded by the 
researcher. The second is the testing of the Q-sample on a group of respondents, known 
as the p-set; the respondents are invited to rank-order each of the statements on a scale 
representing their level of agreement with it,, ranging from “most disagree” to “most 
agree” e.g. +5 “most agree”, +4 “strongly agree”, -2 “somewhat disagree”, -1 “slightly 
disagree, etc., generating a so-called Q-sort which includes the item rankings of each 
participant. The objective here is to sort the items. The completed Q-sort can then be 
analysed using factor analysis techniques. 
 
3) Q methodology could involve a wider group of staff (probably around 25-30) than were 
able to participate in the interviews. The Q-sample would include statements 
representing beliefs and attitudes relating to the themes of the research, such as views 
concerning the nature of the “core business of the NHS” and the core purposes of 
information technology within the NHS, also statements about aspects of web-based 
information-seeking. 
 
 
About your Participants 
 
C2. Who will be potential participants? 
 
1) NHS trust staff in various categories (see above, under C1) 
2) Marketing and technical staff of companies providing information resources and e-
learning platforms to the NHS (EBSCO, Emerald, Wolters Kluwer, ProQuest, Sage, Wiley, 
Blackboard, Cisco, Citrix etc.) 
3) (Possibly) UoS MSc Health Informatics students  
  
C3. How will the potential participants be identified and recruited? 
 
For categories 1) and 2), potential participants will be identified as follows (see above under 
C2 for respondent categories): 
 
1) Initially via recommendations or suggestions from the trust R&D Lead and Senior 
Librarian, thereafter via ‘snowball’ sampling 
2) Via the researcher’s initial contacts with marketing departments at the companies 
concerned, and indirectly via a circular email to health librarians on the LIS-MEDICAL 
JISCmail list inviting them to suggest potential respondents. 
 
Individuals identified initially within categories 1) and 2) will be contacted by the 
researcher via email or letter with information about the study and an invitation to take 
part. 
 
3) Potential respondents in this category are the MSc Health Informatics students. 
Professor Peter Bath will circulate an email to members of this group (category 3) on 
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the researcher’s behalf, with an invitation to contact the researcher directly if they wish 
to participate. 
 
C4.  What is the potential for physical and/or psychological harm / distress to participants? 
 
Minimal, if any, beyond what would be experienced in day-to-day work. 
 
C5. Will informed consent be obtained from the participants?  
X Yes 
 No 
 
If Yes, please explain how informed consent will be obtained? 
 
Each participant will be sent an information sheet in advance of the interview. Informed 
consent will be obtained in writing at the start of the interview, with an opportunity to raise 
questions with the researcher immediately beforehand. 
 
If No, please explain why you need to do this, and how the participants will be de-briefed?  
 
C6. Will financial / in kind payments (other than reasonable expenses and compensation for 
time) be offered to participants? (Indicate how much and on what basis this has been decided) 
 
No 
 
About the Data 
 
C7. What data will be collected? (Tick all that apply) 
 
 Print Digital 
Participant observation    
Audio recording  x 
Video recording   
Computer logs   
Questionnaires/Surveys    
Other: trust documents (policies, strategies, 
technical documentation) 
x x 
Other:   
 
 
C8. What measures will be put in place to ensure confidentiality of personal data, where 
appropriate? 
 
The researcher’s desktop computer at home and university laptop are both password-protected and 
have internet security (firewall and anti-malware) and encryption software (Boxcryptor) installed; 
see below under C9.  
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Individual participants will be assigned codes according to an encrypted, password-protected 
‘master list’ stored on the researcher’s U: drive; these codes will be used in filenames, transcripts, 
analysis and reports. 
 
Within reports of the research the trust(s) will be referred to by pseudonym(s) and described only 
as, e.g. ‘an acute NHS trust in the north of England’, ‘a mental health / learning disabilities trust in 
northern England’ etc. Any information that could indirectly identify the trust or individual 
participants will be removed in the course of transcribing recordings of interviews. An 
anonymisation log will be kept, which will be password-protected and stored on the researcher’s U: 
drive. 
 
 
C9. How/Where will the data be stored? 
 
Following a recorded interview, audio files will be uploaded from the recording device as soon as 
possible to the researcher’s personal cloud storage (Microsoft SkyDrive) and deleted from the 
device. A university-supplied laptop will be used for this purpose, using the Boxcryptor encryption 
service (https://www.boxcryptor.com), which supports a number of cloud storage services including 
SkyDrive. A backup copy will also be uploaded to the researcher’s U: drive. These files will not be 
shared. No other portable media or devices will be used. Anonymised transcripts will subsequently 
be uploaded to NVivo loaded on the researcher’s desktop PC at home for analysis. 
 
 
All project data will be held in specific directories within MS SkyDrive and retained until the PhD has 
been awarded and subsequent publications accepted.  
 
Paper records containing personal or confidential data (e.g. signed consent forms) will be stored 
within the researcher’s locked filing cabinet at the School. 
 
C10. Will the data be stored for future re-use? If so, please explain 
 
Future use of the data by other researchers is not currently envisaged.  
 
 About the Procedure 
 
E11. Does your research raise any issues of personal safety for you or other researchers involved in 
the project (especially if taking place outside working hours or off University premises)? If so, please 
explain how it will be managed. 
 
Not to my knowledge; the interviews etc. will be carried out in normal office hours within the trust 
premises. 
 
 
References 
Anandarajan, M., Paravastu, N., & Simmers, C. a. (2006). Perceptions of personal Web usage in the 
workplace: AQ-methodology approach. CyberPsychology and Behavior, 9(3), 325–35.   
Yin, R. K. (2009). Case study research: design and methods (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
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The University of Sheffield. 
Information School 
 
Title of Research Project:  
 
Access to e-resources within the English NHS: the role and impact of organisational cultures, information 
governance, and IT strategy  
 
We confirm our responsibility to deliver the research project in accordance with the University of 
Sheffield’s policies and procedures, which include the University’s ‘Financial Regulations’, ‘Good 
Research Practice Standards’ and the ‘Ethics Policy Governing Research Involving Human 
Participants, Personal Data and Human Tissue’ (Ethics Policy) and, where externally funded, with the 
terms and conditions of the research funder. 
 
In submitting this research ethics application form I am also confirming that: 
 The form is accurate to the best of our knowledge and belief.  
 The project will abide by the University’s Ethics Policy. 
 There is no potential material interest that may, or may appear to, impair the independence 
and objectivity of researchers conducting this project. 
 Subject to the research being approved, we undertake to adhere to the project protocol 
without un-agreed deviation and to comply with any conditions set out in the letter from 
the University ethics reviewers notifying me of this. 
 We undertake to inform the ethics reviewers of significant changes to the protocol (by 
contacting our academic department’s Ethics Coordinator in the first instance). 
 we are aware of our responsibility to be up to date and comply with the requirements of 
the law and relevant guidelines relating to security and confidentiality of personal data, 
including the need to register when necessary with the appropriate Data Protection Officer 
(within the University the Data Protection Officer is based in CiCS). 
 We understand that the project, including research records and data, may be subject to 
inspection for audit purposes, if required in future. 
 We understand that personal data about us as researchers in this form will be held by those 
involved in the ethics review procedure (e.g. the Ethics Administrator and/or ethics 
reviewers) and that this will be managed according to Data Protection Act principles. 
 If this is an application for a ‘generic’ project all the individual projects that fit under the 
generic project are compatible with this application. 
 We understand that this project cannot be submitted for ethics approval in more than one 
department, and that if I wish to appeal against the decision made, this must be done 
through the original department. 
 
Name of the Student (if applicable): 
Catherine Ebenezer 
Name of Principal Investigator (or the Supervisor):  
Professor Peter Bath  
Research Ethics Review 
Declaration 
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Date: 10/10/2013 
E.2 Information School Research Ethics Panel: Letter of Approval 
 
 
Date: 14th November 2013 
  
TO: Catherine Ebenezer 
 
The Information School Research Ethics Panel has examined the following application: 
 
Title: Access to e-resources within the English NHS: the role and impact of organisational cultures, 
information governance, and IT strategy  
 
 
Submitted by: Catherine Ebenezer 
 
 
And found the proposed research involving human participants to be in accordance with the 
University of Sheffield’s policies and procedures, which include the University’s ‘Financial 
Regulations’, ‘Good Research Practice Standards’ and the ‘Ethics Policy Governing Research Involving 
Human Participants, Personal Data and Human Tissue’ (Ethics Policy). 
 
This letter is the official record of ethics approval by the School, and should accompany any formal 
requests for evidence of research ethics approval. 
 
 
Effective Date: 14th November 2013 
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E.3. Research ethics review outcome 
 
The University of Sheffield. 
Information School 
 
 
Name of Ethics Coordinator (or 
replacement): 
 
Dr Angela Lin 
Date of the Review: 
 
14th November 2013 
 
Research Project Title: Access to e-resources within the English NHS: the role and impact of organisational 
cultures, information governance, and IT strategy  
 
Principal Investigator:  Catherine Ebenezer 
Supervisor:  
(if PI is a student) 
Peter Bath 
 
 
This proposal is       (put an X in front on only one) 
x Approved (as submitted) 
 Pending approval provided compulsory requirements are met (explained in A) 
 Not approved (explained in B) 
 
A. Compulsory requirements that must be met: 
 
 
 
 
I confirm that I do not have a conflict of interest with this project proposal  (insert “x”) x 
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Please revise your initial proposal and resubmit. Once these requirements are approved the research may 
commence. 
 
B. If the proposal is not approved, clearly explain why: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research Issues: These issues were identified by the reviewers. They are suggestions for consideration only, and 
have no effect on the research ethical issues. 
    
504 
 
 
I am not clear how the suggested number of semi-structured interviews (10) within the NHS  
Trust/Trusts will give a clear picture of the opinions of the various groups identified.  
There seems to be an imbalance in the depth of opinions sought from library staff (3/5) in relation 
to other stakeholder groups. Why not have 3/5 interviews with all stakeholder groups? 
There may be an explanation for this. 
 
Section C3.1) highlights snowball sampling, which is methodologically a weak way of sampling and it’s worth 
considering if this is the best option. It may well be due to access issues, but important to think 
about and potentially reconsider.  
 
Why are the students interviewed on the phone? Is there a specific reason to do it this way? Also,  
is there a methodological issue (similar to weakness of snowball sampling) in interviewing students 
at your own University? Is it worth thinking about gaining access to students at a different  
University? 
 
In terms of the various strategies for anonymising participants, how will the course be identified?  
Similar to the way in which the trusts and publishers (though details of how publishers are  
anonymised only appear on the relevant consent form) are dealt with, how will the course be 
de-identified?  
 
On the consent forms for the face to face interviews it might be useful to highlight where the  
Interviews will take place. 
 
Finally, I found the objectives of the study written in a rather dense way that makes it quite hard 
to make sense of them on first reading. This does not make them bad objectives, but it’s worth 
considering if they could be phrased slightly differently so that the objectives of the research are 
made clearer to participants.  
 
The student has clearly covered all issues regarding data security and participant  
ambiguity and has proposed appropriate measures for these. 
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C.4 Participant information sheet and consent form 
 
The University of Sheffield. 
Information School 
Access to e-resources within the NHS in England: the role and 
impact of organisational culture, information governance, and 
IT strategy  
 
Researchers 
Catherine Ebenezer 
Information School, University of Sheffield, Regent Court, 211 Portobello, Sheffield, S1 4DP 
lip12cme@sheffield.ac.uk 
01270 669589 / 07876 494421 
 
Purpose of the research 
The overall aim of the research is to investigate the possible relationship between stated policy 
regarding evidence-based practice and professional learning, particularly e-learning, and the actual 
provision of computing facilities and IT security practice at NHS trust level, both from a technical and 
an organisational perspective. More specifically, the objectives of the research are to investigate: 
1) the impacts of inadequate functionality and restrictions on access to information resources and 
applications on professional information seeking within the NHS; 
2) the attitudes, presuppositions and practices of information governance, communications, human 
resources and technical staff which bear on how the security of networks and devices (PCs, laptops, 
tablets and smartphones) is implemented within NHS trusts, in relation to overall organisational 
priorities and strategies.   
 
Who will be participating? 
The researcher is seeking to conduct semi-structured interviews with library and workforce 
development staff to gain their perspectives on access to e-resources within the organisation and 
upon organisational readiness, in terms of technical infrastructure and support, for e-learning, with 
clinical professional leads, and with managers from information governance, IM&T, human 
resources and communications. 
 
What will you be asked to do? 
The researcher will ask you to participate in a semi-structured interview of up to one hour in length. 
 
What are the potential risks of participating? 
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The risks of participating are the same as those experienced in everyday working life. 
 
What data will we collect? 
The interviews will be audio-recorded. 
 
What will we do with the data? 
Following a recorded interview, audio files will be uploaded from the recording device as soon as 
possible to the researcher’s personal cloud storage and deleted from the device. A university-
supplied encrypted laptop will be used for this purpose. A backup copy will also be uploaded to the 
researcher’s university network drive. These files will not be shared. No other portable media or 
devices will be used. Anonymised transcripts will subsequently be uploaded to the researcher’s 
desktop PC at home for analysis. 
 
All project data will be held in specific directories within the researcher’s cloud storage and retained 
until the PhD has been awarded and subsequent publications accepted.  
 
Signed consent forms will be stored within the researcher’s locked filing cabinet at the Information 
School. Future use of the data by other researchers is not currently envisaged.  
 
Will my participation be confidential? 
Individual participants will be assigned codes according to an encrypted, password-protected 
‘master list’ stored on the researcher’s university network drive; these codes will be used in 
filenames, transcripts, analysis and reports. 
 
Within reports of the research the trust will be referred to by pseudonym(s) and described only as, 
e.g. ‘an acute NHS trust in the north of England’. Any information that could indirectly identify the 
trust or individual participants will be removed in the course of transcribing recordings of interviews.  
 
What will happen to the results of the research project? 
The results of this study will be included in the researcher’s PhD thesis, which will be publicly 
available via the White Rose eTheses Online (WREO) website http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/ and in 
journal articles; also a summary of the results will be available from the researcher on request. 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
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I confirm that I have read and understand the description of the research project, and that I have 
had an opportunity to ask questions about the project. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without 
any negative consequences. 
 
I understand that I may decline to answer any particular question or questions. If I stop participating 
at all time, all of my data will be purged. 
 
I understand that my responses will be kept strictly confidential, that my name or identity will not 
be linked to any research materials, and that I will not be identified or identifiable in any report or 
reports that result from the research. 
 
I give permission for the research team members to have access to my anonymised responses. 
 
I agree to take part in the research project as described above. 
 
   
Participant Name (Please print)  Participant Signature  
 
 
 
  
Researcher Name (Please print)  Researcher Signature 
 
 
Date 
 
 
 
 
Note: If you have any difficulties with, or wish to voice concern about, any aspect of your participation in this 
study, please contact Dr. Angela Lin, Research Ethics Coordinator, Information School, The University of 
Sheffield (ischool_ethics@sheffield.ac.uk), or to the University Registrar and Secretary. 
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Appendix F. 
Interview guides 
 
F. 1 Information technology staff (version 3.11) 
Basic factual information: 
- How many staff do you manage? 
- Number of hospital sites? PCs? 
- Are any IT functions outsourced? If so, which? 
- Wi-Fi support? Staff? Patients? Both? 
- Mobile device support / provision?  
- What web security device(s) are used within your Trust? (web security gateway e.g. 
WebSense, WebMarshal; proxies; firewalls, etc.)? 
- What is/are the web browser(s) in general use? Are alternatives permitted for particular 
purposes? How are browser add-ons managed/updated? 
- Contacts with LIS/e-learning/CPD functions? 
- Trust LIS / other LIS? 
- T&D 
- Professional educators? Medicine, nursing, AHP, pharmacy, etc.? 
- CKO? 
Could you please outline for me your role within the IT department, particularly as it relates to 
information security within the trust? 
In an era of increasing information security threat levels, the staff responsible for information 
security within the trust obviously have a difficult task in safeguarding the security and integrity of 
its IT infrastructure.  
How would you describe your main priorities in information security? 
What are the most difficult issues that you face? 
How would you characterise the general approach to network / information security within the 
trust’s information governance structures? What would you say were the main strengths and 
weaknesses of this approach? How well do the existing structures work? 
 
In addressing information security problems generally, what are your main sources of professional 
information and guidance? 
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What communication channels does the IT department have across the trust for informing strategic 
planning mechanisms for information systems development and for obtaining feedback from 
internal customers? How effective would you say that they were? 
In particular, through what channels are you and your colleagues generally informed of the 
IT system requirements of e-learning and ‘library-related’ applications accessed by trust 
staff? 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Looking now at more day-to-day issues: writers on information security often justify their decisions 
on practical security matters by reference to “business need”.  
 
How do you understand “business need” within the NHS?  
 
How in practice is a “business need” established?  
How do you perceive, or where do you locate, library / knowledge / information services in relation 
to overall NHS “business need”  
 
In the context of information resources, what, for instance, might or might not constitute a 
legitimate “business need”?  
 
What is your view of / what approach is taken by your department to the following? 
- Professional networking sites e.g. LinkedIn, ResearchGate, doc2doc, WeNurses 
- Prezi 
- Web conferencing solutions requiring client software installation, e.g. GoToMeeting, WebEx 
- Skype 
- (Professional) resource sharing sites e.g. Slideshare, educational YouTube channels? 
- Google apps 
- Professional use of Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Pinterest 
- Blogs, wikis, portals 
- Personal cloud storage, e.g. Dropbox, OneDrive?  
 
How would you rate the trust’s e-learning readiness from a technical perspective? 
 
It is often said that “Users are the weakest link”. Can you understand why someone might say that? 
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What approach is taken to the enforcement of acceptable use policies and other information 
security-related policies? (Technical means, disciplinary measures, a mixture of both?) On what basis 
are such decisions made? 
----------------- 
If a ‘legitimate’ website (i.e. one which has not been compromised as a delivery vehicle for malware 
and whose content is of potential professional relevance for NHS staff) is incorrectly blocked by a 
security device, i.e. there is a false positive, is there a process within the trust for getting that site 
unblocked? If so, what is it, and how long does it usually take? 
 
About how many such requests would you estimate are received in any one month? 
To what extent do you perceive that false positives create problems for users? 
 
Is the national whitelist of ‘never to be blocked’ websites (produced by LKSL IMTG) implemented on 
[the trust’s web security device]? 
The article I sent you by Prince et al. from the journal Medical Education about e-resource 
availability within the NHS comments as follows on their findings: “Shouldn’t we be managing the 
risks more effectively in order to allow learners the freedom to use IT resources to better effect?” 
 
Could you comment on your overall approach to the management of risk? What in practice 
constitutes an acceptable level of risk? 
Has the trust suffered any form of data loss or data breach within the last few years?  
 
If so, what would you say have been the effects in terms of information security and information 
governance policy and practice? 
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F.2 Information governance staff (version 1.2) 
 
Could you please outline for me the scope of your role within information governance within the 
Trust? How does it relate to risk management? 
Information security risk management is obviously part of the picture. In an era of increasing 
information security threat levels, the staff responsible for information security within the Trust 
obviously have a difficult task in safeguarding the security and integrity of its IT infrastructure. 
Within [name of Trust] how far / to what extent does information governance have a role in 
information security? 
 What are the most difficult issues that you face in information governance? 
How would you rate your own and your colleagues’ understanding of the technical issues in 
information security that relate to information governance? How dependent are you in 
practice on members of the IT staff? 
In addressing information security problems generally, what are your main sources 
of professional information and guidance? 
How would you characterise the general approach to information security risk within the Trust’s 
information governance structures? What would you say were the main strengths and weaknesses 
of this approach? How well do the existing structures work? 
I am particularly interested in the Trust’s approach to staff use of mobile devices, and in social media 
access and use in relation to risk management, professional cultures and overall organisational 
culture. What are you able to tell me in general? (I am concerned more with staff use of social media 
for professional purposes than with organisational use for public engagement purposes, although 
the two are evidently related.) 
Writers on information security often justify their decisions on practical security matters by 
reference to “business need”.  
 
How do you understand “business need” within the NHS?  
 
How in practice is a “business need” established?  
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In the context of information resources, what, for instance, might or might not constitute a 
legitimate “business need”?  
(It might help to imagine, for instance, that a request has been made to the IT Department 
to provide access to a web conferencing application such as Blackboard Collaborate or 
GoToMeeting, or to Second Life for e-learning purposes).  
What communication channels does the Information Governance department have relating to 
information security across the Trust and for obtaining input/feedback from internal stakeholders 
regarding the impact of information governance policies? How effective would you say that they 
were? 
 
Many writers on information system security speak of an inevitable ‘trade-off’ between the 
functionality and the security of computer systems. Are you aware of any such issues within the 
trust’s systems and services that might bear on the provision of access to e-resources?  
[Bruce Schneier, the author of a well-known book on information security, Secrets and Lies (Wiley, 
2000) famously stated that “Users are the weakest link”. Can you understand why someone might 
say that? What might be the implications for the trust?] 
What approach is taken to the enforcement of acceptable use policies and other information 
security-related policies? (Technical means, disciplinary measures, a mixture of both?) On what basis 
are such decisions made? 
If a ‘legitimate’ website (i.e. one which has not been compromised and whose content is of potential 
professional relevance for NHS staff) is blocked by a security device, is there a process within the 
trust for getting that site unblocked? If so, what is it, and how long does it usually take? 
 
Has the trust suffered any form of data loss or data breach within the last few years?  
 
If so, what would you say have been the effects in terms of information security and information 
governance policy and practice? 
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F.3 Interview guide: library / information managers (version 2.0) 
Could I please ask you some background questions about the library? 
 
How long have you yourself been in post? 
 
Which organisations and staff groups do you serve?  
How is your stock and IT infrastructure provided and supported? 
I sent you a synopsis of findings of the survey on e-resource availability carried out by the then 
Technical Design Authority Group (TDAG) of SHALL (Strategic Health Authority Library Leads) in 2008 
following a post on the LIS-MEDICAL JISCmail list by a library manager in Teesside, John Blenkinsopp, 
and his subsequent article in He@lth Information on the Internet (issue 62, 2008). This related 
primarily to library-managed e-resources, but had a section devoted to e-learning. 
 
Along the lines of the survey, could you please outline in as much detail as possible any problems 
you have encountered with access to electronic content, or that learners have reported? I am 
interested both in technical and in organisational issues, if such exist. 
How well in general would you say that the Trust’s network infrastructure now supports e-resource 
access? 
Do your readers ever report to you problems in accessing or using electronic content? 
Do learners access e-learning content on Trust smartphones or on their own smartphones and 
tablets? If so, what issues does this raise? 
If a ‘legitimate’ website (i.e. one which has not been compromised and whose content is of potential 
professional relevance for NHS staff) is blocked by a security device, is there a process within the 
Trust for getting that site unblocked? If so, what is it, and how long does it usually take? 
To what extent do you perceive that ‘over-blocking’ of legitimate websites creates problems for 
users? 
 
Is the national whitelist of ‘never to be blocked’ websites (produced by SIMTG, TDAG’s successor) 
implemented on [the trust’s web security device]? 
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How do you perceive the attitude of IT and information governance staff in dealing with e-resource 
access problems? And library issues in general? 
Has the Trust suffered any form of data loss or data breach within the last few years?  
 
If so, what would you say have been the effects in terms of information security and information 
governance policy and practice? 
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F.4 Communications staff (version 2.0) 
For the purposes of my research I am concerned mainly with social media and the benefits, as well 
as the risks, for information security as well as for corporate reputation, which they present for 
organisations. 
The TDAG survey (which I sent you) highlighted access to social media as a particular problem. A 
number of information resources which provide content that are highly relevant for NHS staff have a 
‘social’ component (e.g. YouTube, SlideShare, ResearchGate). Also, blogs, wikis and discussion 
boards are frequently used in e-learning. 
Could you please outline for me your own role in communications? 
Social media, even those with a professional and educational focus, evidently present a huge range 
of issues for organisations.  
What approach has been taken corporately to social media? What are [name of Trust’s] priorities? 
What have been the main operative considerations? 
Have particular policies or guidance on use of social media been produced within [name of Trust]? 
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F. 5 Training and development staff (version 3.0) 
 
Can you please tell me about the areas for you are responsible? 
I sent you a synopsis of findings of the survey on e-resource availability carried out by the then 
Technical Design Authority Group of SHALL (Strategic Health Authority Library Leads) in 2008. This 
related primarily to library-managed e-resources, but had a section devoted to e-learning. 
 
Along the lines of the survey, could you please outline in as much detail as possible any problems 
you have encountered with access to e-learning content, or that learners have reported? I am 
interested both in technical and in organisational issues, if such exist. 
-------------- 
 
There have been huge organisational changes within the NHS, and notable developments in the 
provision of e-learning within the NHS, since 2008. How and in what areas do you perceive that have 
things changed for training and development since then? I am interested both in national and in 
local developments. 
 
 
What systems are in place for managing the e-learning undertaken by [name of Trust] staff? 
How would you rate the Trust’s readiness for e-learning?  
 
Does the Trust’s PC and network infrastructure, and the way it is managed, provide an adequate 
platform for e-learning, in your view? In particular, how widely available to staff are computers that 
meet system requirements (sound cards, browser functionality etc.) to run e-learning applications?  
 
Do learners access e-learning content on trust smartphones or on their own smartphones and 
tablets? If so, what issues does this raise? 
--------------- 
Some social media applications, such as blogs and wikis, and also resource sharing sites such as 
SlideShare and YouTube, are widely used in e-learning. The TDAG survey, whose findings we 
discussed earlier, highlighted social media as a particular problem. 
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Are you aware of any policies or guidance on use of social media that have been produced within 
[name of Trust]? 
 
Have you encountered any issues with social media applications? 
--------------- 
How involved is the Trust’s library service with provision of support for e-learning?  
--------------- 
How do you perceive the attitude of IM&T and information governance staff in relation to 
information resources and e-learning? 
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F. 6 Human resources staff (version 1.0) 
Could you please outline for me your own role within HR, particularly with relation to ESR 
implementation within the trust? 
My interest is primarily in 1) computer misuse as a disciplinary issue 2) social media policy 3) the 
overall effects of blocking access to web-based information resources and applications.  
‘Computer misuse is not an IT problem, it’s a management problem.’ Do you agree? What are the 
practical implications of your view? 
What approach is taken within the Trust to the enforcement of acceptable use policies and other 
information security-related policies? (Technical means, disciplinary measures, a mixture of both?) 
On what basis are such decisions made? 
Social media, even those with a professional and educational focus, present a huge range of issues 
for organisations.  
What would you say are the main issues in general?  
What stage has the policy process regarding social media reached at [name of Trust]? What are [the 
Trust’s] priorities? 
In an era of increasing information security threat levels, the staff responsible for information 
security within the trust obviously have a difficult task in safeguarding the security and integrity of 
its IT infrastructure , so … 
Does e-learning raise particular information security issues of which you are aware? 
Should the Prezi.com web application be blocked, as I am told it is within [name of Trust]? What 
issues does the blocking of websites and web applications raise? 
Has the Trust suffered any form of data loss or data breach within the last few years?  
 
If so, what would you say have been the effects on the organisation in terms of general culture? 
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F.7 Clinical staff (sample – nursing v. 1.1) 
 
Can you please tell me about the areas for you are responsible? 
 
I sent you a synopsis of findings of the survey on e-resource availability carried out by the then 
Technical Design Authority Group of SHALL (Strategic Health Authority Library Leads) in 2008, and of 
an article by Prince, Cass and Klaber (2010). These related primarily to library-managed e-resources, 
such as bibliographic databases, e-journals and e-books, and to e-learning. 
 
Along the lines of the ‘TDAG’ survey, could you please outline in as much detail as possible any 
problems reported to you that staff or students on placement have encountered with access to e-
resources, or that you have personally experienced? I am interested both in technical and in 
organisational issues, if such exist. 
 
Have you any other comments to make about these articles? 
-------------- 
 
There have been huge organisational changes within the NHS in England as a whole, and notable 
developments in the provision and availability of e-resources and e-learning within the NHS, since 
2008. How and in what areas do you perceive that have things changed within [nurse] education 
since then? I am interested both in national and in local developments. 
 
Have you been involved at all in the provision of e-learning? If so, please tell me about this. 
 
How would you rate your Trust’s organisational and technical readiness for e-learning?  
 
Are there cultural implications, do you think, in rolling out e-learning within your Trust?  
How would you rate the adequacy / suitability of your Trust’s PC and network infrastructure, and the 
ways in which it is managed, as a platform for access to professional learning content, and in 
particular e-learning? In particular, how widely available to staff are computers that meet system 
requirements (sound cards, browser functionality etc.) to run e-learning applications?  
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To what extent are staff and students on placement access professional learning content on trust 
smartphones or on their own smartphones and tablets? What issues does this raise? 
--------------- 
Some Web 2.0 and social media applications, such as podcasts, blogs and wikis, and also resource 
sharing sites such as SlideShare and YouTube, are widely used in e-learning. The TDAG survey, whose 
findings we discussed earlier, highlighted access to social media as a particular problem. 
Are you aware of any policies or guidance on use of social media that have been produced within 
your Trust? 
 
Have you encountered any issues with blocking of Web 2.0 or social media applications? If so, did 
you attempt to get the site unblocked? What was the outcome? 
--------------- 
What is the relationship of education and training within your profession to the Trust’s library 
service? 
--------------- 
How do you perceive the attitude of IM&T and information governance staff within your Trust in 
relation to e-learning and access to learning content? 
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F.8 NICE manager (version 1.0) 
 
Could I please ask you some background questions about your role at NICE? 
 
How long have you yourself been in post? 
 
My contact with you arose from a survey I heard about that you were conducting of browser 
availability across the NHS following reports that some library staff were unable to administer the 
link resolver or OpenAthens owing to browser incompatibilities.  
 
Could you please tell me the full story about that? 
 
What wider issue does this raise, do you think? (e.g. relating to NHS IT and how it is managed?) 
 
I sent you a synopsis of findings of the survey on e-resource availability carried out by the then 
Technical Design Authority Group (TDAG) of SHALL (Strategic Health Authority Library Leads) in 
2008, and another article by Prince et al. with similar findings.  
 
What would your comments be on this and on the article by Prince et al.? Is the situation they 
describe still the same? Worse? Better? 
 
Are there other issues relating to NHS IT and access to NHS Evidence content of which you are 
aware? 
 
Thinking perhaps more widely, are you able to comment on the ‘politics’ of all this and of the role 
and position of NHS Evidence?  
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Appendix G. 
HSCIC model Internet use policy 
 
[insert logo here]  
 
Policy title: [Insert title here] 
 
Version: [Insert 
version 
number 
here] 
Issued by: [Enter Directorate here] 
 
 
Aim: [Insert broad policy aim here. See Section 2.2]  
 
Scope: [Insert scope of policy here] 
 
 
Associated 
documentation: 
Legal Framework: [For example The Data Protection Act (1998), Copyright Designs & 
Patents Act (1988), Computer Misuse Act (1990), Human Rights Act (1998)] 
Policies: [Enter any policies that relate to this policy. For example, staff discipline, 
email, Information Security] 
Appendices: [Note any appendices here] 
Approved by: [Enter relevant Board/Post here] 
Date: [Enter date approved here. This may differ from the date of issue] 
 
Review and 
consultation 
process: 
[Enter review details here. For example, ‘Annually from review date above. 
Information Governance Board to oversee process’]  
Responsibility for 
Implementation & 
Training: 
[Day to day responsibility for implementation: officer title] 
 
[Day to day responsibility for training: officer title]  
 
Issue date: [Enter date here] Review date: [Enter date here] 
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HISTORY 
 
Revisions: [Enter details of revisions below] 
Date: Author: Description: 
   
   
   
 
Distribution 
methods: 
[Enter the methods used to distribute the policy here] 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This document defines the Internet use Policy for [enter name of organisation]. The Internet use 
Policy applies to all users of the Internet and relevant people who support the Internet system. The 
Internet is a general term that covers access to numerous computers and computer systems 
worldwide that are accessed electronically. Such systems include the World Wide Web (WWW), 
email (dealt with in a separate policy), File Transfer Protocol (FTP), newsgroups, Gopher, etc. The 
Organisation uses NHSnet to access these systems. This document: 
 
 Sets out the Organisation’s policy for the protection of the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of the Internet system. 
 Establishes Organisation and user responsibilities for the Internet system. 
 Provides reference to documentation relevant to this policy. 
 
1. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this policy is to ensure the security of [enter name of organisation] Internet 
system. To do this the Organisation will: 
 
1.1. Ensure Availability - Ensure that the Internet system is available for users. 
1.2. Preserve Integrity - Protect the Internet system from unauthorised or accidental modification 
ensuring the accuracy and completeness of the Organisation’s assets. 
1.3. Preserve Confidentiality - Protect assets against unauthorised disclosure. 
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The purpose of this policy is to ensure the proper use of the Organisation’s NHS Internet 
system and make users aware of what the Organisation deems as acceptable and 
unacceptable use of its Internet system. By following the guidelines in this policy, the Internet 
user can minimise the legal risks involved in the use of Internet. If any user disregards the 
rules set out in this Internet use Policy, the user will be fully liable and may be subject to 
disciplinary action by the Organisation. 
 
2. ORGANISATION RESPONSIBILITIES 
2.1. The Organisation will ensure that all users are properly trained before using the Internet 
system. 
2.2. The Organisation will take all reasonable steps to ensure that users of the Internet service are 
aware of policies, protocols, procedures and legal obligations relating to the use of Internet. 
This will be done through training and staff communications at departmental and 
Organisation-wide levels. 
2.3. The Organisation will ensure all users of the Internet are registered. 
 
3. ACCESS TO THE INTERNET SYSTEM 
3.1. Anyone wishing to open an Internet account must obtain an Internet Access Application 
Agreement from the IT Department. Complete the agreement and return it to the IT 
department. 
 
4. BEST PRACTICES 
4.1. The Organisation considers the Internet as an important means of communication and 
recognises the importance of proper Internet content and speedy replies in conveying a 
professional image and delivering good customer service. Therefore the Organisation wishes 
users to adhere to the following guidelines: 
 
4.2. Acceptable Internet Usage 
4.2.1. To access research material and other information relevant to your work. 
4.2.2. To access web sites and webmail accounts for personal use [delete if not applicable] so long as 
this does not interfere with work. 
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4.3. Unacceptable Internet Usage 
4.3.1. Creating, downloading or transmitting (other than for properly authorised and lawful 
research) any obscene or indecent images, data or other material, or any data capable of 
being resolved into obscene or indecent images or material. 
4.3.2. Creating, downloading or transmitting (other than for properly authorised and lawful 
research) any defamatory, sexist, racist, offensive or otherwise unlawful images, data or other 
material. 
4.3.3. Creating, downloading or transmitting material that is designed to annoy, harass, bully, 
inconvenience or cause needless anxiety to other people. 
4.3.4. Creating or transmitting “junk-mail” or “spam”. This means unsolicited commercial webmail, 
chain letters or advertisements. 
4.3.5. Using the Internet to conduct private or freelance business for the purpose of commercial 
gain. 
4.3.6. Creating, downloading or transmitting data or material that is created for the purpose of 
corrupting or destroying other user’s data or hardware.  
4.3.7. Downloading streaming video or audio for entertainment purposes.  
 
5. SYSTEM MONITORING 
5.1. All Internet traffic is logged automatically (each site a user visits is included in the log, with 
the time visited and pages viewed) to ensure that damaging code or viruses do not enter the 
organisation’s network or systems. The organisation also uses [delete if not applicable] 
software that prevents users visiting sites that may contain illegal or pornographic material. 
These logs are audited periodically by the [enter appropriate officer title].  
5.2. If there is evidence that you are not adhering to the guidelines set out in this policy, the 
Organisation reserves the right to take disciplinary action, which may lead to a termination of 
contract and/or legal action. 
 
6. QUESTIONS 
6.1. If you have any questions or comments about this Internet use Policy, please contact the 
[enter appropriate officer title and contact details]. If you do not have any questions the 
Organisation presumes that you understand and are aware of the rules and guidelines in this 
Internet Use Policy and will adhere to them. 
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7. DEFINITIONS 
7.1. Defamation - What is defamation? 
A published (spoken or written) statement or series or statements that affects the reputation 
of a person (a person can be a human being or an organisation) and exposes them to hatred, 
contempt, ridicule, being shunned or avoided, discredited in their trade, business, office or 
profession, or pecuniary loss. If the statement is not true then it is considered slanderous or 
libellous and the person towards whom it is made has redress in law. 
 
What you must not do 
Make statements about people or organisations on any web pages you are including on the 
website without verifying their basis in fact. 
 
What are the consequences of not following this policy? 
You and the Organisation may be subject to expensive legal action. 
 
7.2. Harassment - What is harassment? 
[If the organisation has a definition of harassment it should be entered here. If there is no 
definition then the organisation should consider one. The Human Resources department 
should define the term.] 
 
    What you must not do 
Use the internet to harass other members of staff by displaying particular web sites that they 
consider offensive or threatening. 
 
What are the consequences of not following this policy? 
The Organisation deals with harassment by providing advice, support and mediation. Those 
perpetrating harassment can also be made subject to the Organisation’s Disciplinary 
procedure. Any proven case of harassment will result in disciplinary action against the guilty 
party which could ultimately lead to their dismissal. 
 
7.3. Pornography - What is pornography? 
Pornography can take many forms. For example, textual descriptions, still and moving 
images, cartoons and sound files. Some pornography is illegal in the UK and some is legal. 
Pornography that is legal in the UK may be considered illegal elsewhere. Because of the 
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global nature of Internet these issues must be taken into consideration. Therefore, the 
Organisation defines pornography as the description or depiction of sexual acts or naked 
people that are designed to be sexually exciting. The Organisation will not tolerate its 
facilities being used for this type of material and considers such behaviour to constitute a 
serious disciplinary offence. 
 
What you must not do 
 Create, download or transmit (other than for properly authorised and lawful research) 
pornography.  
 Send or forward emails with attachments containing pornography. If you receive an 
email with an attachment containing pornography you should report it to the (IM&T) 
Security officer or your supervisor. 
 
What are the consequences of not following this policy? 
 Users and/or the Organisation can be prosecuted or held liable for transmitting or 
downloading pornographic material, in the UK and elsewhere. 
 The reputation of the Organisation will be seriously questioned if its systems have been 
used to access or transmit pornographic material and this becomes publicly known. 
 Users found to be in possession of pornographic material, or to have transmitted 
pornographic material, may be subject to Organisation disciplinary action. 
 
7.4. Copyright - What is copyright? [Use the definition below or insert your own definition] 
Copyright is a term used to describe the rights under law that people have to protect original 
work they have created. The original work can be a computer program, document, graphic, 
film or sound recording, for example. Copyright protects the work to ensure no one else can 
copy, alter or use the work without the express permission of the owner. Copyright is 
sometimes indicated in a piece of work by this symbol ©. However, it does not have to be 
displayed under British law. So a lack of the symbol does not indicate a lack of copyright. In 
the case of computer software, users purchase a licence to use the work. The Organisation 
purchases licences on behalf of its users.  
 
What you must not do 
 Alter any software programs, graphics etc without the express permission of the owner. 
 Claim someone else’s work is your own 
    
528 
 
 Send copyrighted material by Internet without the permission of the owner. This is 
considered copying. 
 
What are the consequences of not following this policy? 
 A user and/or the Organisation can face fines and/or up to two years imprisonment for 
infringing copyright. 
 
8. WHAT TO DO NEXT 
 Sign and date one copy of the policy and return to the IT [enter appropriate department 
or officer] 
 Keep a copy of the policy for your reference purposes 
 
 
Name of User (Please print): 
 
Department: 
 
 
 
Signed: 
 
 
 
Date: 
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Appendix H. 
Mobile phones and infection control 
 
There is one issue regarding mobile devices that is worth highlighting, although it falls within the 
scope more of integrated governance (Deighan & Bullivant, 2006) than of information governance: 
that of possible infection control risks. Hospital-acquired infections (HAI) present an ongoing 
problem for acute hospitals in England despite concerted infection control efforts (Health Protection 
Agency, 2012). The most high-risk clinical areas for HAI are generally thought to be intensive care 
units, operating theatres, surgical wards, and neonatal intensive care units (NICUs). The patient 
groups considered to be the most likely to develop HAI are neonates and elderly people (NHS 
Choices, 2012). Within the last 15 years a considerable number of studies have been published 
documenting contamination of the mobile devices used by health care workers with a variety of 
bacteria, including organisms associated with HAI (also referred to as nosocomial pathogens) such as 
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), Acinetobacter species, and Pseudomonas 
species. These devices are therefore thought to present a possible or probable infection control risk. 
The studies cover a variety of countries and types of setting. Most are concerned with mobile 
phones; however a number of recent studies (Hirsch, Raux, Lancaster, Mann, & Leonard, 2014; 
Kiedrowski, Perisetti, Loock, Khaitsa, & Guerrero, 2013; Manning, Davis, Sparnon, & Ballard, 2013) 
focus specifically on iPads. 
 
The earlier work is reviewed by Brady, Verran, Damani, and Gibb (2009). Most of the studies they 
included were concerned with mobile phones, but some included other devices, such as pagers and 
personal digital assistants (PDAs). In all the included studies, between 6.8% and 40% of the devices 
examined were contaminated with some form of pathogen. Despite a wide variability in the level 
and type of bacteria discovered, the majority of studies reported an overall contamination rate with 
HAI-associated bacteria of around 9% to 25%. Three of the studies investigated the possible 
transmission of bacteria from mobile devices to clinician’s hands, demonstrating co-contamination 
(i.e. the same strain of the bacterium was present on both) of up to 10% of samples.  
Ten other studies demonstrating infection of mobile devices by HAI-associated pathogens are cited 
by Manning et al. (2013). These include the work of Ulger et al. (2009) based in New York and Israel, 
which demonstrated a rate for contamination of mobile phones with nosocomial pathogens of 
94.5%. Among the health care workers sampled in this study, only 10.5% (n = 200) routinely 
decontaminated their phones. The most recent UK-based research in this area is that of Brady et al., 
(2012), who aimed to evaluate the impact of a simple cleaning intervention on the level of surface 
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bacterial contamination of hospital-issued mobile phones. Over a period of three months, a sample 
of on-call mobile phones provided to health care workers (n = 87) were tested for bacterial growth 
before and 12 hours after cleaning with 70% isopropyl alcohol. Testing focused on Gram-positive 
cocci, in particular Staphylococcus aureus. Health care workers were also surveyed regarding their 
demographics and their opinions and practices relating to infection control. It was found that the 
number of phones growing bacteria was reduced from 55% to 16% by the cleaning. While 78% of 
doctors (n = 87) were aware that mobile phones could carry pathogenic bacteria, only 8% cleaned 
their phones regularly. There were no differences by gender, seniority or clinical speciality in the 
levels or types of contamination observed. The authors conclude that simple cleaning interventions 
could substantially reduce the potential of cross-contamination via mobile phones, and that health 
care workers, as well as keeping the number of their mobile devices to a minimum, should be taught 
the importance of regular cleaning of mobile devices as well as good hand hygiene. The authors 
conclude from this and from earlier studies that no conclusive link has been demonstrated from 
mobile phone surface bacteria to clinical infection. 
Among the iPad studies, Hirsch et al. (2014) conducted a small-scale study which investigated 
bacterial contamination of 30 iPads belonging to two groups of university pharmacy teachers, those 
practising within a hospital setting (n = 14) and those outside (n = 16). Although more of the 
hospital-based participants used their iPads at their practice sites and within patient care areas, 
there were no substantial differences between the two groups in presence, absence or quantity of 
the pathogens isolated, which included MRSA (64.3% and 37.5%), vancomycin-resistant enterococci 
(VRE) (7.1% and 0%) and P. aeruginosa (7.1% and 6.3%). C. diff. was not screened for. Two of the 
iPad studies have a particular focus on techniques of decontamination, which are at variance with 
the recommended cleaning guidelines. Kiedrowski et al. (2013) tested 20 hospital iPads for 
contamination with MRSA and Clostridium difficile (C. diff.) Three of them (15%) grew MRSA, while 
none grew C. diff. These authors tested a variety of decontamination methods, and found that damp 
cloths, alcohol swabs and bleach wipes were able to remove 100% of MRSA from iPad screens. 
Howell et al. (2014) compared the effects of six different disinfectant wipes on removal of MRSA, C. 
diff. and VRE from iPads, finding in favour of a proprietary chlorhexidine and alcohol wipe. Neither 
study assessed sterilisation of Gram-negative pathogens. None of the methods of cleaning 
advocated accord with the manufacturer’s recommendations, and the long-term effect on the 
functionality of the devices was not assessed.  
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Appendix J. 
Browser versions: NICE survey and correspondence  
 
J.1 Internet Browser Survey of Link Resolver/Knowledge Base Administrators 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The OCLC Knowledge Base and Link Resolver provide core functionality for the HDAS and A-Z list 
services. It enables the management of purchased and free content at national, regional and local 
levels and ensures users access the content available to them. OCLC is continuously updating their 
product in order to meet the needs of customers and to ensure their products remain competitive in 
the global market. As part of this continuous development OCLC will be upgrading the Knowledge 
Base administration area in February 2014. 
 
OCLC has informed NICE that the new administration site will only work with browsers Internet 
Explorer 9, Google Chrome, or Firefox. OCLC cannot guarantee that it will work on older browsers 
including Internet Explorer 6, 7 or 8.  
 
There is an assumption that Internet Explorer 6, 7 or 8 are the most commonly used browsers across 
the NHS. Therefore NICE may need to assist administrators to upgrade their web browser so they 
can continue to use the Knowledge Base. 
 
The need to upgrade the browser is only for the administrator; it does not impact on services users 
and there is no requirement for organisation wide upgrades. 
 
2. Questionnaire 
 
The questionnaire was sent to all 300 Knowledge Base administrators and 135 administrators 
responded, which is a 44% response rate. The aim of the questionnaire was to gain evidence of 
browser usage, and from this to understand the size of the issue, and to better understand how NICE 
might help local administrators. 
 
3. Summary of Survey 
 
 74% of administrators use a browser that is not compatible with the upgraded Knowledge Base 
administration area. 
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 17% confirm they will be able to upgrade. 37% will not be able to upgrade and 45% do not know. 
 52% reported organisational systems are the reason for the use of a particular browser. 
 63% of respondents thought a letter to their organisation from NICE or Health Education 
England would be helpful. 
 
4. Options 
 
The changes will take place in February 2014 and so there is time to prepare and make sure 
administrators can access the new Knowledge Base. The options for helping administrators upgrade 
include:  
 
1. Write to all Trusts (a letter from Alexia and/or Health Education England). 63% of respondents 
thought this would be helpful. 
2. Prepare a generic business case that administrators can use to upgrade their browser. 42% of 
respondents thought this would be helpful. 
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5. Questionnaire 
 
5.1. Which internet browser do you mainly use? 
 
 
74% of administrators that responded to the survey use a browser that is not compatible 
with the upgraded Knowledge Base administration area. In order for administrators to 
continue using the system they will need to upgrade to IE9, Google Chrome, or Firefox. 
 
The data reports that 26% are using a browser that is compatible and therefore the 
upgraded Knowledge Base will have no impact on their ability to access and use the 
administration area. 
 
5.2. Will you be able to upgrade your internet browser? 
17% of those administrators who responded confirm that they will be able to upgrade. 37% 
will not be able to upgrade and 45% do not know. 
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Based on the data that 74% are using incompatible browsers but 17% can upgrade; this 
means 57% of administrators will need some support in upgrading their browser.  
 
5.3. Is there a reason why your organisation uses this internet browser?  
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52% responded that organisational systems are the reason for the use of a particular 
browser. Of this 52% - 92% reported clinical systems, 4% reported the ESR, and 4% reported 
education and training.  
Several respondents reported that it is possible to have Google Chrome as a browser, but 
this would not be supported (maintained) by their local IM&T department. 
5.4. How NICE might help in local administrators upgrading their browser 
 
Several options were presented to administrators in the questionnaire. The first was for 
NICE to write a generic business case that administrators could localise and use to create 
their case with local IM&T managers. The second was for a letter to be sent either from NICE 
or Health Education England requesting that Knowledge Base administrators are able to 
upgrade to a suitable browser. 
 
A high percentage of respondents thought these options would be helpful. However, a high 
number did not know if these options would be helpful. 
 
 
 
5.5. Administrator Ideas 
 
The questionnaire asked the administrator what ideas they had in making a case to upgrade 
their internet browser? 
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1. Patient care reasons 
2. Clinical system requirements will always take priority. The above would have to 
come from a recognised body and explain why it is necessary for us to have a browser 
upgrade in order to continue running library services and why library services themselves 
are essential. 
3. It might be worth providing the above documentation, but I don't think it will 
necessarily influence our IT department. Not sure what I'm going to do in that case - it 
looks like I won't be able to administer the link resolver next year. 
4. At the moment our Trust allows us to have access to Firefox but if for any reason 
that was removed it might be helpful for NICE to get involved. The Trust is 
normally very helpful at helping us to resolve any access issues we have. 
5. I think it should be possible, but anything to help explain why this is necessary 
would be good. 
6. Updating the browser will enable users to access health information from NICE 
Evidence, Up-To-Date, Clinical Key and other web-based popular clinical 
information services so much quicker and easier. It will also enable library staff to 
train users and demonstrate resources to them successfully. 
7. I have been able to put forward the case for the library PCs to have an IE upgrade 
based on resource need and no requirement to access clinical systems. It is 
possible that any upgrade, discretionary or not, would have to have the authority 
from the relevant NHS body for IT systems. 
8. Cost implications for the Trust of not being able to access full text material and 
having to resort to interlibrary loans... 
9. I can usually make a case for myself, but it would be nice to feel there was some 
external "weight" behind it and it wasn't just me being a difficult demanding 
librarian 
10. Establish that this is the evidence base 
11. I think we should be able to use an internet browser other than IE as we get lousy 
results no matter what version of IE we use. Firefox is fine. NICE should identify the 
best browser for its applications and recommend to all Trusts that this browser be 
made available to all employees. 
12. When I needed Chrome for another application IT were very understanding 
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13. I will continue to use Google Chrome, unless IT decides to ban it. 
14. Benchmarking against other Trusts might also help. 
15. Approach Department of Health re NHS protocols on IT 
16. Normally the response to any requests to upgrade browsers is met with a no 
because of information governance. It would be useful to have some clarity around 
this issue i.e. have some evidence on the different browsers and to what extent or 
not they pose a risk to security and information governance. 
17. We have good relations with our IT department and so long as we state an 
appropriate case for upgrade we usually get what we ask for. Although IE9 would 
be a step too far I suspect. 
18. It is possible that the Trust will be upgraded to IE9 by February 2014. 
19. Argument in favour of installing Firefox. Our Trust will do so on request but are 
mildly reluctant because they think it isn't so 'secure' as IE. 
20. The decision about which browser I am able to use is out of my control. 
21. I can probably make a case to the IT department if the browser on my computer 
needs upgrading in order for me to undertake admin tasks or to access particular 
online information resources. 
22. We have pleaded our case for an upgrade on several occasions but these pleas 
have fallen on deaf ears. 
23. Our IT dept. have been quite kind to us and allowed us access to Firefox but it is 
the lack of support for this package that may need to be addressed as opposed to 
the actual upgrade. 
24. That it wouldn't cost the Trust any money. 
25. How important it is that we can access the systems i.e. the reason we need access 
to the knowledge base (especially if there is some relation to how the resources 
supports patient care). 
26. Stress the differences/benefits of changing/showing shortfalls in cases of not 
making the change, as this will then make them consider the request. 
27. Assurance that upgrade will not interfere with local systems. 
28. I don't think there would need to be a case produced for library upgrades, but the 
above would both help, should there be one. 
    
538 
 
29. Outdated browsers are not secure (no MS patching for older browsers). Increasing 
amount of resources is not compatible with older browsers. 
30. A letter sent not just to the library but to the Chief Executive, and the head of IT 
services. 
31. NICE letter will help but aimed at director level. 
32. Explain how inability to upgrade impairs ability to provide and maintain evidence-
based healthcare information for patient care. 
33. Just stating the facts of why it is necessary. 
34. Give local units more control over what is loaded on their own PCs. 
35. A letter from NICE might go some way, but I'm not sure how many local issues 
influence above this. 
36. A demonstration of the implications of failure to upgrade. 
37. Above worth trying but OCLC need to be made aware of NHS constraints if they're 
dealing with NHS systems. 
38. The above would both be useful if I had a problem but IT have said they are happy 
to upgrade me. 
39. If they are not upgraded, the information for staff would not be current due to 
inability to update NHS Evidence Search. Our Trust no longer has any paper 
journals. 
40. Evidence of the impact not having the latest version has on flexibility and capability 
to deliver clinical care, research or education and training. A consensus and 
guidelines across sector including industry and public sector on policy. 
41. Looking at business models for how IT industry adds value across sectors with 
longer term contracts and incentives for maximising implementation of products 
to ROI, rather than focus on new/cutting edge continually to maintain profitability. 
Better contracts for provision to sectors delivering basic citizenship resources like 
health care. 
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J.2 Letter from NICE to NHS IT managers 
 
 
 
Level 1A 
City Tower 
Manchester 
M1 4BT 
United Kingdom 
 
+44 (0)845 003 7780 
INSERT ADDRESS LINE 1 
INSERT DATE 
 
Dear 
 
REQUEST TO UPGRADE LIBRARY ADMINISTRATOR BROWSERS TO IE9 OR ABOVE OR TO 
GOOGLE CHROME, OR FIREFOX 
 
Your Trust Library Service plays an important role in supporting your clinical staff and 
managers to access and use the very best evidence and information to inform their decision 
making and continuous professional development.  
These resources include leading journals such as the BMJ and the Lancet and many 
thousands of other journal titles and bibliographic references.  
Suppliers of these resources are constantly upgrading their services and it is for this reason 
it is essential that your library administrator has a modern internet browser installed, such 
as Internet Explorer 9 or Google Chrome or Firefox. This will enable your library service to 
continue to manage these resources efficiently and effectively, so that they can continue to 
make these available to those that need them.  
This is a relatively simple request, but without a modern browser, access to evidence and 
information via your library service is likely to be limited and in some cases will not function 
at all. From our own research we know that this issue affects up to 70% of NHS library 
administrators.  
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This upgrade need only be made on the equipment used by your library administrator, 
responsible for managing access to these resources on your behalf. We need the upgrade to 
take place by May 2014. It is not necessary to install upgraded browsers for any other staff 
and there is no impact on users 
Library back-office services are often unseen by library users. However, they are essential to 
ensuring appropriate resources are accessed and used to their maximum. We are grateful 
for your efforts in ensuring that this service is appropriately supported.  
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
 
 
 
Alexia Tonnel  
   
Director for Evidence Resources 
NICE 
Chris Welsh 
 
Director of Education & 
Quality 
Health Education England 
Alison Hill 
 
Deputy to the Chief 
Knowledge Officer 
Public Health England 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________ 
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Appendix K. 
The ISMS plan-do-check-act cycle  
 
A requirement is set out in the document Information security management: NHS code of practice 
(NHS Connecting for Health, 2007) for the establishment within each NHS organisation of an 
information security risk management system (ISMS), the details of which are set out in the BS 
ISO/IEC 27001 standard as shown below in Figure J.1. It should be noted that the Plan element of the 
cycle requires the organisation to establish a security policy establishing information security control 
objectives and controls (safeguards or countermeasures to avoid, counteract or minimize security  
 
Figure K.1 BS ISO/IEC 27001 major process step: PDCA cycle 
Whitman & Mattord (2010), p. 226.  
 
© 2011 Delmar Learning, a part of Cengage Learning, Inc.  
Reproduced by permission. www.cengage.com/permissions  
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risks), together with and a statement of applicability justifying why these particular controls were 
selected and others not (Siponen & Willison, 2009).  
 
A process of this scope and complexity inevitably incorporates many PDCA sub-cycles within it, 
operating asynchronously and at different speeds (Whitman & Mattord, 2010, citing Gamma Secure 
Systems, s.d.) The core aspects of risk management with which we are concerned are more evident 
in another PDCA cycle, as described by Jones (2007) (Figure K.2): 
 
Figure K.2 Risk treatment cycle 
Jones (2007), p. 31  
Reproduced by permission 
 
Identify risks [Act]: by way of background, this includes identification of policies, standards, and 
legislative requirements, as well as a detailed mapping of the IT infrastructure and the business 
processes which it supports, and of information flows through the organisation, including storage, 
capture and processing. The process of risk identification proper (which can also be described as risk 
analysis) requires several stages: identification of potential threats to the system; identification of 
exploitable vulnerabilities; identification of existing controls and counter-measures that will mitigate 
the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited; calculation of the likelihood that a particular threat 
could successfully exploit a particular vulnerability; calculation of the level of impact that this would 
entail; identification and documentation of the so-called residual risk. Residual risk is defined as a 
combination of 1) a threat less the effect of counter-measures; 2) a vulnerability less the effect of 
safeguards; and 3) an asset less the effect of asset-value-reducing; it is the amount of risk 
unaccounted for the application of controls safeguards (Whitman & Mattord, 2010, citing Gamma 
risk 
treatment 
cycle 
identify 
risks [Act] 
assess 
risks [Plan] 
treat risks 
[Do] 
monitor 
and report 
risks 
[Check] 
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Security Systems, s.d.). This process is undertaken for each threat and associated vulnerability. 
Residual risks need to be classified as being either acceptable or unacceptable (Gerber & von Solms, 
2005). 
 
Assess risks [Plan]: this process is achieved by the “establishment of a qualitative or quantitative 
interrelationship between identified risks” (Jones, 2007, p. 32; my italics). This involves the process 
of determining the significance of the identified threat-vulnerability pairings, and estimating the 
risks to those systems that may be affected by them. Sources to inform this process include: self-
assessments as a result of internal or external audits; advisory notices issued by the NHS Information 
Centre, information security standards bodies, and system vendors; and the findings of information 
security vulnerability assessments. A scoring system may be applied (Calder, 2013). Once risks are 
identified and assessed, risk reduction planning is undertaken to reduce the risk exposure of the 
organisation to an acceptable level; includes the evaluation of options and identification of desired 
solutions. The assessment process also includes risk modelling (exploration of the “what-if” 
questions relating to potential information security incidents) and business continuity planning (the 
development of response protocols as a response to identified crisis scenarios) as important 
components.  
 
Treat risks [Do]: once risks have been analysed, risk mitigation actions should be prioritised, based 
on the probability of occurrence and the legal, regulatory, financial or reputation impact to the 
organisation. Such impacts are not easy to quantify. Once they have been identified, it is normal to 
address (treat) risks in one of four ways: risk avoidance (not performing an activity that could carry a 
potential risk); risk reduction or mitigation (measures taken to reduce the severity of impact of an 
incident); risk acceptance (accepting the impact of an incident where it occurs) and risk transfer 
(transferring the risk to another party via contract or via insurance). Contracting out the 
development and hosting of an e-learning application would include an element of risk transfer. 
Blocking social media sites would be one example of risk avoidance. Use of host and network 
defences against malware-based threats would be an example of risk reduction; here a balance has 
to be struck between the cost of the measures and the benefits they provide, and between the level 
of restriction of functionality of the system and impaired performance compared with the 
proportion of attacks that are deterred, detected or prevented. It should be noted that all risks that 
are not avoided, mitigated or transferred are accepted by default.  
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Appendix L. 
Precision (specificity) and recall (sensitivity) of web filtering 
 
For any content classifier, the errors in filtering a sample set of URLs may be represented in the form 
of a “confusion matrix” as follows (Figure L.1): 
 
 Real – positive Real - negative 
Filter - positive TP FP 
Filter - 
negative 
FN TN 
 
 
TP = true positive / FP = false positive / TN = true negative / FN = false negative 
 
Figure L.1 Confusion matrix 
after Gomez Hidalgo (2009), p. 294 
 
Simple formulae can be derived from this representation to define P, R, accuracy (proportion of 
items correctly classified) and error (proportion of items incorrectly classified):  
𝐑 =
𝐓𝐏
𝐓𝐏+𝐅𝐍
  𝐏 =
𝐓𝐏𝐓𝐏+𝐅𝐏
 𝐀 =
𝐓𝐏+ 𝐓𝐍
𝐍
 𝐄 =
𝐅𝐏+ 𝐅𝐍
𝐍
 
 
Over-blocking and under-blocking are represented here by 1-P and 1-R respectively. 
 
The trade-off between precision and recall (specificity and sensitivity) can be represented graphically 
using a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, as in the following example (Figure L.2):
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Figure L.2 ROC curve for content classifier 
 Zhang and Janssen (s.d.) 
Reproduced by permission 
 
It can be seen here that the ‘excellent’ classifier generates the largest area under the curve; the false 
positive rate increases only slightly as the proportion of true positives increases.  
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Appendix M. Usability problems with mobile apps for accessing e-content 
The librarian E10, in her correspondence with the researcher, made some trenchant observations 
about usability problems with publishers and aggregators’ mobile apps for accessing e-content, 
which merit quoting in full. 
 
“My biggest complaint last year was the withdrawal of the [trade name] mobile app. Pub4 
launched their [app name] in a blaze of publicity, claiming that this had been tested and 
approved by loads of people who know about this kind of stuff. Yes, when you eventually get 
to a full text article it does look very nice and works on a mobile device, but you can't use the 
rest of their … website on a mobile device. They clearly tested the mobile article view in 
isolation with absolutely no thought for the customer's journey to the resource.  
 
Most providers can't see further than their own resource and don't understand that the 
majority of users do not go to the publisher website (they don't know who publishes the title 
they want), but access full text by following links in other databases, Google, library 
catalogues, lists of references etc., and in any case the institutional access point is often 
different from that provided for individual subscribers.  
 
The bottom line is that all roads should lead to Rome but they don't. The resource providers 
do not pay enough attention to the customer's journey to the end product. You can only 
reach your destination by trekking miles and miles through jungle, swamps, ravines etc. but 
you have inappropriate clothing/equipment and no navigation aids.” (Librarian, E10) 
 
The point she was making here seems essentially to have been that the design of publishers’ mobile 
apps reflected a very a publisher- or aggregator-centric approach to accessing e-resources which did 
not fit end-users’ approaches to information seeking and use. 
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Appendix N. 
Summary of responses: access to YouTube / streamed services query  
LIS-MEDICAL https://www.jiscmail.ac.uk(18/07/16) 
 
Dear Colleagues 
 
I submitted a request to the list on 8 June, asking for details from trusts who provide access to You 
Tube or similar digital services. The purpose was to establish the prevalence of social media policies 
which cover this form of Internet use and determine how such access is regulated (if at all).  
 
Thank you very much to those who responded and those who provided examples (e.g. policy docs). I 
received 6 replies and also made a quick search via Google - 6 further policies were added (there 
were a few more out there!). 
 
In summary (12 trust policies were examined): 
(1) Access to YouTube or other social media for staff without restriction (i.e. all staff for business and 
personal use): 2/12 
(2) Access with limitations (business use only for named individuals or teams): 10/12 
(3) Policy available to view and included reference to YouTube or similar digital services: 7/12 
 
- Most trusts acknowledged that social media (including digitally streamed services like YouTube) can 
be beneficial for staff in the course of their work and advantageous to the organisation with regard 
to strategic aims and operational objectives; 
- Social media policies are becoming more common and incorporate data security and information 
governance principles;  
- 40% of trusts sampled did not specify YouTube (or streaming services) in their policies and so 
localised discussion/negotiation by library or L&D has shaped their response to access requests;  
- There is a lack of consistency between policies and in attitude to 'risk' (data loss/inappropriate 
use/confidentiality) which is reflected in diverse approaches to risk assessment and access controls 
across the sampled NHS organisations.  
 
Martin Elcock Librarian: Outreach / Deputy Library Manager  
Tel: +44 (0) 121 371 2487 Email: Martin.Elcock@uhb.nhs.uk 
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Appendix P. 
Information security and cybersecurity measures compared 
 
 Information security / governance Cybersecurity 
Behavioural 
measures 
Internet / email / social media 
acceptable use policy  
Use of encrypted portable media 
Screen locking 
Mandatory use of secure email 
systems (e.g. NHSmail) and / or 
encryption facilities and / or password 
protection to send files  
Policy controls on PII / sensitive 
information – how stored / sent / 
transported 
Prohibition of password disclosure or 
sharing 
Internet / email / social media 
acceptable use policy  
Strong password policies 
 
 
 User training re: social engineering, 
data protection, confidentiality, 
privacy, password practices 
User training re: social engineering, 
safe browsing, avoidance of links and 
attachments in unsolicited email, 
password practices 
Non-
behavioural / 
technical 
measures 
Enforced use of prescribed encrypted 
portable media via USB port blocking 
Disabling of optical drives  
Computer screen timeouts 
SWG controls on access to web 
content – inappropriate material 
DLP systems 
Encryption of critical files 
Controls on privileged accounts 
 
 
 
Endpoint anti-malware 
Firewalls 
Restrictions on browser functionality 
and extensions 
Restrictions on types of downloadable 
files 
Intrusion detection systems 
Intrusion prevention systems 
Server OS ‘hardening’ 
Separation of applications within 
networks 
Penetration testing of networks 
SWG malware screening 
Software and OS updates/ patches 
Enforced password changes at set intervals  
Disabling macros in email attachments  
Restrictions on allowed email attachment file types 
Technical authentication requirements for OSs and applications 
 
Table P.1 Information security and cybersecurity measures: comparison matrix
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Appendix R. 
Data analysis matrices 
Table R.1 Results matrix outline as at 28/01/15 
 
 Background Trust IT infrastructures and 
their management 
Published information 
resources 
E-learning Social media Mobile devices 
P
ro
fe
ss
io
n
al
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 b
eh
av
io
u
r 1.1 
T1-DGH partnership 
arrangements with 
university to manage 
library 
 -- offers walk-in access to 
a wider range of resources 
for NHS staff on site 
 
T3-MH largely a virtual 
library 
T4-TH very well stocked. 
LIS manager is national 
expert on e-content and 
collections 
 
No trust implementing 
Map of Medicine 
 
 1.2 
Requirement to use 
encrypted USB memory 
sticks 
  Availability of networks 
Network performance 
Need to run trust and 
university networks in 
parallel 
 
NB applies also to e-
learning 
 
Lack of single sign-on at T1 
 
Problems accessing T2 
systems from within T1 
premises/network 
including e-learning 
 
 
1.3 
Most clinicians making 
use of LIS e-resources 
via OpenAthens – di d 
not always realise that 
LIS administered this. 
Dietician spoke of 
online service from BDA 
– no need to use LIS.  
 
 
 
1.4 
Use of e-learning 
resources in information 
seeking not discussed by 
respondents 
 
T3-MH library services 
promoted in computer 
suites and via training 
events 
1.5 
LIS at T4 had developed 
social media platforms 
to support information 
seeking – Pinterest with 
infographics, current 
awareness portal 
 
Very little use of social 
media within 
workplaces other than 
YouTube videos 
 
Lack of use related to 
negative attitudes / fear 
of social media 
  1.6 
Support by LIS 
 
BYOD at T4-TH – 
permits staff to access 
social media resources 
via own mobile 
devices 
 
Helga’s stuff about 
problems with 
publishers’ and 
aggregators’ mobile 
apps 
 
 
 
Little use observed of 
mobile devices for 
information seeking 
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Ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
  a
n
d
 t
ra
in
in
g 
ar
ra
n
ge
m
en
ts
 
2.1 
Mand & stat – CNST 
Prof ed – contracts with 
universities – which 
students present in the 
three trusts and requiring 
e-resource access 
 
Drivers for growth of e-
learning  
History of e-learning in 
each trust 
 
2.2 
Network access policies re 
students on placement 
[describe situation across 
trusts] 
Add stuff about student 
levels of access to clinical 
systems 
 
Availability of computer 
facilities to students 
 
Wireless networks: 
Eduroam, other 
 
Problems with e-learning 
related to IT infrastructure 
 
Virtualisation? Implications 
for age of PC hardware 
 
 
2.3 
Contacts between 
education, training, LIS 
2.4 
Drivers for growth 
History in each trust 
3.2.1 Scope and 
utilisation of e-learning 
to deliver education and 
training: mandatory and 
statutory training 
professional education – 
pre-reg. and post-reg. 
3.2.2 Attitudes to e-
learning 
3.2.3 Problems with e-
learning: access to 
facilities, computer 
literacy – addressed via 
computer literacy 
training initiatives, 
supported sessions,  
computer suites, tablets 
for loan, home access 
2.5 
Use of social media 
applications and 
resources for education 
and training purposes 
not  discussed by 
respondents- 
 
Mandatory and 
statutory e-learning 
provided by trusts did 
not make use of social 
media / web 2.0 
platforms 
 
Educationalists not 
aware of social media 
use by students for 
educational purposes 
e.g. Facebook study 
groups 
 
Professionals expressing 
need for training on 
social media (T2) 
 2.6 
T1-use of tablets for e-
learning 
 
T3 training loan of 
tablets for e-learning 
 
U3-Med iPad project 
 
Variable use of mobile 
devices otherwise: 
medicine and pharmacy 
yes, nursing and AHP no 
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(Possibly include here CQC 
reports, NHS staff survey 
results) 
 
Statements of values etc. 
6 C’s in nursing 
3.2 
(IT strategic planning 
material goes here: EPR 
system implementation 
etc.) 
 
Role of ? in setting up PG 
Centre Wi-Fi at T1-DGH 
T1-DGH and T4-TH not yet 
implemented EHR – high 
strategic priority in both 
 
Complaints from T4-TH IG 
about disadvantageous 
position, poor communication 
channels, lack of contact with 
IT, unresponsiveness of IT 
helpdesk.  
 
Impression given that IT 
support at T4 was of 
inconsistent quality. Clinical 
staff perceived IT as being 
understaffed and under-
resourced in relation to 
demands 
 
T4 education facilities 
manager – education was a 
lesser priority than clinical 
services for IT support 
 
IT and IG worked closely 
together in T1 and T3 via 
representation on  
committees 
 
3.3 
Communication key issue – T1 
head of IT will not respond to 
communications from LIS 
manager – reportedly 
unresponsive to others also 
T1 IT manager seemingly 
unaware that LIS had trust as 
well as university computers 
 
T3 LIS proactive in publicising 
services at training events 
 
IT dept. works closely in T4 
with LIS re availability of e-
journals – firewall manager 
 
All LIS well regarded by 
clinicians - all spoke highly of 
LIS help with searches and 
document supply 
 
T3  IT manager trusted LIS 
manager re requests to 
unblock websites – no need to 
refer to line manager 
 
NICE attempting to work with 
HSCIC on IT infrastructure 
issues relating to e-resources 
 
LIS providing CAS at T1-
DGH relating to pressure 
sores and falls – or 1.3. T3 
LIS also providing CAS for 
WPH 
 
Emphasis on learning from 
adverse events (T1-Nur-
07) 
3.4 
Issues between training 
department and SMEs 
at T1 re: territory 
 
Cultural issues re e-
learning – T1 HR felt 
that ESR and e-learning 
was a major change 
 
Attitudes to e-learning 
3.5 
Social media perceived 
as high-risk by nurses 
and AHPs in particular – 
averse to using in 
workplace-
confidentiality and 
privacy concerns. Some 
respondents expressed 
negativity about social 
media. 
(discussed in 1.5 – refer 
to this) 
 
All students, also junior 
doctors, receiving 
training on e-
professionalism via 
university or PG Centre? 
Maybe move to 4.5? 
 
Interest in using social 
media to engage with 
patients (T3-MH-
Pharm-18, T2    ) 
 
Services in T3-MH-WPH 
have started to do this. 
Also experiments in T1-
DGH with maternity 
services 
 
 
3.6 
iPads a badge of status? 
CEO at T3-MH had 
pestered IT for three 
years before getting 
one! 
 
iPads issued to board 
members-all trusts – 
and widely used for 
accessing and managing 
documents-issue of 
cloud storage? 
 
Provision of mobile 
devices – who gets 
what? 
T4-Med-19 cf. AHP-10 
 
Professional norms of 
not using mobile devices 
in clinical areas – 
relating to 2009 policy, 
local policies, just 
unwritten 
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 4.1 
Outsourcing  
Procurement 
User support (??) 
 
Organisational position of 
information governance 
 
4.2 
Evident security 
deficiencies: 
obsolete OS +  
browsers 
lack of screen locking + 
USB port blocking 
 
 
Few IG managers in any 
trust. In T3, IG functions 
were distributed across 
departments with IG 
manager having advisory 
role and responsibility for 
IG Toolkit. 
 In T1, part of integrated 
governance 
 
NB T1-DGH-IT-11 was not 
aware of arrangements for 
students to access network 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 
Blocking of websites – 
experiences in each 
trust 
 
IMTG whitelist 
 
Heritage Cirqa IG issue 
at T4-TH 
4.4 
Problems with password 
management accessing 
e-resources and e-
learning 
 
 
4.5 
Past misuse of social 
media: past incidents, 
warnings, sanctions 
 
Blocking of social media 
-   Individual social 
media applications: 
what is blocked, what is 
allowed – table 
   Trust policies on staff 
use of social media, 
impacts on trust 
services (e.g. LIS) and 
    end-users, 
perceptions of policies 
 
Junior doctors in T1 
given training on e-
professionalism (T1-
DGH-Med-06) 
 
4.6 
‘Cultural’ inhibitors of 
mobile device use 
among clinicians 
 
Trust policies 
DH policy 
Security management of 
trust and personal 
devices 
 
infection control issues- 
At T1-DGH, IT had 
insisted on ruggedized 
laptops with easy-wipe 
screens- an infection 
control measure 
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 5.1 
Trust policies – mostly 
restrictive [see table] 
 
Intranet material here – 
who creates content etc.- 
allude to earlier stuff 
5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 
Trusts varied greatly in 
extent to which use was 
being made of social 
media for public 
engagement and 
marketing activities / 
state of development of 
social media strategies 
 
T4-TH and T3-MH were 
using Twitter for 
research dissemination 
5.6 
Mobile device 
management? 
 
Policies / guidance for 
students (T3-MH) and 
staff 
 
 
    
554 
 
Table R.2 Example of an individual matrix cell 
1.2 
 
Trust IT infrastructures and their management 
P
ro
fe
ss
io
n
al
 in
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at
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n
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u
r NB much applies also to e-learning 
 
Within trust networks, negative impacts upon access to published information were experienced in 
respect of: 
 
 The requirement to use encrypted portable media (e.g. laptops, USB memory sticks) 
 Network access, availability and performance 
  ‘Legacy’ hardware (see above, section 1.3.2) 
System policies/limited system privileges (e.g. inability to download updates to browser plugins, or 
files of a particular type) 
 
Requirement to use encrypted portable media 
It has been NHS policy since early 2008 (Department of Health, 2008) that all portable media and 
devices should be encrypted, though the requirement was not necessarily implemented 
immediately in all NHS organisations. In practice this tends to mean laptop computers and USB 
memory sticks. Difficulties in obtaining trust-approved USB memory sticks can act as a barrier to 
saving, storing and using information retrieved online.  
 
Staff at T1-DGH and some staff at T4-TH reported difficulty in obtaining encrypted USB memory 
sticks. “Not all our staff have encrypted memory sticks, only the quite senior staff or staff in training 
roles, erm… have those” (T1-DGH-Nur-08). “Trying to get hold of them is, you know, it is very much 
forms in triplicate” (T1-DGH-Pharm-04). “There are total obstacles, yes” (T4-TH-AHP-10). The 
IronKey devices used at T4-TH apparently cost about £80 each, which may be prohibitively 
expensive for some services (T4-TH-IG-09). Encrypted memory sticks were not available to students 
on placement in T1-DGH, creating problems for them working on case presentations at home (T1-
DGH-Pharm-04). In T3-MH difficulty in obtaining USB memory sticks was not reported, but their use 
away from NHS sites for non-core purposes (e.g. research or study) required specific permission 
from information governance (T3-MH-IG-03). 
 
The requirement to use encrypted USB memory sticks commonly causes inconvenience to visiting 
presenters on NHS sites, who are obliged either to use their own laptop for the presentation or to 
email it in advance (P1).  The devices themselves were perceived to have inherent limitations, 
mainly relating to slow loading of content, causing problems when giving presentations (T3-MH-
Med-21). T3-MH-Med-21 complained that hers could not be used on her Macintosh at home. The 
use of USB memory sticks for transferring information was thought to be old-fashioned in an era of 
widespread cloud storage (T4-TH-AHP-10). 
 
[possible indication of need for NHS-wide secure cloud storage] 
  
‘Legacy’ software – in particular older versions of MS Office, Internet Explorer – users may be 
unable to open, e.g., .pptx files if they still have MS Office 2003 and do not have the required 
viewer, or may encounter a variety of problems with displaying web-based content owing to issues 
with lack of browser support for front-end web technologies such as Cascading Style Sheets (CSS), 
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 HTML 5, and JavaScript (“Can I use... Support tables for HTML5, CSS3, etc.,” n.d.; McCarthy, 2013). 
 
[NB Particular impact on LIS] 
 
 
Network access, availability and performance 
Access to networks 
Authentication and access management 
Policies controlling the availability of network logins, including generic logins, can present barriers to 
accessing and using published information.  This can particularly affect library services, restricting 
the services they are able to offer to NHS staff from other organisations under reciprocal access 
agreements  
 
Remote access 
All the trusts in the study provided remote access to their systems using VPN tokens, though in 
practice within T1-DGH the facility is generally available only to “consultants and people like that” 
(T1-DGH-LIS-01). It is readily available in T3-MH; several respondents referred to using it. Remote 
access was not mentioned by respondents in T4-TH, though its availability was confirmed by 
reference to the relevant policy document. In T1-DGH problems with it affecting user profiles was 
reported:  
 
“It would appear at this site if you hot desk between different computers or if you access your 
computer via your VPN token from home, what then happens it seems to upset your profile and lose 
data and it takes a long time to log on” (T1-DGH-Nur-08).  
 
Also, while it is possible to access the OLMS system from home to undertake e-learning, completing 
the module does not register on the system, thus effectively rendering the remote access facility 
useless (T1-DGH-T&D-??) 
 
Access to systems across organisational network boundaries 
A number of general problems accessing systems across organisational boundaries were reported. 
T2-DGH staff working on T1-DGH sites reported problems accessing some T2-DGH systems from 
within the T1-DGH network, particularly the OLMS for e-learning (T2-DGH-AHP-01, T2-DGH-AHP-02).  
T1-DGH does not have single sign-on for all its clinical systems, resulting in wasted time and 
password proliferation (T1-DGH-IG-12).  In T3-MH, where part of the trust (T3-MH-WPH) is on an 
outsourced network, problems were reported of inability to access the trust intranet, and also T3-
MH e-mail addresses in MS Outlook did not auto-complete on PCs linked to the outsourced 
network.  A member of staff in T3-MH’s community health services (T3-MH-Nur-??) indicated that 
access to T3-MH’s systems from local authority premises and GP surgeries, where many of the staff 
are situated, often presents a problem, since it can depend entirely on local information security 
policies. 
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r In several instances, respondents reported being unable to access NHS systems from within 
university networks or vice versa. The library manager at T1-DGH had encountered a 
problem with access to e-resources at U15, which was subsequently resolved via the IT 
department.  Part-time students at U3 were reported as being readily able to access their 
university e-resources from within T3-MH’s network (T3-MH-LIS-01).  T4-TH-AHP-12, who 
was jointly employed by T4-TH and U9, reported being unable to connect to her U9 network 
drive via VPN. The researcher established in consultation with T4-TH-IT-20 that such a 
connection would not violate trust policy, and the problem was subsequently resolved. 
 
The main problems of this sort arose in connection with HE-NHS collaborations. T1-DGH-LIS, 
which is a jointly-run service between U2, T1-DGH and other trusts, was required to manage 
staff PCs and computer clusters on separate trust and university networks, and to run 
services in parallel. The university would not allow T1-DGH-LIS-01 to connect to the NHS 
Electronic Staff Record system owing to software compatibility concerns.  It did permit walk-
in access for visitors and members of the public to the library computers: staff could log 
them on, requiring only the completion of a record form.  In practice it appeared that the 
library staff were able to use the university network to circumvent system restrictions on the 
NHS network.  In T4-TH it was possible for a member of staff to have logins to three separate 
systems -- the trust’s, U3’s and the NIHR research hub’s – and hence to have three email 
addresses, calendars, network drives etc. This was reported to create problems for 
communication and information sharing, as research staff tended to use their NIHR email 
address and to fail to check their other mailboxes.  Accessing trust systems from a university 
or research network required the member of staff to use a VPN token, and not everyone was 
prepared to make the effort to do this regularly (T4-TH-Com-03). 
 
These are also used to provide access to the information governance e-learning module for 
new starters who do not yet have network accounts, and to provide access to the NHS Jobs 
website for staff such as porters and cleaners who would not normally have network 
accounts (T1-DGH-LIS-01). 
 
Several respondents reported problems in managing the various passwords they required 
for access to NHS and professional systems.  A postgraduate clinical tutor (T3-MH-Med-02) 
complained of password proliferation in relation to e-resources. A nurse educator (T1-DGH-
Nur-08) mentioned passwords in relation to accessing mandatory e-learning, and also 
complained of the lack of a single sign-on to trust systems. An AHP manager (T2-DGH-AHP-
02) reported on the impossibility in practice of following recommended password practices, 
particularly as she was working across two trusts with two email addresses, and on the 
demotivating effect of password problems associated with accessing statutory and 
mandatory e-learning. Could move this to 4.2 governance 
 
Network performance 
Network performance was reported as a problem in two of the trusts. T2-DGH-AHP-02 
reported that the network was slow from lunchtime until late afternoon at T1-DGH’s main 
site, constituting a hindrance to data entry relating to clinical work. Low bandwidth and slow 
downloads of documents were reported to be a problem also at T4-TH (T4-TH-AHP-10). T3-
MH-LIS-01 reported that the network there had improved in speed and reliability during her 
years in post. T4-TH’s connection to the Internet is via Janet rather than N3, as with many 
teaching hospitals (P1); accordingly web searching, including library literature searching, was 
reported as being relatively fast (T4-TH-LIS-06).  
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Policies re: generic logins 
Generic logins are useful for libraries in providing access to e-resources for visitors, including 
NHS staff from other trusts in support of reciprocal access or co-operative policies. They are 
also useful as a stop-gap for temporary staff or for new starters to use before they are 
assigned network accounts, or for students on short-term placements for whom it is difficult 
to organise timely network account provision. Many trusts, however, restrict their 
availability, or will not allow them at all. Moreover, acceptable use policies (e.g. that of T1-
DGH) insist that users must not share or use others' email addresses, usernames, passwords 
or smartcards; this is in line with recognised information security good practice (). In T4-TH, 
generic logins were permitted, but the library was not assigned any. In T1-DGH, library staff 
are able to provide access to e-resources for visitors by using generic logins on to the 
university computer network. No mention of them was made in T3-MH; this may relate to 
the fact that the library service is primarily virtual in nature. 
 
Password management 
Several respondents reported problems in managing the various passwords they required 
for access to NHS and professional systems.  A postgraduate clinical tutor (T3-MH-Med-02) 
complained of password proliferation in relation to e-resources. A nurse educator (T1-DGH-
Nur-08) mentioned passwords in relation to accessing mandatory e-learning, and also 
complained of the lack of a single sign-on to trust systems. An AHP manager (T2-DGH-AHP-
02) reported on the impossibility in practice of following recommended password practices, 
particularly as she was working across two trusts with two email addresses, and on the 
demotivating effect of password problems associated with accessing statutory and 
mandatory e-learning. 
 
Wireless networks, Eduroam, BYOD wireless networks 
All the trusts had a wireless network or networks. In T1-DGH there is a main trust wireless 
network that is available only to trust staff. The coverage is of variable quality, being notably 
poor at the trust’s T1-DGH-IN site (T1-DGH-AHP-02). There is also a postgraduate centre 
network, run in collaboration with the university, to which medical students from U3-Med 
connect. According to U3-Med-01 all the trusts at which medical students are placed offer a 
reasonable standard of Wi-Fi connectivity; however, T1-DGH-LIS-01 informed the researcher 
that students frequently complain about the inadequacies of this network, and visit the 
library instead to complete e-learning, download lectures etc. Plans exists within the trust IT 
department to take over its management and run it as a ‘dirty’ trust network to which staff 
as well as medical students can connect via their own mobile devices  (T1-DGH-IT-11).  
 
T3-MH offers Wi-Fi in nearly all of its 200 sites, with ‘roaming’ access, though the quality is 
variable (T3-MH-Med-02). T3-MH-WPH staff are conducting an unofficial mapping exercise 
in which sites with poor connectivity are identified and the IT department notified (T3-MH-
Nur-18). Access is available only to staff, not to patients or visitors.  
 
 
NB mobile phone signals (3G, 4G) are often poor or totally non-existent within modern NHS 
premises due to their method of construction; the metal frames of the buildings act as a 
giant Faraday cage, screening out the signals. Users of the devices are therefore dependent 
on local Wi-Fi for Internet connections. 
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T4-TH, as well has having a staff wireless network which is available on most sites, provides 
Eduroam in some areas for students;  also a Bring Your Own Device(BYOD) network, to 
which staff can connect with their own personal smartphones, tablets or laptops, is in 
process of being rolled out across the trust. No problems with the performance of any of 
these networks were mentioned by respondents. (BYOD is discussed further under sections 
2.6, 4.6 and 5.6.) 
 
 
 
Could move this to organisational dynamics vs. IT infrastructure 
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Web blocking 
--Blocking of web applications – categories 
--Blocking of individual websites 
--Frequency of blocking experienced 
--Impacts of blocking on individual users 
--Responses to website blocking – e.g. contacting IT helpdesk -- outcomes 
--Technical issues 
--Management aspects 
[Table listing commonly blocked sites and the position across the four trusts] 
 
 
 
 
